What This Concept Is Saying
When the Buddhist tradition names a single root cause of being stuck in samsara, it usually points at ignorance (無明, avidyā) — but that ignorance isn't a vague cluelessness. It has a very specific shape, and that shape is what this entry is about.
俱生身見 (sahaja-satkāyadṛṣṭi) — also rendered as innate body-view, innate self-view, innate satkāyadṛṣṭi, or fundamental view-of-self (根本薩迦耶見 / 微細薩迦耶見之我見) — is the most basic, automatic, non-philosophical form of the assumption "I am." Every sentient being, without exception and without needing any teaching, carries this view as part of how their mind is structured. It is what makes the round of rebirth tick.
The two words in the name already tell the story:
- 俱生 (sahaja) means "born together with," "innate," "co-emergent." It does not depend on any school, doctrine, persuasion, or conversion. A newborn doesn't need a philosophy seminar to grasp "I" — it already does. - 身見 / 薩迦耶見 (satkāyadṛṣṭi) literally means "view of the body / view of a self-entity." "Sat" = existing; "kāya" = body, aggregate, or substantial entity. The classical phrase 薩迦耶見 gets unpacked as the mistaken holding that a self (我) is somehow really there, present as a substantial thing. The Chinese 身見 captures the same: a "view" (見, dṛṣṭi) that takes its object (the "I") as if it were a body-like, findable thing.
The classical sources — *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya* (《入中論善顯密意疏》) and Tsongkhapa's *Lam rim chen mo* summary (《菩提道次第略論》) — agree on the working definition:
An innate, since-beginningless, automatically arising fundamental view-of-self. Its nature (體性) is to grasp the "I" that is conventionally imputed upon the aggregates as possessing findable, self-existent reality. Its object is the pudgala / person (補特伽羅); its mode of apprehension (行相) is to take that person as truly existing (自相實有).
To translate that into plainer language: every time an experience happens, there is an automatic, pre-reflective "I-here" that arises, and that "I-here" is silently assumed to be a real, findable thing, just as findable as this chair or that cup. 俱生身見 is precisely that silent assumption, treated as a cognitive event.
The Two Layers That Make Up This View
This is not just a feeling and not just a thought. It is a *cognitive event* with two inseparable layers:
1. An automatic "I-sense" (任運生起的我覺). Before any reflection, the moment any of the six senses fires, a sense of "I" accompanies it. This is not chosen; it is built into how ordinary mind works. When you stub your toe, "ouch" and "me" arrive in the same package.
2. A grip (執) that this "I" has findable, independent existence (執為自相實有 / 執為實有). The "I-sense" doesn't float neutrally; it carries the conviction that the "I" is a thing — a discrete entity locatable if only one looked carefully. The *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya* phrases this directly: 「於非有我妄計有我，執此是實」 — "Upon an 'I' that does not exist as such, [the mind] falsely imagines an 'I' there and grasps it as real."
If you remove only layer 1, you have anaesthetic shock or saints in deep samādhi — no "I-sense," but no realization either. If you remove only layer 2 with a clever argument ("obviously the self doesn't really exist"), you have a philosophical position that the mind keeps quietly contradicting in every direct experience. The view consists of both layers together. They are the engine and the fuel.
What This View's Object Actually Is — and What It Is Not
This is where most modern readers and even many students of Buddhism go off the rails. The classical commentaries are emphatic: the direct object (所緣) of 俱生身見 is not the five aggregates (五蘊).
The reason this matters: the Buddha's standard teaching — "all grasping at 'I' only sees the five appropriated aggregates (唯見此五取蘊)" — has often been misread as if it meant the aggregates *are* the self, or that one should identify the self with the aggregates. The *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya* explicitly corrects this:
The sutra statement is not saying the aggregates *are* the object of this view. It is negating (遮破) the alternative: that there is an "I" floating apart from the aggregates. The right reading is: "I" is imputed (假立) by the force of name-and-language (名言增上), dependent on the aggregates; it is not findable inside or outside the aggregates as a separately existing thing.
So the object is the imputed "I" itself (依蘊假立之我) — the "person" or pudgala (補特伽羅) that the mind conceptually posits *upon* the aggregates and *through* the aggregates. The mode of apprehension is to treat this imputed "I" as if it had svabhāva (自相有) — its own intrinsic, findable nature.
This means two popular modern moves are *exactly the mistakes the tradition warns against*:
- "I am not my body, I am not my mind, I am something else, deeper." This still posits an "I" — just a subtler one. It's an eternalist (常見) dodge. - "I am my body, I am my brain, my neurons are me." This is the "I = aggregates" refuted in the *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya*: if each aggregate were the "I" without distinction, then because the aggregates are many, you'd have many "I"s in one person. The same argument is applied to "only mind is the I": with multiple consciousnesses (eye-consciousness 眼識, ear-consciousness 耳識, etc.) and with each moment of mind different from the next, you'd again end up with multiple "I"s.
The "person" (補特伽羅) is a designation based on the aggregates — 唯名、唯言、唯是假立 (mere name, mere designation, a mere imputation), as the sutras say. A sentient being is "made of" (攬) the aggregates in the way a chariot is "made of" its parts — there is no chariot-thing over and above the parts, and there is no person-thing over and above the aggregates.
Why This Is Different From Holding That "Other People Are Real"
This is a famously fine point, and the classical sources insist on it.
The same root-delusion gives rise to two automatic grippings: one toward oneself (俱生補特伽羅我執) and one toward others (執他補特伽羅為自相有). Both are "innate self-grasping" in a broad sense, both are part of the basic confusion that runs the round of rebirth.
But only the first is 俱生身見 (innate satkāyadṛṣṭi).
The test given in the *Lam rim* and the *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya* is precise:
The object of 俱生身見 must be such that, when attended to, it automatically arouses the *I-sense* in oneself (必須能任運引起自身的我覺).
When you look at another person and assume they are a real, findable "someone" — that is innate pudgala-grasping toward others, but it is *not* 俱生身見, because it doesn't automatically flash "I" in your own mind.
When you stub your toe and "I" + "ouch" appear together, *that* is 俱生身見 in action.
This matters for the path: the specific thing cut at the culmination of the Buddhist path (the vajra-like wisdom, 金剛智) is this view — the auto-arising "I-sense" plus its gripping at intrinsic existence — not the broader innate pudgala-grasping toward others. They come down together at the very end, but the *primary target* of the path's analytical work is the view whose object triggers one's own "I."
The Mountain Metaphor — and Why This View Is "The Root"
The *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya* uses a memorable image: the Mountain of Satkāyadṛṣṭi (薩迦耶見山). Twenty derivative views — the famous "twenty kinds of satkāyadṛṣṭi" (二十種薩迦耶見) — sit on this mountain like so many buildings. Shake the mountain and all the buildings fall.
This is not metaphor only. The structure is:
- 俱生身見 is the mountain — the root, the foundation, the thing every derivative rests on. - The twenty views — including the classical five (each aggregate seen as self, as belonging to self, etc.), extended by past/future/four-direction analysis — are derivative constructions (分別我執) that *rationalize* and elaborate the basic view. - Even those derivative twenty views are not 俱生身見 *themselves*. They sit on top of it.
The *Lam rim* is uncompromising on the practical point: this innate view is the root of the entire bondage of samsara, not the derivative intellectual errors. The famous *Madhyamakāvatāra* verse is cited for this:
諸於旁生多劫轉， 彼雖不見常轉因， 彼等我執亦隨逐。
"Beings revolving in animal realms for many kalpas — though they do not see the cause of such revolving, that innate self-grasping still follows them."
An insect has no philosophy, no doctrine, no view of itself as a separate substantial soul — yet it is bound in samsara. The reason, the texts say, is precisely that 俱生身見 is doing its automatic work underneath any conceptual story.
This is why a *worldly* understanding of "no self" doesn't liberate, but a fully realized seeing of selflessness (證無我) does. The verse quoted just before — 「證無我時斷常我，此亦不許我執依，是故若能了無我，說滅我見最希有」 — "When selflessness is realized, the [assumption of] permanent self is cut off; [the text] does not allow that self-grasping remains as a basis. Therefore, whoever understands no-self — to say they have destroyed the view-of-self is most extraordinary."
Two Coda Quotes Worth Holding
Two short classical verses accompany this concept everywhere:
- 《寶鬘論》Ratnāvalī (attributed to Nāgārjuna): 「乃至於蘊有計執，爾時於彼有我執」 — "As long as there is grasping *at* the aggregates, at that time there is self-grasping." This is the diagnostic: self-grasping doesn't exist independently; it tracks our basic assumption about the aggregates. - 《四百論》Catuhśataka (by Āryadeva): 「若見緣起生，愚癡無所起」 — "When one sees dependent origination, ignorance has nowhere to arise." This is the cure: the antidote is not a belief but a seeing of how things actually arise through causes and conditions.
Life's Walk-Through: Where To Actually Find 俱生身見 In A Modern Day
The most important rule for this section: don't map the concept loosely. Many readers, encountering Buddhist talk about "no self," start identifying it with "ego" (Freudian), "narcissism," "selfishness," "self-hatred," or "low self-esteem." None of these is 俱生身見. They are *related* mental events; the view sits deeper, and almost always quietly.
Let me walk through a single compressed day, mapping carefully at each step.
Morning — the alarm, the body
The phone rings. Before you have any thought at all — before "I should get up," before "this is so annoying" — there is an automatic "I" present with the sound: *I* am being woken up. Then a flood: *my* back hurts, *my* mouth is dry, *my* morning. This "I" is not chosen, not decided, not constructed in that moment. It just shows up.
That showing-up is layer 1 of 俱生身見.
Layer 2 is harder to see. It is the silent assumption — never made explicit, almost never questioned — that this "I" showing up here is a thing, an entity, with a definite boundary (it stops at the skin), a definite continuity (it was here yesterday and will be here tomorrow), and a definite ownership (these feelings, this body, this name, this person belong to it). You can't point to the "I" — but you never doubt it's there in the same way you never doubt the chair.
Most common mapping mistake here: reducing this to "I'm just attached to comfort" or "I'm just complaining." Those are content. 俱生身見 is the *subject* all that content happens *to*.
Commute — me and mine
On the subway: the person on the right is reading *my* newspaper (because I left it on the seat). The person on the left has taken *my* space. The train is moving *me* toward *my* job. Every interaction is mediated by my and mine — and here is where the related concept of 我所 (ātmanīya, "my-own," "belonging-to-self") enters the picture.
Tsongkhapa is careful: the automatic sense of "mine" attached to things (this *is* my phone, this *is* my career, this *is* my dignity) is itself a derivative cognitive event. But it is *not* the same as 俱生身見 — its object is "what belongs to me" (我所法), not "me." The two work as a pair: the auto-I is the owner; "mine" is everything the owner supposedly owns. We talk about the second ("my phone," "my reputation," "my kids") more than the first, but the first is the foundation.
Most common mapping mistake here: confusing 俱生身見 with possessiveness. Possessiveness is a *behavior pattern built on top of* "mine." The view itself is the prior assumption that there's an "owner" for things to belong to.
Work — the achievements and failures
A presentation goes well. The natural movement of mind: "I did that. My work. My brilliance." A presentation goes badly: "I screwed up. My failure." In both cases, the "I" is the consistent reference point, the one to whom credit and blame accrue.
Notice that the content of the thought can be positive or negative. The view underneath is the same: the "I" doing the accrediting-and-blaming is being assumed as a real agent. This is not the same as having self-confidence or self-doubt — those are fluctuations on the surface. 俱生身見 is the more basic belief that the "I" doing the fluctuating is a real, findable thing.
Most common mapping mistake here: assuming the Buddhist analysis only targets the narcissistic version. The same view operates when you spiral in self-hatred. "I am worthless" still requires that there be a "worthless I" there to be worthless — and that "I" is the same kind of findable-thing the view posits.
Scrolling — the social media self
This one is particularly sharp in the contemporary setting. Every notification is framed as something happening *to* me, *for* me, *about* me. Likes are *my* validation. A critical comment is an attack on *me*. Even posts that have nothing to do with you are scanned for relevance to *your* self-image.
What 俱生身見 adds to this picture is precise: it isn't just that we are socially conditioned to care about our image. It is that, prior to any social conditioning, the mind already posits a "self" that could *have* an image at all. Without that prior positing, no conditioning has anything to attach to.
Most common mapping mistake here: thinking the analysis is about "social media bad, Buddhism says be detached." The Buddhist analysis is far more basic — it's about the cognitive event of *positing* any self at all, online or offline.
Relationship — the intimacy paradox
Being close to someone, especially a long-term partner, often reveals the structure of this view most starkly. The surface language: "you should know what I need without my having to ask." "You hurt me." "You complete me." Underneath: an "I" exists, has needs, can be hurt, can be incomplete — and another "I" exists to fulfill or fail it. The whole script presupposes two solid pudgalas.
What Tsongkhapa's distinction helps us see here: there is a *broad* innate pudgala-grasping that posits the other as a real someone — necessary for any moral relation. There is also the *specific* 俱生身見, whose object triggers one's *own* "I-sense." In close relationship, both are operating; the first is morally and socially appropriate (you really do have a real partner), the second is the more basic underlying view that, when cultivated correctly, gets seen through — without anyone being mistreated in the process.
Most common mapping mistake here: thinking "no-self means no relationship" or "the Buddhist path wants me to be detached from my partner." The path is working on the *finding* of a self, not on the appropriate love and concern for the actual person in front of you.
Parenting — the "my child" grip
"My child is doing well" → pride. "My child is suffering" → anxiety, often worse than the suffering itself. The view is operating in both. So is its companion, the "my-own" (我所) sense that wraps the child in the "mine" of the parent.
Two things to keep distinct:
- Appropriate parental love — caring for an actual child — is not the target of analysis. The Buddhist path doesn't object to that. - The view that posits "my child" as an extension of "me" — a possession, a project, a mirror of my own worth — that is what is being seen through.
Most common mapping mistake here: confusing "no-self in parenting" with the modern idea of "uninvolved parenting" or "I should not project onto my child." Those are stylistic choices. The view being analyzed is the cognitive event that posits "my child" as a findable, ownable extension of "me."
The quiet moment — the one that exposes it
The most honest moment to notice 俱生身見 is when nothing is happening. Sit for a few minutes. Eyes closed. Body still. The mind quickly becomes an owner of "my thoughts," "my memories," "my feelings." Some get stuck in "I can't meditate." Others float into "I am a meditator." Both register with an "I."
This is not failure. This is precisely the field in which the path works. The 俱生身見 is not a bug to be deleted by will; it is the most basic assumption mind makes. Seeing it clearly is the work of a path, not a pep talk.
Why Contemporary People Need This Concept
Several pressures unique to our era make this classical concept more useful, not less.
1. The Self-Construction Industry
The modern world has, in many places, organized itself around the explicit project of self-construction: identity work, personal branding, "find your authentic self," "build your best self." This is a culture-wide amplification of exactly what 俱生身見 posits — that there is a substantial "I" to construct. The classical concept doesn't say self-construction is morally wrong; it points out that the very thing being constructed is the entity the view falsely finds.
This is not a new failure — pride, vanity, status-seeking have a long history. What is new is the *reflexivity*: a culture in which the explicit task of the self is to work on itself, to optimize itself, to brand itself. 俱生身見 is the unspoken premise of that entire project.
2. The Limits Of "I Am Not My Thoughts"
Mindfulness-based interventions, very popular today, often teach a version of "I am not my thoughts" or "you are not your thoughts." This is genuinely helpful at one level. It loosens identification with specific mental contents, which reduces rumination, anxiety, and emotional reactivity.
But — and this is where 俱生身見 sharpens the picture — saying "I am not my thoughts" still posits an "I" doing the non-identifying. The contemplative move has improved mental health; it has not touched the deeper view. The classical tradition's distinction between conceptual (分別) and innate (俱生) matters here: the "I am not my thoughts" move is a conceptual antidote. It works against derivative views. It does not work against the view that runs in the background of every experience, including the experience of "not identifying with thoughts."
A practitioner can have years of "I am not my thoughts" experience and still operate, beneath all of it, on 俱生身見's basic premise — and that premise will continue to be the engine of subtle suffering that conceptual reframing can't reach.
3. Modern Trauma Discourse Often Reifies The Self
Many contemporary trauma frameworks (and not only those) treat the self as a real entity that was wounded and needs healing. "Re-parent your inner child," "heal your wounded self," "boundaries for your authentic self" — each of these has a *clinical* utility that need not be dismissed. But each is, from the perspective of this entry, *operating on the assumption that 俱生身見 posits*: that there is a "self" with continuity, with a definite history, with definite contents that can be reworked.
The Buddhist tradition is not arguing against trauma healing. It is pointing out that the deepest release requires looking *through* the assumed self that the healing is being done to. This is not a position popular in clinical discourse — and the entry should not overclaim equivalence. But it is worth naming: the very entity trauma discourse works on is, from this angle, a construct sustained by 俱生身見.
4. Cognitive Science Has Made The Self A Live Question — And Stopped Short
Contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science describe, in various ways, how the brain constructs a sense of self: predictive processing, the default mode network, the "narrative self" vs. the "experiencing self," proprioceptive ownership, the minimal self vs. the extended self. This body of work has made one thing clear: the sense of self is constructed, not given. It is built up from body maps, memory, language, prediction, social feedback.
This is a powerful parallel to what the Buddhist tradition has been saying for millennia. But — and the entry should mark this carefully — the Buddhist claim is stronger than the scientific finding. Cognitive science can show that the sense of self is *constructed*. The Buddhist tradition claims that the entity the construction *seems to refer to* does not exist in the way it seems to. Science describes the *appearing* of self; the Buddhist analysis is about the *findability* of self. The two are not identical claims, and one does not prove the other. The limits of the scientific picture — that it leaves open questions about consciousness, about what "appearing" ultimately consists in, about whether neural description ever fully captures lived experience — are the very places where the Buddhist analysis has more to say, on its own terms.
Still, the rough parallel is useful: when a Buddhist teacher says "the self is constructed," a contemporary listener who has read about predictive processing or the default mode network may be in a better position to at least entertain the question than someone whose cultural default is a substantial soul.
5. The Quiet Failure Of Self-Improvement
For many contemporary people, the project of self-improvement has reached a saturation point. The self is optimized, branded, healed, forgiven, expressed — and yet a quiet unease persists. The classical tradition's diagnosis of this unease is precise: the entity being improved is itself the problem, not because improvement is bad, but because no amount of improving a mis-found entity will satisfy. 俱生身見 names the structural condition under which this saturation happens.
Common Misreadings And Clarifications
This is a concept that has been badly mangled in popular Buddhist transmission. Some of the most common misreadings:
Misreading 1: "It Means The Self Doesn't Exist"
Wrong on both sides. The Buddhist position is not the annihilationist denial of self; it is the analysis that no self can be found within or apart from the aggregates as a self-existing thing. Self is imputed by name and language upon the aggregates; in that sense, it functions. But it is not findable as a thing.
The famous line from the Heart Sūtra (《般若波羅蜜多心經》) — 「照見五蘊皆空，度一切苦厄」 — "Illuminating the emptiness of the five aggregates, [one] crosses all suffering" — captures this: by seeing the emptiness of the five aggregates, all suffering is crossed. The seeing here is precisely the seeing-through of 俱生身見. Without this nuance, the teaching collapses either into nihilism (no self exists anywhere) or into a denial of moral responsibility (which is also not what is being said).
Misreading 2: "It's About Selfishness, Egoism, Narcissism"
These are content-level manifestations built on top of "mine" (我所) and self-importance. They are downstream. 俱生身見 is more basic: it operates in a humble person who would never dream of bragging, in a self-critical person who dislikes themselves, in a selfless mother, in a depressed person, in a saint. The view is not about *amount* of self-concern; it is about the kind of self that is being assumed.
This is why a person can have no narcissistic tendencies whatsoever and still be operating completely within 俱生身見's basic premise.
Misreading 3: "Once I See The Five Aggregates Are Not Me, I've Got It"
This is the conceptual (分別) mistake. The *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya*'s careful point: "the aggregates are not me, the aggregates are not mine, the aggregates are not my self" — these are negations of a conceptual misidentification. They dismantle the twenty derivative views. They do not, by themselves, dismantle 俱生身見, because 俱生身見 is precisely the view that, even after these negations, continues to posit *some* "I" — the imputed "I" upon the aggregates — as findable.
This is why Tsongkhapa in the *Lam rim* is so careful about sequence: 「先見唯徧計執性安立二我是無，次求滅除俱生煩惱，極為應理」 — first see that the conceptually-constructed (徧計執性) imputed "I" doesn't exist [through reasoning], *then* seek to eliminate the innate (俱生) afflictions. The order is essential; doing them in the wrong order, or conflating them, fails at both levels.
Misreading 4: "It's A Philosophical Position You Can Adopt"
You can't will yourself into not having 俱生身見. It's automatic. Just as you can't cure poor eyesight by deciding to see clearly, you can't dismantle this view by deciding it's wrong. That's why the path involves long cultivation (修), not just right view (正見). Right view enters it; right view + sustained meditative work eventually cuts it. The *Lam rim* phrase is 「變更所緣獲得決定，最為切要」 — changing the object and attaining decisive knowledge [about the object] is the most essential. The decisive knowledge is what cuts the view; but the view cuts only at the culmination, with the vajra-like wisdom (金剛智) that realizes selflessness directly, not conceptually.
Misreading 5: "If I Don't Have A Self, I Can't Be Held Responsible"
This is a confusion of conventions. The Buddhist tradition carefully distinguishes conventional truth (世俗諦) and ultimate truth (勝義諦). At the conventional level, persons (補特伽羅) are designated on the basis of the aggregates, and on that basis moral responsibility, personal continuity, karmic cause and effect — all function as part of ordinary experience. The analysis of 俱生身見 is an *ultimate* analysis: it asks how the imputed person exists when examined precisely. The conventional imputation is not denied; what is denied is the findable self that the view posits.
The famous Diamond Sūtra (《金剛般若波羅蜜經》) line 「若以色見我，以音聲求我，是人行邪道，不能見如來」 — "If you see me in form, seek me in sound, this person walks a wrong path and cannot see the Tathāgata" — points in the same direction. The error is not the devotion; it is the assumption that the Buddha (or the self) can be found as a thing in form or sound.
Misreading 6: "Only Meditators Have This View / Only Meditators Can Lose It"
Both halves wrong. 俱生身見 is universal — the ant and the philosopher both have it. And the realization that cuts it is not a state of meditation but a specific, fully integrated seeing that operates across all states. The path prepares for this through study, analysis, and meditation; the moment of full cutting is sometimes called the *vajra-like knowledge* because, like a diamond, it cuts through without being itself cut.
Misreading 7: "This Is A Belief System, So I Just Need To Believe It"
The Buddhist tradition does not ask for belief in 俱生身見's description. It asks for *investigation* — looking at the imputed "I," seeing if it can be found, and reporting on what is actually there. The tradition's claim is not that you should *believe* there is no findable self. The claim is that, when looked for carefully, it cannot be found. The difference is the difference between doctrine and inquiry.
A Final Note On Terminology
For the contemporary reader who wants to read primary sources in translation:
- 俱生身見 / 俱生薩迦耶見 (sahaja-satkāyadṛṣṭi) — innate body-view / innate view-of-self / innate satkāyadṛṣṭi - 根本薩迦耶見 — fundamental satkāyadṛṣṭi (another name for the same) - 微細薩迦耶見之我見 — the "I-view" within the subtle satkāyadṛṣṭi (yet another name) - 分別我執 / 徧計所起我執 — conceptually-constructed / intellectually-elaborated self-grasping - 俱生我執 — innate self-grasping (broader, includes the view toward others) - 俱生補特伽羅我執 — innate grasping at the person-self - 俱生法我執 — innate grasping at the dharma-self (grasp at phenomena as having findable essence) - 我所 (ātmanīya) — "my-own," "belonging-to-self" — derivative sense of ownership - 自相實有 / 自相有 — inherent existence, findable self-existence, svabhāva - 唯名、唯言、唯是假立 — mere name, mere designation, mere imputation - 薩迦耶見山 — the Mountain of Satkāyadṛṣṭi — the metaphor for this view as the foundation of derivative views - 金剛智 / 金剛喻智 — vajra-like wisdom — the realization that directly cuts 俱生身見
Holding the right name is small, but useful: when a teacher says "you've cut satkāyadṛṣṭi," they are claiming something specific — that the auto-arising "I" no longer carries with it the assumption of findable, self-existing reality. That is a far more precise claim than "you no longer have an ego" or "you have become selfless." It is the cutting of a specific cognitive event that has been at work since beginningless time. The tradition considers this cutting to be possible, complete, and of surpassing rarity — 「說滅我見最希有」.