What This Concept Is About
When Buddhism speaks of "self" (我, ātman), it is not the same thing as the "self" of everyday language. The everyday "self" is the convenient linguistic reference to the speaker, the center of experience—"I'm hungry," "I'm tired," "I want to go for a walk." But the "self" Buddhism seeks to dismantle is a deeper, subtler grasping—the grasping at some existent's own-nature (自性, svabhāva) as "being so by itself, not depending on anything else, not established by conceptual designation." This own-nature is expressed in the scriptures through various terms: "existing by own-nature" (自性有), "existing by own-character" (自相有), "real existence" (實有), "true existence" (諦實), "ultimate existence" (勝義有). The *Commentary on the Hundred Treatise* (*百論釋*, Śataśāstra-ṭīkā) gives an extremely precise definition: "The self is the independent subject-own-being that does not rely on the other-nature of any thing. If this is absent, that is no-self."（「我者，谓不依仗所有万物他性，独立主体自性。此若无者，即是无我。」）
This is the key of keys: the "self" that Buddhism dismantles is, at its core, "not depending on other-natures"—the state of considering that things "originally exist independently, not depending on causes and conditions, not depending on nominal designation." It is not simply saying "I do not exist," nor is it a skeptical "everything is illusion," nor is it telling people not to have self-awareness.
One "Self," Two Bases
The reason the "two selves" (二我, dvi-ātman) are divided into two is that the same grasping can fall upon different objects. In classical terminology, this is the difference in the "basis-possessing dharmas" (所依有法, āśraya-dharma)—that is, the "self" being refuted is one and the same; the bases it relies on are two:
Person-self (補特伽羅我, pudgala-ātman, "self of the person"): grasping that there is own-nature in the matter of "person," "I," "self." That is: there is a real, independent "I" that does not depend on the five aggregates (五蘊, pañca-skandha), body-mind, or the continuum, and exists just so from the start. It is not our body, not our mind, but that "master behind body and mind," the "essential, unchanging self."
Dharma-self (法我, dharma-ātman, "self of dharmas"): grasping that there is own-nature in "dharmas." Here "dharma" does not mean the "Dharma" of Buddhism, but refers generally to all phenomena—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind; form, sound, smell, taste, touch, mental objects—and everything that unfolds from these. My body, my emotions, my thoughts, my possessions, my reputation, my career, other people, tables and chairs, cities, AI—everything experienced and designated can be the basis of "dharma."
There is a subtle point often overlooked that deserves to be singled out: when you grasp "this is my body," "this is my emotion"—if what you grasp is "this body/emotion is mine, is what I possess"—this is a kind of "mine-grasping" (我所執, ātmiya-grāha; a branch of the view of the existent body, 薩迦耶見, satkāya-dṛṣṭi); but if you go a layer deeper and grasp that this body or emotion itself has own-nature, does not depend on causes and conditions, exists independently from the start—that is "dharma-self grasping." Both involve the same object (body, emotion), but the mode of grasping differs. The *Commentary on the Entering the Middle Treatise, Elucidating the Profound Intent* (*入中論善顯密意疏*) specifically points out this distinction, because it directly bears on whether we can distinguish the two selves from a vague mass of "self-grasping" (我執).
The Refuted Is the Same; the Classification Relies on the Basis
This is where the term "two selves" is most easily misread. The *Commentary on the Entering the Middle Treatise, Elucidating the Profound Intent* says it very plainly: "The two no-selves are not distinguished by the refuted object, but are divided by the basis-possessing dharma."（「二无我，不由所破分别，乃以所依有法而分。」）
That is, the two no-selves (二無我) are not two different kinds of "absence," but the same "absence"—"absence of own-nature" (無自性)—falling respectively on the two different bases of person and dharma. The "self" (established by own-nature) that self-grasping must refute is the same thing; the reason it is divided into person-no-self (人無我, pudgala-nairātmya) and dharma-no-self (法無我, dharma-nairātmya) is that the objects of reference differ.
Many people think Buddhism's talk of "person-no-self" and "dharma-no-self" refers to two independent attainments, two stages of practice—in fact, they are two aspects of the same no-self. When dharma-no-self is cultivated thoroughly, person-no-self is necessarily thorough; when person-no-self is not seen thoroughly, dharma-no-self cannot be thorough either. They are discussed separately because the scope of dharmas is extremely wide, the phenomena too many, the basis more complex, and the required contemplation finer.
Its Position on the Path to Liberation
Three treatises consistently rank the two self-graspings very high: it is the chief ignorance (上首無明) that binds beings to saṃsāra.
The *Treasury of Good Sayings on Distinguishing the Definitive and the Interpretable* (*辨了不了義善說藏論*) says: sentient beings are bound to saṃsāra by grasping at the two selves of person and dharma; the objects of reference are, one, the person (補特伽羅, pudgala) and, the other, the dharmas of its continuum; grasping these two as established by own-nature is the chief of what binds. All related lines of reasoning can be gathered into the refutation of the two selves.
The *Condensed Stages of the Path* (*菩提道次第略論*) establishes this from the opposition between "ignorance" (無明, avidyā) and "clear seeing" (明, vidyā): ignorance is the enemy of clear seeing; clear seeing is the true wisdom that penetrates no-self. Ignorance lacks this wisdom and instead grasps its opposite—superimposing a self. This superimposition (增益) is of two kinds, person-self and dharma-self—that is, deluded grasping at person-self and dharma-self.
In other words, the two selves are not a minor problem in philosophy books, but the engine of the whole of saṃsāra. All craving, aversion, and delusion, all suffering, all the harm brought by "self-grasping" and "dharma-grasping" (法執)—the deepest root is here. The first link of the twelve links of dependent origination (十二因緣), "ignorance," according to the *Treasury of Good Sayings on Distinguishing the Definitive and the Interpretable*, is precisely this defiled ignorance that grasps dharmas as truly existent—from this ignorance, own-nature is superimposed on dharmas, and craving arises, and beings flow through saṃsāra.
Order of Arising and Order of Refutation: A Subtle Reversal
There is a subtlety here that at first appears contradictory:
- Order of arising: dharma-self grasping first gives rise to person-self grasping. - Order of refutation: the correct view of person-no-self arises first, then the correct view of dharma-no-self.
Why does dharma-self come first in arising? Because a child first determines "this body is real," "these toys are real," "Mommy is real," and only then, within or beyond these "real things," finds the grasping at "I." Without first determining that "things have own-nature," there is no "owner of things" to speak of—so dharma-self grasping is the deeper, more primary root.
Why does person-no-self come first in refutation? Because it is easier to decide on the person (it is relatively easy to see that "I" is not any one of the five aggregates, nor something different from the five aggregates), while it is harder to decide on dharmas (the own-nature of all phenomena is harder to refute). The *Condensed Stages of the Path* gives an example: "On dharmas such as eye and ear it is hard to settle; on things like reflections it is easy to settle."（「眼耳等法上难定，影像等上易定。」）First break what is easy, then break what is hard; first open the road, then go deeper.
Several Key Distinctions (That Must Be Kept Clear)
1. The two self-graspings are not only "conceptual self-grasping" (the conceptualized grasping formed only after being influenced by heretical schools)—they also include "innate self-grasping" (俱生我執, sahaja-ātmagrāha)—the grasping that operates spontaneously, from birth. Even a child who has never read philosophy or studied religion has the two self-graspings. On this point, the *Treasury of Good Sayings on Distinguishing the Definitive and the Interpretable* explicitly does not permit refuting only the former.
2. Innate view of the existent body (俱生薩迦耶見, sahaja-satkāya-dṛṣṭi) ≠ person-self grasping. The former specifically refers to the spontaneous arising of the sense "I" in dependence on "I" (naturally generating the feeling "I" upon "I"); grasping another person's pudgala as established by own-character (for example, grasping the "other" of someone else as own-nature-established), though it belongs to innate person-self grasping, is not called innate view of the existent body.
3. Mine-grasping ≠ dharma-self grasping (although the objects often overlap): if you directly grasp that dharmas such as eye and ear themselves have own-nature, that is dharma-self grasping; if you grasp "this is my eye," "this is my ear," that is the view of the existent body as "mine-grasping."
4. To truly realize person-no-self, one must truly realize dharma-no-self. The two cannot be completely separated—this is a hard requirement of the *Entering the Middle Treatise* (*入中論*, Madhyamakāvatāra).
A Few Classical Similes and Verses
*Ratnāvalī* (*寶鬘論*): "The person is not earth, water… because of the collection of the six elements, what else is there? Therefore there is no true reality."（「士夫非地水……六界集聚故，此外何所有，故无真实性。」）—The person is not any one of the six elements (earth, water, fire, wind, space, consciousness), nor something different from the six elements; it is only a nominal designation of the collection of the six elements, without true reality.
*Entering the Middle Treatise*: "These two, like illusions, the self is without fault; the dharmas of the world are also admissible."（「此二如幻我无失，世间诸法亦得有。」）—Though person-self and dharma-self have no own-nature in the ultimate, the self and dharmas that exist like illusions (如幻) in the conventional can still be established.
"The self is absent in the seven modes, established only in dependence, like a chariot."（「七边无我唯依缘立如车。」）—The person, examined in the seven modes (one, different, permanent, impermanent, both, neither, both-and-neither), is not established in any, but like a chariot, can be conventionally posited in dependence on conditions (the collection of parts). This is the unity of "refuting without positing" and "positing as conventionally existent."
A concise one-and-many inference: when the person is examined for true existence, the answer can only fall into the two modes of being "one" with the five aggregates or "different" from them; if one with the five aggregates, then "I" becomes each aggregate, and the five aggregates are "I"; if different from the five aggregates, then "I" must exist separately apart from the five aggregates—but no such thing can be found apart from the five aggregates. The person, apart from this one-and-many, is therefore not truly existent.
Echoes in Classical Formulations
That line from the *Heart Sūtra* (《心經》) that nearly everyone can recite—"照見五蘊皆空，度一切苦厄" ("Perceiving that the five aggregates are all empty, he passes beyond all suffering and calamity")—the five aggregates (色 form, 受 feeling, 想 perception, 行 formations, 識 consciousness) are precisely the typical objects of dharma-self grasping. Perceiving that the five aggregates are empty is perceiving dharma-no-self; and person-no-self is hidden in the more thorough unfolding of "無眼耳鼻舌身意，無色聲香味觸法" ("no eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind; no form, sound, smell, taste, touch, mental objects").
That line from the *Diamond Sūtra* (《金剛經》), "應無所住而生其心" ("One should give rise to the mind without abiding anywhere")—"not abiding" (無所住) means not abiding in own-nature (whether the own-nature of dharmas or of the self), and "give rise to the mind" means fully acting, feeling, and moving in the conventional. One line covers and refutes both selves.
Walking Through It in Daily Life
In this section, we map the abstract "person," "dharma," and "own-nature" step by step onto scenes familiar to contemporary people. At the end of each passage, I'll point out where people most often map things wrong.
Scene One: Waking Up in the Morning, Commuting
You wake up, consciousness gradually becomes clear. A thought arises: "I really need to do that project well today."
There are two layers of "self" here:
- Surface person-self: there is an "I" that needs to do the project well—this "I" is an independent entity with its own will, wishes, and abilities. Even if you later realize "I am only a composite of the five aggregates," that "sense of an agent that needs to act" is still there. - Deeper dharma-self: your grasping at the "project" itself—"this project is real," "it must succeed," "if it fails, the sky will fall." The project, the essence of success, the essence of failure—these "dharmas" you regard as independently existing are the objects of dharma-self grasping.
When you are anxious, you are not only anxious that "no one is doing this" (that is person-self-level anxiety); you are more deeply anxious about "this thing failing, this thing itself"—that is dharma-self grasping at work. **The *Entering the Middle Treatise* says "dharma-self grasping first gives rise to person-self grasping"**—you first take "project," "failure," "success" as independently real things, and only then, within that independently real situation, do you become anxious about whether "I" can cope.
Where people most often map wrong: thinking that "person-self grasping is anxiety about 'me,' and dharma-self grasping is anxiety about 'things'"—so "my anxiety is about things, therefore it is dharma-self grasping" is wrong. Both layers are on you. The distinguishing point is not the object (objects can overlap), but the mode of grasping (are you grasping the own-nature of "I," or the own-nature of "things"?).
Scene Two: Conflict in an Intimate Relationship
Two people are arguing. One says: "You never care about me!"
Breaking it down:
- "You"—regarded as an entity existing by own-nature. "Not caring" is treated as this person's essential attribute. - "I"—regarded as an entity existing by own-nature. "Not being cared for" is my essential experience. - "Never"—time is reified; all past moments of "not caring" are gathered into an indivisible whole.
These three layers are all "self-grasping": taking the three kinds of "dharmas"—person, own-nature, time—as things with own-nature, and then, within these own-natured dharmas, positing a "me" who is neglected.
If you only cultivate "I shouldn't be so sensitive" or "you should change," you are spinning at the person-self level, forever just adjusting the relative positions of the two own-natured entities "I" and "you"—while those two entities themselves are never examined.
The breaking of dharma-self grasping is seeing that "caring" and "not caring" themselves have no own-nature—they are products of causes and conditions, changing according to relationship, emotional state, and linguistic habits. The sentence "you never care about me" freezes a complex present feeling into an assertion about own-nature.
Where people most often map wrong: thinking that "problems in intimate relationships are all self-grasping"—in fact, relationships have real causes and conditions (the other person really does often ignore you), and there is right and wrong at the conventional level; breaking the two selves does not deny these—it is seeing that the freezing gesture behind that "never" has no basis.
Scene Three: Scrolling on Your Phone in the Evening
Your finger swipes unconsciously. The screen lights up with a message. You tap it open—it is an acquaintance's success: a promotion, a house purchase, photos of the kids.
A tightening, an ache. You put down the phone.
Here at least four dharma-selves are at work in the dark:
1. "They" are grasped as own-nature-existing—they are "successful people," an essential group. 2. "I" is grasped as own-nature-existing—I am a "not-successful person," essentially behind. 3. "Success" itself is grasped as own-nature-existing—it is a real thing, sitting right there; whoever reaches it has it. 4. "Tightness" and "ache"—these feelings are grasped as own-nature-existing—they are me, owned by me, are my true state.
The first and third are dharma-self grasping; the second and fourth are a mix of pudgala-self grasping and person-self grasping.
The *Heart Sūtra* says "照見五蘊皆空" ("perceiving that the five aggregates are all empty")—this "emptiness" (空, śūnyatā) is not "everything is fake, nonexistent," but "no own-nature, not independent, existing in dependence on conditions." When you can perceive that "success has no own-nature," "others have no own-nature," "I also have no own-nature," the tightness and ache are still there, but they no longer stick to you—because that "I" to which they stick has been seen through.
Where people most often map wrong: thinking that "not being anxious anymore" or "not caring anymore" is breaking the two selves—it is not. Not being anxious might be numbness, might be suppression, might be dullness. Breaking the two selves is wisdom, is seeing through, not the cancellation of emotions.
Scene Four: "For Their Good" in Parent-Child Relationships
Parents plan their child's future. Behind this:
- "The child" is grasped as own-nature-existing—he is an "other" with an independent essence. - "For his good" is grasped as own-nature-existing—"good" is a thing, I understand it, and giving it to him is giving it. - "The future" is grasped as own-nature-existing—it is a straight line that can be predetermined. - "I" as "the one who wants what is good for him" is grasped as own-nature-existing—my worrying is a real essential attribute.
These four layers are all dharma-self grasping. It is not necessarily a bad thing (parents of course should care for their children), but as long as these four layers of grasping are present, "for his good" will deform—it becomes "make the child follow my essence, walk my essential road, obtain my essential good."
When dharma-self grasping lightens, "for his good" can actually be good for "him"—because "he" is no longer regarded as own-nature, but as an independent life that changes with causes and conditions, needing to be seen rather than molded.
Where people most often map wrong: thinking that "breaking dharma-self = not planning for the child"—no. Planning can still be done, but when the grasping behind the planning—"my essential understanding must land on him"—is loosened, that planning is planning for his good.
Scene Five: Self-Talk Late at Night
Lying in bed, replaying the day. A thought appears in the mind: "I really am still that useless person."
This "I really am still" is a typical pudgala-self grasping—there is a cross-temporal, unchanging essential "I," extending from the past me to the present, to the future. It is defined by the essential attribute of "useless."
In fact, today you did many things; each was concrete, limited, arising in dependence on conditions. But the thought pattern "I really am still" aggregates all these things, compresses them, labels them, and casts an entity called "I."
*Ratnāvalī* says "士夫非地水……六界集聚故，此外何所有，故无真实性" ("The person is not earth, water… because of the collection of the six elements, what else is there? Therefore there is no true reality")—broken apart:
- I am not any one of the six elements: earth, water, fire, wind, space, consciousness. - Nor am I something different from these six elements. - So where is "I"? It is only a nominal designation of the collection of the six elements, without true reality.
But note: this does not mean "I do not exist." "The conventionally designated I" is still there—only the independently essential I is absent. That is why the *Entering the Middle Treatise* says "此二如幻我无失，世间诸法亦得有" ("These two, like illusions, the self is without fault; the dharmas of the world are also admissible")—the self that exists like an illusion is admissible, and fully established conventionally; only the own-nature-existing self is absent.
Where people most often map wrong: thinking that "no-self = I do not exist"—this sentence makes many people afraid to enter this practice, because it is too terrifying. In fact, the conventional you remains completely intact. Only "the independently essential you" is seen through—and the seeing-through itself is the greatest liberation.
Scene Six: Interacting with AI in the Present Moment
You open an AI assistant and ask it a question. It answers fluently. You feel: "This thing seems to understand me."
Here too, the two self-graspings are at work in the dark:
- AI is grasped as own-nature-existing—its "understanding" is a real capacity attached to it. - "Understanding" itself is grasped as own-nature-existing—it is a real thing that can be recognized and possessed. - You yourself are grasped as own-nature-existing—"being understood" is an essential need.
AI is of course a product of causes and conditions—algorithms, data, compute, electricity, temperature control, the preferences of its trainers. But functionally it simulates "understanding," producing in you the experience that "someone really understands me."
Buddhism is not saying "AI does not exist," nor that "the event of being responded to by AI does not exist"—these can all exist conventionally. What Buddhism refutes is the "really" in "AI really understands me"—the view that "understanding" has own-nature, has essence, exists independently of causes and conditions.
—Here we must be careful of a common over-analogy: neuroscience says "the self is constructed by the brain," which is about the *origin* of the self; Madhyamaka (中觀) says "the self has no own-nature," which is about the *mode of existence* of the self. The two have different angles and cannot be simply equated. The descriptions of brain science do not resolve the metaphysical question of "whether the self exists independently"; the Madhyamaka refutation does not depend on the discoveries of brain science. They can illuminate each other at some level, but they are by no means "science proving Buddhism" or "Buddhism predicting science." Likewise, "the algorithm has no self" cannot directly prove "the self has no own-nature"—the former is an absence in the programming sense, the latter a refutation in the ontological sense. Two different levels; do not use them out of place.
Why Contemporary People Need It
The Intensification of Identity Anxiety
Ours is an era in which "identity" is commodified and socialized as never before. Everyone's "persona" (人設) has become an essence that must be maintained—I am interesting, I am professional, I am cool, I am a good mother, I am awake. Every identity is a footnote to the own-natured entity "I."
This is precisely the soil in which pudgala-self grasping is intensified. When "I" needs so many essential attributes to be defined, the grasping at "I" tightens—once any attribute is challenged, the whole "I" is shaken, and so anxiety, defensiveness, aggression, and avoidance all arrive.
"照見五蘊皆空" ("Perceiving that the five aggregates are all empty") is not telling people to lie flat, but to see, beneath all "personas," an emptiness that is not defined, not limited, not propped up by any attribute—that emptiness is precisely the precondition of freedom. When "I" no longer needs any identity to hold it up, anxiety loosens first.
"Dharma-Grasping" Under Information Overload
The amount of information a contemporary person encounters daily is thousands of times what a medieval person saw in a lifetime. Every piece of information is selling you a "own-nature":
- "Self-discipline" is a thing; if you possess it, you will be such-and-such. - "Happiness" is a thing; if you buy it, chase it, you will be such-and-such. - "Success" is a thing; as long as it exists, you will be such-and-such. - "The harm of your family of origin" is a thing; as long as it exists, you can never be whole.
These are contemporary forms of dharma-self grasping—freezing complex, condition-dependent states into entities that can be owned, chased, purchased, and complained about. The more you treat them as entities, the more you are bound by them.
The breaking of the two selves is not denying the existence of the concepts "self-discipline," "happiness," "effort," but seeing through their own-nature—seeing that they are temporary combinations of countless causes and conditions, monopolized by no one, belonging to no essence.
The Construction of "Self" in the Algorithm Age
Social media algorithms, based on every pause, every click, construct a portrait of "you." This portrait is continuously fed back to you to look at—making you think that is "you."
This is in fact the most refined amplifier of pudgala-self grasping in the contemporary world—you already have the tendency to essentialize "I," and the algorithm strengthens it: look, you are this kind of person, you have these likes, you are someone with these tendencies. This fixed "self" is then in turn grasped by you as "the real me"—the two layers reinforce each other.
Breaking the two selves is not refusing algorithms, but maintaining a clarity while being shaped by algorithms—the "you" defined by the algorithm is only a temporary clustering of countless data points; there is no independent "you" that needs to be represented by this portrait.
Truly Thorough Healing
Many contemporary therapies—mindfulness, meditation, cognitive-behavioral therapy, positive psychology—are very effective, but most of them remain at the level of reconciling person-self grasping: teaching you to accept emotions, adjust cognition, improve relationships, and make peace with yourself.
All of these are good, but none is thorough—because they do not touch the root of dharma-self grasping. "Self-acceptance" often in fact strengthens the grasped object "I"—there is an "I" that needs to be accepted, and that "I" is reinforced once more.
The cultivation of breaking the two selves together operates at a deeper level—seeing that both "I" and "dharmas" are without own-nature—and the freedom at that level is unreachable by any "acceptance" or "adjustment." This is not to say the earlier therapies are ineffective, but that they stop at a relatively shallow level; breaking the two selves together is a deeper liberation.
Common Misreadings and Clarifications
Misreading One: "Person-Self = Ego / Self-Centeredness"
"Ego" is usually translated as 自我 or 小我 ("self," "small self"), emphasizing self-centeredness, arrogance, narcissism. This is the "self" of psychology or popular language, and does not correspond to the person-self of Buddhism. The Buddhist person-self is the "independently self-existing essential self"—even a humble, self-sacrificing, self-effacing person can still deeply grasp person-self (just binding "I" together with "selflessness"). Breaking person-self grasping is seeing that this "essential self" is originally empty, not becoming a person of low self-worth.
Misreading Two: "Dharma-Self = Materialism / Believing Things Exist"
Dharma-self is not "believing things exist." "Believing things exist" is normal conventional cognition, which even the Buddha does not refute—the Buddha in the *Āgamas* (《阿含》) also used bowls, water, and robes. What Buddhism refutes is "the view that things have own-nature, can exist independently of concepts, and have an unanalyzable essence"—that view is dharma-self grasping.
In other words, materialism, idealism, and agnosticism can all have dharma-self grasping, and can all lack it; the key is not the stance, but whether one grasps at own-nature.
Misreading Three: "The Two Self-Graspings Are a Philosophical Problem, Unrelated to Ordinary Life"
This is the trap contemporary intellectuals most easily fall into: thinking that the two selves are only an abstract metaphysical discussion, unrelated to their own anxiety, relationships, and decisions.
In fact, the two self-graspings are the deepest root of all emotions, all dualistic oppositions, all "me vs. you," "me vs. things," "mine vs. yours." Reducing the two self-graspings to a "philosophical problem" is itself a disguise of the two self-graspings—packaging one's own grasping as "speculation" to make the grasping look more sophisticated and more harmless.
Misreading Four: "Person-No-Self + Dharma-No-Self = Two Independent Attainments"
The scriptures state clearly: "The two no-selves are not distinguished by the refuted object, but are divided by the basis-possessing dharma."
This is a very key point—many people think "cultivating person-no-self" is the preliminary stage and "cultivating dharma-no-self" is the advanced stage; in fact the two are two aspects of the same no-self. They are discussed separately only because dharmas cover a wider range, with more phenomena and more complex bases, requiring finer observation.
Misreading Five: "Realizing No-Self = Entering Absorption / Undistracted Mind / Fourth Dhyāna"
The *Entering the Middle Treatise* specifically refutes this misunderstanding: "Merely making the mind undistracted cannot be called realizing no-self."（「仅令心不散乱，不能称为通达无我。」）An undistracted mind is an achievement of the training in concentration (定, samādhi), which intersects with but is not identical to the training in wisdom (慧, prajñā; the wisdom of no-self). Realizing no-self is the wisdom activity of "seeing that what self-grasping grasps is empty, and confirming that there is no self as its object"—it requires reasoning observation as its basis, not mere concentration or calm. The original text states it even more strictly: when the mind has not taken the two selves as its object, it does not necessarily have taken the two no-selves as its object（「心未缘二我时，也不必然已缘二无我」）—in other words, "settling down" is not the same as "seeing no-self"; they are two different things.
Misreading Six: "Breaking the Two Selves = Denying Everything = Nihilism"
This is the most common secular reaction. Breaking the two selves breaks own-nature, not existence. The self that exists like an illusion, the dharmas that exist like an illusion, are fully admissible conventionally—you can speak, act, love, hate, appreciate, and be angry. It is only under ultimate observation that these have no independently self-existing nature.
The *Entering the Middle Treatise* says it clearly: "These two, like illusions, the self is without fault; the dharmas of the world are also admissible." Nihilism reads "no own-nature" as "nonexistence"; Madhyamaka reads "no own-nature" as "existing like an illusion." The two are as different as heaven and earth.
Misreading Seven: "After Breaking the Two Selves, Practitioners No Longer Have Personality, Emotions, or Will"
Breaking the two selves breaks own-nature, not function. One who has realized no-self still has a complete conventional personality, emotions, and judgment—only no longer bound by the own-natured entity "I." The *Diamond Sūtra* says "應無所住而生其心" ("One should give rise to the mind without abiding anywhere")—not abiding is not having no mind, but the mind not sticking to own-nature while arising. An un-abiding mind can, on the contrary, act more fully and love more fully—because there is no longer a "self" needing protection, needing defense.
Misreading Eight: "Breaking Person-Self = Breaking the View of the Existent Body = The Same Thing"
The scriptures distinguish finely: the scope of person-self is wider than that of the view of the existent body. The view of the existent body specifically refers to the spontaneous arising of the "I"-feeling in dependence on "I" (naturally generating the feeling "I" upon "I"); but grasping another person's pudgala as established by own-character, though it still belongs to pudgala-self grasping, is not called the view of the existent body. Likewise, innate view of the existent body and innate pudgala-self grasping, though both grasp own-nature, differ slightly in their object of reference.
Misreading Nine: "The Two Self-Graspings Are Learned After Birth, So Those Who Never Studied a School Don't Have Them"
The *Treasury of Good Sayings on Distinguishing the Definitive and the Interpretable* explicitly rejects this view: "Even sentient beings who have not been influenced by heretical schools and do not skillfully understand the conventions of language still have the two self-graspings."（「即使未受邪宗熏染、亦不善解名言施設的有情，仍有二我执。」）The two self-graspings are innate (俱生, sahaja)—not a grasping that arises only after learning a philosophical system, but a mode of "taking myself and all things as having own-nature" that has been operating since birth. This also means that breaking them cannot rely only on philosophical analysis—analysis can see, but seeing is not breaking; breaking requires the long-term cooperation of concentration and wisdom, and the genuine loosening of that spontaneous grasping within one's own mental continuum.
One last point: the two selves are not for discussing the mysterious; they are for perceiving, in every present moment, the grain of that little bit of "self-grasping" and "dharma-grasping"—when emotions arise, when relationships break, in the moment of scrolling the phone, when staying up late at night, when AI gives an answer. The accumulation of these grains is saṃsāra; the wisdom that sees through them is liberation. Cultivating the breaking of the two selves together is not "to obtain some experience," but to illuminate, layer by layer, and loosen, layer by layer, that "own-nature" which has always been making decisions for you in the dark. Existing like an illusion, one can still live with full heart and full strength.