Dharma · AI Companion

一合相

piṇḍa-grāha

一合相,指执取众缘和合所成之物为一真实整体之见。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty AdvancedTruth-level span I · dependent arising ⇢ II · emptinessInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

所破之执实一体义于第1重(实有→缘生)被引入;《金刚经》「一合相即非一合相」为对本概念的性空再读,故上限2

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

一合相 (*yī hé xiàng*, “the appearance of a single composite whole”; Sanskrit given as *piṇḍa-grāha*) is the grasping of something assembled through many conditions as one independently real entity.

The problem is not that we perceive wholes. A city is a city, a person is a person, and a team is a team in ordinary speech. The problem begins when the mind silently converts “a useful name for a coordinated process” into “a self-existing thing that possesses its identity from its own side.”

Consider a company. Legally and practically, it can sign contracts, employ people, and go bankrupt. Yet when we look for the single substance that is “the company,” we find employees, capital, documents, software, buildings, customers, laws, memories, expectations, and countless changing relationships. None alone is the company; nor is there an additional company-substance hiding behind them. The company is not nothing, but neither is it an indivisible entity existing by itself. It is a dependently established whole.

This distinction—between functioning conventionally and existing through intrinsic nature—is the heart of the teaching.

The *Diamond Sutra* (《金剛般若波羅蜜經》) develops it through the example of a world:

“If a world were really existent, it would be a single composite whole. The Tathāgata says that a single composite whole is not a single composite whole; therefore it is called a single composite whole.”

The passage employs the characteristic pattern “is not … therefore is called …” (則非……是名……). Its movement has three stages:

1. “A single composite whole” identifies the object as it appears within ordinary discourse. 2. “Not a single composite whole” denies that this name refers to an intrinsically existent unity. 3. “Therefore it is called a single composite whole” restores its conventional designation without turning that designation into a substance.

The last step matters enormously. Prajñāpāramitā does not merely smash names. It teaches us to use names without being used by them. A world may still be called a world; what is relinquished is the demand that “world” name an independently grounded thing.

This is why the same section treats “world,” “a multitude of particles” (微塵眾), and “one composite appearance” alike. Dividing a whole into smaller pieces does not automatically disclose an ultimate substance. The supposed whole depends upon parts, while “the collection of parts” also depends upon selection, arrangement, relations, cognition, and designation. Neither the large unity nor its minute components should be reified.

The sutra continues:

“A single composite whole is inexpressible. It is only ordinary people who greedily cling to that matter.” —*Diamond Sutra*

“Inexpressible” (不可說) should not be turned into the claim that a mysterious cosmic One lies beyond words. That would simply replace an ordinary reification with a grander one. The point is that language can designate the composite, but it cannot capture an independent essence because no such essence can be found. Words work by marking boundaries and stabilizing patterns; dependent reality never acquires self-existence merely because a noun has been assigned to it.

The *Diamond Sutra* therefore connects this teaching with its criticism of 我見、人見、眾生見、壽者見—the views of a self, a person, a sentient being, and a life-holder. “I” is perhaps the composite whole to which we cling most intensely. Body, feeling, recognition, dispositions, consciousness, memory, social role, and personal narrative are coordinated under one indispensable conventional designation: “me.” Suffering deepens when that designation is felt to be an unchanging owner standing behind experience.

The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (《中論》, *Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way*) approaches the issue analytically. Although it does not use the expression 一合相 in the supplied passages, it examines what “combination” could mean if the things combined possessed fixed self-natures.

If two factors are absolutely one, they cannot meaningfully combine: one thing does not join itself as though it were its own partner. If they are intrinsically separate and already complete in themselves, their mere juxtaposition cannot explain a new unity. And if their identities arise only through their relation, neither an independently established difference nor an independently established union can be found beforehand. The alleged act of joining, the joiner, and the time of joining likewise cannot be isolated as self-existing realities.

The text applies the same reasoning to cause and result:

“If a result arose from the combination of conditions, and it already existed within that combination, why would it need to arise through combination?” —*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*

If the result already exists fully formed in its causes, production is redundant. If it is utterly absent and unrelated to them, its production becomes unintelligible. Madhyamaka’s conclusion is not that nothing happens. It is that arising cannot be explained as the production of a self-existing entity from self-existing components. Things arise dependently precisely because they lack fixed intrinsic nature (自性, *svabhāva*).

Thus “no intrinsic production” and “dependent arising” are not competitors. At the conventional level, seeds, soil, water, temperature, time, and cultivation give rise to a plant. Under analysis, no already completed plant is hidden in any cause, and no independent plant-substance crosses a metaphysical threshold into existence. “Plant” designates the changing continuity of a conditioned process.

Chan sources bring the analysis into immediate experience. Baizhang Huaihai says:

“A single composite whole cannot be obtained.” —*Recorded Sayings of the Ancient Worthies* (《古尊宿語錄》)

“Cannot be obtained” (不可得) does not mean that one cannot see a table, meet a person, or act in the world. It means that, when one searches for the self-grounded unity presumed by attachment, nothing answering to that demand can be grasped.

Baoning responds to the question “What is a single composite whole?” with “A bright mirror on its stand.” When asked about the matter of clinging, he replies, “The Hu is the Hu; the Han is the Han.” The exchange holds unity and difference together. A mirror presents an entire field without manufacturing a single substance out of everything reflected. The many appearances occur together, yet their distinctions are not erased. Emptiness is therefore neither fragmentation nor an undifferentiated mystical oneness.

Elsewhere Baoning says, “The Tathāgata says a single composite whole is not a single composite whole—Subhūti deserves thirty blows.” The Chan provocation prevents the corrective formula itself from becoming a new object of attachment. One can cling to “not one composite whole” just as rigidly as one once clung to “one composite whole.” The Middle Way does not settle in either extreme.

Its place on the path of liberation is now clearer. Ignorance does not consist only in lacking information. It is the lived habit of turning conditioned processes into solid things: a solid self who must be defended, solid others who can be permanently classified, solid possessions that promise security, and solid experiences that ought to remain. From this substantializing come craving, aversion, fear, pride, and the compulsion to control. Insight into 一合相 loosens that structure. The practitioner continues to recognize persons and responsibilities, but no longer needs them to possess immutable essences.

A walk-through in everyday life

Imagine opening your phone during the morning commute and seeing a short message from your partner: “Fine. Do whatever you want.” Within seconds, the mind produces a seemingly solid whole: “Our relationship is in trouble.”

Walk through its construction carefully.

First, there are conditions: a screen, written characters, a messaging system, the previous conversation, your partner’s circumstances, your bodily fatigue, remembered arguments, expectations about tone, and the cultural habits by which punctuation acquires emotional significance. These are not irrelevant details surrounding an already existent meaning. They participate in the arising of the meaning you experience.

Second, recognition selects and organizes. The mind identifies the sender, recalls earlier exchanges, interprets “fine” as displeasure, and links the sentence to an existing narrative. This is not yet proof of what your partner intended. It is the operation through which a complex field becomes intelligible.

Third, feeling arises: perhaps a tightening in the chest and an unpleasant tone. Then dispositions gather—defensiveness, fear, the urge to retaliate, the wish to obtain reassurance. Consciousness registers a changing succession of visual, emotional, and mental events.

Now comes the decisive move: all of this is compressed into one apparently self-evident entity—“the state of our relationship.” A momentary configuration is treated as though it were a single thing with a settled essence. You may then add another composite: “This is what they are really like.” And another: “I am always the one being rejected.”

The error is not simply that your conclusion may be factually wrong. It might be partly right; your partner may indeed be angry. The error of 一合相 lies in granting a dependently interpreted configuration more solidity, unity, and permanence than it has.

Seeing emptiness here does not mean saying, “It is all unreal, so I will ignore the message.” That would confuse lack of intrinsic nature with practical nonexistence. A wiser response recognizes both levels: “This message has affected me and may signal a real difficulty, but the meaning of the whole situation is not self-established. I can ask rather than complete the story alone.”

Suppose you write: “I may be reading the tone incorrectly. Are you upset, or are you simply busy?” New conditions enter. Your partner explains that they were hurrying into a meeting. Or perhaps they confirm their anger and tell you why. Either way, the supposedly finished entity called “the relationship problem” reveals itself as a revisable process.

Notice the most common mapping error: the phone, the sentence, or even the relationship is not itself “the delusion.” Conditioned wholes function. The delusion is grasping such a whole as intrinsically unified, independently determined, and fully captured by the story attached to it.

The same mechanism appears at work. A disappointing performance review becomes “I am a failure.” The review depends on particular projects, selected metrics, a manager’s standpoint, institutional incentives, comparison groups, timing, and your own performance. None of this makes the review meaningless. It does mean that the review cannot bear the metaphysical weight of defining an entire person.

It also appears in algorithmic life. A platform gathers clicks, pauses, searches, purchases, and inferred affinities into a profile. That profile may effectively predict some behavior, yet “the user” constructed by the system is a model generated for particular purposes from selected data. It is neither your complete self nor a window onto an immutable essence. Still, the model has consequences: it shapes what you see and thereby becomes one condition influencing later behavior.

This makes algorithmic profiling a useful analogy for dependent designation, but only an analogy. Buddhist analysis concerns the structure of grasping and dependent existence, not merely the statistical incompleteness of digital models. Nor does the usefulness of neuroscience or computational modeling amount to scientific proof of emptiness. Scientific accounts themselves remain contested, purpose-bound, and methodologically limited; they can illuminate mechanisms without deciding the full philosophical and soteriological claims of Buddhism.

Parenting offers another example. A child repeatedly refuses homework, and the parent forms the whole “a lazy child.” That unity is assembled from selected episodes, anxiety about the future, school expectations, comparison with peers, the parent’s exhaustion, and perhaps ignorance of the child’s fear or difficulty. Once the label is reified, every new event is recruited as evidence for it.

To see 一合相 does not require pretending that no behavioral pattern exists. It asks the parent to distinguish a pattern from an essence: “Homework has repeatedly been avoided under these conditions” is workable; “laziness is what this child truly is” imprisons both child and parent. Because the pattern is conditioned rather than self-existent, conditions can be investigated and changed.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary life continually packages processes as solid wholes. News presents “the public,” workplaces speak of “talent,” platforms construct “engagement,” political discourse fabricates homogeneous camps, and personal branding asks us to produce a coherent self that can be displayed and evaluated. These abstractions can be useful. Trouble begins when their convenience becomes invisible and their constructed boundaries are mistaken for reality itself.

Understanding 一合相 cultivates three forms of freedom.

The first is freedom from identity imprisonment. “Successful,” “unlovable,” “an anxious person,” “a good Buddhist,” and “someone who has wasted their life” are composite judgments. Each gathers changing events beneath a name and then makes the name appear to explain the events. Seeing the construction does not erase accountability or history. It prevents history from hardening into destiny.

The second is freedom for ethical responsiveness. If people possessed fixed essences, genuine transformation would be impossible. Because anger, prejudice, addiction, generosity, and courage arise through conditions, harmful conduct can be opposed firmly without reducing a person to that conduct. Emptiness is not moral vagueness; it is what makes education, repentance, repair, and cultivation intelligible.

The third is freedom from compulsive control. We suffer not only because composites change but because we expect them to behave as self-contained things. We try to secure “my career,” “my family,” “my body,” or “my reputation” as if each were one object under a single owner’s command. In reality, each is a field of relationships and contingencies. Recognizing this does not produce passivity. It replaces fantasies of total control with intelligent participation in conditions.

This is where the concept enters the larger path of liberation. Ethical discipline changes the conditions under which experience unfolds. Meditative stability allows the practitioner to observe construction without immediately obeying it. Wisdom (般若, *prajñā*) sees that neither the observed composite nor the observer possesses independent self-nature. Compassion follows because the boundary of the defended self is no longer regarded as absolute, while the conventional reality of suffering remains fully significant.

The practical movement is not from “things exist” to “nothing exists.” It is from “things exist by themselves” to “things arise, function, and cease through relations.” That shift preserves the world while releasing the grip with which we try to possess it.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“Everything composite is an illusion, so nothing matters.”

Lack of intrinsic nature does not mean lack of causal efficacy. A traffic system is a composite designation, but stepping into moving traffic still has consequences. Conventional reality is precisely the domain in which conduct, suffering, care, and liberation operate.

“The teaching denies that wholes exist.”

It denies intrinsically existent wholes, not conventionally designated ones. Refusing to call a hospital “a hospital” would not be wisdom. Wisdom understands that its identity depends upon people, practices, resources, laws, purposes, and continuing coordination.

“If the whole is empty, the parts must be ultimately real.”

This is the reductionist escape that the *Diamond Sutra* blocks by treating both “world” and “multitude of particles” through the same “is not … therefore is called …” formula. Parts are identified through boundaries, functions, relations, and further parts. Analysis does not necessarily arrive at tiny self-existing units.

“Dependent arising means that previously existing things come together like bricks.”

That picture is useful only provisionally. Madhyamaka asks whether the alleged components already possess fully independent identities before combination. If they did, their relationship could make no essential difference to what they are. In dependent arising, conditions do not merely stand around a self-established object; they participate in its very identity and intelligibility.

“‘Inexpressible’ points to one ineffable Absolute.”

That interpretation recreates 一合相 at the highest imaginable level. “Inexpressible” warns that conceptual designation cannot deliver the independent essence it seems to promise. It is not a license to posit an indescribable cosmic substance.

“Emptiness means that all distinctions disappear into oneness.”

Baoning’s “The Hu is the Hu; the Han is the Han” guards against this. Dependent unity does not abolish difference. A body is a coordinated whole, yet eye and ear are not interchangeable. A community is relational, yet individuals do not become morally indistinguishable. Emptiness frees difference from fixed essence; it does not flatten difference.

“Once I understand the argument, attachment should vanish.”

Intellectual clarity is only the beginning. 一合相 is enacted somatically and emotionally: the contraction around “my position,” the heat of “that kind of person,” the panic that “everything is ruined.” Practice consists in recognizing the construction as it occurs, feeling its force without immediately acting from it, and examining the conditions concealed by the apparently solid whole.

“Non-attachment means refusing commitment.”

Commitment without reification may be more faithful, not less. One can care for a relationship as an evolving network of actions and conditions rather than demand that it guarantee a permanent identity. One can defend an institution while admitting it must change. One can take responsibility for a self that is dependently continuous without positing an unchanging owner.

Finally, “一合相 cannot be obtained” must not itself become a doctrine to clutch. The Chan warning is sharp because spiritual language readily forms a new identity: “I am someone who sees through all constructs.” That, too, is a composite appearance assembled from memory, comparison, concepts, and desire.

The mature insight is quieter. When a whole appears, we can name it. When action is needed, we can act. When analysis searches for an independent core, none is found. Because nothing is frozen in self-nature, transformation remains possible; because conditioned appearances still function, compassion and responsibility remain necessary. To see both at once is not to withdraw from the world, but to inhabit it without demanding that its living relationships become solid things.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

一合相,梵语 piṇḍa-grāha,指执取众缘和合所成之物为一真实整体之见。此概念于般若、中观、禅宗等不同部类中,阐述方式虽各具特色,然核心皆指向同一义旨:否定将和合之相视为实有自性之执着。凡夫以种种边见执取和合之物为一实体,圣者则了知其假名施设而无所得。

二、主要阐述

《金刚般若波罗蜜经》对「一合相」之论述集中于须菩提与佛陀之对话,呈现三个层面。其一,名相之遮破:经云「若世界实有者,则是一合相。如来说一合相,则非一合相,是名一合相。」 运用般若经典「则非、是名」三段句式,先标举一合相之名,继而以「则非」遮遣其实体性,最后以「是名」显示其仅为假名施设。其二,语言之边界:经直言「一合相者,则是不可说。」 一合相越出言说诠表之范畴,凡以名言安立者无非假施设。其三,执着之主体:经云「但凡夫之人贪着其事。」 贪着一合相者仅限于凡夫,与同段对「我见、人见、众生见、寿者见」之批判前后呼应,菩萨则应知一切法无我、不贪著于此。

《古尊宿语录》以禅门机锋阐发此概念,手法迥异于义学之逐名解析。百丈怀海以「不可得」一句直破执见,云「一合相不可得。」 盖一合相本是众缘和合之假名,本无实我、实法可得。报宁以「明镜当台」为正面之喻,答「如何是一合相」曰「明镜当台」,喻一合相乃和合之全体大用;进问「如何是贪着底事」,则答「胡是胡,汉是汉」,意谓诸法各住自位、不失差别,故不可于一合相上再生贪着。 又引《金刚经》之语而更进一步否定,云「如来说一合相即非一合相,须菩提好与三十棒。」 以棒喝于言说未消之处再加摧破,使学人于「一合相」、「即非一合相」两端皆不立。

《中论》从因缘和合之角度层层破斥。其一,一法不合:若染法与染者以一法之形态而合,一法则不能自合,如指端不能自触。 若一有合,应离伴而有合。其二,异法不合:异法既各各成竟,自性已立,不须复合;强说合而实犹异。 其三,一异俱不可:若一,应离余因缘而有;若异,前过亦成。 其四,异相与合相互不成:经云「异相无有成,是故汝欲合;合相竟无成,而复说异相」, 复云「异相不成故,合相则不成;于何异相中,而欲说合相?」 其五,合法、合者、合时三皆不可得。 其六,众缘和合生果之不成:经云「若众缘和合,而有果生者;和合中已有,何须和合生?」 复云「若物无自性,是物终不生。」 又云「若众缘和合,是中有果者;和合中应有,而实不可得。」

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

三经所用名相皆为「一合相」三字,未见别译。《金刚经》(鸠摩罗什译)以「一合相」与「世界」、「微尘众」并列出现,皆循同一「则非、是名」之遮诠模式。《古尊宿语录》沿用《金刚经》之名相,所用与经文相同,并无异译;其以禅门机用语句阐发此概念,与义学之解析迥异。《中论》则以「染法、染者」表能所对待,以「合、合相、合者、合时、合法」表和合之事之三相,以「众缘和合」表因缘聚合,以「果」表所生之果,全文未直接使用「一合相」三字,而以破斥和合之论述涵盖此义。-

四、与相关概念的关系

「一合相」与「世界」、「微尘众」在《金刚经》中并列出现,同受「则非、是名」之遮遣。 与「我见、人见、众生见、寿者见」同为凡夫执实之典型边见,皆为菩萨所应破除。在《中论》中,「一合相」之执与染法、染者之和合问题相通,属于广义之因缘和合论议,与缘起性空之宗旨相贯。禅宗则将此概念与「无所得」之旨相接,以棒喝手段直指学人离却言说、两端不立。

五、代表性原文引用

(一)「若世界实有者,则是一合相。如来说一合相,则非一合相,是名一合相。」(《金刚般若波罗蜜经》)

(二)「一合相者,则是不可说。但凡夫之人贪着其事。」(《金刚般若波罗蜜经》)

(三)「一合相不可得。」(《古尊宿语录》百丈怀海)

(四)问「如何是一合相」,师答「明镜当台」;进问「如何是贪着底事」,师答「胡是胡,汉是汉」。(《古尊宿语录》报宁)

(五)「如来说一合相即非一合相,须菩提好与三十棒。」(《古尊宿语录》报宁)

(六)「若众缘和合,而有果生者;和合中已有,何须和合生?」(《中论》)

(七)「若物无自性,是物终不生。」(《中论》)

By SutraAI-generated

金剛般若波羅蜜經T0235 · 般若部

金剛般若波羅蜜經對「一合相」的論述,集中在須菩提與佛陀對話之中,呈現出三個層面的意涵。

一、名相的遮破:「一合相」在本經中,是作為對「世界」實有之執的指稱而提出。經文云:「若世界實有者,則是一合相。如來說一合相,則非一合相,是名一合相。」()此處運用了般若經典常見的「則非、是名」三段句式:先標舉一合相之名,繼而以「則非」遮遣其實體性,最後以「是名」顯示其僅為假名施設。換言之,若執持種種因緣和合所成之世界為一真實整體,即落於一合相之見;而如來所說的一合相,並非真有一合相之實體可得,只不過假名為一合相而已。

二、語言的邊界:「一合相」在本經中被判為「不可說」。經文直言:「一合相者,則是不可說。」()這表明一合相本身即已越出言說詮表的範疇——凡以名言安立者,無非假施設,而一合相作為執取眾緣和合為一實體的見取,更非語言所能真正指向。此一斷語與其上文對「微塵眾」、「世界」同樣採取「則非……是名……」的句式相呼應,顯示本經對一切施設名相皆不予以實體化的立場。

三、執著的主體:經文點出「但凡夫之人貪著其事」(),明確指出貪著一合相者僅限於凡夫,而非證悟之聖者。這一表述與本經同一段中對「我見、人見、眾生見、壽者見」的批判前後呼應——凡夫以種種邊見執取實法,菩薩則應當知一切法無我、得成於忍,不受福德、不貪著於一合相之事。

就術語層面而言,本經直接以「一合相」三字為用,未嘗另立別名,亦未與其他經典之譯名作對照;其與「世界」、「微塵眾」並列出現,皆循同一「則非、是名」之遮詮模式(),顯示此概念在鳩摩羅什此譯本中,乃作為凡夫執實之典型案例而被破斥,並未被視為一獨立深奧之法義來單獨發揮。

中論T1564 · 中觀部

《中論》對「一合相——執取眾緣和合為一實體」之論述,核心在破斥將和合視為實有自性之執著。其論證層層展開如下:

一、「一法不合」:若染法與染者以一法之形態而合,一法則不能自合,如指端不能自觸,故一法無合。 若一有合,應離伴而有合,無需他緣相伴。

二、「異法不合」:若以異法相合,異法既各各成竟,自性已立,則不須復合;強說合而實猶異。 若異而合,不須餘因緣而有合,且雖遠亦應合,顯其荒謬。

三、「一異俱不可」:若染、染者一,應離餘因緣而有,且染是法、染者是人,人法為一則成大亂;若異而言合,前過亦成。是故一與異兩端皆不可說合。

四、「異相與合相互不成」:若染、染者先有決定異相而後說合,二相先已異而後強說合,是則不合。 經云:「異相無有成,是故汝欲合;合相竟無成,而復說異相」, 復云:「異相不成故,合相則不成;於何異相中,而欲說合相?」 異相若無實成,合相亦無實成;凡物皆以異故有合,然見等異相不可得,是故無合。

五、「合法、合者、合時三皆不可得」:是法自體以一故不合,如一指不自合;異法以異故不合,異事已成不須合。如是思惟,合者、合時、合法三皆不可得。

六、「眾緣和合生果之不成」:經云:「若眾緣和合,而有果生者;和合中已有,何須和合生?」 若和合中已先有果,則不須復由和合而生;若和合中本無果,則不應從和合而生。又云:「若眾緣和合,是中有果者;和合中應有,而實不可得。」 復云:「若物無自性,是物終不生。」

《中論》所用術語,以「染法、染者」表能所對待,以「合、合相、合者、合時、合法」表和合之事之三相,以「眾緣和合」表因緣聚合,以「果」表所生之果。此皆破執和合為實有自性之施設。

古尊宿語錄X1315 · 禪宗語錄部

《古尊宿語錄》對「一合相」之闡述,散見於百丈懷海、報寧等禪師的機用語句之中,其手法迥異於義學之逐名解析,而是以遮破、直指與棒喝交錯並用,層層逼顯「一合相」之不可執取。

一、百丈懷海以「不可得」一句直破執見。當僧問西堂「有問有答即且置,無問無答時如何」,西堂答以「怕爛却那」,百丈聞之曰:「從來疑這箇老兄。」及僧請和尚道,百丈即云:「一合相不可得。」此語直截否定「一合相」為可緣可取之實體,蓋「一合相」本是眾緣和合之假名,本無實我、實法可得;百丈以「不可得」三字,即已將「執取眾緣和合為一實體」之見一掃而空。

二、報寧以「明鏡當臺」為正面之喻。問「如何是一合相」,師答:「明鏡當臺。」明鏡高懸臺上,森羅萬象自來而照、無所隱覆,喻「一合相」乃和合之全體大用,雖萬差並陳而宛然一體,呈現即是一合。進問「如何是貪著底事」,師答:「胡是胡,漢是漢。」意謂若執此明鏡所現之和合為一實體而貪著之,便會把胡、漢混作一團、彼此不分;師意正在點醒:和合之相雖宛然,而諸法各住自位、不失差別,故不可於一合相上再生貪著。

三、引《金剛經》之語而更進一步否定。報寧上堂云:「如來說一合相即非一合相,須菩提好與三十棒。」此處先引經文之遮詮——如來說一合相,即非一合相——隨即責須菩提「好與三十棒」。蓋須菩提雖聞佛說「即非一合相」,猶依名言而立遮詮、未盡離念;故禪門棒喝,於言說未消之處再加摧破,使學人於「一合相」、「即非一合相」兩端皆不立,庶幾契入無所得之旨。

要之,《古尊宿語錄》所用之名相即作「一合相」,與《金剛經》所用相同,並無異譯;其論述方式則別具一格——既以「不可得」蕩其執,又以「明鏡當臺」顯其用,再以「胡是胡,漢是漢」點其不可貪著,最後援引經文而反施棒喝,務使學人於和合之相當下了然無所得。

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