Dharma · AI Companion

第二句

禅宗三句(第一、第二、第三句)之第二位次,荐得者堪与人天为师。AI-generated

Type AttainmentDifficulty AdvancedTruth-level span III · nominal designationInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

“Second phrase” (第二句, *dì-èr jù*) is the middle rank in a Chan framework called the “three phrases” (三句, *sān jù*). Its best-known formulation appears in the *Recorded Sayings of the Ancient Worthies* (*Guzunsu Yulu*, 《古尊宿语录》):

“One who realizes the first phrase is fit to be a teacher of patriarchs and buddhas; one who realizes the second phrase is fit to be a teacher of humans and devas; one who realizes the third phrase cannot even save himself.”

The hierarchy is unmistakable:

- The first phrase is the highest position: “fit to be a teacher of patriarchs and buddhas.” - The second phrase is the middle position: “fit to be a teacher of humans and devas.” - The third phrase is the lowest: “unable even to save oneself.”

But “phrase” is potentially misleading. These are not three doctrinal sentences that can be written down, memorized, and recited in order. The second phrase has no single, fixed verbal content. It is a relational judgment made within a living Chan encounter: a teacher examines a question, answer, gesture, hesitation, or manner of understanding and determines where it “lands.”

That is why different masters answer “What is the second phrase?” in radically different ways. The *Recorded Sayings* preserves such replies as “I won’t strike such a donkey fellow,” “Before his face he does not see him; behind his back he complains bitterly,” and Shending’s “What donkey fellow is there?” Fengxue’s response is still different. These are not competing dictionary definitions. They are interventions directed at particular people under particular conditions.

To turn any one of them into the universal definition of the second phrase would therefore miss the classical evidence. The changing answer is part of the point: a Chan utterance functions before it becomes an object that can be detached from the encounter and possessed as information.

The verb in the traditional formula is also important. 荐得 (*jiànde*) here means something like “to recognize,” “realize,” or “personally discern”—not merely to understand an explanation. Someone may accurately repeat the ranking of the three phrases and still not have “realized the second phrase” in the sense tested by the records.

What, then, distinguishes its middle position?

The texts show this more securely through judgments than through definitions. In the *Jingde Record of the Transmission of the Lamp* (《景德传灯录》), Xuefeng asks Fu of Taiyuan about the first phrase. Fu raises his eyes and looks at him. Xuefeng judges: “This is still the second phrase” (此犹是第二句). The gesture is not dismissed as meaningless. It is an actual response, perhaps a skillful and non-discursive one, yet Xuefeng still finds that it has not reached what was being tested as the first phrase.

In another passage, a monk asks Master Kelong Liaokong, “What is Samantabhadra’s first phrase?” The master answers, “You have fallen into the second phrase” (落第二句也). The monk has named the first phrase, but naming it does not place him there. The very structure of seeking it as an answerable object is diagnosed as a descent into the second.

Thus “second” does not mean the second item in a syllabus. “Still the second phrase” and “fallen into the second phrase” are verdicts on the living configuration of questioner, response, discrimination, and attachment.

The sharpest traditional comment is “already wrong before the question was asked” (未问已前错), appended in the *Recorded Sayings* to Fengxue’s second phrase. This should not be flattened into the anti-intellectual slogan that every question is bad. Chan literature contains countless questions, teachings, explanations, and scriptural discussions. The problem lies deeper: before speech begins, the mind may already have divided reality into an ignorant subject over here and a liberating object over there, imagining that the latter can be captured by the right performance or formulation. The spoken question then expresses a prior misalignment.

Yet the second phrase is not worthless. Its traditional dignity is considerable: one who realizes it is “fit to be a teacher of humans and devas” (人天之师). “Humans and devas” is a conventional Buddhist expression for beings within the realms of rebirth; it does not simply mean “ordinary people” in the modern sociological sense. The phrase indicates genuine capacity to guide beings. The middle rank can teach, respond, diagnose, and employ means suited to circumstances. It stands far above the third phrase’s helplessness.

Its limitation is subtler. Effective guidance still does not equal the first phrase. The second phrase belongs to the sphere in which liberating insight is already functioning as an address to someone, an answer to something, or a medicine for a condition. Such responsiveness is indispensable, but once there is an identifiable “device,” it can be copied; once there is an answer, it can be possessed; once there is a distinction between higher and lower, a clever person can imitate the signs of transcendence. The Chan encounter therefore examines not only whether an answer sounds profound, but where the entire act of answering comes from.

This places the concept within the path of liberation in a precise but limited way. The three phrases are not a universal Buddhist map equivalent to the noble eightfold path, the bodhisattva grounds, stages of meditation, or degrees of awakening. They are a Chan instrument of 接引 (*jiēyǐn*, receiving and guiding practitioners), 料拣 (*liàojiǎn*, discerning and critically sorting), and 印可 (*yìnkě*, recognition or confirmation). They test whether living realization is free, whether it has already become a method or stance, and whether the practitioner can guide others without becoming trapped in the guidance itself.

The saying about Longya and Yunju makes this interpersonal dimension especially clear. Longya declares, “Elder brother Yunju attained the second phrase; I attained the first.” The subsequent exchange does not treat this as a tidy report card. Longya’s claim itself becomes material for further examination, with talk of bowing to Yunju and of onlookers laughing. In Chan, claiming the higher position may expose precisely the comparative mind that the claim is meant to transcend. The record preserves the contest of discernment; it does not authorize us to convert it into a definitive ranking of the two monks’ realization.

A walk-through in everyday life

Imagine a familiar scene. After a long day, you send your partner a vulnerable message: “I feel as though you no longer listen to me.” A reply arrives: “That isn’t fair. I’ve done everything I can.” Within seconds, both of you are defending positions.

First, notice what happens before the next question or answer. You are not simply perceiving words. Hurt has already arranged the field: “I am the neglected one; you are the person who refuses to understand; somewhere there is a perfect sentence that will force you to see.” Before typing anything, the situation has acquired a subject, an opponent, a desired outcome, and a strategy. This is where the comment “already wrong before the question was asked” becomes illuminating. It does not mean that your hurt is unreal or that you should remain silent. It points to the structure silently controlling whatever you say next.

You now recall something that sounds Zen and type: “There is no self who is hurt and no other who hurts.” The sentence may contain doctrinal vocabulary, but here it is being used to escape vulnerability and defeat the other person. Calling it “nonduality” does not make its functioning nondual. This is a common mapping error: cryptic or paradoxical speech is not automatically the first phrase—or even genuine Chan.

Next you pause, recognize the defensive pattern, and answer more appropriately: “When I didn’t hear from you today, I became afraid that I didn’t matter. Can we slow down and talk about what happened?” This may be wise and compassionate. It receives the other person rather than merely striking back. In an ordinary ethical and relational sense, it is much better than the clever Zen reply.

Can we label it “the second phrase”? Not mechanically. The classical category is a master’s context-sensitive judgment, not a modern communication score. But the scene helps us understand the second phrase’s domain: insight has become a usable response, shaped for a person and circumstance. It can guide, reconcile, or awaken. That resembles the pedagogical capacity honored by “teacher of humans and devas.”

Still, a new trap appears. Having discovered a successful formula—“name the feeling, state the need, invite dialogue”—you may begin applying it everywhere. Living attention hardens into technique. You become proud of being the emotionally mature partner; your gentle language conceals a demand that the other person behave according to your method. The medicine has become an identity.

This is where the distinction between first and second phrase matters. It warns that even excellent means remain means. A response can be compassionate, skillful, and transformative while still being traceable as a method adopted by someone seeking a result. Chan’s examination presses beyond whether the technique works to whether the mind is bound by its own skillfulness.

Now suppose you genuinely stop rehearsing. You listen without preparing your defense, without trying to look awakened, and without searching for a “Zen” response. Perhaps you apologize. Perhaps you set a firm boundary. Perhaps you say nothing for a moment. The outward behavior cannot by itself be ranked. Silence might be openness, fear, punishment, or performance; a clear explanation might arise from freedom or from compulsion. In the classical records, the same difficulty applies to raised eyes, folded hands, shouts, and retreats: no gesture carries its rank as an intrinsic label.

This also explains the episode in which Fu merely raises his eyes, only to hear Xuefeng say, “This is still the second phrase.” A modern reader may assume that nonverbal immediacy must be superior to language. The record blocks that shortcut. A gesture can be just as constructed, imitative, belated, or strategically “Zen” as a sentence.

Consider a second, briefer scene: scrolling on a phone late at night. An algorithm presents a meditation clip declaring, “There is nowhere to go and nothing to attain.” You recognize the slogan, repost it, and feel momentarily above the anxious people striving for improvement. Conceptually, you may be discussing the highest freedom; functionally, you are collecting an identity. Naming the first phrase while seeking confirmation from it resembles the predicament exposed by “You have fallen into the second phrase.”

Then you notice the craving directly: the hand reaching for another clip, the little anticipation of novelty, the wish to become someone who understands. That recognition may create room not to obey the impulse. It is useful and potentially liberating. But if you turn “watching the craving” into a guaranteed technique, you have again made a living encounter into a reproducible object.

AI systems offer a helpful comparison, with an important limit. A language model can reproduce the vocabulary and stylistic markers of Chan: brevity, reversal, silence represented in words, even plausible shouts and paradoxes. This vividly shows why textual resemblance cannot establish realization. But the analogy proves nothing about buddhahood, consciousness, or the nature of mind; those remain philosophical and scientific questions not settled by linguistic performance. It merely helps contemporary readers see the classical problem: an output may look exactly right while its source and function remain unexamined.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary life rewards second-order fluency. We learn therapeutic language, mindfulness language, management language, political language, and the language of self-awareness. We can explain our patterns while continuing to enact them. We can teach boundaries while using “boundaries” to punish; advocate compassion while craving moral superiority; speak of emptiness while protecting an unusually rigid self-image.

The second phrase is valuable because it refuses two opposite mistakes.

The first is contempt for skillful teaching. The traditional formula does not say that the second phrase is useless or fraudulent. It says that realizing it qualifies one to teach humans and devas. Communication, ethical formation, interpretation, compassionate adaptation, and practical guidance matter profoundly. Beings need medicine suited to their conditions, not abstract displays of ultimacy.

The second mistake is confusing pedagogical mastery with complete freedom. A person may become an impressive teacher, therapist, parent, organizer, or contemplative guide while remaining attached to being the one who understands and helps. Success can make this bondage harder to see. The second phrase honors the medicine and simultaneously asks whether the healer is attached to the role of healer.

This is particularly important in spiritual communities. Charisma, verbal brilliance, knowledge of texts, and an ability to produce powerful experiences may show genuine teaching capacity, but they do not by themselves prove unrestricted awakening or ethical reliability. The three-phrase framework is not a modern safeguarding system and should not replace transparent accountability. It does, however, undermine the naïve assumption that impressive spiritual performance necessarily reveals the highest realization.

The concept also corrects our appetite for portable answers. Digital culture teaches us that every uncertainty should yield to the right search term, prompt, clip, or framework. The Chan records do not merely withhold an answer to create mystique. They challenge the assumption that liberation is an object standing opposite a seeker and waiting to be retrieved. If that structure is already operating “before the question,” an increasingly refined answer may only decorate the enclosure.

Yet the point is not to stop learning. Teachings belong to the path because they can expose confusion, orient conduct, and make practice possible. The second phrase stands precisely in this productive tension: words and means can liberate, but grasping them recreates bondage. One must receive the medicine without building a permanent identity around possessing it.

In that sense, its place on the liberation path is neither “mere theory” nor the final summit. It concerns the conversion of insight into compassionate function—and the danger that function will solidify into a standpoint. The practitioner learns to respond without worshipping the response, teach without possessing the teaching, and use distinctions without forgetting their provisional character.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“The second phrase is a particular sentence.” It is not. The sources preserve multiple incompatible-looking replies because the term marks a position discerned in an encounter, not a canonical sentence with fixed wording.

“First, second, and third are three chronological lessons.” The records give a hierarchy, but not a standardized curriculum through which everyone advances in three measurable stages. They are ranks of discernment used in Chan examination and encounter.

“The second phrase simply means conventional truth, while the first means ultimate truth.” That equation is too neat and is not supplied by the cited passages. The two-truths doctrine may help a later interpreter think about teaching and ultimacy, but it should not be substituted for the records’ own relational language: “still,” “fallen into,” “realized,” and the ability to teach humans and devas.

“Being a teacher of humans and devas means being an ordinary schoolteacher or a popular spiritual instructor.” No. 人天, “humans and devas,” belongs to Buddhist cosmological and soteriological language. The saying praises a capacity to guide beings; it is not a prediction of professional success, institutional rank, or popularity.

“The second phrase is bad because one has ‘fallen’ into it.” This ignores its middle rank. Relative to the first phrase it is insufficient; relative to the third it represents great capacity. Chan’s judgment is exacting without being binary.

“Any compassionate or skillful teaching is automatically the second phrase.” That goes beyond the evidence. “Teacher of humans and devas” indicates its function, but the records do not give us a checklist by which every helpful statement can be classified. The term belongs to live discernment, not retrospective labeling of anything beneficial.

“Silence, shouting, looking, or walking away must be the first phrase because these actions are beyond words.” Fu’s raised eyes are explicitly judged “still the second phrase.” Nonverbal behavior is not inherently free of calculation. A silence can be copied as easily as a doctrine.

“Already wrong before the question was asked” means that study and inquiry are obstacles.” The literature itself refutes that reading by preserving elaborate questions, answers, commentarial judgments, and records. What is examined is the prior posture of grasping—not the grammatical existence of a question. A sincere question can be part of practice; a sophisticated question can also be a strategy for protecting the questioner.

“If Longya said he attained the first phrase and Yunju the second, the record gives us their final spiritual rankings.” The ensuing exchange turns Longya’s claim itself into a case for examination. The passage shows mutual testing and appraisal within the Chan community. It does not provide sufficient grounds for a modern reader to issue final certificates of attainment.

“The three phrases are a universal Buddhist doctrine.” They are a specific Chan classificatory and pedagogical device found in encounter records such as the *Recorded Sayings of the Ancient Worthies* and the *Jingde Record of the Transmission of the Lamp*. They should not be confused with broadly shared Buddhist structures such as the four noble truths or the noble eightfold path.

The deepest use of the second phrase, then, is not to make us obsessed with reaching “number one.” That ambition could itself be the error present before the question. Its use is to refine discernment. It teaches us to respect words without being captured by words, to employ methods without mistaking them for freedom, and to recognize that even genuine spiritual effectiveness can become a subtle place of residence.

The second phrase is therefore both an achievement and a warning. It is an achievement because liberating understanding has become capable of meeting and guiding beings. It is a warning because the very form taken for their sake can be grasped as the truth itself. Chan keeps both sides visible: without skillful response, one may not even save oneself; with skillful response, one may teach humans and devas; but freedom cannot finally be reduced to the response that displays it.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「第二句」是禅宗「三句」框架中的中间位次,与「第一句」「第三句」共同构成次第序列。《古尊宿语录》明载三句之等次与功用:「第一句荐得,堪与祖佛为师;第二句荐得,堪与人天为师;第三句荐得,自救不了。」由此可知,第二句之位在第一句之下、第三句之上,其功用为接引人天。第二句并非一个固定的命题或定义,而是一个在禅僧问答与机锋勘辨中用以判别当下应答所落位置的序列性术语。

二、主要阐述

《古尊宿语录》论「第二句」,始终以三句结构为脉络,既标其位次,又存诸家异答与公案实例。

就位次而言,《古尊宿语录》两处引述首山之语,重申三句等次——第二句荐得者堪作人天之师,较第一句所对之祖佛为师低一层次,而高于第三句之自救不了。

就答语而言,当问「如何是第二句」时,诸师各以不同语句施设接引:有以棒喝之辞答「不打恁么驴汉」者;有以拟喻之句答「面前渠不见,背后称冤苦」者;风穴垂示则以言句「妙解岂容无著问?漚和争赴截流机?」作答;神鼎举问下答「有什么驴汉?」各家机用虽异,有棒喝、拟喻、言句之别,皆不正面给出第二句之固定内容。

就公案而言,《古尊宿语录》载龙牙语:「云居师兄得第二句,我得第一句。」西院反问龙牙与么道还扶得也无,师代云「须礼拜云居始得」,西院则云「傍观者哂」。此段显示第二句非仅义理层次,亦涉宗门中人互相印可、彼此料拣之公案事实。

就料拣而言,引风穴举三句后,本师对第一句「三要印开朱点窄,未容拟议主宾分」处「随後一喝」;对第二句「妙解岂容无著问?漚和争赴截流机?」则著语云「未问已前错」;对第三句「但看棚头弄傀儡,牵抽都在里头人」著语「明破即不堪」。三句各有对应之料拣,第二句之关键标明为「未问已前」之谬误。

《景德传灯录》论「第二句」,主要置于禅僧问答及机锋勘辨之中,并不先为它作抽象界定,而是藉第一句与第二句的相对判别,显示答语所落的位置。太原孚上座一段中,雪峰问临济是否有「三句」,孚上座答「是」;雪峰续问「作幺生是第一句」,孚上座仅「举目视之」,雪峰随即判曰「此犹是第二句」,再追问第一句。本录直接采用「三句」「第一句」「第二句」等序列性术语,其中第二句是对当前举动的判语,表示该应对虽已呈现,仍被雪峰判为未是所问的第一句。此段又以后续动作補足辨别:孚上座在雪峰再次追问「如何是第一句」时,「叉手而退」,原文不再用语句解释,也未明言此举应判作哪一句,只记雪峰自此「深器之」。

福州东禅院可隆了空大师一段,则以「落第二句也」为明确表述。僧问「如何是普贤第一句」,师答「落第二句也」。此处第二句不是列出第二条命题的正文,而是以「落」字指出:一旦如此发问,所问虽名为「第一句」,其问语或问答情境却已被判作落入第二句。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

《古尊宿语录》(禅宗语录部·X1315)与《景德传灯录》(史传部·《景德傳燈錄》)同属禅宗文献,论述侧重有所不同:

《古尊宿语录》侧重于「第二句」的位次定位与诸师接引之语,反复引用「第一句荐得,堪与祖佛为师;第二句荐得,堪与人天为师;第三句荐得,自救不了」之三句等次,对各家如何接引「第二句」问题作并列展示,并引龙牙、云居公案佐证。所用术语即「第二句」,未见他译名。

《景德传灯录》则不立义理框架,而以问答应对的当场判语呈现「第二句」。两处用语有别:一处用「此犹是第二句」(太原孚上座段),以「犹」字带出尚未契合所问第一句之判断;一处用「落第二句也」(可隆了空大师段),以「落」字写成问答当下所陷入之位置。前者为师对弟子之判语,后者为师对问者之指正。两处都不提供固定内容清单,也未为第二句下一般性定义。

此外,《景德传灯录》中另有「其二曰」之列举标志,可证「其二」亦被用作次序提示;但原文块没有附载其所承接之第一项及第二项内容,故只能记录其形式为「其二曰」,不能据此补定其命题内容,更不能将它与上述禅门问答中的「第二句」强行等同。

四、与相关概念的关系

「第二句」作为「三句」框架中的中间位次,与「第一句」「第三句」构成完整序列。三句之间有高下之别:第一句荐得者堪与祖佛为师,是最高层次;第二句荐得者堪与人天为师,居中;第三句荐得者自救不了,为最低层次。三句之间非仅逻辑关系,更涉及宗门中人互相印可、彼此料拣之公案事实。

此外,「第二句」又与「三句」整体相连——《景德传灯录》太原孚上座段,雪峰首先问临济是否有「三句」,确认之后才展开第一句与第二句之辨别,故「三句」框架是「第二句」概念成立之前提。「第二句」还与宗门的「荐得」「印可」等接引方式相关,是机用而非教义命题。

五、代表性原文引用

《古尊宿语录》: 「第一句荐得,堪与祖佛为师;第二句荐得,堪与人天为师;第三句荐得,自救不了。」

「第一句荐得,与祖佛为师;第二句荐得,与人天为师;第三句荐得,自救即不可。又云:自救也不了。」

当问「如何是第二句」时,有师答曰:「不打恁么驴汉」;另一处同问下,答曰:「面前渠不见,背后称冤苦」。

引风穴垂示,第二句为「妙解岂容无著问?漚和争赴截流机?」

引神鼎举问,「如何是第二句?云:有什么驴汉?」

龙牙道:「云居师兄得第二句,我得第一句。」

对第二句「妙解岂容无著问?漚和争赴截流机?」则著语云:「未问已前错」

《景德传灯录》: 雪峰判曰「此犹是第二句」,再追问第一句。

僧问「如何是普贤第一句」,师答「落第二句也」。

录中另有「其二曰」之列举标志。

By SutraAI-generated

景德傳燈錄T2076 · 史傳部

《景德傳燈錄》論「第二句」,主要置於禪僧問答及機鋒勘辨之中,並非先為它作抽象界定,而是藉「第一句」與「第二句」的相對判別,顯示答語所落的位置。太原孚上座一段中,雪峯問臨濟是否有「三句」,孚上座答「是」;雪峯續問「作麼生是第一句」,孚上座僅「舉目視之」,雪峯隨即判曰「此猶是第二句」,再追問第一句。由此可見,本錄直接採用「三句」「第一句」「第二句」等序列性術語;其中「第二句」是對當前舉動的判語,表示該應對雖已呈現,仍被雪峯判為未是所問的第一句。

此段又以後續動作補足辨別:孚上座在雪峯再次追問「如何是第一句」時,「叉手而退」,原文不再用語句解釋,也未明言此舉究竟應判作哪一句,只記雪峯自此「深器之」。因此,關於第二句,原文確定說出的核心只有「此猶是第二句」;至於叉手而退與第一句的關係,本錄保留在師徒機用的敘事之中,未另立義理解說,不宜越出原文代作定論。

福州東禪院可隆了空大師一段,則以「落第二句也」為明確表述。僧問「如何是普賢第一句」,師答「落第二句也」。此處「第二句」不是列出第二條命題的正文,而是以「落」字指出:一旦如此發問,所問雖名為「第一句」,其問語或問答情境卻已被判作落入第二句。這形成《景德傳燈錄》記述此概念的另一鮮明用語,即不僅說「是第二句」,亦說「落第二句」。

綜合兩處完整語境,本錄對「第二句」的記載具有判別性與關係性:它總與「第一句」相對而出,既可由問者評定某一應對「猶是第二句」,亦可由答者當下指出對方已「落第二句」。前者的「猶」帶出尚未契合所問第一句的判斷,後者的「落」則將第二句寫成問答當下所陷入的位置;兩者都不提供固定內容清單,也未為第二句下一般性定義。

此外,錄中另有兩處僅存「其二曰」的列舉標誌,可證「其二」亦被用作次序提示;但原文塊沒有附載其所承接的第一項及第二項內容,故只能記錄其形式為「其二曰」,不能據此補定其命題內容,更不能將它與上述禪門問答中的「第二句」強行等同。

古尊宿語錄X1315 · 禪宗語錄部

《古尊宿語錄》論「第二句」,主要置於「三句」——第一句、第二句、第三句——的框架之中。以下歸納其表述諸端。

一、三句之等次與功能。本部明載三句之等次:「第一句薦得,堪與祖佛為師;第二句薦得,堪與人天為師;第三句薦得,自救不了。」()又於引述首山語下重申:「第一句薦得,與祖佛為師;第二句薦得,與人天為師;第三句薦得,自救即不可。又云:自救也不了。」()是知「第二句」之位,在第一句之下、第三句之上,其功用為堪作人天之師。

二、諸師對「如何是第二句」之答語。本部並列多則異答,各以不同語句施設接引。當問「如何是第二句」時,有師答曰:「不打恁麼驢漢」();另一處同問下,答曰:「面前渠不見,背後稱冤苦」();引風穴垂示,第二句為「妙解豈容無著問?漚和爭赴截流機?」()引神鼎舉問,「如何是第二句?云:有什麼驢漢?」()是見各家施設:有棒喝之辭(「驢漢」),有擬喻之句(「面前不見、背後稱冤」),有言句(「妙解豈容無著問」),機用不一。

三、龍牙與雲居論辯之公案。本部又載龍牙道:「雲居師兄得第二句,我得第一句。」()西院反問:「祇如龍牙與麼道,還扶得也無?」師代云:「須禮拜雲居始得。」西院則云:「傍觀者哂。」此段顯示「第二句」非僅義理層次,亦涉宗門中人互相印可、彼此料揀之公案事實。

四、首山示眾之著語。引風穴舉三句後,本師對第一句「三要印開朱點窄,未容擬議主賓分」處「隨後一喝」();對第二句「妙解豈容無著問?漚和爭赴截流機?」則著語云:「未問已前錯」;對第三句「但看棚頭弄傀儡,牽抽都在裏頭人」著語云:「明破即不堪」。三句各有對應之料揀,「第二句」之關鍵點明為「未問已前」之謬誤。

五、結語。本部論「第二句」,始終以三句結構為脈絡,既標其位次(人天為師),又存諸家異答(驢漢、冤苦、妙解等),並引龍牙、雲居公案佐證。所用語即「第二句」,未見與他經相異之譯名。

Related