Dharma · AI Companion

苾芻律儀

bhikṣu-saṃvara

比丘受持具足戒形成的戒律防护。AI-generated

Type PracticeDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span outside the four-fold two-truths frameworkInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

Reading a blueprint for committing one's body and speech wholly to a single undertaking


I. What This Concept Is Saying

1. The Name and Its Coordinate System

苾芻律儀 (bhikṣu-saṃvara, "the vow-restraint of a full monk") is, strictly speaking, the business of one who has left home (pravrajita). "苾芻" is a phonetic transcription, rendered in meaning as "乞士" (the alms-seeking one), referring to a male who has received the 具足戒 (upasaṃpanna, "complete precepts," the final ordination procedure for a monk's formal renunciation). In the 《阿毘達磨俱舍論》 (Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya) and the 《瑜伽師地論》 (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra), "苾芻" is the fixed translation; "比丘" does not appear as the primary term—an unremarkable but important detail: when a term is fixed, it means the institution it rests upon has already taken shape in the source texts. "律儀" is the meaning-rendering of saṃvara, meaning "guarding, stopping evil"; it is near-synonymous in this text's vocabulary with 尸羅 (śīla, "moral discipline") and 戒律儀 (the restraint of moral precepts).

It sits in the sequence of the "seven classes of pratimokṣa restraints" (七眾別解脫律儀): 近事 (upāsaka, "lay male devotee") keeps five items, 近住 (upavāsa, "the one-day-eight-precept observance") keeps eight, 勤策 (śrāmaṇera, "novice") keeps ten—all of the preceding are finite numbers. 苾芻律儀 no longer follows the logic of "adding a few more rules"; its special character lies in that key proposition of the 《阿毘達磨俱舍論》:

受離一切應離身語業」 *"One receives [the vow to] abandon all bodily and verbal deeds that should be abandoned."*

It is not the finite sum of several precepts, but the complete inclusion of "the bodily and verbal deeds one should keep away from." This is the first key to understanding it: it belongs to a different logic—the inclusive logic of "all," not the itemized logic of "add a few more."

2. Obtained from All: Three Universal Dimensions of the Scope of Acquisition

The Kośa further pushes "complete inclusion" into three dimensions:

- Obtained from all sentient beings (從一切有情得): the objects toward whom you vow not to harm cannot be pre-excluded. It is not "do not harm humans, but do not care about ants"—the object must be "一切有情" (sarva-sattva, all sentient beings). - Obtained from all limbs of the restraint (從一切律儀支得): 支 (śākhā, "branch") refers to the fundamental paths of action (業道, karmapatha; three of body, four of speech). Only the fundamental paths of action are called "limbs of the restraint." The lay five precepts can be obtained from four limbs (established on only some of these fundamental paths); the bhikṣu restraint must be obtained from all limbs. - Obtained by any one of the lower, middle, or higher minds (由任一下、中、上心得): even if at the time of receiving the precepts you receive them merely with a mind of 慚愧心 (shame), 怖畏心 (fear), or 忍耐心 (forbearance)—whichever one—you still obtain the restraint with regard to all sentient beings and from all limbs; if all three minds are present together, it is said to be "obtained from all limbs and by all causes."

The converse is the most cautionary: if you set limits in advance—"only toward such-and-such beings," "keep only such-and-such limbs," "only in such a place at such a time"—what you obtain is not the restraint but only a "妙行" (good conduct) that resembles it. This is the deviation ordinary people most easily fall into: saying "I keep the precepts" while actually keeping a carefully filtered list.

The Kośa also has a seemingly odd but significant provision: with regard to objects one cannot actually harm at all (e.g., beings not yet born, or those who have already attained the state beyond training), one can still obtain the precepts by virtue of "raising a universal intention of non-harm toward all sentient beings"; conversely, an object that could not originally be harmed later becoming harmable does not increase or decrease the restraint already obtained. The key point is here: the establishment of the restraint fundamentally does not lie in actually "completing non-harm" at the level of reality, but in "possessing a universal good intention" at the level of mind.

3. Received from Another: the Restraint as a Relational Event

The 《瑜伽師地論》 emphasizes: the bhikṣu restraint must be received from another; there is no such thing as "self-receiving." Why? If leaving home did not require receiving through a legitimate teacher and the saṅgha, through the procedural act of 羯磨 (karman, "the saṅgha's deliberative and declarative procedure"), then it would mean that "those fit to leave home and those unfit" could all declare themselves to have left home on their own authority, and the normative framework of the holy teaching would be emptied. The concrete scenario is: the recipient goes to the teacher's place, earnestly requests, remains in reverence, and expresses his intention in words—this involves the three deeds of 身表業 (bodily expression, the physical reverence), 語表業 (verbal expression, the spoken statement), and 意表業 (mental expression, the inner aspiration).

What this rule carries is not mere form but institutional legitimacy: a restraint must be recognized by a lineage of transmission longer than the individual before it can operate validly within the saṅgha.

4. The Four Limbs: Four Pillars of the Restraint's Operation

The 《瑜伽師地論》 summarizes the establishment and operation of the bhikṣu restraint as 四支 (four limbs):

- 受具足支 (the limb of receiving full ordination): in the 白四羯磨 (jñapticaturtha-karman, "the procedure of four declarations, inquiries, and votes addressed to the ordinand"), the fourth declaration is completed, roughly encompassing the "隨粗學處" (the coarser training rules); thereby the full bhikṣu precepts are first established—identity is set. - 受隨法學處支 (the limb of receiving the training rules according to the Dharma): toward the many 學處 (śikṣāpada, "training rules") in the 毘奈耶 (vinaya, "monastic discipline") that accord with the bhikṣu's śīla, "guard and uphold them all in practice"—content is implemented. - 隨護他心支 (the limb of protecting others' minds): make your 軌範 (exemplary bearing) and your conduct complete, so that you are not censured by the world, by the virtuous, by fellow practitioners, by vinaya-holders, or by vinaya-students—the precepts are not only your own business with yourself; they sustain the credibility of the entire saṅgha in people's eyes. - 隨護如所受學處支 (the limb of protecting the training rules as received): regard even 微細罪 (subtle offenses) with deep fear, do not transgress the training rules received, and if there is a violation, confess and clear it according to the Dharma (through confession-karman procedures)—the precepts are not enough with a single floor; they must be fine-grained to the point where you dare not touch them carelessly.

One limb establishes identity, one builds content, one guards public trust, one guards fine conduct—if any of the four is missing, it is not a complete bhikṣu restraint.

5. The Daily Form of Pure Livelihood: Giving the Restraint-Body a House to Live In

The 《瑜伽論》 gives a picture concrete enough to read directly even today:

Body and speech "without impairment" (身語無虧): with respect to the training rules received, do not impair bodily deeds, do not impair verbal deeds—without deficiency, without gaps. In the paths of deportment (威儀路, īryāpatha)—walking, standing, sitting, lying down—together with robes, bowl, alms-begging, receiving and using, washing the feet, arranging the bedding, each item must be both "隨順世間" (conformable to the world, looking human to humans) and "隨順毘奈耶" (conformable to the vinaya, in keeping with the rules of a renunciant).

淨命 (pure livelihood) has three facets: - 所行 (conduct)—keep away from buying and selling, keep away from harming and binding and the like (do not get involved in profit-making, do not get involved in violence or control over others); - 攝取 (acquisition)—do not acquire precious goods such as elephants, horses, or raw grain; robes merely "cover the body," food merely "fills the belly," and keep away from surplus possessions (accumulated extras); - 受用 (use)—keep away from untimely food (non-time eating, i.e., not eating after noon).

These three together are not decoration; they are the real structure within which the restraint can "stand up": when your clothing can only cover the body, your bowl can only fill the belly, your daily rhythm is bounded by time, and you do not touch buying and selling or submit to control—only then is that "complete" restraint-body not merely an inner commitment but a visible house.

6. Relinquishing the Restraint: When This Restraint Comes to a Stop

The two treatises, the 《俱舍》 and the 《瑜伽》, give this side by side:

The four conditions listed by the 《俱舍》 (the common relinquishing conditions for the seven [classes] other than the one-day observance): 1. Declaring to one who can understand: "I relinquish my training rules"; 2. Abandoning the 眾同分 (nikāya-sabhāga, "shared identity," i.e., leaving the saṅgha); 3. The arising of 二形俱生 (both sexual characteristics appearing together); 4. The cutting off of 善根 (kuśala-mūla, "wholesome roots," i.e., having attained nirvāṇa).

The one-day observance has its own fifth condition: the end of the night (the eighth-precept day passing).

The 《瑜伽》 lists: relinquishing the training rules, committing a fundamental offense, the male characteristic disappearing and both characteristics arising, the cutting off of wholesome roots, abandoning the shared identity; when the 正法 (saddharma, "true Dharma") is destroyed and concealed, though one can no longer newly receive, one who has already received does not relinquish on that account.

The two treatises preserve side by side the question of whether committing a grave offense relinquishes the bhikṣu precepts: - 有餘部 (some schools): committing any one of the four grave offenses leading to downfall (殺盜淫妄—killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech—the four great crimes) relinquishes the restraints of both the novice and the bhikṣu. - 迦濕彌羅毘婆沙師 (the Kaśmīra Vaibhāṣika masters): committing a fundamental offense does not relinquish the renunciation precepts, but there are two names—"one who keeps the precepts / one who violates the precepts"; after open confession and removal, one is called solely "具尸羅" (one possessed of śīla)—meaning the restraint-body is still there, but at present it must be counteracted by confession.

The two positions are placed side by side, and the 《俱舍》 finally points out a metaphor: 多羅樹斷頭,不能復生長—the tāla tree, once its head is cut off, cannot grow again—even if, according to the Vaibhāṣika masters, the restraint-body is not relinquished, the function of "producing greatness" has been broken. The root is still there, but the branches and leaves can no longer continue to grow wide—this is the real price of a fundamental grave offense.

7. The "Four Kinds of Bhikṣu" Mentioned in the 《俱舍》

In the terminology of the precepts, "苾芻" is divided into four grades:

- 名想苾芻 (nominal bhikṣu): merely named a monk, of monastic appearance, but not necessarily actually keeping the precepts; - 自稱苾芻 (self-proclaimed bhikṣu): one who calls himself a monk; - 乞匃苾芻 (mendicant bhikṣu): one who lives by begging for alms (this is the bhikṣu in the literal sense); - 破惑苾芻 (bhikṣu who has destroyed the defilements): a monk whose outflows (āsrava) are exhausted, who has realized the stages of attainment.

The first three can all receive full ordination, but only the fourth is a bhikṣu at the level of realization. In this distinction there is a gentle but relentless meaning: a restraint-body can be held by a person who is not entirely pure; the restraint-body does not equal purity. The restraint-body is the "status of one who should be a renunciant" that the institution gives you; purity is the transcript you earn by walking within that status.


II. A Walkthrough in Daily Life

苾芻律儀 is the business of renunciants; lay people cannot directly uphold it (if lay people could receive it, the renunciant status would dissolve). But its structure—"the universality of the vow," "fine-grainedness," "visible pure livelihood," "the price of violating the precepts," "the institutional logic of receiving from another"—is a mirror that can show us several patterns that recur in our ethical commitments. Let us walk through its limbs using everyday scenarios.

Walkthrough 1: "The Limb of Receiving Full Ordination" and "The Limb of Receiving the Training Rules According to the Dharma"—the Universality of a Single Commitment

Imagine entering a truly serious professional role—physician, lawyer, psychotherapist, sea-rescue crew member. The moment you sign is the moment that launches the continuum of all subsequent training rules—that signing is equivalent to the karman being completed; thereafter every professional ethic (confidentiality, non-harm, conflict of interest, informed consent…) becomes your daily "training rules according to the Dharma."

Read its reverse side: people who signed the same agreement but silently set a "only for such-and-such clients," "only in the office," "only on big projects"—this is precisely what the Kośa calls "pre-setting limits"; what they get is "妙行" (good conduct, looking like they are keeping it), not the restraint (truly keeping it). In contemporary professional-ethics dilemmas, the hardest thing is not the lack of rules; it is rules being self-limited into a comfortable boundary.

Walkthrough 2: "The Limb of Protecting Others' Minds"—When You Are Not Present, the Precepts Continue

A bhikṣu, wherever he goes, hopes not to be censured by "the world, the virtuous, fellow practitioners, vinaya-holders, vinaya-students." Put in contemporary terms: a therapist who casually gossips about a client after work hours makes the credibility of the entire profession be re-evaluated; a teacher who at home routinely berates his children is quietly loosening the professional "exemplar of the teacher"—the precepts are not something that stops when you are not on duty.

"Protecting others' minds" is not image management; it is a built-in structure of the restraint: you keep fine conduct so that the community you represent remains trusted.

Walkthrough 3: "The Limb of Protecting the Training Rules as Received"—Deep Fear of Subtle Offenses

Contemporary culture tends to treat morality as "just don't cross the big line," so a small dishonesty, a small breach of trust, a small jab of sarcasm all go unindicted. The bhikṣu restraint is not set up that way: it requires you to flinch at every kind of impropriety that "looks like no big deal."

Walk through it once—while scrolling your phone, casually spreading a slanderous comment about something you haven't seen in full; a small thing you promised a friend and then "forgot"; agreeing to meet someone and arriving twenty minutes late, and it being treated as nothing—these things do not count as offenses under the "grave offense" standard, but they are precisely the parts the restraint asks you to slowly see clearly. "Fearing small offenses" is not neurosis; it is letting coarse vigilance grow fine-grained.

Walkthrough 4: The Three Facets of Pure Livelihood—the Small Matter of Clothes and Food

The 《瑜伽論》 lands on the most trivial details: robes merely "cover the body" are enough, food merely "fills the belly" is enough, keep away from surplus possessions and untimely food. This is not an ascetic posture; it is letting the impulse to possess loosen at the level of daily consumption.

Walk through it—buying a coffee on the commute, casually ordering delivery at lunch, scrolling subscription videos on the subway, a pile of unopened packages at home—these are not technical violations of "not eating after noon." A person who repeatedly reads this precept will be pressed by it into a more fundamental question: how many purchases, subscriptions, and pushes is my body being fed by in a single day? Are they, in turn, occupying my attention? The three facets of pure livelihood, read today, are almost a "counter-overload" exercise—when possession loosens first, the mind can see other things.

Walkthrough 5: "Obtained from All" and "Obtained from All Limbs"—That Ant and That Person You Don't Like

The Kośa says "possess a good intention toward all sentient beings." This is a universal proposition: no sliver of objects may be an exception. Technically, "the bhikṣu restraint must at minimum take all human beings as its object"; but its spirit is to train you into a structural willingness-to-care that is directed at all.

Walk through it—a piece of bad news from afar flashes by while you scroll; a certain disdain in your heart toward that person in the next building whom you don't like. You may never have intended to harm them, but "universal good intention" is not "not harming"; it is a structure of intention—it must slowly grow in you; it is not already grown; it must be trained.

Walkthrough 6: "The Tāla Tree with Its Head Cut Off"—the Price of "Seemingly Still There but Unable to Grow" in Close Relationships

The final metaphor of the Kośa carries no small weight: the tāla tree with its head cut off—the root is still there, but the branches and leaves can no longer continue to grow. Committing a fundamental grave offense is not "the restraint-body is gone"; it is "the function of producing greatness is interrupted."

This metaphor lands on intimate relationships with a particularly painful fit—a relationship repeatedly smoothed over by cold violence and then a careless "sorry" is often not as simple as "starting over"; a lie that was said once and then brushed past lightly makes the weight of all subsequent words different; for a body or a mind that has been hurt, "forgiveness" is precious, but it is not a button that can be pressed—the part where growth has been interrupted needs time and conditions before it can rise again.

Walkthrough 7: "Received from Another" and "Protecting the Training Rules as Received"—the Moment of the Marriage Vow and the Fine-Grainedness After It

A marriage vow is a typical "received from another"—you speak that sentence before family and witnesses, and only after that moment do all the subsequent "training rules according to the Dharma" begin to operate in your life. It does not complete all obligations at the moment of the wedding; it is at that moment that the continuum of all subsequent fine-grained obligations is launched.

If this vow is tacitly permitted to take effect only "on certain kinds of days," "only in certain places," "only before friends"—it has already fallen into the "pre-setting limits" the Kośa speaks of. If this vow is then self-relaxed to "anything that isn't a big deal is OK"—it has already loosened on the "limb of protecting the training rules as received." The universality and fine-grainedness of a commitment are the true reason it can survive the years without being consumed—whether that commitment is renunciation, marriage, a profession, or a certain self-expectation.


III. Why Contemporary People Need It

For one who is not a renunciant, the bhikṣu restraint is not a daily operable institution. But it can lend contemporary people a few things that are rare:

First, a Sample of "Universal-Proposition" Ethics

Contemporary ethics is often governed by situationism and consequentialism—"is it reasonable to do this under these circumstances," "what consequences will it produce." The Kośa and the Yogācārabhūmi give a very clean proposition: the establishment of ethics does not lie in whether non-harm has actually been completed in reality, but in whether the structure of intention is universal. This is a training—training in "a willingness-to-care directed at all"—and it lets you not have to complete all obligations first before you can declare "I have already made the choice." This structure is visible in therapists, sea-rescue workers, and surgeons: often, before the event even happens, they must first issue that universal promise.

Second, a Demonstration of "Fine-Grained Ethics"

Contemporary culture reduces ethics to "just don't cross the line"; the bhikṣu restraint pushes ethics to "seeing terror even in the subtle." In AI companies discussing model "alignment," there is a common saying: you cannot train a model to stay on the right side only on key issues, let it run free on daily subtleties, and then expect it to truly stay on the right side at the crucial point. This is almost the same structure as "deep fear of subtle offenses." Note: this is an analogy—the fine-grained inner keeping of a human mind and the alignment of an algorithm are not on the same level and cannot be equated; but it can help people see that fine-grainedness is a trained structural capacity, not an attitude.

Third, "Pure Livelihood" as an Executable Way of Life

Robes merely cover the body, food merely fills the belly, keeping away from buying and selling, not hoarding, not eating after noon—this is a concrete project of disciplining greed through daily consumption. What contemporary people most often feel "possessed" by is not coercion but being fed by subscriptions, pushes, and connected consumption. Pure livelihood is not asceticism; it is a practice of letting possession loosen first. Once it loosens, you can possibly see again—what it is you are truly doing, and what is feeding your attention while also making you anxious.

Fourth, the Institutional Logic of "Received from Another"

Behind "received from another" lies a whole system of respect for lineage, for karman procedure, for institutional trust. Many contemporary ethical commitments pride themselves on "individual independent choice." But the renunciation precepts point to a fact in the opposite direction: for an ethic to be stable, it often needs to be recognized by a transmission longer than the individual. It is not that individualism cannot establish ethics; it is that an ethic relying on individualism alone often cannot hold at critical junctures—it lacks that layer of institutional companionship and protection, and that structural sense of "there are people behind you." This principle applies equally to professional lineage, to peer support in addiction recovery, to the setting of long-term psychotherapy, and to the commitment of long-term partnership.

Fifth, the Sobriety of "the Price of Grave Offenses"

The tāla tree with its head cut off cannot grow again—this metaphor tells contemporary people: for some harms you do, what remains afterward is not "nothing is lost," but "the capacity to continue expanding and growing is no longer as before." This is, in fact, a kindness—it keeps you from continuing to gamble inside the light illusion of "sorry."


IV. Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading 1: Treating the Bhikṣu Restraint as a Long Checklist

The "bhikṣu's two hundred fifty precepts" is often memorized as a checklist. But the Kośa clearly says it is "receiving [the vow to] abandon all bodily and verbal deeds that should be abandoned"—the core is not that number but the word "all." The two hundred-odd items are only an unfolding, not a ceiling. Treating it as a checklist narrows the reading.

Misreading 2: Treating It as "Stricter Lay Precepts"

Lay people and renunciants are two kinds of status in the Buddhist tradition. The bhikṣu restraint is the protection system of the renunciant status. If lay people want to learn its spirit, they should learn the wisdom of its structure (fine-grainedness, universality, pure livelihood, receiving from another), not count the precepts that are not appropriate for lay life.

Misreading 3: Reading "Received from Another" as Attachment to an Individual

"Received from another" is not attachment; it is transmission. Transmission means: your renunciant identity is recognized by an institution (lineage + karman), and therefore you have legitimacy within the institution, renunciants have a shared duty of protection toward you, and your practice can connect to a stream of Dharma longer than yourself. This does not conflict with "independent personhood"; on the contrary, it gives independent personhood a soil in which it can grow.

Misreading 4: Thinking That Committing a Grave Offense Makes You Nothing

The Kośa already places two positions side by side: one says committing a fundamental grave offense relinquishes the precepts; the other says committing a fundamental grave offense does not relinquish the restraint-body, but after confession one is called solely "one possessed of śīla." The two positions are placed side by side deliberately, to leave room, because this is a technical controversy. But the metaphor of the tāla tree with its head cut off and unable to grow again holds for either reading: whether the restraint-body is relinquished or retained, the function of "producing greatness" is interrupted—renewed growth requires a real price.

Misreading 5: Reading "Protecting Others' Minds" with Performance Thinking

"Not being censured by others" sounds like building a public image. What it truly wants is not face but keeping the restraint-body from being corrupted by your presence. It is ethical, not image engineering. "Not disappointing people" and "not letting people see, through you, the failure of this group" are two different things; the former points to yourself, the latter points to the community you represent.

Misreading 6: Reading "Pure Livelihood" as Old Rules

Robes covering the body, food filling the belly, not eating at untimely hours—these forms are easily read in contemporary times as "the ritual sense of the older generation." But what the 《瑜伽論》 points to as the substance is: this whole set of details lets the root-tendrils of greed loosen first in daily life. The form is the surface; the substance is the engineering of the mind—the mind is to be ground by these details, and what is ground out is vigilance and the capacity for restraint.

Misreading 7: Thinking That "Universal-Proposition" Means "No Exceptions"

The Kośa's "obtained from all" is a structure of intention—the objects of your vow cannot be pre-excluded. But in practice it does not mean that every object is "harmable," nor that you can accomplish it in every situation. The establishment of the restraint relies on the universality of the intention, not the completion in reality. Distinguishing these two levels lets one neither fall into the slackness of "since reality cannot complete it, there is no need to vow" nor into the oppression of "since I have vowed, everything must be perfect."


Final Words

Most readers today will not receive the bhikṣu restraint. But the five things it demonstrates—"universal-proposition ethics," "fine-grained ethics," "the institutional ethics of receiving from another," "the pure-livelihood way of life," "the real price of grave offenses"—are, in how a person treats their own commitments, the people they care about, their daily fine-grainedness, their own lineage, and their own errors, almost all tools one can borrow to see oneself by. It is a blueprint—for those who choose "to commit body and speech wholly to a single undertaking"; what it asks for is not surface perfection but fine-grainedness, trustworthiness, and sustainability that can last. To last long is itself the practice.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

苾芻律儀(bhikṣu-saṃvara)是出家苾芻从他依法受具足戒后所得、以守护学处和远离应离身语业为内容的别解脱律仪。《阿毘達磨俱舍論》将其列于近事、近住、勤策之后:前三种分别远离五项、八项、十项,苾芻则“受離一切應離身語業”,故其范围并非若干戒条的有限相加,而是遍摄一切应当远离的身业、语业。

2. 主要阐述

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》着重说明律仪的取得范围。别解律仪必须从一切有情得,不得预先排除某类对象。苾芻律儀又是“從一切得”,即由一切律仪支而得;其余律仪则可从四支得,因为只有根本业道称为律仪支。受戒者以任一下、中、上心受持,皆能于一切有情、由一切支得律仪,但未必由一切因得;若三心俱用,则由一切支及一切因得。

取得律仪须对一切有情具有善意乐。若事先限定有情、戒支、处所、时间或缘,例如只对某类有情不害、只守某支、只在某地或某时远离恶业,便不能取得律仪,仅得与律仪相似的妙行。即使某些对象实际上无法加害,仍可依普遍不损命的增上意乐得戒;对象后来成为能害或不能害,也不使既得律仪增减。

《瑜伽師地論》则强调受戒程序与持守结构。苾芻律儀必须从他受,不存在自然受;否则堪出家与不堪出家者皆可自行出家,圣教轨范及善说法毘奈耶即无从显明。受者往趣师所,殷勤劝请、礼敬而住,并以语言表白所欲,其中具有身表、语表及意表业。

该论以四支总摄苾芻律儀:一、“受具足支”,经表白第四羯磨,略摄受随粗学处,初成具苾芻戒;二、“受隨法學處支”,守护奉行毘奈耶别解脱中随顺苾芻尸罗的众多学处;三、“隨護他心支”,使轨范、所行具足,不受世间、贤良、同法者及持律、学律者讥责;四、“隨護如所受學處支”,于微细罪深见怖畏,不犯所受学处,若有毁犯则依法出罪。

其日常持守表现为身业、语业于所受学处无亏、无缺、无穿;行住坐卧以及衣、钵、乞食、受用、洗足、敷具等,皆须顺应世间及毘奈耶。净命圆满又涉及所行、摄取、受用:远离买卖、伤害、拘缚等事,不摄取象马、生谷等物,衣仅蔽身、食仅充腹而知足,并远离长物及非时食等。

关于舍戒,《阿毘達磨俱舍論》说,除近住外的七种别解律仪由四缘舍:向能理解者表示舍弃学处、舍众同分、二形俱生、善根断;近住另加夜尽。对于犯极重罪,有余部主张随犯四极重感堕罪之一,即舍勤策及苾芻律儀;迦湿弥罗毘婆沙师则主张犯根本罪不舍出家戒,但兼有持戒、犯戒二名,发露悔除后仅名具尸罗。《瑜伽師地論》所列舍因包括舍所学处、犯根本罪、男形隐没而生二形、善根断及舍众同分;正法毁坏隐没时虽不能新受,既受得者并不因此舍戒。两论说法依出处并列,不作裁决。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

毘昙部《阿毘達磨俱舍論》以“苾芻律儀”为固定术语,并交替使用“苾芻戒”“別解律儀”“出家戒”“具足戒”。论中还列“名想苾芻、自稱苾芻、乞匃苾芻、破惑苾芻”,并以“白四羯磨受具足戒苾芻”标明受戒身份;其主要译语是“苾芻”,不是“比丘”。

瑜伽部《瑜伽師地論》同样固定使用“苾芻”,并将“苾芻律儀”置于“別解脫律儀”“尸羅”“戒律儀”的语汇系统中,又使用“毘奈耶”“學處”“具足戒”等名目;其中“尸羅”亦名“律儀”,“戒律儀”以安住具戒乃至受学学处为义。现有材料未提供同论异译本,故不另立异译用词分歧。

4. 与相关概念的关系

苾芻律儀是别解脱律仪的一类;“具足戒”侧重取得苾芻身份的受戒阶段,“学处”是受后应守护奉行的具体规范,“尸罗”“戒律仪”则用于表述安住具戒及其清净持守。《瑜伽師地論》又将苾芻尼、正学、勤策、勤策女律仪摄属苾芻律儀,理由是皆属出家品;苾芻尼依勤策女、正学、具足戒的次第渐受学,以承担广大众多学处。

5. 代表性原文引用

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》:“受離一切應離身語業。”又以律仪取得范围说:“從一切得。”

《瑜伽師地論》以“受具足支”“受隨法學處支”“隨護他心支”“隨護如所受學處支”四支总摄其受得、奉行及守护。《俱舍論》论犯重后戒体问题时,又载多罗树断头不能复生长之喻,说明根本重罪使其余所受不能继续生长广大。

By SutraAI-generated

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》以「四遠離」的層遞結構安立四種別解律儀,苾芻律儀居其頂。論文明確界定:「若受離一切應離身語業,安立第四苾芻律儀。」 此即苾芻律儀之核心表述——不限定具體條數,而是總攝一切應離之身業與語業,與近事律儀(離五)、近住律儀(離八)、勤策律儀(離十)形成由狹至廣的階次。近事五支為殺生、不與取、欲邪行、虛誑語、飲諸酒;近住加非梵行、塗飾香鬘舞歌觀聽、高廣床座、非時食共八支;勤策將第六支開為二並加受畜金銀等寶為十支;苾芻則不再逐條列舉,以「一切應離身語業」總括。

在捨戒議題上,論云:「唯除近住,所餘七種別解律儀,由四緣捨:一由意樂對有解人發有表業捨學處故、二由棄捨眾同分故、三由二形俱時生故、四由所因善根斷故。」近住戒另加「夜盡」為第五緣。 苾芻律儀屬七種之一,故由前四緣捨,不涉期限。

論中並載部派異說:「有餘部說:於四極重感墮罪中若隨犯一,亦捨勤策苾芻律儀。」 此即主張犯四重(他勝)即失苾芻律儀。另有部言正法滅時一切學處結界羯磨止息,亦能令捨。 迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師則持相反立場:「犯根本罪時,不捨出家戒」,理由為「非犯一邊一切律儀應遍捨故,非犯餘罪有斷尸羅」,犯者但得「持犯戒」二名,猶如富人負債,若發露悔除則還名具尸羅。

對於佛說「犯四重者不名苾芻、不名沙門非釋迦子」之經文,毘婆沙師判為「依勝義苾芻,密意作是說」,並引律藏自釋四種苾芻:一名想苾芻、二自稱苾芻、三乞匃苾芻、四破惑苾芻。論斷:「此義中言非苾芻者,謂非白四羯磨受具足戒苾芻。」 亦即犯重所失者為勝義(破惑)苾芻,非謂羯磨所受之體全無。論末引佛喻:「如多羅樹若被斷頭必不復能生長廣大,諸苾芻等犯重亦然」,意顯犯一邊根本重罪令餘所受「必不復能生長廣大」。

術語形式方面,本論(玄奘譯)一律用「苾芻」而非「比丘」,用「律儀」譯 saṃvara,用「別解律儀」譯 prātimokṣa,用「尸羅」譯 śīla,用「勤策」指沙彌,用「近事」「近住」指優婆塞與八關齋,用「白四羯磨」指受具足戒之儀軌,用「他勝」指波羅夷(極重感墮罪)。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》論苾芻律儀,置於「戒律儀」總綱之下,以「安住具戒」與「受學學處」為其核心界定。論中明言:七眾別解脫律儀雖因眾差別而成多律儀,然此處「唯依苾芻律儀處說善能守護別解脫律儀」,即以苾芻律儀為別解脫律儀之代表而廣說。偈中亦稱「苾芻、苾芻尼,戒莊嚴圓滿」,以戒莊嚴攝其功德。

受戒方面,論中強調苾芻律儀必從他受,無自然受義。其理由為:「由苾芻律儀非一切堪受故」,若許自然受,則一切欲出家者皆可隨意出家,「聖教便無軌範」。正受之時,以白四羯磨為體,從戒師所得聞少分學處,復從親教、軌範師處聞別解脫經,總略宣說過於二百五十學處,皆自誓言一切當學。

論以四支攝苾芻律儀:一受具足支(白四羯磨及略攝受隨麁學處),二受隨法學處支(守護奉行別解脫中所有隨順苾芻尸羅),三隨護他心支(軌範具足、所行具足),四隨護如所受學處支(於微細罪深見怖畏,設犯能出)。苾芻尼、正學、勤策、勤策女律儀皆在出家品所攝,攝屬苾芻律儀。

論又立八種律儀——能起、攝受、防護、還引、下品、中品、上品、清淨,總歸為三:受律儀、持律儀、清淨律儀。其中防護律儀謂由五根攝受善思,遇惡友或煩惱增多時即生慚羞速捨;還引律儀謂失念犯已,發露蠲悔,後堅守護。清淨律儀則依靜慮損伏犯戒種子,乃至入諦現觀永害惡戒種子,名無漏律儀。

不應授苾芻律儀有六因:意樂損害、依止損害、男形損害、白法損害、繫屬於他、為護他故。受已還捨有五因緣:捨所學處、犯根本罪、形沒二形生、善根斷、棄捨眾同分;然正法隱沒時,先已受得者不捨。

此外,論以三因緣說具戒苾芻禁戒淨命圓滿:所行圓滿、攝取圓滿、受用圓滿。又以正出家為依止,由正請問、審觀察、修對治、任持信四事防戒蘊,名善防護。戒蘊略義以三相顯示:無失壞相(安住具戒)、自性相(善守護別解律儀)、自性功德相(軌則所行圓滿,令他未信者信、信者增長)。

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