Dharma · AI Companion

vitarka

心对所缘作粗略推求AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span outside the four-fold two-truths frameworkInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is Saying

尋 (*vitarka*, also translated as "initial thought-application" or "directed search") is one of the four indeterminate mental factors (四不定心所, *catvāri aniyāḥ*) listed in the Yogācāra analysis of mind, alongside 悔 (*kaukṛtya*, regret), 眠 (*middha*, sleep/drowsiness), and 伺 (*vicāra*, sustained investigation). They are called "indeterminate" because, unlike 觸 (*spraṣṭavya*, contact) which arises with every mind (遍行, "universal"), or 欲 (*chanda*, desire) which arises only toward particular objects (別境, "object-specific"), these four factors are morally and contextually variable — they can be wholesome (善), unwholesome (染), or morally neutral (無記) depending on what mental factors accompany them.

The classical definition from 《成唯識論》(*Chéng Wéishí Lùn*, *Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only*, T1585) is precise: "尋謂尋求,令心怱遽於意言境,麁轉為性" — "Vitarka is *seeking* (尋求); it makes the mind hurried (怱遽); its object is the realm of conceptual-verbalization (意言境, *manojalpa-viṣaya*); and it is characterized by *coarse* movement (麁轉)."

Each piece of this compact formula carries weight. Let us walk through them, because the precision is the whole point.

1. The Operation (行相): 麁轉 — Coarse Movement

尋 is not a synonym for "thinking" in any general sense. It is specifically the coarse, darting, outward-thrusting kind of cognitive movement. When your mind first reaches toward something — "wait, was it here?", "could it be this?", "let me check that" — that initial casting-about is 尋. It does not settle. It does not penetrate deeply. It is more like the first sweeping motion of search, before careful inspection.

This is precisely what distinguishes 尋 from its partner 伺 (*vicāra*). The same passage defines 伺 as 細轉 — fine, sustained movement; deep, penetrating probing. The distinction is one of cognitive register: 尋 is rapid and shallow; 伺 is sustained and penetrating. Both share the same object and the same composition, but the tempo and depth differ. The Treatise summarizes: "於意言境不深推度及深推度,義類別故" — "they differ in that one does not deeply probe and the other deeply probes on the conceptual-verbal object; the sense-class is distinct."

2. The Object (所緣): 意言境 — The Realm of Conceptual-Verbalization

This is perhaps the most important, and most often overlooked, component of the definition. 尋 and 伺 operate exclusively on what classical texts call 意言境 (*manojalpa-viṣaya*) — the realm of mental verbalization, the level of reality that mind reaches through names and concepts.

Think of it this way. When sunlight hits your skin, that is a raw sensory event — heat, light, pressure — which the five sense consciousnesses (眼耳鼻舌身, the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile consciousnesses) register as such. There is no language yet, no naming. But when your mind thinks *"ah, it's warm in here, just like summer, like that holiday last year"* — *that* is 意言境. It is where sensation meets vocabulary, where bare encounter with the world gets translated into the shapes that thought can manipulate.

尋 operates only at this level. This is why 《成唯識論》 is emphatic: "五識定無尋、伺" — "the five sense consciousnesses definitely do not have vitarka or vicāra." Why? Because the five senses take raw sensory objects (色聲香味觸, *visible form, sound, smell, taste, tangibility*) as their object, not names-and-concepts. When certain sūtras say "the eye has vitarka and vicāra," the Treatise explains, this is a roundabout way of saying that *mind often arises from the eye's contact* — not that vitarka literally co-arises with seeing. The text puts it precisely: "以名身等義為所緣,非五識身以名身等義為境故" — "because vitarka and vicāra take names (名身, *nāmakāya*) and similar meanings as their object, and the five sense consciousnesses do not take names and similar meanings as their object."

This has a striking contemporary resonance. 尋 is the mental activity of naming, labeling, flipping through conceptual alternatives. When you look at a screen and your mind says "is this email urgent? is it spam? should I read it now or later?" — that is 尋, operating entirely on the conceptual-verbal layer. The raw sense of light hitting your retina is something else entirely.

3. The Effect (作用): 令心怱遽 — Making the Mind Hurried

尋 does not passively observe. It agitates. The Chinese term 怱遽 (*cōngjù*) means hurried, flustered, inwardly unsettled. When 尋 is active, there is a subtle flutter at the heart-base (in the chest area, where classical texts locate affective experience), a sense of mental hastening. The mind does not sit calmly with its object; it is being thrown outward, again and again, toward the next possibility.

This is significant because it tells us that 尋, by its very nature, prevents the mind from settling. It is structurally opposed to the quietude (止, *śamatha*) that concentration practice aims at. Even when 尋 is wholesome — for instance, in the preliminary stages of investigating the dharma — it still has this hastening quality. It is not stillness. It is the active seeking of mind in its most outward-thrusting mode. The shared 业 (function) of 尋 and 伺, the Treatise notes, is "安、不安住身心分位所依為業" — "serving as the basis for the mental and physical state of being settled or unsettled" — the very condition of inner stability or its absence hangs on whether 尋伺 is active.

4. The Composition (體性): 思 + 慧 — Volition and Discernment in Combination

Here is one of the more subtle points. 尋 is not a "thing" in the naïve sense. The Treatise is explicit: "並用思、慧一分為體,若離思、慧,尋、伺二種體類差別不可得故" — "Both take one portion each of cetanā (思, intention/volitional thrust) and prajñā (慧, discernment/wisdom) as their substance; if separated from cetanā and prajñā, the distinction of the two types vitarka and vicāra cannot be found." And again: "四中尋、伺定是假有,思、慧合成,聖所所故" — "Of the four [indeterminate factors], vitarka and vicāra are *provisionally existent* (假有), composed of cetanā and prajñā, as the Sage taught."

This means 尋 is a quality that arises when 思 (the mind's volitional thrust toward an object) and 慧 (the discriminating, discerning aspect of cognition) come together in a particular configuration. The 思 supplies the energy, the forward-momentum; the 慧 supplies the discriminating investigation. Without both, 尋 cannot exist. If you have only 思 without 慧, you get blind volition. If you have only 慧 without 思, you get pure discernment without the darting quality. 尋 requires both, blended.

This also explains why 尋 is called 假 (*provisional*) rather than 實 (*substantive*). It is a name for a particular pattern of interaction between two more fundamental mental factors. Like "roughness" is not a substance but a quality of a surface, 尋 is not a substance but a quality of how 思 and 慧 combine. This is a sophisticated ontological point embedded in the analysis: not every "thing" we speak of is independently existing.

5. The Incompatibility with 伺: Why They Never Co-Arise

A counter-intuitive point in the same passage: "尋、伺定不相應,體類是同,麁、細異故" — "Vitarka and vicāra definitely do not co-arise; their underlying type is the same, only the coarse/fine distinction differs."

This means that at any given moment, your mind is doing *one* of these: it is either in coarse-probing mode (尋) or in fine-probing mode (伺), but not both. You can see why this is so. Imagine trying to simultaneously skim a page and deeply analyze its argument — these are different cognitive modes, and the mind naturally oscillates between them rather than blending them. In classical jhāna theory, this distinction maps directly onto the first jhāna (which has 尋 and 伺 — *vitakka* and *vicāra* in Pali) versus the second jhāna (where 尋 and 伺 fall away, replaced by a more unified one-pointedness of mind).

6. The Scope: 欲界 and 初靜慮 — Desire Realm and First Dhyāna

Another striking constraint. 《成唯識論》 notes that 尋伺 exist only "在欲及初靜慮" — in the desire realm and in the first dhyāna. "餘界地法皆妙靜故" — "the dharmas of the other realms and grounds are all wonderfully peaceful." Second dhyāna and above simply have no 尋.

This tells us something profound: 尋 is essentially a desire-realm (and first-dhyāna) feature. It belongs to minds that are still coarse enough to dart about conceptually. The deeper the meditative absorption, the more 尋 dissolves. In its place, a more direct, more unified, less verbal way of knowing. The same passage also notes that 尋伺 can correlate with all four feelings (憂喜捨樂, *domanassa, saumanasya, upekṣā, sukha*) — in the first dhyāna, mind associates with 樂 (*sukha*) — and it can co-arise with the five object-specific factors, eleven wholesome factors (including 輕安, *praśrabdhi*, in the first dhyāna), ten afflictions (煩惱), and twenty secondary afflictions (隨煩惱). It pervades all three moral categories (善/不善/無記) and all three trainings (有學/無學/非學非無學, *training, beyond training, neither*).

The passage also makes a sweeping structural claim: "依於尋、伺有染、離染立三地別" — "The distinction of the three realms (三地, here referring to the three realms of saṃsāra: desire, form, and formless) is established according to whether 尋 and 伺 are defiled or undefiled." That is, the very structure of saṃsāra's three realms is mapped onto the state of 尋伺 — a striking claim that elevates this "indeterminate" mental factor to a kind of architectural role in the cosmology.

7. The Teaching Function: Why Even the Buddha Uses It

A beautiful and subtle point in 《成唯識論》: "後得正智中為他說法必假尋、伺,言說因故;佛地無功用說,不復假尋伺" — "In subsequent wisdom (後得智, *prṣṭhalabha-jñāna*) when teaching others, [the Buddha] necessarily relies on vitarka and vicāra as the cause of verbal expression. But in the Buddha-ground itself, there is *effortless expression* (無功用說), no longer needing to borrow vitarka and vicāra."

This is remarkable. Even an enlightened being, when they turn to teach the dharma to others, must still use 尋 to *initiate* verbal exposition — because teaching requires sequential language, and language requires this initial probing-thrust. But at the level of the Buddha's own mind, in the ultimate state, expression happens without the cognitive effort of searching-for-words. There is a *spontaneous responsiveness* (無功用, *anābhoga*) that bypasses the conceptual-searching process. The same passage also notes: "尋、伺雖非真無漏道,而能引彼,從彼引生,故通見、修、非所斷攝" — "Although vitarka and vicāra are not themselves the true non-outflow path, they can lead to it and arise from it; therefore they are included among what is to-be-seen, to-be-cultivated, and what is not to-be-abandoned" (i.e., they are not "things to cut off" in the manner of the afflictions).

8. The Place of 尋 in the Larger Path

尋 is not a villain. It is a tool. Its role varies across the path:

- **In the stage of listening and reflection (聞思, *śrutamayī and cintāmayī prajñā*): 尋 is essential — it is the initial, questioning, outward-reaching quality that drives the practitioner to investigate the dharma. "What does this mean? Could it be otherwise?" That outward thrust is 尋. - In the cultivation of meditative concentration (定, *samādhi*): 尋 is something to be quieted. The second dhyāna is defined precisely by the cessation of 尋 and 伺. - In the post-realization teaching stage: 尋 is repurposed as the verbal-thrust for teaching others. - In the ultimate realization itself**: 尋 is no longer needed.

So 尋 is not something to be "killed." It is something to be understood in its function, calmed when excessive, and used skillfully when appropriate.


A Walkthrough of 尋 in Contemporary Life

Let us walk through several common scenes and see how 尋 actually operates, moment by moment.

Scene 1: The Morning Phone Pickup

You wake up. Reach for the phone. The moment you see the lock screen, your mind begins to dart: *"what notifications came in overnight? did anyone text? what's the news today? do I have any urgent emails?"* That rapid, un-settled, outward-casting quality — that is 尋. The mind is not yet resting on any one object. It is searching, scanning, throwing out conceptual possibilities across names and categories.

Suppose instead of just scanning, you open one specific email and read it slowly, carefully considering each sentence, weighing its implications — at that moment, you have crossed into 伺. The cognitive mode has shifted from *seeking* to *investigating*, from coarse darting to fine-grained attention on a single conceptual thread.

Where most people mis-map: They think 尋 = "any thought at all." Not so. Pure sense-contact (the brightness of the screen hitting your eyes) is not 尋 — it is sense-consciousness. The verbalizing, naming, comparing mind is 尋. 尋 is the *cognitive search*, not the raw sensation.

Scene 2: The Argument with a Partner

Your partner says something that lands awkwardly. Before you fully process what was said, your mind begins to search: *"are they criticizing me? are they hinting at something else? what do they really mean? should I be defensive? or is this about yesterday?"* That *throwing out of possibilities* — that is 尋, darting across conceptual alternatives at the level of meaning, all of it operating on 意言境.

Now suppose you stop and actually sit with the hurt feeling, slowly examining "where in my body is this reaction? what is the precise nature of my upset?" — that deeper, sustained probing is 伺.

Where people mis-map: They think 尋 = "negative thoughts" and 伺 = "rational thoughts." Not so. 尋 and 伺 are morally neutral in themselves; they are modes of cognitive engagement, not moral verdicts. A wholesome 尋 might be the initial investigation of the dharma; an unwholesome 尋 might be paranoid suspicion; a neutral 尋 might be simply scanning your environment for what to attend to next.

Scene 3: Problem-Solving at Work

Your team is facing a tricky problem. In the brainstorm, ideas come quickly: *"could we try X? or Y? what about Z? or maybe a combination?"* That quick outward-throwing of possibilities is 尋. The mind is moving across conceptual alternatives without deeply committing to any.

Once you pick one option and slowly work through its consequences, checking each implication — *"if we do X, then A happens; but if A happens, then B; and B might conflict with C; and then we'd have to..."* — that sequential, deepening investigation is 伺.

Useful insight: In a healthy creative process, you want 尋 at the brainstorming stage (broad, unconstrained, rapid) and 伺 at the analysis stage (focused, sequential, careful). Many people, however, get stuck in 尋 — they keep generating possibilities without ever entering 伺, and never actually solve anything. The mind is forever scanning, never resting deeply enough on any one thread to truly understand it.

Scene 4: Anxiety Before Sleep

You lie in bed. Your mind will not stop. It darts: *"did I send that email? what about that conversation? will the project be okay? what if X happens? what if Y happens? did I lock the door?"* That scattered, jumping, outward-thrown quality of mind is 尋 out of control. The mind is searching, but without any object it can settle into.

This is a case where 尋 is bound up with the afflictions (煩惱, *kleśa*), specifically with the secondary afflictions (隨煩惱, *upakleśa*) like 散亂 (*vikṣepa*, mental distraction) and 掉舉 (*auddhatya*, agitation). The classical analysis notes that 尋 can co-arise with the ten primary afflictions and twenty secondary ones. Anxiety is 尋 entangled with 煩惱.

The classical remedy: not to suppress 尋 with force, but to gently shift cognitive mode. Move from 尋 (coarse search) toward 伺 (sustained, single-pointed attention), and from 伺 toward a unified one-pointedness where both dissolve. This is essentially the classical instruction in moving from discursive thought toward meditative absorption. To do it well, one has to first *recognize* what is happening — that the darting is 尋, not "you" being broken.

Scene 5: The First Minutes of Meditation

You sit down to meditate. The first several minutes are typically dominated by 尋. The mind throws itself out toward topics: *"what will I have for lunch? did I lock the door? what about that email? did I remember to..."* This is the mind's default outward-thrusting mode, exactly as classical texts describe.

As concentration deepens, the mind stops throwing out. It begins to stay with one object — the breath at the nostrils, a mantra, a visualization, a koan. This is 伺. The mind is no longer scanning alternatives; it is investigating one thing, gently, repeatedly.

With deeper concentration, both 尋 and 伺 fall away. What remains is a unified one-pointedness (the second jhāna and above, where, as the *Pāli suttas* and 《成唯識論》 agree, vitakka and vicāra have ceased). This is why classical meditation manuals emphasize "settling the mind" — what is being settled is precisely 尋, the outward thrust.

Where people mis-map: They think "settling the mind" means "stopping all thought." Not exactly. It means shifting from the rapid darting mode (尋) to the unified settled mode. Thought, in some form, continues into 伺; only 尋 itself fully ceases in deeper states. Even more, the *capacity* for 尋 returns when one emerges from jhāna; what has changed is the practitioner's relationship to it.


Why Contemporary People Need This Concept

The modern world is, in many ways, designed to maximize 尋. News feeds, social media, push notifications, the constant toggling between tasks — all of these train the mind in *coarse scanning*, never letting it settle into 伺, much less into unified one-pointedness. The economic logic of attention-extraction is, almost uncannily, a logic of inducing 尋. (Neuroscientists studying attention sometimes distinguish between "top-down broad attention" and "sustained focused attention" — useful parallels, but not identical to 尋 and 伺, and neuroscience by itself cannot adjudicate the Buddhist claim about what modes of mind are wholesome.)

Three specific benefits come from understanding 尋:

1. Diagnostic clarity. When you recognize that your mental agitation is the cognitive mode of 尋 — not "you" being a bad person, not an inevitable feature of the universe — you can begin to work with it skillfully. The Buddhist analysis gives you a vocabulary: this is 尋, this is what it does (it darts on 意言境, it makes the heart hurried), this is how to relate to it. Without the vocabulary, you can only fight yourself.

2. Skillful deployment. Not all 尋 is bad. The initial stage of any deep inquiry — into a philosophical question, a personal relationship, a spiritual practice — requires 尋, the outward-thrusting "could it be this?" The problem is not 尋 itself but *uncontrolled*, *scattered* 尋 that never transitions into 伺. The classical distinction gives you a way to navigate: do you need broad scanning now, or sustained investigation? Are you in the right cognitive mode for what you are trying to do?

3. Path-mapped understanding. Knowing that 尋 ceases in the second dhyāna and above gives you a direction: meditative absorption requires the quieting of 尋. This is not just a religious claim; it is a structural insight into how the mind's modes of engagement can be refined. And knowing that even the Buddha, in his *subsequent* wisdom, uses 尋 to teach — but not in his *ultimate* state — gives you a long arc on which to place this mental factor. It is not trash to be discarded. It is one of the mind's tools, with its season and its limit.


Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading 1: 尋 = "thinking" in general.

No. 尋 is specifically the *coarse*, *outward-thrusting*, *seeking* mode of thought — and only when it operates on 意言境. It does not include 伺 (sustained investigation), nor direct perception, nor the unified awareness of deep jhāna. It is one specific cognitive quality.

Misreading 2: 尋 = consciousness itself.

No. 尋 is a mental *factor* (心所, *caitta*), a flavor that arises within a moment of consciousness (識, *vijñāna*). It is not the whole of mind, and not even a major category of mind. It is a specific quality that may or may not be present in any given moment.

Misreading 3: 尋 is bad and must be eliminated.

No. 尋 is morally indeterminate. It can be joined with wholesome factors (the eleven wholesome factors, 十一善) or unwholesome ones (the ten afflictions and twenty secondary afflictions). The Buddha himself uses 尋 when teaching others. What needs to be addressed is *uncontrolled*, *affliction-bound* 尋, not 尋 itself.

Misreading 4: 尋 is the same as 思 (cetanā, volition).

No. 思 is a universal mental factor (遍行, *sarvatraga*) that arises with every mind; it is the basic volitional thrust toward an object. 尋 is composed of 思 *plus* 慧 (discernment), and arises only when *both* are present in a particular configuration. Without 慧, you have pure 思 but not 尋. 尋 is a 假 (provisional) composite, not a basic factor.

Misreading 5: 尋 and 伺 are just "thinking" and "analyzing" in English terms.

The English glosses are rough and can mislead. 尋 is more like "outward-directed seeking-thought," not simply thinking. 伺 is more like "sustained inward investigation," not simply analyzing. The key is the *direction* and *tempo* of cognitive engagement on the conceptual-verbal layer, not the content.

Misreading 6: Meditation aims to kill 尋 forever.

No. Meditation (in the classical framework) aims to *calm* 尋 — to allow the mind to settle into deeper modes of awareness. But the *capacity* for 尋 remains. After emerging from jhāna, the practitioner has 尋 again; what has changed is their relationship to it. They no longer mistake 尋 for the whole of mind, nor are they driven by it.

Misreading 7: 尋 is unique to Buddhist analysis.

Many contemplative traditions have noticed something like 尋. In modern cognitive science, there is research on the "default mode network" (the brain system active during mind-wandering), which involves rapid topic-switching and self-referential search — a cognitive mode that has interesting parallels with the classical description of 尋. Some attention researchers distinguish "exploratory attention" (broad scanning) from "focused attention" (sustained investigation), which loosely maps to 尋 and 伺. But we should be careful: parallels are not identity, and neuroscience does not "prove" the Buddhist analysis. It may, however, suggest that the classical observation of different cognitive modes has correlates in the brain's actual operation. The full picture, as always, lies beyond what any single framework can claim.


Closing Reflection

尋 is the mind's outward-thrusting search. It darts across conceptual alternatives on the layer of names and meanings. It never quite settles. It can be wholesome or unwholesome, used by the Buddha himself or bound up with our deepest anxieties. To understand 尋 is not to reject it but to recognize its texture — its coarse movement, its conceptual object, its hastening effect on the heart, its composition of volition and discernment in a particular configuration.

Once recognized, the path becomes clearer. There are times when 尋 is exactly what is needed — the first tentative inquiry into the dharma, the opening of a difficult conversation, the brainstorming of possibilities before any of them is tested. And there are times when 尋 must be quieted — when the scattered darts of conceptual search prevent the mind from resting, from seeing, from being present.

To know 尋 is to know one of the mind's most basic modes of operation. And to know one's own mind is, in the end, where the path of liberation begins.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

定义与核心要义

寻(vitarka),汉译有「寻」「觉」「伺察」等译名,是瑜伽行派所列心所之一。《成唯识论》(《成唯識論》)将其列为「四不定心所」之一,与悔、眠、伺同列。「不定」之名,是因为这四种心所「于善、染等皆不定故,非如触等定遍心故,非如欲等定遍地故」。

本论的核心定义为:「寻谓寻求,令心怱遽于意言境,麁转为性。」简言之,寻是对所缘之粗略的思察推求,其行相为「麁转」,作用为使心「怱遽」(躁动不安)。

主要阐述

依《成唯识论》,寻与伺同以「意言境」(即名言概念之境)为所缘,但行相有别:寻为「麁转」(不深推度),伺为「细转」(深推度),「于意言境不深推度及深推度,义类别故」。

在体性方面,本论明言:「并用思、慧一分为体,若离思、慧,寻、伺二种体类差别不可得故」,即寻以思、慧各一分为其体。体之假实方面,论断言「四中寻、伺定是假有,思、慧合成,圣所说故」。

关于与五识的关系,《成唯识论》列有两家异议:一派认为寻伺亦可与五识俱起,另一派主张唯与意识俱起。论最终判定「五识定无寻、伺」,理由是寻伺「以名身等义为所缘,非五识身以名身等义为境故」;经说五识有寻伺者,「显多由彼起,非说彼相应」。

界地方面,寻伺「在欲及初静虑,余界地法皆妙静故」;上下地亦能互相缘虑。寻伺可与忧、喜、舍、乐四受相应(初静虑意与乐俱故),并可与五别境、十一善(初静虑有轻安)、十烦恼、二十随烦恼俱起。三性方面通善、不善、无记;三学方面通有学、无学、非学非无学。

关于断与无漏,《成唯识论》指出:「寻、伺虽非真无漏道,而能引彼,从彼引生,故通见、修、非所断摄」。后得正智中「为他说法必假寻、伺」,称之为「言说因故」;至于佛地则「无功用说」,不复假借寻伺。

不同部类与译本的表述差异

《成唯识论》(《成唯識論》)与《唯识三十论颂》(《唯識三十論頌》)对寻的论述详略悬殊。

《成唯識論》给出详备定义,明标所缘(「意言境」)、行相(「麁转」)、作用(「令心怱遽」)及体性(思、慧合成),并展开论述其与五识之关系、界地分布、受相应情况、三性三学等多方面。

《唯識三十論頌》则仅以分列方式带过。原文所列包括「不定谓悔、眠,寻、伺二各二」,将寻与伺并置于「不定」心所项下,并标示「二各二」的数目结构。然所引原文未展开「二各二」之细目,亦未交代寻之所缘、行相、体性或与识之关系。《唯識三十論頌》以「遍行」「别境」「不定」等名目组织诸心所,别境所举为欲、胜解、念、定、慧五种,寻不在其中,而是归于「不定」项下。

用语方面,《唯識三十論頌》使用单字「寻」并与「伺」成对并列;《成唯識論》同样用「寻、伺」并举,但术语更为丰富,以「寻求」释寻,标其行相为「麁转」,以「怱遽」形容心之作用,皆为本论所特有之措辞。

与相关概念的关系

(一)与伺的关系:寻与伺同为四不定心所,同以意言境为所缘,同以思、慧各一分为体,然行相有麁细之别。依《成唯识论》,「寻、伺定不相应,体类是同,麁、细异故」,二者在任何情境下不俱起。又「依于寻、伺有染、离染立三地别」,即三界之安立依寻伺之染与离染而分别。

(二)与思、慧的关系:寻以思、慧各一分为体,故与思、慧二心所密切关联。但此关系在《唯識三十論頌》中未见提及。

(三)与其他心所分类的关系:寻被归于「不定」一类,而非遍行、别境、善、烦恼或随烦恼。

(四)与识的关系:《唯識三十論頌》原文另列有「异熟、思量,及了别境识」等识类术语,但未将寻与之建立关联,该材料不足以说明寻所属何识或如何参与了别。

代表性原文引用

《成唯识论》(《成唯識論》):「寻谓寻求,令心怱遽于意言境,麁转为性。伺谓伺察,令心怱遽于意言境,细转为性。此二俱以意言境为所缘,于意言境不深推度及深推度,义类别故。并用思、慧一分为体,若离思、慧,寻、伺二种体类差别不可得故。安、不安住身心分位所依为业。」

《成唯识论》(《成唯識論》):「四中寻、伺定是假有,思、慧合成,圣所说故。寻、伺定不相应,体类是同,麁、细异故。依于寻、伺有染、离染立三地别。……有义寻伺亦五识俱,有义唯意识俱。今应详审:五识定无寻、伺,以名身等义为所缘,非五识身以名身等义为境故。经说五识有寻伺者,显多由彼起,非说彼相应。」

《成唯识论》(《成唯識論》):「寻伺在欲及初静虑,余界地法皆妙静故。……初静虑意乐俱故。……容与五别境俱、十一善俱、十烦恼俱、二十随惑俱,三性通善、不善、无记,三学通有学、无学、非学非无学。」

《成唯识论》(《成唯識論》):「寻、伺虽非真无漏道,而能引彼,从彼引生,故通见、修、非所断摄。后得正智中为他说法必假寻、伺,言说因故;佛地无功用说,不复假寻伺。」

《唯识三十论颂》(《唯識三十論頌》):「不定谓悔、眠,寻、伺二各二。」

By SutraAI-generated

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》對「尋」之論述,可歸納為以下數端:

一、體性與定義 論以麁細對待而立尋伺:「尋伺別者,謂心麁細,心之麁性名尋,心之細性名伺」。又以語言行攝尋伺:「要有尋伺方有語言,非無尋伺此語言行,故麁者名尋、細者名伺」。是故尋者,乃心對所緣作粗略推求之麁性心所也。

二、五識與意地之配屬 頌云「五識唯尋伺,後三三餘無」。論釋云:眼等五識恆與尋伺相應,「由與尋伺恒共相應,以行相麁外門轉故、顯義決定」。「後三」謂意界、法界、意識界,通三品:欲界及初靜慮有尋有伺,靜慮中間無尋唯伺,第二靜慮以上乃至有頂皆無尋無伺。法界所攝非相應法,靜慮中間伺亦如是。

三、有尋伺地之四品 論主於有尋伺地建立四品法:一有尋有伺(除尋伺餘相應法)、二無尋唯伺(即尋)、三無尋無伺(即一切非相應法)、四無伺唯尋(即伺)。餘十色界尋伺俱無,常與尋伺不相應故。

四、自性分別之體 分別有三種:自性分別、計度分別、隨念分別。五識唯有自性分別而無餘二,故說無分別,如一足馬名為無足。「自性分別體唯是尋」;意識相應散慧名為計度分別,若定若散意識相應諸念名為隨念分別。

五、靜慮之離欲階次 初靜慮具五支——尋、伺、喜、樂、定;第二靜慮以上已無尋故除正思惟,第三、四靜慮並除喜、尋。中間靜慮於初靜慮所除外更除尋。第四靜慮被稱為「不動」,因尋、伺、喜、樂、入息、出息等八災患皆無,「下三靜慮名有動者,有災患故」。

六、菩提分法之攝屬 三十七覺分實事唯十,「正思惟以尋為體」。初靜慮具三十七,未至地除喜覺支,第二靜慮除正思惟,第三、四靜慮並除喜尋,前三無色除戒三支並除喜尋,欲界及有頂除覺、道支。

七、三摩地之分類 三摩地分三種:有尋有伺三摩地(初靜慮及未至攝)、無尋唯伺三摩地(靜慮中間地攝)、無尋無伺三摩地(第二靜慮近分乃至非想非非想攝)。

本論術語統一用「尋」、「伺」、「靜慮」(非「禪定」)、「三摩地」(非「三昧」)、「心所」(非「心數法」)、「麁/細」、「自性分別/計度分別/隨念分別」、「覺支」、「菩提分法」等名相。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》對「尋」的論述層面豐富,從體性、行相、位次到流轉皆有所說,可歸納如下:

一、體性與所緣。論以「不深推度所緣,思為體性」界定尋;若深推度所緣,則以慧為體性。另從煩惱雜染建立的立場,說尋伺「慧思為性,猶如諸見」:若慧依止意言而生,於所緣境慞惶推究,雖慧為性而名尋伺;於諸境界遽務推求、依止意言之麁慧稱為尋,即於此境不甚遽務而隨究察之細慧稱為伺。可知本論以「思」與「慧」並說,視所緣推求之深淺而定其性。

二、定地中的相貌。在初靜慮定中,「於緣最初率爾而起怱務行境,麁意言性,是名為尋」;與第二靜慮無尋無伺之「靜相」相對,尋伺被覺為「麁相」。此處以「怱務」、「麁意言性」形容尋之行相,與「徐歷」、「細意言性」之伺形成對比。

三、所緣、行相與等起。尋伺以名身、句身、文身所表之義為所緣;其行相為於所緣之「尋求」與「伺察」;等起則為「發起語言」,故尋伺與諸語業俱名「語行」。

四、三地差別與七門分別。論以「有尋有伺地、無尋唯伺地、無尋無伺地」三分,於尋伺建立體性、所緣、行相、等起、差別、決擇、流轉七門。

五、與靜慮的關係。尋伺為初靜慮所具,故被稱為「動」;此「動」望他地而言,非望自地。尋之寂靜有次第:由欲寂靜、尋寂靜至觸寂靜,乃至超越有頂一切寂靜。

六、差別與流轉。尋伺有七種差別,涵有相、無相、染污、不染污等。流轉門中,依那落迦、傍生、餓鬼、人、欲界天、初靜慮天之別,說其行、觸、引、相應、求、業各異。

七、與見煩惱的關聯。外道由「為性尋思、為性觀察」而起我見,建立有我之論。

八、其他。問答中以「遍尋求、遍伺察」與簡擇、極簡擇並舉;尋亦被列入「障隨惑」之一。

術語上,本論常以「尋伺」並稱,並以「麁意言性」、「怱務行境」、「慞惶推究」、「遽務推求」等獨特語彙形容尋之行相,可資辨識其義涵。

成唯識論T1585 · 瑜伽部

《成唯識論》將「尋」列為心所之一,與「悔、睡眠、伺」同屬「不定」法。文中以「尋謂尋求」定義其自性,謂尋能使心「怱遽」(匆迫不安)於「意言境」之上,具「麁轉」之性,亦即對所緣作粗略、淺層之推求。

在體性方面,論以「並用思、慧一分為體」說明尋與伺同以思與慧之一分為體;二者之所以有「麁」「細」之別,係由於「於意言境不深推度及深推度,義類別故」,即尋為不深推度(粗略推求),伺為深推度。論並判定尋、伺「定是假有」,因「思、慧合成,聖所說故」,乃由思、慧和合而成。

業用方面,尋與伺「俱以安、不安住身心分位所依為業」,即以使身心安或不安之住著狀態為業。「二各二」之釋義,論列諸家說,謂尋、伺各有染與不染(不善、無記及纏與隨眠)二類。

在與心識相應的問題上,論中諍議甚多。雖然有義引《雜集》等文主張五識亦具尋、伺,但《成唯識論》最終判定「五識定無尋、伺」,因尋、伺以名、句、文等「意言境」為所緣,非五識現量境故。論又明定尋、伺「麁、細異故」,體類雖同而粗細有別,故定不相應;依染、離染分屬三地,上下互起,下上尋伺亦能緣上下。

所緣方面,尋、伺唯以「意言境」為所緣,故唯有意識方能引生;論並判尋、伺通三性(善、染、無記),通欲界及初靜慮。

值得注意者,論雖以「正思惟是無漏故,後得智中為他說法必假尋、伺」許尋、伺通於無漏,同時明示「雖說尋、伺必是分別,而不定說唯屬第三,後得正智中亦有分別故」,即無漏位亦得假借尋、伺為言說因。

術語方面,本論以「尋」對應尋求,以「意言境」明示其對象為名言概念之境,以「麁轉」表示粗略推求之相,並以「思、慧一分」明其構成。整套術語乃唯識學之特殊用法,與他經所說有連繫亦有分別,應以上層條目並列呈現。

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