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有對

sapratigha

具有质碍或能被阻碍的色法性质。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arisingInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

*Yǒuduì* (有對, “being subject to opposition, limitation, or an object”) is an Abhidharma term for a simple but far-reaching fact: conditioned things do not operate without conditions. Some things exclude one another spatially; some faculties function only within a limited field; and every actual episode of mind arises facing a particular object.

The Sanskrit term is *sapratigha*. In Xuanzang’s translation of Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (《阿毘達磨俱舍論》), its defining word is *ài* (礙): impediment, resistance, or limitation. The treatise states:

“對是礙義。此復三種:障礙、境界、所緣異故。” “Opposition means impediment. It is of three kinds, differing as obstruction, cognitive range, and object.”

This does not mean that all three kinds are physical blockages. “Impediment” changes its sense according to the relation being analyzed. The three must therefore be kept distinct.

1. *Zhàng’ài yǒuduì* (障礙有對, obstructional opposition)

This is literal mutual resistance: when one material phenomenon occupies a place, another cannot arise in precisely that place in the same way. The treatise illustrates it with “hand obstructing hand” and “stone obstructing stone.”

In the analysis of the eighteen elements (*shíbā jiè*, 十八界), this applies to the “ten material elements”:

- The five material sense faculties: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. - The five sensory fields: visible form, sound, smell, taste, and tangible objects.

Hence the verse “十有色有對”: ten are material and obstructional. These ten are contained within the aggregate of form, but form here must not be reduced to the human body. *Rūpa-skandha* (色蘊, the aggregate of form) includes all material phenomena derived from the four great elements—both bodily faculties and the external material environment.

The point is not merely that matter can feel “solid.” Sound, for example, belongs to the ten material elements even though ordinary language does not call it a solid object. The classification follows the Abhidharma account of material phenomena, not a casual modern distinction between “solid things” and “everything else.”

This sense is also related to, but not identical with, the definition “變礙故名為色”—form is so called because it undergoes alteration and resistance. “Alteration-and-resistance” explains the general character from which form receives its name; “obstructional opposition” classifies the ten material elements according to their capacity for mutual impediment. The treatise says that an individual atom does not manifest alteration and resistance by itself, while an aggregation of atoms does. It also records a debate over whether atoms truly touch or whether “contact” is provisionally designated when no interval remains. The supplied passage preserves an argument and a challenge, not a final license for us to settle every ancient sectarian dispute in a sentence.

2. *Jìngjiè yǒuduì* (境界有對, opposition through cognitive range)

Here nothing needs to collide with anything. A faculty or cognition is “opposed” because its efficacy is bounded by a corresponding domain. It can function there, but it does not range indiscriminately over everything.

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, citing the *Prajñaptiśāstra* (《施設論》), gives two revealing examples: a fish’s eye functions without impediment in water but is impeded on land; a human eye functions in daylight but is impeded at night. The issue is not that darkness physically pushes the eye away. The issue is that a capacity has conditions and a field within which it can operate.

This applies to twelve elements and to part of the element of mental objects—namely, those phenomena possessing a cognitive field. In practical terms, the six faculties and six consciousnesses do not all know the same kind of thing. Eye-consciousness does not hear a melody; ear-consciousness does not see blue; ordinary sensory consciousness does not range over every time, place, or possible object.

“Field” here is not simply whatever happens to be noticed at a particular moment. The treatise defines it functionally:

“若於彼法此有功能,即說彼為此法境界。” “When this has efficacy with regard to that phenomenon, that phenomenon is called its cognitive range.”

A cognitive range is therefore the domain in relation to which a faculty or consciousness is capable of functioning.

3. *Suǒyuán yǒuduì* (所緣有對, opposition through an apprehended object)

This applies specifically to mind and mental factors (*xīn-xīnsuǒ*, 心心所). A mental event does not arise as an entirely objectless glow. It arises directed toward, supported by, or taking up its own object (*ālambana*, 所緣).

The treatise distinguishes this carefully from cognitive range:

“心心所法執彼而起,彼於心等名為所緣。” “When mind and mental factors arise apprehending that phenomenon, it is called their object.”

A field is what a capacity can operate upon; an object is what a particular occurrence of mind actually takes up. Your eyes may be capable of seeing the entire phone screen—that is part of their operative field—while your present attention is fixed on one red notification badge. The badge as actually apprehended is the object of that mental episode.

This example is only an analogy. A complete Abhidharma analysis distinguishes the objects of the sense consciousnesses, the succeeding mental consciousness, attention, recognition, feeling, and other associated factors more finely than ordinary talk about “attention.”

The treatise also supplies a fourfold distinction concerning obstructional and cognitive-range opposition:

| Class | Obstructional opposition | Cognitive-range opposition | |---|---:|---:| | Seven consciousness elements and associated factors in part of the element of mental objects | No | Yes | | The five sensory objects—visible form, sound, smell, taste, and tangible objects | Yes | No | | The five material sense faculties | Yes | Yes | | Non-associated phenomena in part of the element of mental objects | No | No |

The “seven consciousness elements” are the six sensory and mental consciousnesses together with the mind element as classified in the eighteen-element system. “Associated factors” means mental factors associated with consciousness. “Non-associated” phenomena here belong to a technical Abhidharma category and should not casually be equated with thoughts, ideas, or physical objects.

This table prevents an important mistake: “material” and “having a cognitive field” are not synonyms. A visible object obstructs materially but is not itself a knowing faculty. Consciousness has a bounded field but does not occupy space as a stone does. A material eye faculty has both properties: it belongs to the mutually obstructing material order and has a particular sensory range.

A verse attributed to Kumāralāta states:

“是處心欲生,他礙令不起,應知是有對,無對此相違。” “Where mind would arise but another impedes it so that it does not arise, know that to be ‘with opposition’; what lacks opposition is contrary to this.”

The verse expresses the general mark through frustrated arising: something would occur there, but an opposing condition prevents it. It should be read alongside the treatise’s three precise classifications, not used to collapse all three into psychological inhibition.

Why does such an austere taxonomy matter to the path of liberation? Because bondage repeatedly depends on overlooking limits and relations. We experience a sight and imagine that we have encountered a self-sufficient thing. We feel desire and imagine a sovereign “I” freely producing it. We attend to one object and forget the enormous field excluded by that selection. The analysis of *yǒuduì* breaks this spell. Body, world, faculty, consciousness, and object are shown as condition-bound relations—not as an independent subject confronting a fully available universe.

That insight is not yet liberation. It is conceptual discrimination serving contemplative wisdom. Used properly, it weakens the assumptions of permanence, complete control, and selfhood, preparing the mind to see conditioned phenomena as impermanent, unsatisfactory when clung to, and not-self.

A walkthrough in ordinary life

Imagine standing in a crowded subway carriage after a long day. Your phone vibrates. A message from someone close to you reads: “We need to talk.” Let us walk through the event without mixing the three meanings of *yǒuduì*.

First, obstructional opposition.

Your body occupies part of the carriage. Another passenger’s shoulder prevents your arm from moving freely. Your hand, the phone, the floor, the train, the vibrations reaching the ear, the visible characters on the screen, and the pressure against your skin all belong—under the relevant Abhidharma classifications—to the material side of experience. The five faculties and five sensory fields are “with opposition” in the obstructional sense.

The common mapping error is to say, “Obstructional opposition means my body is blocked.” That is too narrow. The relevant material classification includes bodily faculties and external sensory objects. Nor does “form” mean only the visible appearance of something: the aggregate of form encompasses the material domain much more broadly.

Second, cognitive-range opposition.

Your eye can operate with respect to visible form, not sound. Your ear can operate with respect to sound, not the visual shape of the message. The train’s dim lighting, the angle of the screen, the noise, the condition of the faculties, and distance all delimit what can be registered.

Your eyes do not “know” the message’s emotional meaning merely by receiving visible forms. In the Abhidharma sequence, sensory consciousness and mental processing must not be flattened into one vague act called “seeing.” Eye-consciousness has visible form as its corresponding field. The interpretation “This message means the relationship is in danger” belongs to subsequent mental activity.

The common error here is to equate cognitive range with personal interest: “My world is limited because I only care about relationship problems.” That may be psychologically true, but it is not the classical definition. *Jìngjiè yǒuduì* first concerns the bounded efficacy of faculties and cognitions in relation to their respective domains.

Third, objectual opposition.

At one moment, the words on the screen are taken as an object. In the next, the mind takes the remembered tone of a previous argument as its object. Then it takes an imagined future conversation. Fear may arise with that imagined scene; recognition identifies its features; intention begins rehearsing a reply.

The mind’s operative field may include many possible objects, but each actual mental event arises taking an object. That is *suǒyuán yǒuduì*. The possible and the actual must not be confused: what cognition is capable of engaging is its cognitive range; what this occurrence of mind apprehends is its object.

Now notice the chain of appropriation:

- Material conditions present colors, sounds, bodily pressure, and vibration. - Faculties and consciousnesses operate only in their corresponding ranges and under supporting conditions. - Particular mental events take particular objects. - Recognition marks: “serious message,” “possible rejection,” “the same problem again.” - Feeling is unpleasant. - Volitional formations prepare defense, accusation, withdrawal, or compulsive checking. - Clinging says: “This threat is happening to me; I must settle it now.”

The last four points widen the lens beyond *yǒuduì* itself. They show its place within dependent experience. Recognition (*saṃjñā*, 想) means taking and identifying marks; it is not merely “having thoughts.” Volitional formations (*saṃskāra*, 行) concern conditioning intentions and constructions; they are not simply outward actions. These processes arise around an object supplied by a limited, conditioned episode of cognition.

Suppose you then reread the message fifteen times. The visible text has scarcely changed. Yet the mind successively takes the words, a remembered quarrel, an imagined abandonment, bodily tightness, and a proposed reply as objects. What feels like one solid crisis is actually a rapidly changing series of object-relations.

This is where practice begins. You need not deny the relationship problem. You can recognize, more modestly:

- “Visible form is being seen.” - “A sentence is being interpreted.” - “An unpleasant feeling has arisen.” - “The mind is now taking an imagined future as its object.” - “An intention to retaliate is forming.”

Such observation inserts wisdom between contact and appropriation. It does not make you passive. It may make the eventual reply more truthful because you no longer confuse the presently imagined future with the message actually received.

Algorithmic life intensifies this dynamic. A recommendation system places certain objects before you; interface design narrows the immediately available field; notifications repeatedly redirect attention. Yet algorithm, cognitive range, and object are not identical concepts. An algorithm influences what becomes salient or accessible, while *jìngjiè yǒuduì* and *suǒyuán yǒuduì* belong to a classical analysis of faculties, consciousness, and objects. The comparison is illuminating precisely if the difference is preserved.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary culture often treats freedom as unlimited access: every place should be reachable, every message answerable, every fact searchable, and every desire satisfiable. *Yǒuduì* begins from the opposite observation: embodied and cognitive existence is structured by limits.

This is not pessimism. A limit is also what gives a capacity its intelligible shape. Because the eye does not hear, seeing has a determinate field. Because a present mind takes this object rather than every object, coherent experience is possible. Because material things resist one another, bodies and environments have relative stability. Conditions constrain life, but they also make particular forms of life possible.

The suffering begins when limitation is appropriated as an insult to selfhood. We resent the body for tiring, attention for wandering, partners for not reading our minds, children for not conforming to our plans, and reality for refusing to accommodate incompatible demands. We secretly expect finite faculties to behave like omniscience and conditioned bodies to behave like possessions under absolute control.

Understanding *yǒuduì* encourages three forms of sobriety.

First, epistemic humility. What is vivid to us is not necessarily the whole situation. A cognition operates within a range and presently takes a selected object. This is particularly important online, where one clip, headline, or comment can occupy the mind so completely that selection masquerades as totality.

Second, ethical patience. Another person’s field of experience is conditioned differently. They may not have perceived what we perceived, noticed what we noticed, or taken the same feature as their object. This does not erase responsibility, but it cautions against treating our present cognitive object as the complete moral reality.

Third, contemplative disidentification. If seeing depends on faculty, field, object, light, attention, and many supporting conditions, then “I see” is a useful conventional expression, not evidence of an independent seer standing outside the event. If anger repeatedly takes remembered injuries as objects, anger is a conditioned process—not a permanent owner of the mind.

This is the concept’s place on the liberation path. Abhidharma classification trains precise attention: material resistance is known as material resistance; functional limitation as functional limitation; object-directed mentality as object-directed mentality. Precision undermines projection. Projection weakened, craving and aversion lose some of their apparent inevitability. With sustained ethical discipline, concentration, and insight, one can investigate not merely what the mind takes as an object, but how grasping turns conditioned experience into “I,” “mine,” and “myself.”

Modern neuroscience and cognitive science also study selective attention, modality-specific processing, sensory limits, and the constructive character of perception. These can provide useful comparisons: the brain does not process every available signal equally, and attention strongly shapes reportable experience. But such findings do not “prove Buddhism.” Scientific models address empirically measurable mechanisms and remain contested or incomplete in many areas, especially concerning consciousness itself. Abhidharma is pursuing a soteriological analysis: how experience is structured, appropriated, and released from clinging. The questions overlap at points without becoming identical.

Common misreadings and clarifications

“Having opposition means being material.”

Only if “opposition” is being used in the specific sense of obstructional opposition. The broader term has three meanings. Consciousness and associated mental factors can be “with opposition” through cognitive range and object without becoming spatially obstructing matter.

“It simply means two solid objects cannot occupy the same space.”

That describes the core intuition of obstructional opposition but not the full classification. The ten material elements include the five faculties and five sensory fields, among them sound, smell, and taste. One must retain the traditional categories rather than silently replacing them with a modern list of solid bodies.

“Cognitive-range opposition means sensory deprivation or disability.”

Those can illustrate intensified limitations, but the concept is more fundamental. Even a normally functioning faculty has a corresponding range and does not operate universally. The eye’s inability to hear is not a defect in the eye; it shows the specificity of its function.

“Cognitive range and object are the same thing.”

They are closely related but explicitly distinguished. Cognitive range concerns where a faculty or cognition has efficacy. Object concerns what an actual mind or mental factor apprehends in arising. Capacity is not the same as present engagement.

“An object must be an external physical thing.”

No. Mind may take a visible form, a sound, a memory, a concept, an imagined future, or another mental phenomenon as its object, according to the relevant analysis. “Object” means that toward which the mental event arises, not necessarily a freestanding object in physical space.

“Object-directedness proves that the mind passively copies reality.”

The definition says that mind and mental factors arise apprehending an object. It does not by itself settle every question about representation, interpretation, error, or the ultimate status of subject and object. Recognition, attention, feeling, intention, memory, and habitual construction all condition lived experience.

“Because cognition is limited, truth is impossible.”

That conclusion does not follow. Recognizing limits is a condition for careful knowledge, not its negation. Buddhist training does not ask us to declare every appearance false; it asks us to know appearances, conditions, interpretations, and clinging without confusing one with another.

“Everything is obstructed, so liberation must also be impossible.”

*Yǒuduì* classifies conditioned phenomena and their relations; it is not a doctrine that an eternal barrier encloses the mind. Indeed, seeing conditionality accurately is part of loosening bondage. The obstacle is not finitude alone but ignorance and appropriation: taking what is conditioned, unstable, and not fully controllable to be a secure self or possession.

“Non-obstructing means supernatural or omnipresent.”

Not necessarily. *Wúduì* (無對, “without opposition”) is defined relative to the particular kind of opposition under discussion. Something can lack material obstruction without being all-knowing, eternal, unconditioned, or spiritually liberated. One must always ask: without which kind of opposition?

“The doctrine says we should overcome every limit.”

Its wiser invitation is to stop demanding limitlessness from conditioned life. A mature practitioner still improves eyesight, designs accessible environments, protects attention, studies carefully, and repairs relationships. But these actions are undertaken without imagining that perfect control will finally produce an invulnerable self.

*Yǒuduì* is therefore more than a technical label attached to a table of eighteen elements. It teaches us to perceive three different forms of boundedness: bodies and material fields resist one another; capacities operate within determinate ranges; minds arise facing particular objects. Once these are distinguished, experience becomes less monolithic. What looked like “me trapped in reality” can be examined as conditioned materiality, bounded cognition, selected objects, feeling, recognition, intention, and clinging.

The liberating force lies in that change of grammar. Limits remain, but the imaginary owner of all limits becomes harder to find. Objects remain, but they need not be grasped as “mine.” Cognition continues, but it is known as a conditioned event rather than an independent self. Abhidharma begins with classification; when joined to practice, the classification becomes a way of releasing the mind from what it had mistakenly taken itself to be.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

「有对」(sapratigha)在《阿毘达磨俱舍论》中以「碍」为核心义。论文明言「对是碍义」,但依「碍」所呈现的方式,又分为障碍有对、境界有对、所缘有对三种。因此,「有对」不仅可指色法彼此占据处所、互相妨碍,也可指认识作用受限于一定境界,或心、心所必须对向自己的所缘而生起。

在十八界的总判中,颂曰「十有色有对」,专就障碍有对而言,指五根与五境所成的十色界。论释「唯色蕴摄十界有对」,并说其所以有对,是因为诸色「更相障故」;其余诸界则依此义准知为无对。

2. 主要阐述

第一,障碍有对指十色界,即眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五根与色、声、香、味、触五境。其特征是某法占有一处时,能使另一法不能在同一处生起,论中表述为「自于他处被碍不生」,并举「手碍手、石碍石」以及两物彼此相碍为例。这是物质性障碍的意义,也是「十有色有对」所直接采用的分类标准。

第二,境界有对指十二界以及法界一分中的诸有境法。某法的作用只能在相应境界中发生,超出该境界便受到限制,故名有对。《俱舍论》引《施设论》说明:鱼眼在水中无碍,在陆上有碍;人眼在白昼无碍,在夜间有碍。这里的「碍」不是两种色法占据同一处所,而是根或识的功能不能遍行于一切境界。

第三,所缘有对专指心、心所对于各自所缘而起。论中特别区分境界与所缘:「若于彼法此有功能,即说彼为此法境界;心心所法执彼而起,彼于心等名为所缘。」前者着重某法功能所及的范围,后者着重心、心所实际攀缘而生起的对象。

三类有对可以四句分别:七心界及法界一分相应法,唯是境界有对而非障碍有对;色、声、香、味、触五境,唯是障碍有对而非境界有对;眼等五根兼具障碍与境界二种有对;法界一分非相应法则二者俱非。 十有色有对之中,除色、声之外,其余八界判为无记。

此外,大德鸠摩逻多以偈说:「是处心欲生,他碍令不起,应知是有对,无对此相违。」此说从「欲生而被他法阻碍」显示有对之相,并以不具此相者为无对。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

所给材料集中于毘昙部《阿毘达磨俱舍论》(《阿毘達磨俱舍論》,世亲造、玄奘译),没有列出其他部类经论或同论异译本,因而不能据此逐项比较「五阴/五蕴」等异译。就本译的术语而言,论中稳定使用「有对」「无对」「障碍有对」「境界有对」「所缘有对」与「变碍」;「对」明确训为「碍」,但材料未见以「有碍」「无碍」取代「有对」「无对」而成为独立分类名称。

另有「五相应有对,第六俱增语」一语,属五识身相应品的科判表述;其「有对」仍沿用本论术语,但该处并未重新建立另一套有对分类。

4. 与相关概念的关系

「有对」首先与「色」密切相关。《俱舍论》以「变碍故名为色」解释色蕴之名。单一极微虽不能显出变碍,但众多极微聚集时,「变碍义成」。因此,变碍是色蕴得名的通义,而障碍有对则用以标示十八界中五根、五境十色界彼此相碍的性质。

色处之所以能独得「色」名,论中提出的理由之一也是「由有对故,手等触时即便变坏」。此处把有对、触及变坏相连,显示色法受到接触与障碍时可以发生改变。

「有对」也与极微是否相触的问题相涉。论载大德所说:「一切极微实不相触,但由无间假立触名。」随后提出「中间既空,谁障其行许为有对」之难。这段论议以能否形成阻碍检验「相触」与「有对」的关系,但材料只呈现论中所载主张及问难,不宜据此另作宗派裁决。

相对于有对,「无对」即不具相应之碍。若依障碍义,十色界以外诸界由义准而说无对;若依鸠摩逻多偈,心欲生而不被他法阻止者,便与有对之相相违。

5. 代表性原文引用

「對是礙義。此復三種:障礙、境界、所緣異故。」
「唯色蘊攝十界有對……唯就障礙有對而說,故但言十有色有對,更相障故。」
「若於彼法此有功能,即說彼為此法境界;心心所法執彼而起,彼於心等名為所緣。」
「變礙故名為色……眾微聚集變礙義成。」
「是處心欲生,他礙令不起,應知是有對,無對此相違。」
「一切極微實不相觸,但由無間假立觸名。」

By SutraAI-generated

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》以「對是礙義」明確「有對」之核心定義,指色法能被障礙之性質。論將有對分為三種:障礙有對、境界有對、所緣有對,以「障礙、境界、所緣異故」區別。

就障礙有對而言,論釋「自於他處被礙不生,如手礙手或石礙石或二相礙」;十八界中唯十有色界(眼耳鼻舌身、色香味觸)具此,故頌云「十有色有對」。境界有對則施設種種差別,如魚等眼於水有礙非陸,人等眼於陸有礙非水(從多分說),畢舍遮、室獸摩羅及捕魚人等眼於水陸俱礙,蝙蝠鵂鶹等眼於夜有礙非晝,狗、野干、馬、豹、豺狼、猫、狸等眼於晝夜俱礙。

所緣有對謂心心所於自所緣。論以「若於彼法此有功能,即說彼為此法境界」與「心心所法執彼而起,彼於心等名為所緣」分別境界與所緣之別。又就「有對」之施設意義,引大德鳩摩邏多頌:「是處心欲生,他礙令不起,應知是有對,無對此相違」。論判定此處十有色有對,「唯就障礙有對而說」,以區別於境界、所緣有對。

「有對」與「變礙」關係密切。論於釋色時先以「變礙故名為色」解色,謂眾微聚集方成變礙義,故破「極微應不名色,無變礙故」之難。於建立十色處之理由中亦云:「由有對故,手等觸時即便變壞」。然無表色是否名色,論中引異說:「表色有變礙故,無表隨彼亦受色名」者,論主破以「無表色應不名色」、「無變礙故」;「所依大種變礙,故無表業亦得色名」者,亦被難破。

關於極微是否有對,世友尊者說諸極微相觸即應住至後念,大德說一切極微實不相觸,但由無間假立觸名,論主讚大德意,謂「中間既空,誰障其行許為有對」,以成立極微之有對。

論又就境界有對與障礙有對之關係作四句料簡:若法境界有對亦障礙有對耶?第一句為七心界及法界一分相應法,第二句為色等五境,第三句為眼等五根,第四句為法界一分非相應法。若法境界有對亦所緣有對耶?應順後句,謂所緣有對定是境界有對,眼等五根為境界有對而非所緣有對之例。

此論所用術語,「有對」、「變礙」、「變壞」互為關聯,而以「對是礙義」一句統攝其核心。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》從定義、範圍、與其他色法的關聯三方面論述「有對」這一色法性質。

一、核心定義 論中明確界定:「展轉相觸據處所義及麁大義,是有對義」。此定義含兩層義:其一為「展轉相觸據處所義」,謂諸色法各佔據方所,能與他物相互觸對而形成質礙;其二為「麁大義」,謂具有粗顯之相。論中接著解釋:「麁大義者,當知遠離三種微細。此三微細,如前應知」,指出凡遠離三種微細之性者,即為麁大之相;至於三種微細之具體內容,此處以「如前應知」標明,應前文所說。

二、所攝範圍 在五蘊分類下,論中指出「一蘊一分是有對」,即僅色蘊中之一分具有有對之性,其餘諸蘊及色蘊之其他分則非有對。同段亦載「一蘊一分是有見」,以「眼所行義」為有見義;可見有對與有見雖同為色蘊部分之所攝,但所依之義不同——有對就方所與麁大而立,有見則就眼境而立,二者所攝範圍不盡相同。

三、與有色法的交涉 論於他處說:「若四大種及彼所造,當知唯此名有色法」,總括四大種及其所造色為有色法。又談及大種種子之分別:「隨逐色根大種種子,名有方所;隨無色根大種種子,名無方所」,可知「有方所」與物質佔據空間相關,與「有對」之佔據方所義相呼應;此處「無色根」即指心,與「色根」對舉而立。

論中引述世尊言:「觸謂外處,若四大種,若四大種所造,有色無見有對」,將觸處所攝之四大種及所造色歸為「有色、無見、有對」一類,與「有見」之色相區隔。此處「有對」即指能互相質礙、佔據方所之物質特性,與其前段所定義之「展轉相觸據處所義」完全相應。

四、術語特色 《瑜伽師地論》使用「有色法」統稱四大種及所造色,以「蘊」為基本分類單位;其專有術語如「展轉相觸」、「麁大」、「方所」、「色根」、「無色根」、「大種」、「所造色」皆依瑜伽行派之體系而立。「有對」一詞本身則為通稱,與其他經論所用一致;本卷以問答體逐項解說有見、有對、有漏、有為、有諍、有愛味等諸性質,層次井然。

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