Dharma · AI Companion

異熟果

vipāka-phala

善恶业因于后时成熟所感之果报,果因不同时,以六道本识为体。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arisingInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

異熟果 (*vipāka-phala*, “the fruit of maturation”) is the result experienced when a morally significant action ripens after its causal moment has passed. A wholesome or unwholesome act does not necessarily disclose its full consequence while it is being performed. It leaves a causal potency that may mature later, when supporting conditions come together.

The word 異熟, “different maturation,” must be heard carefully. It does not merely mean “a result that happens later.” It indicates several linked differences between cause and fruit:

- The cause and its fruit occur at different times. The act is performed now; its maturation may appear later in this life or in a subsequent existence. - The cause is 有記 (*vyākṛta*, morally determinate)—wholesome or unwholesome—whereas the ripened result is 無記 (*avyākṛta*, morally indeterminate). Pain is not itself a fresh evil deed, and pleasure is not itself a fresh good deed. Their ethical significance depends on how one responds to them. - The form taken by the result need not resemble the original action. A moment of cruelty does not have to return as another visually similar act of cruelty. It may mature as a broader condition of existence, capacity, vulnerability, or rebirth.

This last point distinguishes 異熟果 from 習果, the “habitual” or “similar fruit.” A repeated angry response may make anger easier next time: that is a resemblance and continuation between cause and fruit. 異熟果 is different. It is not principally the repetition of the same psychological pattern, but the maturation of karma into the basis and circumstances within which experience becomes possible.

In the Yogācāra account represented by the supplied texts, its specific body or basis is the 六道本識, “fundamental consciousness within the six destinies.” The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya* translated by Paramārtha calls this 果報果, “retributive fruit,” rather than using the term 異熟果 directly. It identifies the matured fundamental consciousness as the fruit that supports birth in one of the six destinies and makes possible the subsequent arising of faculties, objects, and the other constituents of a new existence. Hence its terse judgment: “此法即果報果”—“This very dharma is the retributive fruit.”

This is more precise than the popular formula “good deeds bring good luck; bad deeds bring bad luck.” In this system, karmic fruition is not merely an external reward or punishment attached to an otherwise unchanged person. Karma helps condition the very basis from which a world is encountered: the kind of birth, capacities, limitations, sensory faculties, and field of experience that become available. The fruit is therefore not only an event happening *to* someone. It participates in the formation of the experiential situation in which a “someone” and a “world” appear together.

The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya* explains this through the image of a garment made from many threads. At first, the threads are tied together and do not display their various possible colors. When the garment is placed in dye and the knots are undone, innumerable differences become visible. In the same way, wholesome, unwholesome, and “unmoving” karmas perfume or impress the 阿梨耶識 (*ālaya-vijñāna*, store or foundational consciousness). At the stage of perfuming, karmic seeds and foundational consciousness are both morally indeterminate as stored causal potential; the seeds do not exist as separate little objects outside consciousness, and their future diversity is not yet manifest. When the required conditions assemble, differentiated results appear.

The analogy does not say that consciousness is a permanent cloth or soul. It explains how apparently undifferentiated causal retention can later disclose highly differentiated fruits. The continuity required for karma is a conditioned continuum, not an eternal owner traveling unchanged through time.

The same treatise calls karmic formation an 引因, an “projecting cause.” What it projects into maturation in the six destinies is the fundamental consciousness belonging to that mode of birth. Without such a matured basis, it argues, the eyes and other faculties, visible forms and other objects, and the remaining elements of a subsequent existence could not arise. 異熟果 is thus the matured basis of a life, together with the possibility of the experiential world established upon it—not merely an isolated pleasant or painful incident.

This also explains why the fruit can differ according to its support. Among fortunate destinies, human and heavenly forms of existence differ; among unfortunate destinies, hell and animal existence differ. The supplied treatise describes favorable supports as possessing “superior capacity” and unfavorable supports as lacking it. This is not a claim that every detail of a person’s present social condition can be decoded into a known deed from the past. Ordinary people generally cannot inspect the full causal history of another being, and Buddhist causal analysis includes many conditions besides karma. The doctrine supplies an ethical-causal structure, not a license for speculative biography or blame.

The fruit also has an endpoint. The treatise uses the expression 有受相, the “aspect capable of receiving or exhausting fruition.” When a particular wholesome or unwholesome karmic seed has delivered its result, that specific efficacy is used up; it does not keep producing the identical retribution forever. This is called 受用: the causal potency gives its fruit and is exhausted as that fruit is undergone. The text contrasts this with 不受相, associated with linguistic or conceptual perfuming whose continuity is not exhausted in precisely the same way. The distinction matters because karmic fruition must be finite and conditioned. If every deed generated an inexhaustible sentence, liberation could never occur.

The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* also uses 果報果 as the corresponding term, placing it first in several presentations of five fruits. Its examples show that the doctrine is not confined to punishment:

- From abiding in the 梵住 (*brahma-vihāras*, sublime abodes), the bodhisattva obtains birth among beings of the desire realm, allowing continued presence with and care for them. - From 大悲 (*mahākaruṇā*, great compassion), the bodhisattva obtains a 可愛報, a desirable maturation. - From 有羞, moral shame or conscientious reluctance to do what is blameworthy, the bodhisattva obtains intelligent birth among humans and gods.

These are not three interchangeable descriptions. The first emphasizes a birth shared with beings who are to be helped; the second emphasizes the desirability of the maturation produced by great compassion; the third emphasizes the excellence of the place and capacities of birth. In each case, a cultivated ethical quality helps shape a future field of existence.

In that treatise’s terminology, the five fruits are 果報果, 增上果, 丈夫果, 依果, and 相離果. These correspond respectively to the more usual Yogācāra names 異熟果 (maturation fruit), 增上果 (dominant or contributory fruit), 士用果 (agent-produced fruit), 等流果 (homogeneous or continuing fruit), and 離繫果 (fruit of release from bondage). The names should not be mixed as though every “result” meant the same thing. 異熟果 concerns karmic maturation; 等流果 concerns continuity or resemblance; 士用果 concerns what is accomplished through an agent’s activity; 增上果 concerns the result supported by contributory conditions; 離繫果 is the freedom obtained through severing bondage.

Its place on the path of liberation now becomes visible. 異熟果 explains why actions matter beyond the instant of choice, why a life’s field of experience is conditioned rather than arbitrary, and why conditioning need not be eternal. Karma can ripen, expend its efficacy, and cease. At the same time, present responses plant or withhold further causes. Liberation is possible because neither the karmic seed, the matured consciousness, nor its world is an immutable self.

A walkthrough in everyday life

Imagine a commuter standing in a crowded train, scrolling through a workplace group chat. A colleague has publicly blamed her for a delay. Anger rises, and she begins typing a humiliating reply.

First, there is the ethically determinate cause. The sting of the message and the unpleasant feeling it triggers are not yet the unwholesome karma in question. Nor is the train, the phone, or the movement of her fingers by itself that karma. The decisive element is intentional formation: she recognizes the colleague, frames the event as an attack, wishes to injure his standing, chooses words for that purpose, and sends them. In Buddhist ethical analysis, intention gives the deed its karmic direction.

Second, there can be an immediate practical consequence without that consequence being 異熟果 in the strict sense. The colleague may answer at once; a manager may intervene; other passengers may notice her agitation. These can be ordinary causal or agent-produced results. “It happened after my action” is not enough to classify something as a maturation fruit.

Third, a similar psychological pattern may be strengthened. Having retaliated, she may become quicker to read ambiguous messages as attacks and quicker to humiliate others. This is close to a 習果 or 等流果: the result resembles and continues the originating tendency. It should not be confused with 異熟果 merely because both arise from karma.

Fourth, the action leaves karmic efficacy whose maturation is not simultaneous with the deed. In the Yogācāra explanation, this potential is held within the conditioned continuum of foundational consciousness. It is not a visible object stored somewhere in the brain, a metaphysical file bearing a divine sentence, or an unchanging piece of a soul. “Seed” and “perfuming” are causal models used to explain continuity and maturation without positing a permanent self.

Fifth, maturation requires conditions. One hostile message cannot responsibly be treated as a complete explanation for one particular future misfortune. Karma operates amid many interacting causes, and the exact relation between a deed and a distant result is not ordinarily available to casual inspection. What the doctrine affirms is that morally charged intention is not causally sterile: when its supporting conditions are complete, its efficacy can mature.

Sixth, the fully ripened result is morally indeterminate as result. Suppose an unwholesome karma contributes to a painful or restricted field of experience. The pain is not itself “evil,” and undergoing pain is not committing a new sin. At that point a new ethical junction appears: resentment, cruelty, patience, compassion, understanding, or some mixture may arise in response. The old fruit and the new cause must not be collapsed into one thing.

Seventh, in the specific framework of the supplied treatise, the deepest referent is not simply a later bad day at work. 異熟果 is the matured fundamental consciousness that supports a mode of birth in the six destinies, from which faculties and an experienced world can arise. Everyday setbacks can illustrate delayed causality, but they should not be passed off as the complete classical definition.

Finally, once that particular karmic potency gives its maturation, its work as that seed is exhausted. Yet the way the person reacts while receiving the fruit may establish new causes. This creates the practical cycle:

intention and deed → retained causal efficacy → supporting conditions → maturation into a field of experience → response within that field → possible new karma.

Consider the same sequence in parenting. A tired parent hears a child crying at night. The fatigue and the sound are not morally bad karma. The parent’s intention matters: turning toward the child with care, despite irritation, is a wholesome formation; deliberately frightening the child into silence is unwholesome. Repeated care can also produce a similar fruit—a more readily compassionate disposition—and an immediate agent-produced fruit, such as soothing the child. Its 異熟果, however, is the later maturation of the morally determinate deed into a morally indeterminate result, classically understood at its deepest level through the basis of future experience and birth. Calling the child’s instant calm “good karma paying back” would blur distinct categories of fruit.

Algorithmic life offers a limited analogy. A recommendation system may register countless clicks whose significance is initially unobvious; only after aggregation and later conditions does a differentiated feed emerge, and that feed then shapes what the user can encounter. This helps us imagine how accumulated traces might condition a future field of experience. But the analogy stops there. An algorithm has designers, explicit machinery, and measurable data structures; karmic seeds are not proven digital records, and current neuroscience has not established rebirth or Yogācāra’s foundational consciousness. Scientific models of memory and habit can illuminate proximate conditioning, but they neither verify nor refute the full Buddhist account of karmic maturation across lives.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary life trains us to expect instantaneous feedback. A post receives approval or silence within minutes; a purchase arrives quickly; workplace performance is reduced to a dashboard. 異熟果 restores a longer moral horizon. Some actions are immediately rewarded yet corrupting; others are costly now yet wholesome. The absence of instant punishment does not make cruelty harmless, and the absence of instant reward does not make integrity futile.

It also helps separate experience from identity. A painful result is something conditioned and undergone; it is not proof of a permanently bad self. A pleasant result is likewise not proof of superior essence or moral purity. Because the fruit is morally indeterminate, the decisive question is not only “Why is this happening to me?” but “What intention am I forming in response?” That shift preserves responsibility without turning suffering into identity.

The doctrine also deepens responsibility beyond visible outcomes. We commonly judge an act only by what can immediately be measured: no one noticed, the lie worked, the insult disappeared down the feed. 異熟果 says that an intention can have causal reach even when its eventual differentiation is not yet apparent—like the tied threads whose colors appear only after later processing.

At the same time, it can soften the fantasy of total control. One inherits a conditioned field that cannot simply be wished away. Practice does not promise that every old cause will be instantly canceled. It teaches how not to add greed, hatred, and delusion to whatever has already matured, while cultivating causes conducive to clarity, compassion, favorable supports, and ultimately freedom.

Most importantly, 異熟果 belongs inside the path to liberation, not merely inside a system of cosmic bookkeeping. Ethical restraint and wholesome cultivation improve the causal conditions of existence. But even desirable maturation remains within conditioned becoming. The bodhisattva examples—desirable birth, intelligence, and birth among beings who can be helped—show why good maturation is valuable: it furnishes a workable basis for practice and benefit. It is not yet liberation itself.

Liberation requires insight into the conditioned and selfless character of the entire process. There is causal continuity, but no permanent judge distributing rewards and no unchanging recipient who owns them. There is inheritance without an eternal inheritor: later moments arise dependent on earlier ones, neither absolutely identical to them nor wholly disconnected from them. This middle position allows moral responsibility without a metaphysical soul and transformation without denial of continuity.

The teaching’s hope lies in the “exhaustibility” of karma. A karmic potency can give its fruit and cease. If, while receiving old fruits, one weakens ignorance and refrains from generating new binding karma, the cycle need not perpetuate itself indefinitely. Thus the doctrine explains both bondage and the possibility of its ending.

Common misreadings and clarifications

1. “異熟果 means instant payback.” No. Its defining feature is that cause and maturation are not simultaneous. Immediate social and physical consequences may belong to other kinds of causality or other classifications of fruit.

2. “Every unpleasant event proves a particular past misdeed.” No. Buddhist causality is plural and conditional. Without extraordinary knowledge, assigning a precise hidden deed to someone else’s illness, poverty, disability, or loss is speculation. It easily becomes cruelty disguised as doctrine.

3. “Pain is evil fruit, so a person in pain must be morally bad.” The karmic cause is wholesome or unwholesome; the matured experience as fruit is morally indeterminate. A painful experience is not itself a fresh evil action, and its recipient is not thereby an evil person.

4. “Pleasure proves present virtue.” No. Pleasant maturation does not guarantee that one’s present choices are wholesome. A person can receive favorable conditions while using them greedily, just as someone can meet hardship with extraordinary compassion.

5. “The fruit must visibly resemble the deed.” That describes similar or homogeneous fruition more closely. 異熟果 can differ in form from its cause and, in the Yogācāra account here, matures as the basis and differentiated circumstances of experience within the six destinies.

6. “六道本識 is simply the conscious mind I notice right now.” No. It refers to the foundational continuum supporting a mode of rebirth and the arising of faculties and objects. Ordinary waking awareness is only part of the manifest cognitive life established upon that basis.

7. “Ālaya-consciousness is a hidden soul.” No. It is conditioned, perfumed by causes, changing from moment to moment, capable of transformation, and not an autonomous owner. Its purpose is to explain causal continuity without introducing an eternal self.

8. “Seeds are tiny substances kept in a mental warehouse.” The treatise explicitly denies that seeds possess a separate entity apart from consciousness. “Seed,” “perfuming,” and “store” articulate causal efficacy and continuity; they should not be reified into little objects.

9. “Once karma exists, nothing can be done.” This is fatalism, not the logic presented here. A seed matures only with conditions; a particular karmic efficacy is exhausted upon delivering its fruit; and one’s present response is itself a field of new intention. Past conditioning limits the present without completely predetermining the ethical use of the present.

10. “Good rebirth is the final goal.” A favorable 異熟果 can provide intelligence, opportunity, stability, and proximity to teachers and beings who need help. It is therefore precious. But it remains a conditioned fruit within saṃsāra. The liberating aim is not merely to secure better fruits forever, but to end ignorance and the production of binding karma.

11. “果報果, 異熟果, and every other ‘fruit’ are interchangeable.” 果報果 is the equivalent term used in the supplied Paramārtha translation and in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*. But 等流果, 士用果, 增上果, and 離繫果 name different causal relations. Translation should preserve those distinctions rather than flattening them into the single English word “result.”

12. “The doctrine licenses passive acceptance of injustice.” No. The maturation of past conditions does not absolve present agents or institutions. If someone exploits, abuses, or neglects another person, that intentional conduct is new karma and should be restrained. Compassionate intervention can itself be wholesome action. The bodhisattva examples make this active orientation explicit: favorable fruition is valued partly because it enables one to remain among beings, mature them, and relieve suffering.

The heart of 異熟果 is therefore neither threat nor consolation. It is a disciplined account of moral continuity: intentions outlive their moment, results require conditions, the form of a result may differ from its cause, and every matured situation becomes a fresh site of response. Because causes matter, practice is urgent. Because fruits are conditioned and exhaustible, transformation is possible. And because no permanent self stands behind the process, liberation means more than improving the fortune of an enduring “me”: it means seeing through and finally ending the ignorance that keeps the entire machinery of appropriation and renewed becoming in motion.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

定义与核心要义

异熟果(vipāka-phala),指由善恶有记之业因,于后时方得成熟而感之果报;其果与因不同时,并非因之同时显现,故名「异熟」。此果之体,就瑜伽行派之说,即六道受生所依之本识,亦即能令善恶业因于六道中成熟之根本依止。

主要阐述

《摄大乘论释(真谛译)》以「果报果」一名表述此一概念,并以结缕染衣为喻明其深义:衣以多缕初结之时,尚未显出种种色相,投入染器解结后方显无量差别。阿梨耶识亦如是,受善、恶、不动三业熏习之时,种子与本识同为无记性,离识亦无别体,表面呈现「一性无有多种」之相;待众缘具足,于现生后三时之一现前时,无量果报相貌方在本识中显现。此明熏习时虽无显著差别,果报成熟时却能呈现无量差别之理。

论又以「果报差别」说明业行于六道中之成熟。行是「引因」,于六道中成熟者即是「本识」,说名为「引」;若无此成熟之本识,后时受生时眼等诸根、色等诸尘皆不得生起,故正文具云:「此法即果报果。」可知果报果不仅为抽象之善恶报应,具体落在六道受生所依之本识及由此成立之后有诸法。

论区分「习果」与「果报果」:习果即「相似果」,果报果则是「六道本识」。果报果具依止差别,善道有人、天之异,恶道有地狱、畜生等异;善道依止有「胜能」,恶道依止无「胜能」。若无本识,此等差别及其因果关系皆不能成立。

论并以本识之「有受相」解说善恶业果之受用与穷尽:本识昔具善恶种子,果报若皆成熟,种子作用即告尽灭,只余本识,故称「有受相」。善恶业因施与果报而功能灭尽、不再受报,称为「受用」;若无有受相本识,便不能说明善恶二业作或不作、施果后受用穷尽之义,并将导致解脱义不能成立。相对而言,「不受相」指名言熏习种子,其相续受用无尽,非此处善恶种子果报成熟后用尽之情形。

《大乘庄严经论》在论述菩萨修习梵住、大悲、有羞等修行时,皆以「五果」之架构说明所得之报,「果报果」皆为五果之首。其释义有三端:

一、依梵住为因而得之果报果:「菩萨住诸梵住为因,具得五果。一者欲界众生中生,是果报果。」显示菩萨因安住梵住,能感得于欲界与众生共处、摄受同类之果报。此果报果与增上果、丈夫果、依果、相离果并列。

二、依大悲为因而得之果报果:论就「障断、觉因、与乐、爱果、自流」五名,分别配释「相离果、增上果、丈夫果、果报果、依果」,其中「爱果者,是果报果,得可爱报故」,以「可爱报」点出果报果之核心——菩萨由大悲之力,未来必当感得可爱之果报。论并结示「五果皆依大悲所得,当知如此菩萨,去佛菩提则为不远」。

三、依有羞为因而得之果报果:「有羞集得功德,具足聚集五胜果」,其中第一即「天人聪慧生者,是得果报果,谓常生天上及以人中恒得聪慧故」。此处侧重生处之胜(天人、聪慧),与梵住门下侧重生处之共(欲界与众生共处)有所不同。

不同部类与译本的表述差异

- 《摄大乘论释(真谛译)》(《攝大乘論釋(真諦譯)》)正文主要使用「果报」「果报果」「果报因」「果报熟」等语,并未直接使用「异熟果」一词。 - 《大乘庄严经论》(《大乘莊嚴經論》)以「果报果」为相当于「异熟果」之概念,亦不使用「异熟果」一词。 - 《大乘庄严经论》五果之名(果报果、增上果、丈夫果、依果、相离果)与瑜伽行派通常所列五果(异熟果、等流果、离系果、士用果、增上果)名称互异:「果报果」即「异熟果」之异名;「丈夫果」即「士用果」,本论以「丈夫所作」释其义;「依果」即「等流果」,本论以「与未来胜悲」或「一切生处不离彼障对治」明其相续随转之义;「相离果」即「离系果」,以「离彼障」或「障断」为其体性;唯「增上果」一名与诸论相同。此种异名反映本论独特之术语体系,于多译名归一之整理尤须留意。

与相关概念的关系

异熟果在五果体系中与等流果、离系果、士用果、增上果并列。其与「习果」(相似果)相对:习果为因与果相似之果,异熟果则为六道本识之果报果。其体性与「有受相」本识密切相关——善恶业因成熟后种子功能尽灭,所余之有受相本识即为异熟果之体。

代表性原文引用

- 《摄大乘论释(真谛译)》:此法即果报果。 - 《摄大乘论释(真谛译)》:善恶业因施与果报而功能灭尽、不再受报,称为受用;若无有受相本识,便不能说明善恶二业作或不作、施果后受用穷尽之义,并将导致解脱义不能成立。 - 《大乘庄严经论》:菩萨住诸梵住为因,具得五果。一者欲界众生中生,是果报果。 - 《大乘庄严经论》:爱果者,是果报果,得可爱报故。 - 《大乘庄严经论》:天人聪慧生者,是得果报果,谓常生天上及以人中恒得聪慧故。

By SutraAI-generated

攝大乘論釋(真諦譯)T1595 · 瑜伽部

《攝大乘論釋(真諦譯)》論述此一概念時,正文主要使用「果報」「果報果」「果報因」及「果報熟」等語,並未直接使用「異熟果」一詞。其核心義理是:果報因必屬有記,而果報之果與因不同時,顯示善惡業因須待後時成熟,方顯其果;論中又說,大乘於果上說果,故亦可就阿梨耶識及其所顯差別稱說果報。

論以結縷染衣為譬喻:衣初以多縷結成時,尚未顯出多種色相;投入染器而解開先結後,種種相貌才顯現。阿梨耶識亦如是,受善、惡、不動三業熏習;熏習之時,種子與阿梨耶識同為無記性,且離識並無各別異體,故表面呈現「一性無有多種」。待眾緣具足,種子與本識於現生後三時之一現前,便有不可數的果報相貌在阿梨耶識中顯現。由此說明,熏習時雖無顯著差異,果報成熟時卻能呈現無量差別。

本論又以「果報差別」說明業行在六道中的成熟。行是「引因」,其於六道中成熟者即是「本識」,並說名為「引」;若無此成熟之本識,後時受生時眼等諸根、色等諸塵便不得生起。正文直接判定:「此法即果報果。」因此,果報果不僅指抽象的善惡報應,也具體落在六道受生所依的本識及由此成立的後有諸法。

在果的分類上,本論區分「習果」與「果報果」:習果即「相似果」,果報果則是「六道本識」。果報果具有依止差別,善道中有人、天之異,惡道中有地獄、畜生等異;善道依止有「勝能」,惡道依止無「勝能」。若無本識,這些差別及其因果關係皆不能成立。此處顯示本論以六道本識作為果報果的特定術語表述。

本論並以本識的「有受相」解說善惡業果的受用與窮盡:本識昔具善惡種子,果報若皆成熟,種子的作用即告盡滅,只餘本識,故稱「有受相」。善惡業因施與果報而功能滅盡,不再受報,稱為「受用」;若無有受相本識,便不能說明善惡二業作或不作、施果後受用窮盡之義,並將導致解脫義不能成立。相對而言,「不受相」指名言熏習種子,其相續受用無盡,並非此處善惡種子果報成熟後用盡的情形。

大乘莊嚴經論T1604 · 瑜伽部

本論在論述菩薩修習「梵住」、「大悲」、「有羞」等修行時,皆以「五果」之架構說明其所得之報,而「果報果」皆為五果之首。值得特別指出者,本論並未使用瑜伽、唯識諸論中常見的「異熟果」一詞,而以「果報果」作為相當於「異熟果」之概念,此即本部論在五果名稱上的一項特殊用語,對於歸納異熟果之多譯名極具參考價值。

一、依梵住為因而得之果報果。釋論云:「菩薩住諸梵住為因,具得五果。一者欲界眾生中生,是果報果。」此即以「欲界眾生中生」釋果報果之義,顯示菩薩因安住梵住,能感得於欲界與眾生共處、攝受同類之果報。此果報果與其餘四果——增上果(二聚圓滿)、丈夫果(成熟眾生)、依果(一切生處不離梵住)、相離果(恒離彼障)——並列,共同攝盡菩薩住梵住之所得。

二、依大悲為因而得之果報果。釋論更就「障斷、覺因、與樂、愛果、自流」五名,分別配釋「相離果、增上果、丈夫果、果報果、依果」。其中「愛果者,是果報果,得可愛報故」,以「可愛報」三字點出果報果之核心——即菩薩由大悲之力,未來必當感得可愛之果報。釋論並結示「五果皆依大悲所得,當知如此菩薩,去佛菩提則為不遠」,可知果報果亦依大悲而感,菩薩由此與佛菩提不遠。

三、依有羞為因而得之果報果。釋論又說「有羞集得功德,具足聚集五勝果」,其中第一即「天人聰慧生者,是得果報果,謂常生天上及以人中恒得聰慧故」。此處以「常生天上及以人中恒得聰慧」釋果報果,與梵住門下之「欲界眾生中生」雖皆屬果報之義,而側重不同——前者偏重生處之勝(天人、聰慧),後者偏重生處之共(欲界與眾生共處)。

四、本論五果名稱之異名對照。本部論所立五果之名——果報果、增上果、丈夫果、依果、相離果——與瑜伽行派通常所列五果(異熟果、等流果、離繫果、士用果、增上果)名稱互異。其中「果報果」即「異熟果」之異名;「丈夫果」即「士用果」,本論以「丈夫所作」釋其義;「依果」即「等流果」,本論以「與未來勝悲」或「一切生處不離彼障對治」明其相續隨轉之義;「相離果」即「離繫果」,以「離彼障」或「障斷」為其體性;唯「增上果」一名與諸論相同。此種異名,反映本論獨特之術語體系,於多譯名歸一之整理尤須留意。

Related