Dharma · AI Companion

所造色

upādāyarūpa

依四大种而形成的物质现象。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arising ⇢ II · emptinessInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

依四大种缘生而立所造色,初层即完整教授(1);般若中观以色即是空正面再读其无自性(2);唯识别读为识所变相分〔判教镜头〕

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

所造色 (upādāya-rūpa, “derived material form”) is material form that arises through, depends upon, is established in, is sustained by, and is nourished by the 四大种 (catvāri mahābhūtāni, four great elements). In the analytical system of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (《阿毘达磨俱舍论》), it is distinguished from the four great elements themselves.

The word “derived” can easily mislead a modern reader. It does not mean “manufactured by a creator,” nor does it mean that four independently existing substances first assemble and then produce a second layer of matter. The treatise is describing relations within embodied, conditioned material existence. Wherever derived form occurs, the great elements are its indispensable material basis; derived form does not float free of them.

The four great elements are defined by characteristic functions rather than by the ordinary objects called earth, water, fire, and wind:

- 地大 (earth element) has firmness or resistance, , as its characteristic. - 水大 (water element) has cohesion or moistening, 湿, as its characteristic. - 火大 (fire element) has warmth and maturation, , as its characteristic. - 风大 (wind element) has motion or distension, , as its characteristic.

So the earth element is not simply soil, the water element is not merely liquid, the fire element is not a visible flame, and the wind element is not merely moving air. A piece of ice, for example, may display resistance, cohesion, temperature, and dynamic pressures together. “Element” here names a fundamental mode in which material form functions and becomes tangible.

The treatise summarizes the field of material form with the verse:

“色者唯五根、五境及无表。” “Material form consists only of the five faculties, the five objects, and unmanifest form.”

This field includes:

1. the five material sense faculties; 2. the five kinds of sense object; 3. 无表色 (avijñapti-rūpa, unmanifest or non-indicative form).

But one must immediately add a qualification: not everything within the tactile field is derived form. The verse says:

“触界中有二,余九色所造,法一分亦然,十色可积集。”

The 触处 (tactile field) contains both great elements and derived forms. Firmness, cohesion, warmth, and motion belong to the four great elements themselves. The seven tactile qualities—smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst—are classified as derived form. The other nine material domains are derived: the five material sense faculties and the four object-fields of visible form, sound, smell, and taste. A portion of the domain of mental objects—unmanifest form—is also derived.

This distinction matters. “Derived form” is not a synonym for all matter, and the four great elements are not four additional objects placed beside the visible, audible, and tangible world. They are the material conditions through which the derived faculties and objects can occur.

The components must therefore be understood precisely.

The five faculties, or 五根, are:

- the eye faculty; - the ear faculty; - the nose faculty; - the tongue faculty; - the body faculty.

These are not simply the gross anatomical organs. The text describes the eye, for example, as “内处四大种所造净色”—a “lucid” or specially sensitive material form derived from the four great elements within the internal field. The visible eyeball is a supporting bodily structure; the eye faculty in Abhidharma analysis is the material sensitivity by virtue of which visual consciousness can arise. The same caution applies to the ear, nose, tongue, and body faculties. Translating 根 merely as “organ” can make the doctrine sound cruder than it is.

The five objects, or 五境, are:

- 色境, visible form or color-and-shape—not “matter” in the widest sense; - sound; - smell; - taste; - the tangible field.

Again, the tangible field is mixed. Its firmness, cohesion, warmth, and motion are great elements; its smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst are derived tactile forms. Hunger and thirst are classified here as bodily tangible qualities, not as the thoughts “I would like lunch” or “I should drink something.” The thought about hunger belongs to a mental process; the bodily quality being registered belongs to the tactile analysis.

Unmanifest form requires particular care. Within the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma framework used by the *Abhidharmakośa*, it is a subtle form associated with karmic restraint or non-restraint that does not outwardly disclose itself as visible bodily movement or audible speech. It is called “unmanifest” precisely because it does not indicate the mind to others in the way an observable bodily or verbal act may do. The treatise nevertheless classifies it as derived form, in a portion of the domain of mental objects.

This is a school-specific Abhidharma category, not a license to invent an invisible substance detectable by modern instruments. Nor should it be reduced to “a memory,” “a habit,” or “an intention.” Those modern comparisons may help one ask how an adopted commitment continues to shape conduct after the initiating moment, but none is an exact translation of avijñapti-rūpa.

The treatise further says:

“无表与表异大种生。” “Unmanifest and manifest [form] arise from different combinations of great elements.”

Thus manifest bodily or verbal form and unmanifest form are both related to great elements, but they are not said to arise from one numerically identical combination of elements.

The relationship between great elements and derived form is explained through five kinds of causal support:

- 生, generation: the great elements enable derived form to arise; - 依, dependence: they serve as the basis on which it proceeds; - 立, establishment: they provide its place or footing; - 持, maintenance: they sustain its continuity; - 养, nourishment: they enable its development or increase.

This fivefold account is richer than saying, “The elements make derived matter.” A flame may light a lamp, but lighting alone does not explain what supports the flame, keeps it established, prevents its immediate cessation, and allows it to grow. The five relations distinguish different senses in which derived form depends on its material conditions.

Causality is also not simply one-way. The verse states:

“大为大二因,为所造五种,造为造三种,为大唯一因。”

The great elements can function as two kinds of cause for one another—coexistent and homogeneous causes—and as five kinds of cause for derived form. Derived forms can stand to one another as coexistent, homogeneous, and maturation causes; derived form can be a maturation cause in relation to the great elements. These statements use “cause” in distinct technical senses. They do not cancel the basic distinction between the great elements as the formative basis and derived form as what depends upon that basis. They prevent us from flattening a network of conditioned relations into a single mechanical arrow.

The account of 极微聚 (clusters of minimal material units) makes the same point from another direction. In the desire realm, the smallest cluster without sound or a sense faculty is described as having eight co-arising types: the four great elements together with visible form, smell, taste, and derived tangible form. Where the body faculty is present, a ninth type is counted; where one of the other faculties is present, ten types are counted; when sound occurs, sound is added.

“Eight,” “nine,” or “ten” here counts categories of material event, not eight, nine, or ten little beads sitting beside one another. The analysis is intended to show that derived form does not occur as an independent material island. Even the most minimal material cluster is conditionally structured.

That is where 所造色 belongs on the path of liberation. Buddhism is not offering this analysis merely to satisfy curiosity about ancient physics. It is training us to stop experiencing the body and world as solid, simple, self-existing possessions. What we casually call “my body,” “my eye,” “that beautiful object,” or “this unbearable discomfort” is analytically a contingent meeting of faculties, objects, material qualities, consciousness, and other conditions.

The doctrine does not say that the world is unreal in the everyday sense. It says that what appears unitary is dependently constituted. Derived form is real enough to support seeing, hearing, pain, pleasure, action, and karmic consequence within conventional experience; yet it is never independent, self-grounding, or fit to be taken as “I” or “mine.” Analysis weakens appropriation. That weakening prepares the ground for insight into impermanence, suffering, and non-self.

A walk-through in everyday life

Imagine standing in a crowded subway carriage after a long workday. Your phone vibrates. A message from someone close to you says, “We need to talk.” Before the train reaches the next station, an entire private drama seems to have appeared.

Start with the body rather than the story.

Your feet meet the floor. The pressure and resistance registered there involve the earth element’s characteristic of firmness. The warmth inside your shoes involves the fire element. Subtle expansion, contraction, and movement in muscles and breath involve the wind element. Bodily cohesion—what prevents the material complex from simply scattering—is analyzed under the water element.

These are not yet the seven derived tactile qualities. If the metal handrail feels smooth, smoothness is derived tangible form. If your bag feels heavy, heaviness is derived form. If cold air blows from the carriage vent, cold is derived form. If you skipped dinner and experience bodily hunger, hunger is derived form.

A common mapping error occurs here: “I am worried” is not another tactile quality. Anxiety may be accompanied by warmth, pressure, movement, coldness, heaviness, or other bodily events, but anxiety as a mental state is not thereby identical with derived material form. The doctrine invites careful discrimination, not the relabeling of every experience as “energy in the body.”

Now the phone lights up. The colors and shapes on the screen belong to the object-field of visible form and are derived from great elements. The material eye faculty—the sensitive “lucid form,” not merely the whole eyeball—is also derived. Given eye faculty, visible form, light, attention, and other conditions, visual consciousness can occur.

The eye faculty is not “the experience of seeing,” and the visible message is not the consciousness that knows it. Faculty, object, and consciousness occupy different places in the analysis. Saying “everything is matter” would erase precisely the distinctions the system is trying to teach.

The vibration is registered through the body faculty and the tangible field. Its dynamic or moving aspect is analyzed through the wind element; other felt features may fall among derived tactile qualities. The notification sound, if enabled, is a derived object in the auditory field. The material ear faculty that makes hearing possible is also derived. But auditory consciousness is not derived form.

You read the sentence. The visible shapes are derived form; recognizing those shapes as words, remembering previous arguments, imagining abandonment, and forming a reply belong to mental processes. None of these should be smuggled into the category of visible form merely because they were triggered by a screen.

This is where contemporary algorithmic life exploits a useful ambiguity. A notification is only a brief configuration of color, sound, and vibration, yet it is designed to recruit recognition, feeling, anticipation, and action almost instantly. The material signal is small; the appropriation can be enormous. “They are leaving me.” “I must answer now.” “I cannot bear this.”

The Abhidharma walk-through creates a little space:

- There is visible form, but the visible form is not yet the feared future. - There is sound or vibration, but neither is a command. - There is bodily heat and movement, but these are not proof that the imagined catastrophe is true. - There is a material sense faculty, but it is not a permanent seer or hearer. - There are thoughts and intentions, but they should not be confused with material form.

Suppose you have undertaken a moral commitment not to use cruel speech during conflict. The commitment is not visible on your face like a badge. In the Sarvāstivāda analysis, the continuing non-indicative karmic dimension of restraint is discussed under unmanifest form. Your actual typed message, bodily movements, and audible words belong to manifest activity and its material supports; the unmanifest restraint is not identical with those observable gestures.

This does not mean that every private resolution automatically equals unmanifest form in every Buddhist school. Nor does it mean that “self-control chemicals” have been discovered in the brain. It means that this Abhidharma system developed a precise category for the karmic continuity of restraint and non-restraint even when nothing is presently being outwardly displayed.

You pause instead of sending the first angry reply. The pause is not based on denying the body or pretending the message did not arrive. It is based on seeing more accurately: a conditioned material event has contacted a conditioned faculty, and mental proliferation is now building a world around it. Once the pieces are distinguished, they need not dictate one another quite so blindly.

That is a small example of how analysis becomes practice. One does not chant a list of categories over every notification. With training, however, the categories undermine the reflex by which contact becomes ownership, bodily arousal becomes certainty, and certainty becomes harmful action.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary culture tends to oscillate between two pictures of the body.

In one, the body is “me”: its appearance, health, performance, desirability, and decline define my worth. In the other, the body is “my equipment”: a machine that should obey optimization plans, productivity schedules, diets, metrics, and cosmetic interventions. Both pictures conceal dependence. The first turns conditioned form into identity; the second turns it into property.

Derived form offers a third way. The body is intimate but not sovereign. It must be generated, supported, established, maintained, and nourished. Seeing depends on a viable faculty and a viable object. Hearing depends on another faculty and another object. Warmth, motion, resistance, smoothness, cold, hunger, and fatigue arise according to conditions. The body is neither a mystical essence nor a perfectly controllable device. It is a vulnerable ecology of dependencies.

This can soften shame. If faculties weaken, the change is not a moral failure of the self. It can also soften vanity. A beautiful appearance is derived, supported, maintained, and perishable; it does not establish an enduring owner. And it can deepen ethical seriousness: because bodies are dependent, what we do to the material conditions of other beings—food, shelter, safety, medical care, violence, exhaustion—matters greatly.

The analysis is especially useful in an age of screens. Algorithms continually arrange visible forms, sounds, and signals so that they capture the faculties and provoke feeling, recognition, and action. Buddhist analysis does not require us to demonize technology. It lets us locate the hinge: a sense object is not yet craving, and contact is not yet compulsion. The phone can present an image; it cannot, by itself, force us to build an identity around it.

Neuroscience can provide valuable accounts of sensory receptors, neural pathways, predictive processing, bodily regulation, and the construction of perceptual experience. These may offer illuminating comparisons with the Buddhist refusal to treat perception as a simple inner spectator looking at a finished outer world. But the frameworks are not identical. “Lucid material faculty” is not an ancient term for a retina or neural circuit; the four great elements are not the periodic table; unmanifest form is not a neuroscientific variable. Scientific research also continues to debate how neural processes relate to conscious experience. Such comparisons can clarify questions, but they do not constitute scientific proof of Abhidharma doctrine.

Most importantly, 所造色 teaches conditionality at the very point where attachment feels most undeniable. A body seems to declare, “I am here, solid and mine.” The analysis replies gently: look again. There is resistance, cohesion, temperature, movement, sensory capacity, color, sound, smell, taste, and touch—all arising within dependencies. There is functioning, but no single independent owner can be found among the functions.

This is not yet the whole of liberation. Knowing the classification intellectually does not uproot craving. But it supports liberating insight by correcting the view on which craving feeds. When the faculty is known as conditioned faculty, the object as conditioned object, and bodily sensation as conditioned material occurrence, one becomes less compelled to conclude: “This is me; this is mine; this is what I must secure forever.”

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“Derived form means the physical body.”

Too narrow. It includes the five material faculties and external objects such as visible form, sound, smell, and taste, together with the derived portion of the tactile field and unmanifest form. It therefore includes both what is conventionally called “inside” and much of what is conventionally called “outside.”

“All tangible form is derived form.”

Incorrect. The tactile field contains two classes. Firmness, cohesion, warmth, and motion are the four great elements; smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst are derived tangible forms.

“The five faculties are just the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin.”

Imprecise. In this analysis they are subtle material sensitivities derived from the great elements. Gross anatomical structures support them, but the faculty should not simply be equated with the whole visible organ. The body faculty is likewise not merely “the skin”; it is the material sensitivity distributed through the body by which tangible objects can be apprehended.

“Visible form means all material reality.”

No. 色 can have different scopes in Buddhist texts. In “色境,” it means the object of visual awareness—color and shape. In broader contexts, such as the category of material form, it covers a much larger field. Context determines the scope.

“The four great elements are ancient chemical elements.”

No. Their defining characteristics are firmness, cohesion, warmth, and motion. Treating them as primitive versions of modern chemical substances misses the analytical purpose of the doctrine.

“Derived means created at an earlier moment by four elements that then disappear.”

That is too mechanical. The treatise describes the great elements as generation, dependence, establishment, maintenance, and nourishment conditions, and it also describes great elements and derived forms as co-arising within material clusters. Dependence is ongoing and structurally differentiated, not merely a one-time manufacturing event.

“The causal relation is entirely one-way.”

Not in the complete Abhidharma account. The great elements are the fivefold causes of derived form in the relevant sense, but derived form can also be related to great elements as a maturation cause. Different causal categories are being applied. This does not erase the distinction between “formative” and “derived”; it shows that conditioned existence cannot be captured by a single kind of causation.

“A minimal material cluster is an ancient atom made of eight tiny particles.”

The cited enumeration counts types or categories that co-arise, not necessarily eight isolated miniature objects. Its practical point is that derived qualities never appear independently of a supporting configuration of great elements.

“Unmanifest form is simply intention, memory, personality, or habit.”

No. Those may be useful analogies only at a great distance. In the Sarvāstivāda framework, unmanifest form is a particular karmic and material category connected with restraint or non-restraint and classified within a portion of the domain of mental objects. Other Buddhist traditions analyze karmic continuity differently, so the term should not be universalized without qualification.

“If form is conditioned and not-self, the body does not matter.”

This reverses the ethical implication. A conditioned body needs support, protection, nourishment, and care. Non-self removes absolute ownership; it does not remove vulnerability or consequence. Precisely because bodily life depends on conditions, cruelty damages it and care sustains it.

“Analysis is enough for liberation.”

Classification is a tool, not the destination. Its purpose is to transform seeing. If one merely memorizes “five faculties, five objects, and unmanifest form,” the doctrine remains scholastic furniture. If one uses the distinctions to observe how a faculty, an object, bodily qualities, consciousness, feeling, recognition, craving, and action dependently meet, the analysis begins to loosen identification.

The deepest lesson of 所造色 is therefore not that the world is made from a Buddhist list of components. It is that material experience never stands by itself. What appears immediate and self-evident—“my body,” “the object I need,” “the discomfort I cannot bear”—is already supported, constituted, maintained, and changing through conditions.

To see derived form clearly is to recover a degree of freedom at the sensory threshold. The eye can be an eye rather than “me.” A screen image can be visible form rather than a verdict on my worth. Hunger can be a conditioned bodily quality rather than a personal injustice. A painful sound can be heard without immediately becoming a self that has been attacked.

The doctrine begins with a demanding taxonomy, but it ends in a humane insight: because experience is conditioned, it is workable; because form is dependent, it need not be possessed; because it is not an independent self, one can care for it fully without asking it to provide an identity it could never sustain.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

「所造色」(upādāya-rūpa)是《阿毘達磨俱舍論》用来与「大种」相对而立的色法类别。大种即地、水、火、风四大种,以坚、湿、煖、动为其相;所造色则是由四大种生起,并以大种为所依、为安立处、受其任持与长养的色法。二者虽同属色法,却不可混为一类:四大种是能造,所造色是其所造;但论中又从六因分别说明二者之间以及各自内部的因果关系,故其关系并非只由「能造—所造」一项穷尽。

2. 主要阐述

所造色的范围

《俱舍论》以颂文「色者唯五根、五境及无表」总摄色法:五根为眼、耳、鼻、舌、身,五境为色、声、香、味、触,此外还有法界一分所摄的无表色。不过,这些色法并非全部都是所造色。论颂说:「触界中有二,余九色所造,法一分亦然,十色可积集。」其中,触处兼摄大种与所造色:坚、湿、煖、动四者属于大种;滑、涩、重、轻、冷、饥、渴七者属于所造。除触以外的九色界,即五色根与色、声、香、味四境,皆属所造;法界中的一分无表色也属所造。其余七心界及法界的另一部分,则既非大种,也非所造。

论中又援引契经对诸处的说明,如「眼谓内处四大种所造净色」以及「色谓外处四大种所造」,以此表明眼等五根和相应外境属于四大种所造。这里的「净色」用于说明色根,而「所造」则标示其与四大种的关系。

与大种俱生

论书通过欲界的极微聚说明,大种与所造色在具体色聚中俱时生起。无声、无根的最细色聚有「八事俱生」,即四大种与色、香、味、触四种所造色;具有身根者增为九事;具有眼等其余色根者增为十事。若该处有声,还须在上述数目中增加声,分别形成九事、十事或十一事俱生。因而,所谓所造色并不是脱离四大种而单独存在的色聚成分。

这里所说的「事」,依论中的辨析是按种类计算,并非把每一大种或每一所造色仅视为一个极微。极微聚的说明着重展示:在欲界色法生起时,能造的大种与相应所造色依一定类别共同出现。

大种与所造色的因果差别

论颂说:「大为大二因,为所造五种,造为造三种,为大唯一因。」四大种彼此相望,能作俱有因、同类因二种;大种对于所造色则能作生、依、立、持、养五因。「生」指令所造色生起,「依」指成为其转起所依,「立」指使其得以安立,「持」指任持不绝,「养」指令其增长。

所造色彼此相望,可有俱有因、同类因、异熟因三种;所造色对于大种,则只作异熟因。由此可见,《俱舍论》既以大种为所造色的五种能作因,又承认所造色在特定因果门中可以成为大种之因,分别属于不同的因义,不能仅凭名称将因果关系理解成单向的一种作用。

对不同主张的记载与辨析

论中记载,尊者觉天主张十种色处皆以大种为性。论主依据契经只以坚等四相说明大种,并说触处摄四大种,认为若十色处全是大种,便与这些经文的界定不合。

论中还讨论「造色即是大种」的主张,并以反诘指出:若所造色就是大种,依同类推论,也应容许就五蕴建立补特伽罗,从而与持该说者自身的立场发生抵牾。 此外,颂文「无表与表异大种生」说明,无表色与表色虽都与大种有关,却由不同和合的大种所生,并非由同一组大种生起。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

现有材料仅涉及毘昙部《阿毘达磨俱舍论》(《阿毘達磨俱舍論》),未提供其他部类经典或本论异译本,故不能据此列出跨部类或同经异译的词语分歧。本论在所引段落中一贯使用「大种」「四大种」「所造」「所造色」「造色」「极微」等词;其中「所造」「所造色」「造色」依上下文指向同一所造色类,材料中未见另用其他异译名。

本论称身心构成类别为「五蕴」,在破斥「造色即大种」一说时亦用「即五蕴立补特伽罗」的表达;现有材料未见同一文本另作「五阴」。

4. 与相关概念的关系

- 四大种:地、水、火、风四大种分别以坚、湿、煖、动为相,是所造色的生、依、立、持、养五因。

- 触处:触处同时包含四大种与所造色,是十色界中不能全归入所造色的一处;其中滑、涩、重、轻、冷、饥、渴属于所造。

- 五根与五境:五根以及色、声、香、味四境皆为所造;触境则须分别其中的大种与所造部分。

- 无表色与表色:法界一分的无表属于所造色;无表与表由不同和合的大种生起。

- 极微与色聚:极微聚是论中说明大种和所造色俱生的分析单位;欲界最细色聚至少具有四大种和色、香、味、触四所造。

5. 代表性原文引用

「色者唯五根、五境及无表。」
「触界中有二,余九色所造,法一分亦然,十色可积集。」
「眼谓内处四大种所造净色……色谓外处四大种所造。」
「大为大二因,为所造五种,造为造三种,为大唯一因。」
「无表与表异大种生。」

By SutraAI-generated

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》以「所造色」為核心術語,論述依四大種而起的物質現象,茲彙其說如下。

一、定義與體性:論中明言「觸界通二,謂大種及所造。大種有四,謂堅性等。所造有七,謂滑性等,依大種生故名所造」,以「依大種生」標示所造色的定義,所造有七種性相(滑性等),與四大種之堅、濕、煖、動相對而立。論首亦先明大種「能持自相及所造色」,故名為界,以「一切餘色所依性故」立其大種之名。

二、十八界中的分布:論判「餘九色界唯是所造,謂五色根、色等四境。法界一分無表業色亦唯所造」,明五根、色聲香味四境(合九色界)及法界中一分無表業色皆唯屬所造;唯觸界兼具大種與所造二類。前五根中,眼等前四根「境唯所造」(取色聲香味),身根「境不定,或取大種、或取造色、或二俱取」。

三、極微聚中的俱生:論以「色聚極細立微聚名」說明欲界無聲無根處,「八事俱生」——四大種及四所造(色、香、味、觸)隨一不減;有身根聚九事,有餘根聚十事,有聲處則隨次遞增。又舉「無表與表異大種生」,明表色、無表色俱與大種同時而生,唯所依大種有別。

四、自他因果:頌云「六大為大二因,為所造五種;造為造三種,為大唯一因」。論釋大種望大種為俱有、同類二因;大種望所造能為五因——生、依、立、持、養(起、變、持、住、長之因性);所造色自互相望容有三因(俱有、同類、異熟),所造望大種但為異熟因一種(身語二業能招異熟大種果故)。此明大種與所造互為因果之精細分判。

五、破異執:論中對「諸計造色即大種論」明確破斥,引契經說堅等四相為大種,又明「觸處攝四大種,分明顯示餘有色處皆非大種」,並以「眼謂內處四大種所造淨色」等經文為證,斥尊者覺天「十種色處唯大種性」之說理定不然。又於「造色唯一,大種有四,寧言造色不異大種」之難,亦設質遮之。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》論「所造色」,核心在闡明其與「四大種」之依存、生成、不相離之理,及其內部分類。

一、總攝與特相。論中將一切色法分為二大類——四大種與所造色,二者皆以「變礙相」為共相。有色法攝十色處及法處所攝色,其共相為「觸所觸即便變壞」。於色聚中,攝有地、水、火、風、色、聲、香、味、觸及眼等五根,凡十四種事。

二、大種對造色之五種作用。論反覆指出,大種望於所造色有五種功能:生起、依止、建立、任持、增長。其中「依止」謂造色生已不離大種處而轉;「建立」謂大種損益,彼同安危;「任持」謂隨大種等量不壞;「增長」謂因飲食、睡眠、修習梵行、三摩地等,造色倍復增廣。

三、不相離之理。造色與大種具「同處不相離」與「和雜不相離」二種關係。造色依止大種處,不過大種處量;乃至大種所據處所,諸所造色還即據此。造色遍滿所依大種,如種種物石磨為末以水和合互不相離,非如胡麻、綠豆、粟、稗等聚之有間隙。

四、「住循身觀」之分別。於身念處三觀中,內身住循身觀緣「內能造大種色」;外身住循身觀緣「外能造大種色」;內外身住循身觀緣「依能造大種色所生根境所攝造色」。於「界差別觀」中,先取內外地、水、火、風、空等大相作粗大勝解,再分析身中支節乃至極微,分析四大種及十種所造諸色而起微細勝解。

五、造色之分類。論以「自類差別」與「異類差別」兩大類區分造色。異類差別造色者,謂眼、耳等五內色處,四外色處,法處一分;自類差別造色者,謂觸處所攝澁、滑等性,皆於大種清淨、堅實、慢緩等分位假施設而立。滑依大種清淨性,重依堅實性,澁、輕依不清淨不堅實性,軟依不清淨慢緩性,冷由水與風和合;飢渴、弱力、病、老、死、癢、悶絕、黏、疲極等,皆由大種不平等變異而假立,憩息、勇銳、飽、強力則由平等而假立,總有淨不淨、堅不堅、慢緩、和合、不平等、平等六位。

六、無見無對色與定所行色。由定心思惟欲界或色界有色諸法影像所生之色,當言欲界或色界大種所造,名「無見無對色」;其體性為「法處所攝勝定果色」,唯依勝定、不依大種,從緣彼種類影像三摩地發,故亦說為大種所造;此色唯是世間,有漏、無漏由定而生,非出世間。

七、造色與大種之異相。所造色望於大種,定有異相,以三事可得:異根所行、可運轉與不可運轉、變異與不變異。

八、物生之五種。依止生,謂造色於所依大種處所生,故說「由四大種造所造色」;種子生,謂色各從自種;勢引生,由業力令內諸色差別相續;攝受生,由攝受緣令色增益;損減生與此相違。又由士夫用、業所作、勝定三因緣,令大種變異,造色隨之變異而生。

大乘阿毘達磨雜集論T1606 · 瑜伽部

《大乘阿毘達磨雜集論》建立色蘊時,先總攝一切色為「四大種及四大種所造」,並直接使用「所造色」一詞。論中所說「造」,不是泛指製作,而是指以四大種為生、依、立、持、養五因:所造色離開大種便不能生起;捨離大種便無從另據一處而起作用;大種變異時,所造色亦隨之變異;大種使其相似相續而不斷;又能資養所造色,使之增長。四大種則明定為地、水、火、風界,依次以堅勁、流濕、溫熱、輕動為性。

就範圍而言,本論將所造色列為眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五根,色、聲、香、味,「所觸一分」,以及「法處所攝色」。五根皆被界定為四大種所造、相應識之所依,並以「清淨色」為體。色是四大種所造、眼根所行之義;聲是四大種所造、耳根所取之義;香亦是四大種所造、鼻根所取之義。由此可見,本論不是只作抽象定義,也按根、境及法處所攝色具體展開所造色的門類;其固定用語是「四大種所造」與「所造色」,不是另以其他名稱代稱。

本論又從「有色」說明所造色與大種的關係:「依大種」顯示色法與其他色相合;諸所造色因與大種色相合,故名有色。此處仍以「大種色」和「所造色」相對敘述,並說色具有方所、分量、遍滿方處、可被共同緣取,以及變壞、積集建立等面向,補充所造色作為色法所具的依處與變壞性。

對「依此而有,是造義」,本論另作細密說明:四大種與所造色可以同在一處,但某一色聚中實際可得何種大種或所造色,即只就該聚判定其有此而非餘。論中舉乾泥團、濕泥、煖泥、濕煖泥團,以及光、帶聲香之風、香煙、沙糖團等,說明色聚中大種與所造色可有不同組合;此說依麁物而立,不就種子而說,因一一聚中具有一切種子。

本論並以所依與能依的關係說明遍處觀:地、水、火、風是所依大種,青、黃、赤、白等是能依的所造色;建立地等遍處,是為了觀所依、能依之色皆遍滿。若不建立地等,便成為離開所依大種而觀青等所造色,故本論再次以「所依大種—能依所造色」的術語結構呈現兩者不可割裂的關係。

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