Dharma · AI Companion

四煩惱

catvāraḥ kleśāḥ

末那识恒常相应之我痴、我见、我慢、我爱四种根本烦恼。AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty AdvancedTruth-level span III · nominal designationInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

末那恒相应之四烦恼依唯识八识/依他起框架立(第三重)。

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is Saying

Have you ever noticed the one who is noticing? Beneath every explicit thought—*I am hungry, I should reply to that message, I don't want to go to that meeting*—there is a more subtle, persistent felt sense of a self who owns all those experiences, who matters more than the rest of reality, who is, in some quiet way, the center of the universe. This is the subject of 末那識 (manas-vijñāna), the seventh consciousness in the Yogācāra / 唯識 (Consciousness-Only) teaching, also called 染污意 (defiled mind) because of what constantly accompanies it.

The Four Afflictions are exactly that accompaniment. The classical definition is uncompromising: they are 我癡 (self-ignorance), 我見 (self-view), 我慢 (self-conceit), and 我愛 (self-love)—four fundamental afflictions that have coexisted with the seventh consciousness moment by moment since beginningless time, and will continue to do so until the path of practice *transforms* (轉依) that consciousness.

The leading "我" on each term is the heart of the matter. These are not generic afflictions—the ordinary anger toward an obstacle, the ordinary greed for a pleasant object. They are afflictions specifically directed at the assumed self itself. They are the four faces of automatic self-grasping (我執).

Let me take them one by one, with the classical definitions from 《成唯識論》 held firmly in place.

我癡 (self-ignorance) — the classical text says: *「愚於我相,迷無我理」*. Foolish about the marks of self, lost in the principle of non-self (無我). This is not ignorance of facts; it is the deeper confusion that takes the sense of "I" to be real and substantial without ever questioning it. It is the cognitive underlay that makes the other three possible.

我見 (self-view) — *「於非我法,妄計為我」*. On what is not-self, falsely reckoning it as self. This is the actual grip—operating beneath all explicit thought—that there is a "me" who owns this body, this mind, these experiences. The Yogācāra analysis specifies its object precisely: this view grasps the perceiving aspect (見分) of the eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, ālaya-vijñāna, also called 藏識, "storehouse consciousness") as an inner self. It is not a thought you have; it is a posture you *hold* before any thought.

我慢 (self-conceit) — *「恃所執我,令心高舉」*. Relying on the grasped self, causing the mind to rise up. This is not explicit arrogance or boastfulness. It is the subtle, continuous sense of mattering—of being the one around whom situations revolve. You can be outwardly the most humble person in the room and still have 我慢 running every second as the quiet self-positioning of "I am the one who is being humble."

我愛 (self-love) — *「於所執我,深生耽著」*. Toward the grasped self, deeply producing clinging. Also called 我貪 (self-greed). Not greed for external things, but the basic protective affection toward "me" that precedes and underlies all other forms of greed. The mind that flinch-protects its own comfort, its own mood, its own story—that is 我愛 in action.

Why Only These Four

The question is natural: there are many fundamental afflictions—greed, hatred, delusion, doubt, arrogance, wrong view, and several secondary ones. Why does the seventh consciousness associate with only these four?

The classical answer (《成唯識論》) is elegant and precise:

- Self-view is necessary. Because the seventh consciousness is precisely the consciousness that constantly grasps an "I," self-view must be present. - Other views are excluded. 我見, 邊見 (extreme view), and 邪見 (wrong view) all share the same cognitive nature (慧, discernment). One mind cannot hold two discernments at once. So once self-view is there, the other views cannot arise. - Doubt is excluded. Because self-view is precisely a *certainty* about the self, doubt (疑) cannot coexist with it. - Anger is excluded. Because the self is loved (我愛), anger (瞋) toward it cannot arise.

So the very structure of the seventh consciousness restricts its afflictions to these four—no more, no less. And these four are *innate* (俱生) afflictions, only cut off by long cultivation (修所斷), not by the first analytical insight into emptiness (見道所斷). They go deeper than conceptual analysis can reach.

How View, Conceit, and Love Coexist

A sharp objection arises: the *Yogācārabhūmi* (《瑜伽論》) says greed causes the mind to sink and conceit causes it to rise. How can 我慢 (rising) and 我愛 (sinking) operate together in one mind?

The 《成唯識論》 answers: *「行相無違,俱起何失?」*. Their modes of operation do not conflict, so what is the harm in them co-arising? The Yogācāra descriptions of greed-sinking and conceit-rising concern *conceptual* afflictions (分別) directed at *external* objects, where the dynamics are coarse and visible. The Four Afflictions are *innate* (俱生) and directed at the *inner* self, subtle and obscure. Different objects, different operations—no contradiction.

Their Function

The classical text states their function starkly: *「此四常起,擾濁內心,令外轉識恒成雜染。有情由此生死輪迴,不能出離,故名煩惱。」* — Constantly arising, they disturb and muddy the inner mind, so that the outer six consciousnesses are always mixed with defilements. Because of them, sentient beings cycle in birth and death and cannot get free. Hence they are called afflictions.

Their Internal Structure

They are not four separate items in a bag. 《攝大乘論釋(無性釋)》 describes an interlocking sequence: from 薩迦耶見 (satkāya-dṛṣṭi, the same as 我見)—the firm grasping of "I" and "mine"—rises 我慢, the self-inflation that relies on that grasping. Once these two are in place, 我愛 (self-love / 我貪, self-greed) follows naturally. And all three have 我癡 (ignorance, 無明) as their common root. So: a basic bewilderment that believes in self → an explicit assertion of self → an inflation around that self → a protective clinging to it. This is one engine with four gears.

Perhaps most striking of all: even in *good* states of mind (善心) and *neutral* states (無記心), these four are still operating. The 《攝大乘論釋》 explicitly says that the defiled mind does not contradict good or meditative states—even when you are being kind, generous, and wise, the seventh consciousness is still running its automatic program of self-grasping. This is why the defiled mind is classified as 有覆無記 (obscured but morally indeterminate): it doesn't show up as overtly good or bad, but it always casts a shadow over the mind. Self-grasping is the undeclared background of every experience.


Life's Walk-Through

Morning: the first instant

The alarm goes off. Before any explicit thought, who wakes up? *Me*. The body is already a known thing—"my" body, "my" sleepiness, "my" day ahead. The first instant of consciousness carries an owner and something owned.

- 我癡 is the deepest layer: no question is raised whether this "I" is real. It is simply taken for granted as the one who has the day. - 我見 is the grip: the immediate "this is me" that isn't argued, just felt and operated from. - 我慢 is the subtle inflation: the day's events will matter to *me*; I am the one with the schedule. - 我愛 is the protective affection: the reluctance to leave "my" warm bed, the priority of "my" preferences in the first moments.

Scrolling the phone

A notification arrives. Whatever its content, the moment of reception has a subtle internal posture: *is this good or bad for me?*

- 我見 is the tacit "I" the message is addressed to. - 我慢 registers as the small lift when the message implies I matter, the small deflation when it doesn't. - 我愛 holds "my" interpretation, "my" mood, "my" reaction close.

A meeting at work

Someone's idea is being discussed.

- 我慢 is the unspoken comparison running in the background: *my* thought, *my* contribution, *my* standing. - 我見 provides the framework for the comparison. - 我愛 defends against anything that feels like an attack on the grasped self. - 我癡 underwrites all of it by failing to see that "I" is itself a contingent process.

A conflict with someone close

They say something that stings.

- 我見 says: "this happened to *me*." - 我慢 inflates: "I don't deserve this," or "I am more right / more wounded / more careful than they are." - 我愛 clings: "*my* hurt, *my* story, *my* grievance." - 我癡 underwrites all of it by failing to see that "I" is itself a constructed, contingent thing.

The trickiest case: being kind

You give someone a thoughtful gift. You listen carefully to their trouble. You sit with their pain.

- Even here, the seventh consciousness is still running. The "I" who is being kind, who is the helper, who has the good heart—that is 我見 at work. - The subtle satisfaction in being the generous one, the quiet self-image of being a good person—that is 我慢. - The protective affection toward this "good self" that resents being unappreciated—that is 我愛. - The background assumption that this "I" is who is doing the giving—that is 我癡.

The classical tradition insists on this point, because it is the place where most contemporary people map the concept incorrectly. The Four Afflictions are not loud; they are the constant, quiet, automatic sense of there being a self who owns things and matters. You cannot see them by looking outward at your behavior; you see them by looking inward at the felt sense of "me" that precedes every experience. And they do not stop when you become a better person. They are transformed only when the underlying self-grasping is seen through.


Why Contemporary People Need This Concept

Modern life has a particular structure that intensifies the operation of these four.

Self-presentation as a baseline. Social platforms, professional networks, personal branding—all operate on the premise that you must position, defend, and enhance "yourself." The platform rewards engagement generated by self-concern: am I being seen? am I being liked? does my image hold? Every notification is a tiny report on the state of "me." The Four Afflictions have a continuous, real-time, measurable feed.

Comparison as background noise. The economy of attention is built on constant comparison—salary, relationship status, health metrics, children's milestones, vacation photos. Each comparison reactivates 我慢 as the self-inflation that uses the comparison to raise or lower the relative position of "me."

Identity as a project. The contemporary self is something to be curated, optimized, expressed. This is not random—it feeds exactly the operations of 我見 (asserting I have a defined self to curate), 我慢 (the sense of its importance), and 我愛 (the protective attachment to it). 我癡 is the layer that allows all this to seem natural and unquestioned.

The mental-health conversation. Much contemporary distress has the structure of the Four Afflictions: chronic low self-esteem (我慢 failing to rise), anxiety (我愛 defending against imagined threat), burnout from constant self-projection (我見 as a heavy load to carry), confusion about identity (我癡 failing to see that the whole framework is contingent). Naming the four gives a vocabulary that neither pathologizes nor enables—it points to a structural feature of experience that can be worked with.

It is worth saying clearly: the Buddhist claim here is about the existential structure of experience and how liberation from it is possible. Neuroscience and psychology can observe correlates—the default mode network, self-referential processing, threat-detection systems—but they cannot, from their own evidence, adjudicate whether the self is ultimately real or merely felt. The analogy is illuminating; it is not proof. The Buddhist case rests on its own analysis and on the lived results of practice.


Common Misreadings and Clarifications

"These are about being selfish or narcissistic." No—the classical definitions are explicit. 我慢 is *internal* reliance on the grasped self, not "arrogance toward others." 我愛 is *clinging to the grasped self*, not "greed for external objects." A person outwardly altruistic can be running these every second. The Four Afflictions are not behavior; they are the structural operation of self-grasping *underneath* all behavior.

"These are the same as thoughts about 'I' in everyday thinking." No. The sixth consciousness (意識) produces explicit thinking about "I"—"I am hungry," "I am a kind person." The Four Afflictions operate one layer deeper, at the seventh, where the assumption of self is not being *thought* but is functioning as the very framework in which thought takes place. You can have all kinds of self-attitudes in the sixth; the Four Afflictions are the automatic layer *beneath*.

"If the Four Afflictions are always there, can I never act without them?" At the conventional level, you can—because the four are 有覆 (obscured), they don't actively produce bad karma at every moment. You can perform virtuous deeds, reach deep meditative states, and even attain profound insights while they are still running. But they remain the *root cause* of why you remain in saṃsāra. Only when the seventh consciousness is *transformed* (轉依) do they finally cease—and at that point, even the past and future aspects of these afflictions have no self-nature, because their basis has been seen through.

"Why only four? What about envy, resentment, or cruelty?" The classical explanation is precise and worth holding. Self-view is necessary by definition of the seventh consciousness. Once self-view is present, no other *view* can arise in that mind (one mind cannot hold two discernments). Doubt is excluded by the certainty of self-view. Anger is excluded by love toward the self. So the very *nature* of the seventh consciousness restricts its afflictions to these four. Other afflictions operate at the sixth (conceptual) level; these four operate at the seventh (sub-structural) level.

"This is pessimistic—Buddhism says there's no escape from self." The opposite. The whole point of mapping the four so precisely is to identify what must be transformed—and the texts are emphatic that it can be transformed. The seventh consciousness, when the path matures, changes its object: instead of grasping the perceived aspect of the eighth as a self, it realizes non-self directly. The Four Afflictions then cease—not by suppression, but by their fundamental basis being seen through. The precision of the diagnosis is what makes the cure possible.

"The naming differences between 《成唯識論》 and 《攝大乘論釋》 show inconsistency." Not really. 《成唯識論》 uses the systematized form *我癡、我見、我慢、我愛* with "我" prefix marking self-orientation. 《攝大乘論釋(無性釋)》 uses the more traditional *薩迦耶見、我慢、我愛、無明*. The terms correspond cleanly: 我癡 ↔ 無明; 我見 ↔ 薩迦耶見; 我慢 and 我愛 are the same in both. Same content, slightly different framing. (A note for the careful reader: the 《攝大乘論釋》 further specifies that the ātmadṛṣṭi here is what it calls *a-kuśala-mūla*, that is, "deeply rooted in unwholesome"), and that 不共無明—the non-shared ignorance, also called 我癡—is the ignorance *that is uniquely this self-grasping one*, "not found elsewhere," not that it fails to accompany other afflictions.)

"Maybe modern psychology has already solved this." Modern psychology has rich tools for working with the *symptoms* of self-grasping—anxiety, low self-esteem, defensive patterns. The classical Yogācāra analysis is making a different, more radical claim: that self-grasping is not just a problem to manage but a fundamental misperception of the structure of experience itself, and that it can be *ended*, not just reduced. Whether one accepts that claim is a separate question; but conflating "psychological help" with "what the Four Afflictions are pointing to" misses both.


A Final Image

Imagine you are watching a movie. There is the story on the screen—the plot, the characters, the events. Then there is the projector. You usually only look at the screen; you forget the projector is running.

The Yogācāra teaching is: look at the projector. The Four Afflictions are what the projector is running. They are not the story you tell yourself about yourself; they are the mechanism *generating* the sense that there is a self who has that story. Until that mechanism is seen through, every act—virtuous or not, peaceful or anxious, kind or cruel—is being projected onto the screen from a source you have not yet examined.

That examination, in this tradition, is what the path is for.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「四烦恼」(catvāraḥ kleśāḥ),指末那识(第七识,亦名染污意)自无始以来恒常相应的四种根本烦恼,即我痴、我见、我慢、我爱。此四烦恼与末那恒俱生灭,为有情生死流转、轮回不断之根本所依。

二、主要阐述

(一)四烦恼之名义与体性

《成唯识论》逐一释四烦恼之名义:「我痴者:谓无明,愚于我相,迷无我理,故名我痴。我见者:谓我执,于非我法,妄计为我,故名我见。我慢者:谓倨傲,恃所执我,令心高举,故名我慢。我爱者:谓我贪,于所执我,深生耽着,故名我爱。」以「我」字冠于痴、见、慢、爱之上,标示其皆以「自我」为所执对象之独特侧面:「我痴」即无明之别称,「我见」即我执,「我慢」即倨傲,「我爱」即我贪。「并」字表明慢、爱与见、痴俱起,以遮破他部执无相应之义。

(二)俱起之时与所缘

《成唯识论》以颂文明示此四为末那识恒常相应之法,并与遍行触等五法共同俱转:「四烦恼常俱,谓:我痴、我见,并我慢、我爱,及余触等俱」。 从无始至未转依位,末那任运恒缘藏识,与四根本烦恼相应。圣教亦云:「有染污意,从无始来,与四烦恼,恒俱生灭。」此「染污意」即末那之异名,「藏识」即第八阿赖耶识之别名。论释其所缘:此识俱萨迦耶见,任运一类恒相续生,执彼藏识见分为自内我。

(三)何以唯四

烦恼总十种,何故末那唯与四俱?《成唯识论》释:「有我见故,余见不生。无一心中,有二慧故。」我见、边见、邪见同以慧为体,一心不容二慧;我所、边见依我见生而此相应见不依彼起。恒内执有我故须有我见;由见审决故疑无容起;爱着我故瞋不得生,故此识俱烦恼唯四。又此俱烦恼唯是俱生、修所断者,非分别、见所断之所能断。

(四)见慢爱三俱起之理

《成唯识论》设问:见、慢、爱三,如何俱起?答:「行相无违,俱起何失?」《瑜伽论》说贪令心下、慢令心举,彼约分别、外境,所陵麁显;此属俱生、内境,所恃细昧,麁细有殊,故彼此文义不相乖返。

(五)扰浊系缚之业用

《成唯识论》明言:「此四常起,扰浊内心,令外转识恒成杂染。有情由此生死轮回,不能出离,故名烦恼。」

(六)四烦恼之内在关联

《摄大乘论释(无性释)》从另一角度阐述四者之关联:「萨迦耶见」被解为坚固执着我与我所;由此势力生起我慢,即凭恃我、我所而自我高举。前二者既有,便进一步生起「我贪」,而本经说此即名「我爱」。至于「无明」,则解作「无智」,因其为明所对治;同时又说前三者皆以无明为因。此呈现以我、我所之执为起点,连及自高与贪爱,并以无明作其共同之因。

(七)染污意恒常现行之作用

《摄大乘论释(无性释)》从染污意之恒常现行说明四烦恼的作用:所相应之意,在定与不定、善等心位中皆不相违;即使善心现行之时,仍有执我。识由此「第二染污」而受杂染,因为计度我等能造成杂染。其成立方式是「俱有现行」,而非必与各种心直接作「相应现行」,借此说明善与无记心中亦可有我、我所烦恼现行。无想天一期生中若全无染污意,也将导致其中没有我执、我慢的过失。

(八)染污意之性质

《摄大乘论释(无性释)》明言此染污意是「有覆无记性」,并与四烦恼「常共相应」;其行相微细而一切时随逐。不共无明则被说为能障碍真智生起的愚暗;所谓「不共」,是指此惑为余处所无,并非指它不与身见等其余烦恼相应。此处又以「身见等」指涉与无明俱行的其余烦恼,与前文正式列名的「萨迦耶见」相互照应。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

两部论典同属瑜伽部,且同论末那恒与四烦恼相应之义,然列名顺序与用词有所不同:

- 《成唯识论》:以「我痴、我见、我慢、我爱」为序,「我」字冠于四烦恼之上,标示其以「自我」为所执对象之独特侧面。 - 《摄大乘论释(无性释)》:列名为「萨迦耶见、我慢、我爱、无明」,并不在列名时直接使用「我痴」,而以「无明」为第四烦恼。若以「我痴、我见、我慢、我爱」归纳,须特别记录本经原词是「萨迦耶见、我慢、我爱、无明」。

两者对应关系大体如下:成唯识之「我痴」即摄大乘释之「无明」;成唯识之「我见」即摄大乘释之「萨迦耶见」;成唯识之「我慢」「我爱」两者名称相同。

四、与相关概念的关系

- 末那识(染污意):四烦恼所恒相应之识,为第七识之异名。其行相为「恒审思量」,未转依位恒审思量所执我相,已转依位亦审思量无我相故;对治道生、断烦恼已,相应烦恼非唯现无,过去、未来亦无自性。 - 阿赖耶识(藏识):四烦恼所缘之对象,此识俱萨迦耶见执彼藏识见分为自内我。 - 萨迦耶见(身见、我见):与四烦恼中「我见」相当,为末那恒相应之根本烦恼。 - 不共无明:为四烦恼中「我痴」之别称,《摄大乘论释(无性释)》特别强调「不共」是指此惑为余处所无,并非不与身见等其余烦恼相应。 - 遍行触等五法:四烦恼与末那相应时,亦与遍行触等五法共同俱转。

五、代表性原文引用

- 《成唯识论》:「四烦恼常俱,谓:我痴、我见,并我慢、我爱,及余触等俱。」 - 《成唯识论》:「我痴者:谓无明,愚于我相,迷无我理,故名我痴。我见者:谓我执,于非我法,妄计为我,故名我见。我慢者:谓倨傲,恃所执我,令心高举,故名我慢。我爱者:谓我贪,于所执我,深生耽着,故名我爱。」 - 《成唯识论》:「有染污意,从无始来,与四烦恼,恒俱生灭。」 - 《成唯识论》:「此四常起,扰浊内心,令外转识恒成杂染。有情由此生死轮回,不能出离,故名烦恼。」 - 《摄大乘论释(无性释)》:以「萨迦耶见、我慢、我爱、无明」列四烦恼之原词。

By SutraAI-generated

成唯識論T1585 · 瑜伽部

《成唯識論》以頌與長行兩重形式論述「四煩惱」——我癡、我見、我慢、我愛。其核心頌文曰:「四煩惱常俱,謂:我癡、我見,并我慢、我愛,及餘觸等俱」,明示此四為末那識恆常相應之法,並與遍行觸等五法共同俱轉。

一、名稱與體性

論逐一釋四煩惱之名義:「我癡者:謂無明,愚於我相,迷無我理,故名我癡。我見者:謂我執,於非我法,妄計為我,故名我見。我慢者:謂倨傲,恃所執我,令心高舉,故名我慢。我愛者:謂我貪,於所執我,深生耽著,故名我愛。」 此經以「我」字冠於癡、見、慢、愛之上,標示其皆以「自我」為所執對象之獨特側面:「我癡」即無明之別稱,「我見」即我執,「我慢」即倨傲,「我愛」即我貪。「并」字表明慢、愛與見、癡俱起,以遮破他部執無相應之義。

二、俱起之時與所緣

「俱」顯相應之義——從無始至未轉依位,末那任運恒緣藏識,與四根本煩惱相應。 聖教亦云:「有染污意,從無始來,與四煩惱,恒俱生滅。」 此「染污意」即末那之異名,「藏識」即第八阿賴耶識之此經所立之名。論釋其所緣:此識俱薩迦耶見,任運一類恒相續生,執彼藏識見分為自內我。

三、何以唯四

煩惱總十種,何故末那唯與四俱?論云:「有我見故,餘見不生。無一心中,有二慧故。」我見、邊見、邪見同以慧為體,一心不容二慧;我所、邊見依我見生而此相應見不依彼起。恒內執有我故須有我見;由見審決故疑無容起;愛著我故瞋不得生,故此識俱煩惱唯四。 又此俱煩惱唯是俱生、修所斷者,非分別、見所斷之所能斷。

四、見慢愛三俱起之理

論設問:見、慢、愛三,如何俱起?答:「行相無違,俱起何失?」《瑜伽論》說貪令心下、慢令心舉,彼約分別、外境,所陵麁顯;此屬俱生、內境,所恃細昧,麁細有殊,故彼此文義不相乖返。

五、擾濁繫縛之業用

「此四常起,擾濁內心,令外轉識恒成雜染。有情由此生死輪迴,不能出離,故名煩惱。」

六、此經獨特術語

本論以「末那」稱第七識(亦名「染污意」),以「藏識」稱第八阿賴耶識,以「思量」雙顯自性行相,以「未轉依位/已轉依位」區凡聖差別:未轉依位恒審思量所執我相,已轉依位亦審思量無我相故;對治道生、斷煩惱已,相應煩惱非唯現無,過去、未來亦無自性。

攝大乘論釋(無性釋)T1598 · 瑜伽部

《攝大乘論釋(無性釋)》以「第二染污意」說明四煩惱:此意恆與四惑相應,依次列為「薩迦耶見、我慢、我愛、無明」,並說染污意由此四者所染污,成為「識雜染所依」。因此,本經並不在列名時直接使用「我癡」,而以「無明」為第四煩惱;若以「我癡、我見、我慢、我愛」歸納,須特別記錄本經的原詞是「薩迦耶見、我慢、我愛、無明」。

就四者的內在關聯而言,「薩迦耶見」被解釋為堅固執著我與我所;由此勢力生起我慢,即憑恃我、我所而自我高舉。前二者既有,便進一步生起「我貪」,而本經說此即名「我愛」。至於「無明」,則解作「無智」,因其為明所對治;同時又說前三者皆以無明為因。這段解釋呈現的並非四項彼此孤立的羅列,而是以我、我所之執為起點,連及自高與貪愛,並以無明作其共同之因。

本經又從染污意的恆常現行說明四煩惱的作用:它們所相應的意,在定與不定、善等心位中皆不相違;即使善心現行之時,仍有執我。識由此「第二染污」而受雜染,因為計度我等能造成雜染。故四煩惱在此主要用來闡明染污意如何成為識之雜染所依,而不只是一般性的煩惱名目。

為證成染污意,本經指出,若無此意,便難以成立不共無明;又說一切時中我執皆可現行,遍於善、不善、無記心。其成立方式是「俱有現行」,而非必與各種心直接作「相應現行」,藉此說明善與無記心中亦可有我、我所煩惱現行。無想天一期生中若全無染污意,也將導致其中沒有我執、我慢的過失。

在性質上,本經明言此染污意是「有覆無記性」,並與四煩惱「常共相應」;其行相微細而一切時隨逐。不共無明則被說為能障礙真智生起的愚闇;所謂「不共」,是指此惑為餘處所無,並非指它不與身見等其餘煩惱相應。此處又以「身見等」指涉與無明俱行的其餘煩惱,與前文正式列名的「薩迦耶見」相互照應。

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