Dharma · AI Companion

七使

sapta-anuśaya

七种随逐众生的根本烦恼。AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arisingInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

随眠法数依业感缘起框架立足于第一重;「烦恼即菩提」为圆教对总体的读法,依 PP1/PP2 不下放。

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

The seven使 (七使, saptānuśaya; seven underlying afflictive tendencies) are not merely seven unpleasant emotions. They are seven ways in which attachment and confusion continue to “follow” the mind, shaping what it notices, wants, rejects, believes, and defends.

The supplied passage from the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (*Dà zhìdù lùn*, 《大智度論》, T1509) gives the authoritative list for this entry:

「七使:欲染使,瞋恚使,有愛使,憍慢使,無明使,見使,疑使。」

These exact names matter. They should not be rearranged into a convenient list such as “greed, hatred, delusion, pride, doubt, views, and desire.” In particular, 欲染使 and 有愛使 are two distinct members, while 無明使 is not to be silently replaced by 癡使 and 憍慢使 should not be reduced to the bare word 慢使.

The Sanskrit *anuśaya* and its related Buddhist usages are often rendered as an underlying tendency, latent disposition, or “随眠.” This helps explain why 使 is more than a passing mental event: it indicates an affliction capable of accompanying and conditioning experience. But that general explanation comes from the wider Buddhist technical tradition; the cited T1509 passage itself lists the seven without defining their psychological operation one by one. [Fo Guang Dictionary of Buddhism, “隨眠”](https://buddhaspace.org/dict/fk/data/%25E9%259A%25A8%25E7%259C%25A0.html)

A useful image is a rut in a road. A single angry thought is like one wheel passing over the soil. A tendency is the rut that makes later wheels turn in the same direction almost by themselves. The rut is not a hidden permanent entity; it is a conditioned propensity repeatedly renewed through grasping, reaction, and mistaken understanding.

With that limitation made explicit, the seven names can be read carefully as follows:

1. 欲染使 (yùrǎn shǐ, the tendency of sensual defilement)

This is attraction coloured by 欲染: the mind becomes stained or captivated by desirable sensory experience. It is not the bare fact that a sight, sound, taste, smell, touch, or mental presentation is pleasant. Nor does it mean that every practical preference is already bondage. The crucial movement is appropriation: “I need this contact; I must prolong it; without it I am diminished.”

It must not be narrowed to sexual desire. Food, comfort, appearance, entertainment, praise, novelty, and the tiny reward of another notification can all become objects around which sensual fascination organizes the mind.

2. 瞋恚使 (chēnhuì shǐ, the tendency of aversion or ill will)

This is the propensity to meet what displeases us with hostility, rejection, resentment, or the wish that the offending person or experience would disappear. It is broader than visible rage. Cold contempt, punitive silence, rehearsed grievances, and inward irritation may belong to the same field.

It should not be confused with clear discernment. One can recognize abuse, refuse an unjust demand, or establish a firm boundary without wishing suffering upon another person. Aversion adds the contracted insistence that reality—or someone within it—must be hated before it can be opposed.

3. 有愛使 (yǒu’ài shǐ, the tendency of craving for existence or becoming)

The supplied passage establishes this as a separate member from 欲染使. The safest distinction is therefore not “strong desire versus weak desire,” but two different directions of attachment: sensual captivation on the one hand, and attachment involving , existence or becoming, on the other.

In lived experience, 有愛 can be approached as the demand to secure, continue, or manufacture a particular mode of being: “I must become successful”; “I must remain the indispensable parent”; “I must be recognized as a spiritual person”; “this version of me must survive.” This is a broader doctrinal gloss, not a definition supplied by the quoted T1509 paragraph itself.

欲染 wants the gratifying object; 有愛 fastens upon being the kind of self who possesses, enjoys, controls, or outlasts it. The two often cooperate, but the text’s sevenfold structure does not permit us to merge them.

4. 憍慢使 (jiāomàn shǐ, the tendency of conceit and self-exaltation)

This is the comparative construction of self: above others, below others, or preoccupied with being equal to them. Its obvious form is arrogance, but its subtler forms include wounded status, chronic comparison, and the need to establish one’s rank.

Low self-esteem is therefore not automatically the opposite of conceit. “I am uniquely inferior” can still make the imagined self the organizing centre of experience. Healthy confidence concerns capacities and responsibilities; 憍慢 turns those facts into a defended identity measured against other identities.

5. 無明使 (wúmíng shǐ, the tendency of ignorance or unknowing)

無明 is not merely lack of information or low intelligence. A highly educated person may still repeatedly misconstrue what is impermanent as dependable, what is conditioned as self-sufficient, and what cannot finally be possessed as “me” or “mine.”

In the sevenfold pattern, ignorance is especially deep because it concerns the terms under which experience is interpreted. We do not simply desire an object; we fail to see clearly what desire is doing. We do not simply defend an identity; we overlook how that identity is being assembled through conditions.

6. 見使 (jiàn shǐ, the tendency of views)

見 here cannot mean every act of seeing or every provisional opinion. The problem is the mind’s bondage through views: taking an interpretation as a position that must secure the self and govern reality.

A view can even contain correct words while being held wrongly. “Everything changes,” for example, may be used as a living observation that loosens attachment, or as a slogan with which one dismisses another person’s grief. The doctrinal sentence may be correct while the mind’s relation to it remains defensive and appropriative.

7. 疑使 (yí shǐ, the tendency of doubt)

This is not a prohibition against questions. Careful inquiry, examination of evidence, and refusal to accept a teacher blindly can serve wisdom. The afflictive tendency is doubt that immobilizes practice: endlessly circling possibilities so that no truth need be tested and no attachment need be relinquished.

Constructive doubt asks, investigates, and learns. 疑使 keeps the door permanently half-open because commitment would expose the self to correction.

The passage does something important after naming the seven: it turns them into objects of Abhidharma-style analysis. It asks which are connected with the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm; which are removed through 見諦斷 and which through 思惟斷; how the former are examined as 見苦斷、見集斷、見盡斷、見道斷; and how many are 遍使 or 不遍使.

But the passage only poses these questions. It does not supply the allocation table, the numbers, or a definition of “pervasive” and “non-pervasive.” We should therefore preserve the questions without manufacturing answers.

That restraint reveals the passage’s deeper lesson. A list of afflictions is only the beginning. The path asks:

- In what field of existence does this tendency operate? - Is it undone by seeing a truth that overturns a false orientation, or by continuing cultivation that wears out an ingrained habit? - Which aspect of the four truths exposes it? - Is its reach broad or limited?

Thus the seven使 occupy a place between ordinary self-observation and liberating wisdom. They diagnose why suffering returns even after we have intellectually decided to “let go.” A momentary state may subside, while the conditions for its recurrence remain. Liberation is not the construction of a nicer personality over those conditions; it is their understanding and eventual exhaustion.

A walkthrough in everyday life

Imagine an ordinary evening. You are commuting home after a difficult workday and open your phone “for just a minute.”

A short video offers food, attractive bodies, travel, luxury, and effortless amusement. Pleasant contact is not itself 欲染使. The tendency becomes visible when the mind leans forward: “One more; I need this stimulation; the dullness of the train is intolerable.” This is 欲染使. The common mapping error is to call the phone itself “desire.” The device is an object and a condition; the tendency is the mind’s conditioned way of fastening upon gratification.

Next you encounter a colleague’s post announcing a promotion. A project you contributed to is not mentioned. Heat appears: “They always take the credit.” You begin composing a cutting reply. This is the field of 瞋恚使. The mistake would be to label every judgment of unfairness as anger. The practical issue may be real. The tendency is disclosed by hostility, fixation, and the wish to wound or diminish.

Then another thought forms: “I cannot remain someone who is overlooked. I have to become a director before everyone else.” Now the centre of gravity has shifted. The attractive object is not merely salary or praise; it is a projected mode of being. This illustrates 有愛使. The mapping error is to collapse it into 欲染使 because both involve wanting. The classical list keeps them distinct.

You check the profiles of former classmates. One is less successful than you, producing relief; another is more successful, producing shame. Both reactions orbit rank. This is 憍慢使. The error is to look only for boastfulness. Feeling superior and feeling personally diminished can both sustain the comparative construction of “I am.”

Underneath these reactions lies 無明使. For a moment the mind treats a job title, public acknowledgment, and other people’s judgments as though they could establish a stable self. It overlooks their dependence on institutions, health, market conditions, memory, fashion, and countless other causes. The error is to map 無明 to “not knowing who received the promotion.” You may know every factual detail and still misunderstand the conditioned nature of the identity you are defending.

A view then hardens: “In this world, only ruthless people succeed,” or perhaps, “A good Buddhist should never care about career.” Either proposition may contain observations worth examining. 見使 appears when the formulation becomes a totalizing refuge that protects the self from further investigation. The first view licenses aggression; the second may disguise fear and passivity as spirituality. The error is to treat all opinions as 見使. A working hypothesis held open to evidence is not the same as an identity-bearing view.

Finally you think: “Perhaps practice helps, perhaps it is all self-deception; perhaps I should meditate, but perhaps that would be avoidance; I should read ten more books before trying anything.” This may begin as honest inquiry. It becomes 疑使 when uncertainty is repeatedly used to postpone observation and practice. The mapping error is to equate faith with never asking questions. The issue is not the presence of a question but the function doubt is serving.

Suppose you now put the phone down and feel calm. That is valuable, but it does not prove that the seven tendencies have been uprooted. Their immediate objects have disappeared. The classical analytical questions point further: what kind of seeing corrects the underlying orientation, and what requires repeated cultivation? A quiet mood is not yet liberation.

A modest practice at this moment would be:

- recognize the specific tendency rather than merely saying “I feel bad”; - distinguish the object from the mind’s manner of relating to it; - notice the conditions that fed it—fatigue, comparison, stimulation, memory, fear; - refrain from feeding it through speech or action; - examine what it promises and whether that promise can actually be fulfilled; - return to the four-truth structure: the distress, its conditioning, the possibility of its cessation, and the path of cultivation.

This does not fabricate the unanswered classification table in T1509. It follows the direction implied by the passage: afflictions are to be differentiated, investigated, and understood in relation to release.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary life is exceptionally skilled at addressing the seven tendencies without naming them as such. Advertising recruits 欲染; outrage-driven media recruits 瞋恚; personal branding recruits 有愛; public metrics recruit 憍慢; opaque systems encourage 無明; ideological enclaves harden 見; and endless competing claims can turn discernment into immobilizing 疑.

Algorithms may learn which images hold attention or which provocations produce engagement. That comparison is useful but limited. An algorithmic recommendation system is not equivalent to karma, mind, or an afflictive tendency, and neuroscience has not “proved Buddhism.” Scientific models investigate measurable behaviour and neural processes; Buddhist analysis is directed toward suffering, ethical causation, contemplative observation, and liberation. Their questions overlap only partly, and important questions about consciousness remain unsettled.

Still, the sevenfold analysis gives us something contemporary discourse often lacks: granularity without moral panic. Instead of saying “technology is evil” or “I am toxic,” we can ask exactly what is operating.

Is this sensual capture? Hostility? Craving to become someone? Comparison? Misunderstanding? A defended view? Paralyzing doubt?

That specificity creates room for responsibility. If every disturbance is called “stress,” the response will probably be rest or distraction. Rest may be needed, but it will not by itself examine the view that one’s worth equals productivity, the conceit organized around outperforming colleagues, or the craving to become indispensable.

The seven使 also prevent spiritual practice from becoming mere emotional management. Buddhism does not aim only to make anger less uncomfortable while leaving the structures of attachment untouched. Nor is the goal to suppress desire until one becomes numb. The deeper work is to see how experience is appropriated, how identity is constructed around it, and how ignorance allows the cycle to renew itself.

Their place in the path can therefore be stated simply:

Ethical restraint prevents tendencies from immediately becoming harmful conduct. Collected attention makes their arising and passing easier to see. Wisdom investigates their conditions and the mistaken grasping that sustains them. Release means not merely managing their symptoms but bringing the relevant causes of bondage to an end.

The T1509 passage’s unanswered categories are significant here. They warn us that different afflictions cannot necessarily be treated by one undifferentiated method. Some confusion is overturned when reality is seen differently; some patterns also require sustained cultivation. The text does not give the detailed assignments in this paragraph, so we should not pretend that it does. But its analytical form already teaches us not to prescribe “just be mindful” as a universal cure.

Common misreadings and clarifications

“Seven使 are seven emotions.” No. An emotion is an occurrence; a 使 is an afflictive tendency capable of conditioning repeated occurrences. Anger may be absent while resentment remains ready to reactivate under suitable conditions.

“欲染使 means sexuality, while 有愛使 means ordinary desire.” That division is unsupported by the supplied passage. It names 欲染使 and 有愛使 separately but does not define their respective objects there. Sensual captivation and craving involving existence or becoming offer a useful broader doctrinal distinction, but they must not be presented as an explanation explicitly supplied by this T1509 paragraph.

“All wanting is 欲染.” Wanting food when hungry, seeking medicine, protecting a child, and forming an aspiration to practise are not adequately understood by attaching one label to their surface grammar. One must examine the object, motivation, appropriation, and effect on the mind.

“瞋恚 means that a Buddhist should never resist.” Refusal, protest, protection, and firm boundaries need not be rooted in hatred. The relevant question is whether clarity and care guide the response, or whether hostility has taken command.

“憍慢 only affects confident people.” Comparison can organize superiority, inferiority, and anxious equality. Self-denigration may look humble while remaining intensely self-preoccupied.

“無明 means stupidity.” It concerns a failure to see experience and its conditions correctly, not a low IQ or lack of stored information. Cleverness can make ignorance more articulate without making it less binding.

“見使 means Buddhism rejects thinking and views.” The *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* passage itself is engaged in careful analysis. The problem cannot therefore be analysis as such. The danger is bondage through views—especially when a formulation is treated as an unquestionable possession or identity.

“疑使 means questions are sinful.” Inquiry can be indispensable. Afflictive doubt is recognized by its fruit: it obstructs examination, decision, cultivation, or insight rather than advancing them.

“Once I notice a tendency, it is gone.” Recognition is a decisive beginning, not necessarily completion. The passage’s distinction between 見諦斷 and 思惟斷, together with its finer questions concerning the four truths, signals that the removal of affliction requires analysis more exact than momentary self-awareness.

“The text gives a complete chart assigning every使 to the three realms and modes of abandonment.” Not in the supplied paragraph. It asks which are 欲界繫, 色界繫, and 無色界繫; which are 見諦斷 or 思惟斷; which fall under 見苦斷、見集斷、見盡斷、見道斷; and how many are 遍使 or 不遍使. It does not answer those questions there. Supplying numbers or allocations and attributing them to this passage would be invention.

“The list is basically greed, anger, and delusion expanded to seven.” That paraphrase loses the architecture. It erases the separation of 欲染使 and 有愛使, blurs 憍慢使 into generic pride, converts 無明使 into a different label, and treats 見使 and 疑使 as incidental additions. The sevenfold list is useful precisely because it distinguishes several ways bondage operates.

The practical heart of 七使 is therefore not: “There are seven bad things inside me.” It is: “Suffering is renewed through distinguishable conditioned tendencies, and what is distinguishable can be observed with precision.”

That precision is compassionate. It replaces the verdict “I am an angry, vain, confused person” with a more workable recognition: under these conditions, this tendency is being fed; with clear seeing, restraint, and cultivation, it need not be fed forever.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

「七使」(saptānuśaya)是对七种烦恼随使的合称。《大智度论》列为:「欲染使,瞋恚使,有爱使,憍慢使,无明使,见使,疑使。」就本段而言,七使的核心内容即此七项名目;论中没有在列名之后逐一说明各使的性质、作用、生起条件或先后次第。因此,理解本条目时,应以原文实际列举及其分类问门为限,不把其他经论中有关随使的解释补入本论。

《大智度论》在说明「阿毘曇」能够广解佛语时,以七使为论议和分别法相的例证。七使在这里不仅是一张烦恼名目表,更是可由多种角度加以分析的一组法:可以考察其三界系属,可以依断惑方式区别,也可以按四谛所断及是否周遍而分别。原文的着重点由此落在阿毘曇式的分类方法,而非叙事性或逐条释义式的说明。

2. 主要阐述

本论首先完整列出七使:一、欲染使;二、瞋恚使;三、有爱使;四、憍慢使;五、无明使;六、见使;七、疑使。七项之中,「欲染使」与「有爱使」分别成立,不能因二者都含有染爱之义,便在转述时任意合并。原段只确认其为七使的两个不同名目,未进一步解释二者各自所缘的境界或具体差别。

列名之后,论中从三界系属发问:七使之中,哪些属于「欲界繫」,哪些属于「色界繫」,哪些属于「無色界繫」。这一问门表明七使可依欲界、色界、无色界三类系属加以考察。然而原文在此处只是提出分类纲目,没有逐项判定某一使属于何界,也没有给出各界所摄使的数目。因此,本条目不替原文补列界系分配表。

其次,论中从断惑门发问,分别考察七使之中哪些是「見諦斷」,哪些是「思惟斷」。这一层分类又进一步展开:「見諦斷」可依四谛分作「見苦斷、見集斷、見盡斷、見道斷」。由此可见,本段同时列出了见谛断与思惟断这一组纲目,以及见苦、见集、见尽、见道四种更细的所断门类。但它仍未说明七使各自应归入哪一类,也未说明一种使是否可在多个门类中分别考察。

最后,论中又问七使之中「幾遍使,幾不遍使」。这显示七使还可依「遍使」与「不遍使」加以分别。原段同样没有回答二者各有几种,也没有界定「遍」与「不遍」的含义。综合这些问门,本论的主要阐述方式,是先确定七使名目,再展示三界系、见谛断与思惟断、四谛所断以及遍与不遍等分析层次;其目的在以七使示范阿毘曇广分别佛语的论议形式。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

现有材料只提供释经论部《大智度论》(《大智度論》)的表述,未提供其他部类经典或同经异译本的七使原文,故无法据此逐经列出异说,也不宜推定其他文本必然采用相同名目。就《大智度论》自身而言,应保存以下译语特点:第一,作「欲染使」,不可简化为单独的「欲使」或「贪使」;第二,另列「有愛使」,与欲染使并列;第三,作「瞋恚使」,而非仅写「瞋使」;第四,作「憍慢使」,而非单称「慢使」;第五,作「無明使」,不改写为「癡使」;其余两项作「見使」与「疑使」。因此,不应把本论的七使概括成「贪、瞋、痴、慢、疑、见、欲」之类重新配列的名目。

断惑术语方面,本段明确使用「見諦斷」与「思惟斷」,并在四谛分判中写作「見苦斷、見集斷、見盡斷、見道斷」。其中尤应注意「見盡斷」是本论此处的实际用语,不宜擅自替换为其他经典或论书可能使用的名称。关于同经异译的用词分歧,现有材料没有提供可供比对的异译文本,故本条目不作推测。

4. 与相关概念的关系

七使在本段中直接与「阿毘曇」的分析方式相联系:它被用来说明如何广解佛语、论议法义和分别法相。与七使相配套的相关概念,首先是欲界、色界、无色界三种「繫」,它们构成考察各使界系归属的框架;其次是「見諦斷」与「思惟斷」,构成断惑方式的两类问门;再次是苦、集、尽、道四谛,由此形成见苦断、见集断、见尽断、见道断的细分;最后是「遍使」与「不遍使」,用于考察诸使是否周遍。

这些概念在原段中的关系主要表现为分类对象与分类标准的关系:七使是被分析的对象,三界系、断惑门、四谛所断及遍不遍则是依次提出的分析纲目。由于原文只设问而未作结答,不能据此断定某一具体使与某一界、某一种断法或遍不遍之间的确定对应关系;也不能从这些问题自行推导各类数量。

5. 代表性原文引用

《大智度论》列七使曰:「七使:欲染使,瞋恚使,有愛使,憍慢使,無明使,見使,疑使。」此句是确定本论七使名目的核心依据。

关于界系与断惑等分类,原段以问题形式考察七使中哪些为「欲界繫」、哪些为「色界繫」、哪些为「無色界繫」,又问哪些属「見諦斷」、哪些属「思惟斷」,并列「見苦斷、見集斷、見盡斷、見道斷」,最后问「幾遍使,幾不遍使」。这些语句共同显示,本段旨在呈现多重法相分别的问门;除七使名单外,各分类并无随文给出的具体结论。

By SutraAI-generated

大智度論T1509 · 釋經論部

《大智度論》論七使,並非以獨立專題形式展開,而是將七使置於「阿毘曇」釋義的脈絡中,作為展示阿毘曇分析範式之例證。論中先追溯阿毘曇之淵源:佛在世時法無違錯,佛滅度後百年,阿輸迦王作般闍于瑟大會,諸法師論議異而有別部名字;其後姓迦旃延婆羅門道人作《發智經八犍度》,諸弟子又作《鞞婆娑》以助後人理解,另有六分阿毘曇、《舍利弗阿毘曇》、摩訶迦旃延之蜫勒等,皆是「廣解佛語」之作。在此脈絡下,論主以五戒之分類問答(幾有色幾無色、幾可見幾不可見、幾有漏幾無漏等)為第一例,緊接以七使為第二例,示範阿毘曇如何以多重問難剖析一組法數。

論中所列七使之名目為:欲染使、瞋恚使、有愛使、憍慢使、無明使、見使、疑使。此處術語形式值得注意:本論一律以「使」為名(欲染使、瞋恚使……),而非他經論常見之「隨眠」;七者之總稱亦徑稱「七使」,不另立「七隨眠」之名。其中「欲染使」對應欲界貪染,「有愛使」對應色、無色界之貪愛(即「有愛」),「憍慢使」以「憍慢」合稱而非單言「慢」,皆為本論用詞之特徵。

列出名目後,論中即對七使施以層層問難,其分析維度有三:其一,三界繫屬——「幾欲界繫,幾色界繫,幾無色界繫」,問七使各繫於何界;其二,斷除階位——「幾見諦斷,幾思惟斷」,先以見道、修道二途總分,再細化為「幾見苦斷,幾見集斷,幾見盡斷,幾見道斷」,即於見道所斷中更分苦、集、滅、道四諦所斷;其三,遍與不遍——「幾遍使,幾不遍使」,問七使中何者遍行一切(遍使)、何者非遍行。

此種問答體式本身即是論旨所在:論主並非在正面建構七使之義理體系,而是以七使為例,說明阿毘曇之特質正在於對每一組法數作如此多維度、多層次的分別問難。論中緊接七使之後又舉十智(法智、比智、世智、他心智、苦智、集智、滅智、道智、盡智、無生智)為例,問其有漏無漏、有為無為、所緣三界與不繫等,與七使問難結構平行,可見七使在此僅為阿毘曇方法論之示範材料。

總之,《大智度論》對七使之論述,重心不在逐一解釋各使之體性對治,而在呈現阿毘曇「廣解佛語」之分析範式:列出法數名目後,以三界繫、見修斷、四諦斷、遍不遍等維度反覆問難,使學者知阿毘曇之功用即在此種精密分別。

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