Dharma · AI Companion

處非處善巧

sthānāsthānakauśalya

善知诸法可能与不可能的智慧。AI-generated

Type AttainmentDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arisingInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

*Chù fēi chù shànqiǎo* (處非處善巧; Sanskrit *sthānāsthāna-kauśalya*) may be translated as “skill in discerning what is possible and impossible,” or more literally, “discernment regarding what has a valid ground and what does not.” It is the clear, accurate wisdom that recognizes correspondence between causes, conditions, actions, and results—and, more broadly, recognizes any principle that is not inverted or contrary to reality.

Here 處 does not mean a physical “place.” It means that something has a ground, occasion, or rational possibility: given these causes and conditions, this result can occur. 非處 means that it has no such ground: the proposed result does not follow from those causes, contradicts the relevant principle, or is impossible under the stated conditions. 善巧 here is not clever rhetoric or expedient teaching; it is trained competence in making this distinction without confusion.

The *Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* (《瑜伽師地論》, T1579) places this discernment among the *skillful objects of contemplation* (善巧所緣), alongside skill regarding the aggregates, elements, sense bases, dependent arising, and faculties. Its purpose is intensely practical: “使染污清淨正方便智不壞”—to prevent correct practical wisdom concerning defilement and purification from being damaged. In plain language: if we misunderstand what produces bondage and what produces freedom, even great diligence may carry us in the wrong direction.

The first scope: correspondence between karma and its maturation

In one formulation, discernment of 處 and 非處 is treated as a differentiation within *skill in dependent arising* (緣起善巧). The text says:

「善法能感可愛果異熟,不善法能感非愛果異熟,如實了知此理,是名處非處善巧。」

“Wholesome dharmas are capable of bringing about desirable matured results; unwholesome dharmas are capable of bringing about undesirable matured results. Knowing this principle as it really is is called skill regarding the possible and impossible.” —*Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* (《瑜伽師地論》)

The key term is *vipāka* (異熟), “maturation.” An intention does not necessarily produce an immediate, visibly matching event. A kind act may be followed by illness; a cruel person may temporarily prosper. The doctrine is not the childish equation “good people always get pleasant events at once.” It says that volitional qualities condition corresponding kinds of maturation, while the event that actually appears depends upon a much larger field of causes, supporting conditions, obstructing conditions, previous actions, and timing.

Thus “wholesome causes yield desirable maturation” must not be converted into victim-blaming. Buddhism does not authorize us to infer another person’s past conduct from their present suffering. Nor does this passage state that karma is the sole cause of every illness, accident, political disaster, or economic inequality. The point is narrower and more ethically exact: greed, hatred, and delusion cannot be cultivated as a reliable route to freedom from greed, hatred, and delusion. Non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion are causally consonant with well-being and liberation.

The text calls an attribution that assigns everything beings undergo to Īśvara or another universal maker an “unequal-cause theory” (不平等因論). Its objection is about causal explanation: when diverse results and their changing conditions are attributed indiscriminately to one author, the proposed cause does not vary in a way corresponding to the diversity of its alleged effects. This is not a license to dismiss every form of theism without examination; it identifies a particular explanatory model criticized in the śāstra.

The same concern appears in the rejection of the claim that an effect already exists fully formed inside its cause. If the effect were already complete, production would do no work. The text instead stresses that a cause must await conditions, and that changes in the causal complex are followed by corresponding changes in the result. A seed is not a miniature tree. Seed, moisture, soil, temperature, time, and the absence of certain obstructions together make a particular development possible.

This gives us a practical test of causal claims:

- What is the proposed cause? - What conditions must accompany it? - What characteristic result is it supposed to produce? - What function does each factor perform? - When the causal conditions vary, does the result vary correspondingly?

A mere sequence—“this happened after that”—is not yet adequate causal understanding.

The wider scope: all non-inverted reasoning

Elsewhere the *Yogācārabhūmi* draws a breadth distinction:

「唯於因果生起道理獲得顯了正智,名緣起善巧;於一切無顛倒理獲得顯了正智,名處非處善巧。」

“Clear correct knowledge concerning the principle by which causes and results arise is called skill in dependent arising; clear correct knowledge concerning all non-inverted principles is called skill regarding the possible and impossible.” —*Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* (《瑜伽師地論》)

This resolves what might otherwise look like a contradiction. In the narrower treatment, 處非處善巧 is a specific aspect of understanding dependent arising, particularly the correspondence of action and maturation. In the broader treatment, it includes but exceeds that domain: it is the ability to recognize what accords with any undistorted principle.

The text organizes this examination around four kinds of reasoning:

1. *Guāndài dàolǐ* (觀待道理), the reasoning of dependence or conditional requirement. A conditioned phenomenon arises or is established only in dependence upon relevant causes, conditions, or conceptual-linguistic supports. For example, a sprout depends upon a seed and supporting conditions; the designation “team leader” depends upon a social structure, roles, and conventions. This is not merely “one thing happened near another,” but “this cannot be established in this way without dependence on those factors.”

2. *Zuòyòng dàolǐ* (作用道理), the reasoning of function. Distinct phenomena have characteristic capacities and perform particular work when the necessary conditions are present. Sight apprehends visible form; hearing apprehends sound. Fire heats rather than remembers an appointment. In causal analysis, this asks what a factor actually contributes instead of treating every correlated factor as interchangeable.

3. *Zhèngchéng dàolǐ* (證成道理), the reasoning of warranted establishment. A claim must be established through appropriate means of knowledge and sound reasoning rather than assertion, prestige, or repetition. Yogācāra discussions associate this with direct perception, inference, and reliable scriptural testimony, each within its proper domain. Scriptural authority is therefore not a pretext for carelessly attributing invented sentences to a sūtra; nor should inference pretend to be direct realization.

4. *Fǎ’ěr dàolǐ* (法爾道理), the reasoning of the nature of things: regularities that obtain given what the relevant phenomena are. Classical examples include earth’s solidity, water’s moistening, fire’s heat, and wind’s movement. “It is naturally so” does not mean “anything familiar is eternally fixed.” It means that explanation eventually reaches the characteristic nature and lawful regularity under examination rather than an arbitrary agent’s decision. The fuller classical treatments of these four forms appear in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and related Yogācāra literature; a searchable summary of the relevant passages is available through the [DILA Buddhist Studies Glossaries](https://glossaries.dila.edu.tw/search?g=DFB&term=%E5%9B%9B%E7%A8%AE%E9%81%93%E7%90%86).

A statement that does not conflict with the applicable reasoning is 處: it has a valid place or possibility. One that conflicts is 非處. Hence the recurring canonical formula:

「無處無位……無有是處;與此相違,斯有是處。」

“There is no ground and no occasion … there is no such possibility; the contrary has a possibility.” —*Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* (《瑜伽師地論》)

The distinction is not simply between “things I believe” and “things I dislike.” Nor is it the abstract claim that everything imaginable is possible. Possibility is always disciplined by conditions: possible given what causes, possible in what sense, possible at what stage of the path, and possible according to which relevant principle?

This is why other Buddhist scholastic presentations give examples such as: without abandoning the five hindrances and cultivating the factors of awakening, one cannot reach the exhaustion of suffering merely by wishing for it. Conversely, when the necessary path factors are cultivated, realization has a genuine basis. The point is not fatalistic impossibility; it is conditional possibility. A concise traditional compilation of these passages can be found in the [BuddhaSpace entry on 處非處善巧](https://buddhaspace.org/dict/index.php?action=searchcontent&keyword=%E8%BD%89%E8%BC%AA%E8%81%96%E7%8E%8B).

That places the concept squarely within the path of liberation. Suffering is not ended by intensity of desire alone. It ends through causes capable of ending it: ethical restraint weakens remorse and harm; collectedness steadies the mind; wisdom sees impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, non-self, and dependent arising; relinquishment removes the fuel of grasping. 處非處善巧 is the intelligence that keeps this map causally intact.

A walkthrough in everyday life

Imagine that, during the commute, your phone shows a message from your partner: “We need to talk tonight.” Your stomach tightens. Within seconds the mind has produced a complete drama: “They are leaving me. It is because I worked late. Our relationship is over.”

Let us walk through this using the classical framework.

1. Separate the event from the proposed conclusion

The event is a short message. The conclusion is an interpretation. It is certainly possible that the message concerns a serious relationship problem—but the words alone do not make that conclusion necessary.

The common mapping error is to call a strong feeling “intuition” and then treat it as direct knowledge. Anxiety is real as anxiety; it is not thereby proof of the story attached to it. Under 證成道理, the evidence does not yet establish “the relationship is over.” That claim remains a possibility, not a fact.

2. Examine dependence

What did the reaction depend upon?

It depended upon the ambiguous message, memories of earlier conflict, fatigue from overwork, fear of abandonment, and perhaps the phone interface that stripped away tone and context. If any of these conditions changed—the message included a smiling emoji, you had slept well, or your partner had mentioned a practical issue beforehand—the reaction might be different.

That is 觀待道理. The fear did not appear from nowhere, and it was not issued by a permanent inner self. It arose through a convergence of conditions.

A frequent mistake is to map “dependent” onto “unreal.” The fear is occurring and has consequences. Dependence means it is conditioned and alterable, not that it is nonexistent.

3. Identify actual functions

What is each factor doing?

The phone transmits text. Memory supplies earlier images and phrases. Perception recognizes the words. Feeling registers unpleasantness. Fear mobilizes attention toward possible threat. Repetitive thought simulates outcomes. The urge to send an accusatory reply prepares an action.

This is 作用道理: distinguish functions instead of naming the whole bundle “my intuition” or “the truth.” The message does not itself perform the function of proving betrayal; the anxious simulation does not perform the function of reading another person’s mind.

The same care applies to algorithms. A recommendation system can select content predicted to hold attention. It does not therefore know what is ultimately good for you, and engagement is not identical with well-being. This is a useful analogy, not a claim that Buddhist mental analysis and computer systems are the same thing.

4. Test the causal claim

You think: “Working late caused the relationship to fail.” Perhaps repeated absence has contributed to tension. But has failure already occurred? What other conditions matter—communication, your partner’s needs, shared expectations, financial pressure, affection, willingness to repair?

A competent causal judgment looks for covariance: when the relevant conditions change, does the result change? If you reduce overtime, listen without defensiveness, and establish reliable time together, does the relationship soften? If nothing changes, was the proposed cause incomplete or mistaken?

This is not an experiment that guarantees control over another person. Your conduct is one causal stream among several. Dependent arising removes the fantasy of total control without collapsing into helplessness: you cannot command the whole field, but you can cultivate conditions within your reach.

5. Discern karmic correspondence

Now the impulse appears: “I’ll send a cruel message first so I cannot be hurt first.” Is cruelty a 處—a causally fitting means—for intimacy, truthfulness, or liberation from fear?

It is not. A hostile message may produce compliance, silence, or a momentary sense of power. Those are possible short-term effects. But hostility nourishes hostility, fear, defensiveness, and the habit of protecting oneself through harm. As a means to non-hatred and clear understanding, it is 非處.

A truthful and non-aggressive reply—“That message made me anxious; can you tell me whether this is urgent?”—does not guarantee the result you want. Wholesome action is not magical control. It is nevertheless consonant with clarity, non-harming, and the possibility of honest conversation. In that respect it is 處.

The usual mapping error is to define “wholesome” as “whatever gets me the preferred outcome.” In Buddhist ethics, an intention can be wholesome even when external circumstances remain painful; conversely, manipulation can secure a pleasant outcome while strengthening greed, aversion, and delusion.

6. Locate lawful regularity without freezing it into destiny

Repeated rumination tends to reinforce rumination; repeatedly interrupting it with mindful recognition, inquiry, and non-reactivity tends to weaken its automatic authority. This illustrates 法爾道理 at an everyday level: patterns have characteristic tendencies.

Contemporary psychology and neuroscience also investigate habit learning, attentional bias, and the plasticity of learned responses. These comparisons can illuminate how repetition conditions future responses. They do not scientifically prove Buddhist claims about karma, rebirth, liberation, or the complete structure of mind; scientific models remain method-bound, revisable, and contested in important details.

7. Find the path-relevant possibility

What is genuinely possible at this moment?

It may be impossible to abolish fear by issuing the command “Do not be afraid.” It is possible to refrain from sending the first reactive message. It is possible to notice bodily tightening, recognize the unverified story, ask for information, and choose non-harming speech. With repeated cultivation, it becomes possible for fear to arise without dictating conduct.

This final distinction is the heart of 處非處善巧. It redirects attention from fantasy—“How do I guarantee that nothing painful happens?”—to the path: “Which causes can I establish now that are compatible with non-harming, clarity, and release?”

Why contemporary people need it

We live amid systems designed to collapse possibility into certainty. A headline says “This one habit destroys your brain.” A short video turns correlation into causation. An algorithm repeatedly shows one interpretation until familiarity feels like proof. An AI system can generate fluent explanations whose polish exceeds their evidential basis. 處非處善巧 asks the question that fluency tries to make us forget: does this conclusion actually have a ground?

It supplies four forms of resistance.

First, it resists magical causality. Wanting something intensely is not a sufficient cause of obtaining it. Visualizing liberation is not the same as cultivating its causes. Declaring “I have no attachment” does not remove attachment when conduct still revolves around possession and fear.

Second, it resists fatalism. If phenomena depend upon conditions, changing relevant conditions can change what follows. “I am an angry person” becomes “anger arises strongly under these conditions and is reinforced by these responses.” That does not minimize responsibility. It makes responsibility workable.

Third, it resists moral simplification. Karma is neither cosmic instant punishment nor a tool for explaining why someone deserves misfortune. It concerns the formative and maturational efficacy of intentional action within a complex causal field. Its proper first use is self-examination: “What am I cultivating through this intention?”—not judgment of another person’s hidden past.

Fourth, it protects spiritual practice from misplaced means. Sleep deprivation is not inherently awakening. Emotional intensity is not necessarily insight. A charismatic teacher’s confidence is not proof of realization. Suppressing thought is not identical with wisdom. Temporary calm is valuable but does not by itself uproot ignorance. Each may be confused with a later fruit because it resembles one feature of that fruit.

On the liberation path, this discernment guards the relation between diagnosis, practice, and result:

- If suffering is conditioned by craving and ignorance, feeding craving while giving it a sacred name is not a path beyond suffering. - If ethical misconduct agitates and fragments the mind, meditative technique cannot simply make the ethical dimension irrelevant. - If wisdom requires seeing phenomena without appropriation as “I” and “mine,” building a more exalted spiritual identity is not yet that wisdom. - If awakening depends upon cultivation, wishing, belonging, or intellectual agreement alone cannot substitute for cultivation.

The concept is therefore not merely Buddhist logic. It is wisdom about practicability: what can actually do the work of purification, and what only resembles a method while preserving the disease.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“處 means a location, and 非處 means the wrong location.”

Not here. The terms concern whether something has a valid ground, occasion, causal fit, or possibility. “There is no such 處” means that under the stated conditions, the proposed event has no basis—not that it is geographically misplaced.

“Possible means anything that can be imagined.”

Imaginability is much wider than conditioned possibility. One can imagine becoming free from anger by rehearsing resentment every day. But the proposed cause is contrary to the result. Buddhist possibility is indexed to causes, conditions, functions, and the relevant principle.

“Impossible means permanently and metaphysically forbidden.”

Often the claim is conditional: without certain causes, the result cannot occur. “Without cultivating the path, one cannot obtain its fruit” does not condemn anyone to permanent exclusion. Establishing the necessary conditions changes the situation. 非處 can become 處 when the causal basis changes.

“If wholesome actions yield desirable maturation, good people should never suffer.”

This mistakes one causal principle for an exhaustive explanation of every event and erases temporal complexity. Multiple causal streams mature under multiple conditions. The doctrine does not promise that one good intention immediately cancels every painful condition. Nor does present suffering reveal a person’s moral worth.

“Karma means every event is personally deserved.”

No. The relevant teaching concerns intentional action and its maturation. It should not be stretched into a totalizing explanation of natural events, biological processes, social structures, or another person’s suffering. Using karma to withhold compassion is itself a morally consequential intention.

“Dependent arising and 處非處善巧 are identical.”

They overlap but are not simply interchangeable. In the narrow account, 處非處善巧 is a differentiation of skill in dependent arising, highlighting the correspondence of wholesome and unwholesome action with their maturation. In the broader account, dependent-arising skill concerns clear knowledge of causal arising, while 處非處善巧 extends to all non-inverted reasoning, including dependence, function, warranted establishment, and lawful regularity.

“The four reasonings are four modern scientific methods.”

They can fruitfully be compared with conditional analysis, functional explanation, evidential justification, and the study of regularities. But they arose in a Buddhist philosophical and contemplative framework. Mapping them one-to-one onto contemporary scientific categories would distort both traditions. Science can test many empirical claims; it does not, by its current methods alone, adjudicate every soteriological or karmic claim found in Buddhist traditions.

“法爾道理 means accepting tradition because ‘that is just how things are.’”

That would undermine 證成道理. 法爾 refers to characteristic nature or regularity, not immunity from inquiry. A social custom, prejudice, or institutional habit does not become a law of reality merely because it is old or familiar.

“This teaching encourages cold rationalism.”

Its aim is not to win arguments but to keep the means of purification intact. Compassion without causal wisdom may repeatedly enable harm; causal analysis without compassion may become a weapon. Genuine skill knows both that suffering has conditions and that a suffering person should not be reduced to a causal diagram.

“Correct understanding is enough; practice is optional.”

Knowing the map verbally is not the same as walking the path. One may accurately explain that anger conditions suffering and still send the destructive message. 處非處善巧 becomes liberating when it enters the pause before action: this intention leads in that direction; this other response supports non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion.

Its deepest question is therefore very intimate. At each moment, what are we asking this action to produce? If we want peace while cultivating hostility, freedom while cultivating grasping, or insight while defending a fixed self, the means and end do not correspond. There is “no such possibility” in that direction.

But the opposite is equally important. When the causes of clarity, ethical restraint, collectedness, and wisdom are patiently established, liberation is not groundless. The path becomes a real possibility—not because reality grants exceptions to those who wish hard enough, but because causes and conditions can be understood, cultivated, and eventually relinquished.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

处非处善巧(sthānāsthāna-kauśalya)是瑜伽行派《瑜伽师地论》所立「善巧所缘」之一,与蕴善巧、界善巧、处善巧、缘起善巧、根善巧等并列。其核心在于如理辨明「处」与「非处」——即某事于道理上究竟是否可能、合理或不颠倒——从而于因果报应及一切不颠倒道理获得显了正智。此善巧施设之目的,是使染污与清净之正方便智不致失坏。

二、主要阐述

(一)作为缘起善巧之差别

《瑜伽师地论》将处非处善巧视为缘起善巧的一种差别:能正确了知因果并非由不平等之因所决定,而是善法感可爱果异熟、不善法感非爱果异熟,如实了知此理即名处非处善巧。此处特别使用「非不平等因果道理」「果异熟」「可爱果异熟」「非爱果异熟」等语,强调业果必须与因相称。

(二)与缘起善巧之广狭区别

论中又从较广的范围辨别二者:唯于因果生起道理获得显了正智,名为「缘起善巧」;于一切无颠倒理获得显了正智,方名「处非处善巧」。前者专就因果生起一端而说,后者则遍及一切不颠倒的道理,范围更为宽广。

(三)「处」与「非处」之判定标准

「处」与「非处」依是否违背正理而定。论举四种道理:观待道理、作用道理、证成道理、法尔道理。凡示现、宣说而不与这些道理相违者,名为「处」;若与之相违,则名「非处」。此四处与四非处,连同前文所述之因果道理上的处非处,合成八种处非处善巧。原文亦以「无处无位……无有是处;与此相违,斯有是处」的句式,分判某事究竟可能或不可能。

(四)对错误因果论之辨析

论中对错误因果论亦作辨析:反对因中先已有果的观点,指出必须有因并等待诸缘,果才生起;并以处所、所依、自相、自作业,以及因缘变异而果随之变异等相,检验事物间的因果关系。这显示其善巧所依的因果理解,重在因待缘生及因缘与果之相应变异。

(五)对不平等因论之批评

对以自在天或其他作者为世间一切遭受之因的说法,论称之为「不平等因论」;其起因是见众生所欲与实际业果不相随,遂推想另有作者、生者、变化者。此段呈现「不平等因」所指的错误归因形态,与前述「非不平等因果道理」相互照应。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

本条目所依主要出处为《瑜伽师地论》(《瑜伽師地論》),属瑜伽部。论中固定使用「处非处善巧」一术语,并未另用其他名称,亦未见其他部派经典或异译本对此概念另立异称。

四、与相关概念的关系

处非处善巧于瑜伽行派修行体系中,与其他善巧所缘(蕴、界、处、缘起、根等善巧)并列而各有侧重。其中与缘起善巧关系最为密切:狭义上,处非处善巧为缘起善巧之一差别,着重于因果报应之相应;广义上,处非处善巧之范围比缘起善巧更广,遍及一切不颠倒的道理,不仅限于因果生起一端。此外,处非处善巧与四种道理(观待道理、作用道理、证成道理、法尔道理)直接相关,是判断「处」与「非处」之标准。

五、代表性原文引用

- 「非不平等因果道理……善法能感可爱果异熟,不善法能感非爱果异熟,如实了知此理,是名处非处善巧。」 - 「唯于因果生起道理获得显了正智,名缘起善巧;于一切无颠倒理获得显了正智,名处非处善巧。」 - 「观待道理、作用道理、证成道理、法尔道理……不与此相违,名为处;与此相违,名非处。」 - 「使染污清净正方便智不坏。」 - 「无处无位……无有是处;与此相违,斯有是处。」 - 「以自在天或余作者为世间一切起诸因者,是不平等因论。」

By SutraAI-generated

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》將「處非處善巧」列為六種善巧所緣之一,與蘊善巧、界善巧、處善巧、緣起善巧、根善巧並立。本論對其定位最核心的表述為:「處非處善巧,當知即是緣起善巧差別」——並非獨立於緣起之外的另一套觀法,而是緣起善巧的進一步分化與深化。

就二者之差別,本論設有專問:「緣起善巧、處非處善巧何差別?」答曰:「唯於因果生起道理正智顯了,名緣起善巧。若於一切無顛倒理正智顯了,名處非處善巧。」 緣起善巧偏重因果相續生起之序列,處非處善巧則擴及一切無顛倒之理,範圍更廣。

其具體所觀為「非不平等因果道理」:善不善法各有其果異熟,善法感可愛果異熟,不善法感非愛果異熟;能如實了知此因果平等法則,即名處非處善巧。此處本論以「果異熟」一詞指稱因果報應,以「可愛」「非愛」形容果報之性質,是其術語特色。

六善巧可略攝為二:自相善巧與共相善巧。蘊善巧顯自相善巧,其餘諸善巧(含處非處善巧)顯共相善巧。

本論復以四種道理——觀待道理、作用道理、證成道理、法爾道理——為觀察處非處之綱要:「若於如是所說道理不相違背示現宣說,是名為處;若此相違示現宣說,是名非處。」合前所說,共成八種處非處善巧。

本論亦舉實例以明處非處:「無處無位一切智者、一切見者有所知境而不了知,或復失念作非一切智者所作,無有是處」;「無處無位已入大地諸菩薩等,於諸有情起故害心,或菩提心當有退轉,無有是處」;反之則「斯有是處」。此類例示顯示處非處善巧兼攝染污與清淨兩面之正方便智。

世尊開示處非處善巧之用意,本論明言:「為欲顯示染污、清淨正方便智無失壞故。」 即令修行者於染淨因果之方便智不生錯謬失壞。本論於緣起善巧說畢後,另立總嗢拕南以專說處非處善巧,並謂「所餘處非處善巧決擇,文不復現」,表示此處所說即為本論對該概念之完整決擇。

顯揚聖教論T1602 · 瑜伽部

《顯揚聖教論》將「處非處善巧」列為十種善巧事之一,與蘊善巧、界善巧、處善巧、緣起善巧、根善巧、諦善巧等並舉()。值得注意的是,此論中「處」字有二義須先區辨:一為十二處之「處善巧」,一為可能不可能之「處非處善巧」,二者論述各有不同。論中先以頌文標示其體性,次以論文廣為解釋。就「處善巧」(十二處)而言,論以「觸」「受」為例,說明「處」有能生、所居之義:觸為受之所依,故以觸為受處;就世俗諦,了知「觸者」「受者」二種自性可得;然就勝義諦,二者皆不可得(、)。此段雖屬「處善巧」之釋義,非「處非處善巧」之正體,然顯示論中對「處」字用例之嚴。就「處非處善巧」之正體,論以頌曰:「不作,不趣、得,二、餘體不轉,淨見無餘業,非我自在二。如是智能知,處非處善巧,於自果定處,異此說非處。」()論文隨即以此頌為本,詳為六門之解釋():一、不作——計執有我而於因果得自在者,必無是處,以不純修妙善行故。二、不趣——離妙行不往善趣,如經言「無處無容行身惡行得生天上,必無是處」。三、不得——離善方便無漏聖道,定不能得道果所攝畢竟清淨,如「不永斷五蓋、不修七遍覺支,不能證得苦盡邊際」。四、二體不轉——「無處無容非前非後有二如來出現於世」,二佛並出必無是處。五、餘體不轉——「離丈夫身外,女人得作轉輪聖王,必無是處」,轉輪王必於丈夫身中現起。六、淨見無餘業——「聖見具足之補特伽羅故斷物命,乃至受第八有,必無是處」;此則唯異生有是處。論中復統攝此六門:以「不見我、於因果二處而得自在」為其總相,故頌結云「非我自在二」。就「處」「非處」之定義,論文明言:「於自果決定名之為處,當知於餘名為非處」,是就果上決定不決定而立名。由此「無倒慧」於此善巧,即是「處非處善巧」。論末並點明此中兼顯「處非處善巧自體及彼障斷勝利」()。就術語而言,本論沿用瑜伽行派通行名相:「補特伽羅」自音譯,「五蓋」「七遍覺支」「轉輪聖王」「第八有」皆如常譯;亦用「世俗諦」「勝義諦」「無倒慧」等術語貫通前後。論中以頌、論雙行,總顯「無我」為處非處善巧之根本前提;其後即接「根善巧」「諦善巧」之觀察(),共同成此十善巧之完整體系。

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