Dharma · AI Companion

六見處

ṣaḍdṛṣṭisthāna

六见处指六类容易生起我见的所缘境界,为观察非我、非我所之修所依处。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arising ⇢ II · emptinessInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

六见处为阿含观非我非我所之所依,于缘生重(第1)完整教授;般若重释其所缘本空(第2重)。

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

The Six Grounds of Views, 六見處 (*ṣaḍ-dṛṣṭi-sthāna*, “six grounds or bases on which views take their stand”), are six domains in which the mind readily constructs “I,” “mine,” or an enduring self. They are not six philosophical opinions to memorize. They are six places where appropriation happens.

A simple example: pain occurs, and almost immediately the mind says, “Why is this happening to me?” A memory appears, and it becomes “my past.” A conviction arises, and one feels, “This is what I truly am.” The event itself and the act of taking it as self are not the same. The teaching asks us to observe that added act of ownership.

The title “six” requires careful reading. In the Chinese *Madhyama Āgama* passage, punctuation is not supplied by the ancient manuscript. Read in light of its Indic parallel, the compressed sequence unfolds as:

1. material form; 2. feeling; 3. perception; 4. the view or wish for one’s future non-existence; 5. everything seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, examined, or mentally pondered; 6. the metaphysical view of an eternal self and world.

The Chinese text places the middle members in one continuous sentence, which is why summaries sometimes appear to list only four blocks. The canonical passage itself nevertheless introduces them as “six grounds of views.” The parallel *Majjhima Nikāya* recension organizes the middle of the list somewhat differently, explicitly including volitional formations. This is a genuine difference in textual arrangement, not something that should be silently harmonized away. The Chinese text is available in the [*Madhyama Āgama*, Discourse 200, Āliṭṭha Sūtra](https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E9%98%BF%E5%90%AB%E7%B6%93/%E5%8D%B7%E7%AC%AC_54), while the Pāli parallel is [MN 22, *Alagaddūpama Sutta*](https://suttacentral.net/mn22/en/sujato).

The six grounds can now be examined one by one.

1. **Material form — 色 (*rūpa*)**

The text begins with “all form”: past, future, or present; internal or external; refined or coarse; attractive or unattractive; far or near. This is meant to exhaust the field, not merely describe the human body.

Here includes bodily form and external material form: one’s face and limbs, another person’s body, clothing, buildings, devices, food, landscapes, and the physical objects that populate one’s world. To translate it merely as “the body” would be too narrow.

The self can be planted here in several ways:

- “This body is me.” - “This appearance is mine and establishes my worth.” - “That home, object, or territory is an extension of me.” - “If my body changes, I am diminished.”

The *Madhyama Āgama* applies a threefold contemplation: “not possessed by me; I am not possessed by it; nor is it the enduring self.” Its wording is: “彼一切非我有,我非彼有,亦非是神.” Here does not mean a deity. In this context it renders the supposedly permanent soul or self posited by non-Buddhist theories.

The first negation loosens ownership: form is not truly “mine.” The second loosens identification or reciprocal belonging: I cannot find an independent owner standing behind form, nor am I an entity belonging to it. The third denies that form conceals an eternal soul.

This is not contempt for the body or the material world. A body that is “not-self” still needs food, medicine, sleep, safety, and kindness. Non-self removes metaphysical possession; it does not remove ethical responsibility.

2. **Feeling — 覺/受 (*vedanā*)**

In this *Madhyama Āgama* translation, is used where other texts commonly use : feeling-tone. It means the immediate affective character of an experience—pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. It does not mean a considered emotion, a philosophical judgment, or enlightenment.

When a message arrives, the tiny lift is feeling. When criticism lands, the sting is feeling. When one waits without strong pleasure or pain, the neutral tone is also feeling.

Self-view enters when the mind turns:

- “Pleasure proves that my life is going well.” - “Because pain is present, I am broken.” - “I must preserve this feeling because it is mine.” - “This anxiety is what I am.”

But feeling arises through conditions, changes, and ceases. It is intimately experienced without therefore being an owner or an essence. “Not-self” does not mean “not felt.” It means that what is felt does not display the properties of a sovereign, permanent self.

3. **Perception — 想 (*saṃjñā/saññā*)**

is not simply “thoughts” or imagination. Its classical function is taking a mark and recognizing or identifying it: “red,” “familiar face,” “hostile tone,” “success,” “my child,” “the kind of person who always ignores me.”

Perception makes experience intelligible by selecting features and applying recognition. Yet the label can become a home for self-view:

- “I am an introvert, so this is simply what I am.” - “She is selfish; now everything she does confirms it.” - “That failure reveals my true identity.”

The teaching does not ask us to cease recognizing things. Without perception we could not cross a road or understand speech. It asks us to see that recognition is conditioned and revisable. A label may function conventionally without revealing an immutable essence.

4. The view of future non-existence

The Chinese passage includes the formulation “I shall be without; I shall not exist” (我當無,我當不有). This is subtle. One may suppose that denying a future self must already be Buddhist insight. It is not necessarily so.

“I will be annihilated” can preserve the very self it claims to deny. It imagines a real entity now and then becomes terrified or fascinated by its future destruction. The grammar remains: “There is a solid me, and later that me will become nothing.”

This is why Buddhist non-self is not the doctrine “a self exists for a while and is then obliterated.” It examines present experience and finds dependently arisen processes, without locating an independent possessor within or apart from them. It avoids both eternalism—an unchanging self survives forever—and annihilationism—a real self is later destroyed.

The discourse connects such views directly with fear: a person thinks that something truly constituting “me” will no longer be obtained, then grieves, beats the breast, and falls into bewilderment. The issue is therefore existential, not merely logical. When identity has been made into a thing, either its continuation or its loss becomes frightening.

5. The whole field of cognition and experience

The fifth ground includes whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, examined, or mentally pondered見聞識知,所得所觀,意所思念—and extends even to views concerning passage from this world to another and from another world to this one.

This is broader than bare sense-consciousness. It includes:

- sensory information; - remembered and interpreted experience; - conclusions reached through reflection; - meditative attainments or unusual experiences; - knowledge claims about this life and other lives; - the very contents through which one constructs a worldview.

One can make a self from knowledge as readily as from the body: “I am the person who understands.” Spiritual experience is especially vulnerable to this appropriation: “I saw something profound, therefore I am awakened.” Even a correct teaching can become identity—one carries the raft on one’s head after crossing with it. This is especially important in MN 22 and its Chinese parallel, where the simile of the raft precedes the Six Grounds: teachings are used for crossing beyond attachment, not for building a more exalted self.

6. The metaphysical eternal self

The last ground states the most explicit form of self-view: “This is the self; this is the world; this is I. After death I shall exist, permanent, unchanging, eternally not subject to destruction.” The Chinese reads: “此是神,此是世,此是我,我當後世有,常不變易,恒不磨滅法.”

This is not merely attachment to a body or feeling. It is a theory of what ultimately exists: an enduring self identified with, contained in, or somehow standing behind the world.

The discourse does not refute it by proposing a subtler eternal observer. It subjects even this most refined “witness” to the same investigation: is it actually found as mine, as what I am, or as a permanent soul? A feeling of pure witnessing may be peaceful and spiritually significant, but the feeling of invariance is not by itself proof of a metaphysically invariant entity.

The related *Saṃyukta Āgama* material gives a complementary analytical grid. In relation to each of the five aggregates—form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness—the ordinary person can construct four patterns:

- the aggregate is self: “feeling itself is me”; - the aggregate is other than self or belongs to self: “I possess this consciousness”; - the aggregate is in the self: “my body exists inside a greater self”; - the self is in the aggregate: “a soul lives inside and pervades the body.”

For feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, the discourse further analyzes six classes according to eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind contact. Here (*saṃskāra/saṅkhāra*) means volitional formation or intentional construction, represented by the six classes of intention—not external physical action. (*vijñāna/viññāṇa*) means the six modes of consciousness arising dependent on their respective conditions, not an immortal stream-substance.

This complementary presentation shows what makes a “ground of view” a ground: the problem is not the object alone but the relationship that thought superimposes upon it—identity, possession, containment, or indwelling.

The *Yogācārabhūmi* calls the underlying distortion 薩迦耶見 (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*, identity-view or view of a real personal complex). It describes it as defiled discernment, whether consciously theorized or operating without explicit reflection. It arises through associating with unwholesome influences, hearing distorted teaching, attending unwisely, and simply losing mindfulness. Thus self-view is not only a sentence one believes. It may be an automatic posture: defending, comparing, controlling, and appropriating before one has formulated any philosophy.

Its place on the path is therefore central. Self-view turns the five aggregates into the five aggregates subject to clinging, 五取蘊. Clinging gives craving somewhere to settle; craving supports renewed becoming; becoming sustains the continuation of suffering. Insight into non-self is not an isolated metaphysical achievement. It weakens the machinery by which experience becomes “my threatened existence.” The *Saṃyukta Āgama* consequently links contemplation of the six grounds as “not-self, not-mine” with the ending of perplexity concerning suffering, its arising, its cessation, and the path—the Four Noble Truths.

A walkthrough in everyday life

Imagine an evening commute. You open your phone and see that a colleague has publicly criticized a proposal you spent weeks preparing.

First, material form. There is the phone, the visible text, your body on the train, tension around the jaw, warmth in the face, and the external environment. All of these belong to , not only your body. The most common incorrect mapping is to call the body “form” while treating the screen and surrounding world as somehow outside the aggregate’s scope.

The body’s reaction is real, but no independently commanding self can simply order it not to flush or tense. Conditions are operating.

Second, feeling. The visual contact carries an unpleasant feeling-tone. Perhaps another notification briefly brings pleasure; the crowded train remains mostly neutral. These are 受/覺. “I feel humiliated” already contains more than feeling: it includes perception, interpretation, memory, and self-reference. The feeling itself is the unpleasantness before the full story crystallizes.

Third, perception. The mind recognizes your colleague’s name, identifies certain sentences as criticism, detects a phrase as dismissive, and labels the event “public humiliation.” This is , taking marks and recognizing them. It is not yet every thought that follows. The label may be partly accurate, partly shaped by past conflict, or both.

Fourth, the annihilation story. A thought flashes: “My career is over. I will become nobody.” This is not non-self insight. It is self-view projecting its own destruction: first an allegedly solid professional self is constructed, then a future in which that self disappears is imagined. Fear comes from defending the entity implied by “nobody.”

Fifth, the wider cognitive field. You reread the post, hear an imagined tone of voice, remember an earlier disagreement, infer what senior management will think, compose replies, and perhaps recall career advice from a podcast. All that is seen, heard, remembered, inferred, sought, and mentally pondered belongs to this wider ground. The mistake would be to reduce it to “consciousness” as a featureless inner screen. It includes the experienced and interpreted contents through which a personal world is assembled.

An algorithm may intensify the process by repeatedly presenting similar content. It can shape attention and reinforce recognition: “People are attacking me; my standing is collapsing.” This is a useful comparison, but algorithms do not prove the Buddhist analysis, and the human mind is not merely a recommendation system. Scientific accounts of attention, predictive processing, or self-modeling remain contested and operate at a different explanatory level from the soteriological question of clinging and liberation.

Sixth, the enduring observer. After noticing that thoughts and sensations change, you may retreat to a subtler claim: “At least the one silently watching all this is my real, permanent self.” The practice asks you to examine that claim too. Is the experience of observing continuous? Does it arise independently of attention and conditions? Can an owner distinct from the knowing be located, or is “the observer” another concept produced within experience?

Now the practical contemplation begins. You do not chant “not mine” to suppress embarrassment. You notice:

- visible form and bodily tension are present, conditioned, and changing; - unpleasant feeling is present without being an identity; - perception has applied the label “humiliation”; - the mind is imagining the extinction of a professional self; - memories, predictions, and rehearsed replies are arising as conditioned cognitions; - the supposed permanent witness cannot simply be assumed.

With that space, an ethical response becomes possible. You may correct a factual error, ask for a private conversation, apologize for an actual mistake, or decide not to answer until the body settles. Non-self does not make you passive. It makes action less captive to self-defense.

The same walkthrough works in an intimate relationship. A partner’s silence is sound and bodily form; its painful tone is feeling; “rejection” is perception; “our relationship—and therefore I—will disappear” is the annihilation story; memories and imagined motives fill the cognitive field; and “the hurt one inside me who has always been the same” becomes the metaphysical refuge. Seeing these layers does not deny love. It helps love cease to be indistinguishable from possession.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary life turns nearly every ground of view into a measurable profile.

Bodies become images and health metrics. Feeling becomes a demand for continuous satisfaction. Perception becomes a rigid identity label. Cognition becomes public content and searchable opinion. The imagined future self becomes a career trajectory. Even spirituality becomes a personal brand.

Under these conditions, suffering is easily misread as a failure of self-management: “If I optimize enough, I can finally secure who I am.” The Six Grounds expose the impossible assignment hidden inside that project. One is trying to obtain permanence and sovereignty from processes whose nature is conditional and changing.

The teaching offers three forms of freedom.

First, freedom from compulsive ownership. A thought can be present without becoming “my position.” Pain can be cared for without becoming “my ruined life.” Praise can be enjoyed without becoming evidence of an enduring status.

Second, freedom from identity panic. The *Madhyama Āgama* deliberately places fear beside the Six Grounds. When a cherished identity is challenged, the ordinary reaction is not merely intellectual disagreement; it may be grief, rage, or near-madness. The intensity reveals how much ontological weight has been placed upon something conditioned. Non-self does not promise that loss will never hurt. It prevents every loss from becoming the destruction of an imagined essence.

Third, freedom for ethical and compassionate action. If “I” and “mine” are less rigid, admitting error becomes easier. Another person’s suffering no longer competes so sharply with the defense of one’s image. Responsibility becomes more precise: actions and consequences matter, while the extra project of proving a permanent actor can be relinquished.

This is why the teaching belongs within the entire path to liberation. Ethical discipline steadies conduct so that self-defense does not continually erupt into harm. Concentration makes the arising of feeling, perception, and intention observable. Wisdom sees these processes as impermanent, stressful when grasped, and not-self. As appropriation weakens, craving and becoming lose their support. The aim is not a more elegant theory of personal identity but what the discourse calls the ending of fear, the exhaustion of renewed becoming, and the “making of an end to suffering.”

The best-known Mahāyāna expression of the same liberative direction is the *Heart Sūtra*: “照見五蘊皆空,度一切苦厄”—Avalokiteśvara “clearly saw that the five aggregates are empty and crossed beyond all suffering and distress.” Emptiness here should not be used to erase the careful distinctions among form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. Their emptiness is precisely why none can serve as an independent self or possession. The Six Grounds examine the appropriation; the language of emptiness discloses why the appropriated object cannot bear the metaphysical burden placed upon it.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“The Six Grounds are the six sense bases.”

No. The six sense bases, 六處—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind—are a different sixfold teaching. The *Yogācārabhūmi* discusses identity-view in relation to the six sense bases, and the *Saṃyukta Āgama* divides feeling, perception, intention, and consciousness into six classes. That creates a close relationship, but not an identity of terms. 六見處 names grounds on which self-view takes its stand; 六處 names the six internal sensory and mental bases.

“Non-self means that nothing exists.”

The contemplation denies ownership, identity, and an eternal soul; it does not deny conventional persons, causal continuity, actions, or consequences. Hunger still requires food. Cruel speech still wounds. A promise still establishes an ethical responsibility.

“The teaching says, ‘I do not exist.’”

That turns non-self into precisely the annihilationist position examined among the grounds of view. The practice is not to replace “I eternally exist” with “I absolutely do not exist.” It asks whether any conditioned phenomenon can truthfully be regarded as “This is mine, this I am, this is my permanent self.”

“Form means only the fleshly body.”

Too narrow. The canonical enumeration expressly includes internal and external form, across past, present, and future, refined and coarse, attractive and unattractive, near and far. The body is included; it does not exhaust the category.

“Feeling means emotion, and perception means thoughts.”

Not precisely. Feeling is the pleasant, painful, or neutral tone of experience. Perception recognizes marks and identifies objects. A full emotion such as jealousy or shame generally involves feeling, perception, volition, bodily form, consciousness, memory, and self-referential construction together.

“Volitional formations are outward actions.”

No. Where the parallel presentation analyzes , it treats it as intentional or volitional formation, including the six classes of intention conditioned by the six sensory fields. Bodily and verbal actions may result from volition, but they are not the definition of the aggregate.

“Consciousness is the permanent witness behind the other aggregates.”

In the early discourses, consciousness is differentiated as eye-, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mind-consciousness and arises dependent on corresponding conditions. Treating it as an unchanged entity that travels intact through experience is another form of self-view.

“If an experience is not mine, I should become indifferent to it.”

This confuses non-appropriation with dissociation. Buddhist cultivation joins insight to compassion and ethical care. “Not mine” means that pain need not be converted into possession and identity; it does not mean pain is unworthy of response.

“All views are bad, so understanding is unnecessary.”

The discourse’s raft simile does not equate right understanding with arbitrary opinion. A raft must be constructed and used correctly before it can be left behind. The *Yogācārabhūmi* explicitly distinguishes self-view from insight into non-self: they may examine the same conditioned processes, but one apprehends them wrongly and with defilement, the other rightly and with purification.

“見處 in Chan records always means the Six Grounds of Views.”

No. When the *Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Guishan Lingyou* says “祇是見處太麁”—roughly, “your point of seeing is simply too coarse”—見處 means one’s standpoint or level of realization. It is Chan usage, not an abbreviated technical reference to the six grounds. Chan encounters may work practically upon attachment amid sights, sounds, gestures, and words, but identical characters do not guarantee an identical doctrinal category.

The deepest point is therefore neither “there is a self” nor “there is no one here, so nothing matters.” It is to watch experience before ownership hardens around it. Form is form; feeling is feeling; perception recognizes; intentions shape responses; consciousness occurs dependently; theories of survival and extinction arise as views. Suffering intensifies when any of these is compelled to answer the demand, “Tell me what I eternally am.”

The Six Grounds teach us to withdraw that demand—not by becoming less alive, but by meeting experience without forcing it to support an owner it cannot provide.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

六见处(ṣaḍdṛṣṭisthāna),又作六见所、六所见处,指六类容易引生我见的所缘境界。其观慧核心在于以如实智观察此六处「非我、非我所、非神」,进而断除于色、觉、见闻识知乃至最根本之形上执取上的我见、我所见。

二、主要阐述

《中阿含经》以「六见处」标举六类所缘,并对每一见处施以「彼一切非我有,我非彼有,亦非是神」的三重否定观法。 第一见处以「所有色」为所缘,以三世、内外、精麤、妙不妙、近远等十一门类穷尽色法;第二见处以「觉、想」为所缘,并加入「我当无,我当不有」一句,将否定推进至对未来自我断灭之执取;第三见处以「见闻识知,所得所观,意所思念」及「从此世至彼世,从彼世至此世」为所缘,涵盖认知活动与跨世流转之见;第四见处直指最根本之形上执取——「此是神,此是世,此是我,我当后世有,常不变易,恒不磨灭法」。 经文两段六见处之间,插入因内有恐怖与因内无恐怖之问答,显示六见处之教与修行者内心是否生起恐怖、狂痴直接相关。 末后举阿梨咤比丘(伽陀婆利耶)为反例,警示若不善解六见处之教便具足生起邪见及见所相续。

《杂阿含经》以五蕴(色、受、想、行、识)为所缘,逐一展开四种我见关系模式:「即是我」「异我」(我所)「我中」「中我」(在中住,周遍其四体)。 其观法核心句式为「非我、非我所」,如是观者于四圣谛或于三宝、四谛合为七事之狐疑永断,不复趣三恶道。

《瑜伽师地论》不径称「我见」而多用「萨迦耶见」,以「六处」「所缘」「五取蕴」为核心术语。 论中详述我见由三因(亲近不善丈夫、闻非正法、不如理作意)及任运失念而生;以「分别、不分别染污慧」为体;于六相事(我所依事、境界事、自性事、受用因事、受用事、随说事、作用事、希望事)中令未善纯熟修观行者妄计有我,善纯熟者妄计皆不得生。 又就六处细立贪瞋痴之名(味、结、合)及三世之顾恋、希望、耽染(随眠、系属、执着)。 我见作杂染之四相(因缘、自性、果、等流)以事愚痴与见愚痴为因;由世故与由慢故六转现行;我见与无我见同缘诸行为境而邪正有别,故名同分、不同分。 又列于三世诸行分别有我、离诸行分别有我,乃至计实我能作、能受、领受、舍此蕴续余蕴等,皆以萨迦耶见为自性,能生余见趣,故名「见处」;复有见稠林、见旷野、见厌背、见行历、见动摇、见结等异名。

《潭州沩山灵祐禅师语录》属禅宗语录体裁,并非以阿毘达磨式分析正面阐说六见处,而是以机缘公案侧写离于根尘所缘之执,如香严云「言发非声,色前不物」,沩山评资国「祇是见处太麁」等。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

(一)所缘分类:《中阿含经》以「所有色、觉、想、见闻识知所观、神世自我、形上常住」等六类立说;《杂阿含经》以五蕴为所缘;《瑜伽师地论》以六处、所缘、五取蕴为核心。

(二)核心句式:《中阿含经》作「非我有、我非彼有、亦非是神」三重否定,以「神」字指称外道所执常住自我,并以「觉」称受蕴、「觉行」称受之活动;《杂阿含经》作「非我、非我所」;《瑜伽师地论》用「萨迦耶见」、「非我性」等术语;《沩山语录》中「见处」一词系指「见地之处所、领悟之所在」,与阿毘达磨所说六见处中之「见处」含义有别。

(三)观法名称:《中阿含经》以「慧观」「如其真」表述;《杂阿含经》以「观察非我、非我所」表述,并以「狐疑断」而非「疑断」表述断疑,以「作苦边」表述究竟离苦。

(四)我见类型:《杂阿含经》立「即是我、异我、我中、中我」四种关系模式,为本经独特表述。

(五)所缘细分:《杂阿含经》以「六受身、六想身、六思身、六识身」格式将受、想、行、识四蕴各开为六分;「中我」句以「于X中住,周遍其四体」表述空间化之我见。

(六)我见异名:《瑜伽师地论》以萨迦耶见为根本名「覆」,执我故名「藏」,执我所故名「护」;又立见稠林、见旷野、见厌背、见行历、见动摇、见结等异名。

四、与相关概念的关系

六见处与「萨迦耶见」密切相关——《瑜伽师地论》即以萨迦耶见统摄诸见,谓边执见于执五取蕴为我性已,「等随观执为断为常」,邪见、见取、戒禁取、贪、恚、慢、无明、疑等皆依此三因而转,各以染污慧或染着、憎恚、高举、无知、异觉为体。 六见处亦与「我见」「我所见」互为表里:就所缘而立名为「六见处」,就能观所断而立名为「我见、我所见」。又《杂阿含经》以断四圣谛或三宝四谛之狐疑为观成之果, 与四圣谛、三宝之修证紧密相连。《瑜伽师地论》更以六处三受之味、结、合,随眠、系属、执着等,显示六见处与烦恼杂染之依存关系。

五、代表性原文引用

1.《中阿含经》:「所有色,或过去、或未来、或现在,或内、或外,或麤、或细,或好、或丑,或远、或近,如是一切色非我有,我非彼有,亦非是神,如是慧观,知其如真。」(参见)

2.《中阿含经》:「此是神,此是世,此是我,我当后世有,常不变易,恒不磨灭法,如是慧观,知其如真。」(参见)

3.《中阿含经》:「若因内有恐怖故……便忧戚烦劳、啼哭椎胸而发狂痴。」(参见)

4.《杂阿含经》:「见色是我,受是我所……于色中住,入于色,周遍其四体。」(参见)

5.《杂阿含经》:「多闻圣弟子于此六见处观察非我、非我所,如是观者,于苦狐疑断,于习、灭、道狐疑断。」(参见)

6.《瑜伽师地论》:「彼萨迦耶见……以分别、不分别染污慧为体。」(参见)

7.《沩山语录》:「祇是见处太麁。」(此「见处」非六见处之见处,参见)

By SutraAI-generated

中阿含經T0026 · 阿含部

《中阿含經》以「六見處」一詞標舉六類容易生起我見的所緣,並對每一見處施以「彼一切非我有,我非彼有,亦非是神,如是慧觀,知其如真」的三重否定觀法。此「非我有、我非彼有、亦非是神」三句是本經論述六見處的核心公式,貫穿全部六處;觀慧的標準則以「慧觀」與「如其真」(知其如真)表述。

第一見處以「所有色」為所緣,經文以三世(過去、未來、現在)、內外、精麤、妙不妙、近遠等十一種門類窮盡一切色法,總歸於非我、非神。第二見處以「覺」與「想」為所緣,並加入「我當無,我當不有」一句,將否定推進至對未來自我斷滅之執取的觀察。第三見處以「見聞識知,所得所觀,意所思念」及「從此世至彼世,從彼世至此世」為所緣,涵蓋更細密的認知活動與跨世流轉之見。第四見處直指最根本的形上執取——「此是神,此是世,此是我,我當後世有,常不變易,恒不磨滅法」,亦以三重否定破之。

值得注意的是,本經以「神」字指稱外道所執的常住自我(相當於他經所說的「我」或「靈魂」),「亦非是神」的句式為《中阿含經》特有的術語選擇。又本經以「覺」稱受蘊(他經多作「受」),以「覺行」稱受之活動,皆屬本經用詞特色。

經文兩段六見處之間,插入因內有恐怖與因內無恐怖的問答:若人執「昔時無,設有我不得」之見,便憂慼煩勞、啼哭椎胸而發狂癡,是因內有恐怖;反之,不取著可愛可樂可意念之法,便不生憂慼,是因外無恐怖。此段顯示六見處的教說並非純理論分析,而與修行者內心是否生起恐怖、狂癡直接相關。

經文復以「因神故有我,無神見無我」總結,指出神與神所有不可得、不可施設,心中見處、結著、諸使亦不可得、不可施設。末後舉阿梨吒比丘(伽陀婆利耶)為反例,警示若不善解六見處之教,便如阿梨吒般具足生起邪見及見所相續。第二段六見處重述時,第二見處改作「彼當無我,當不有」,語序略有不同而義旨一致。

雜阿含經T0099 · 阿含部

《雜阿含經》論「六見處」,以五蘊(色、受、想、行、識)為所緣,逐一展開四種我見關係模式:「即是我」(該蘊即是自我)、「異我」(該蘊是我所有)、「我中」(該蘊在我之中)、「中我」(我在該蘊之中、周遍其四體)。經文以此四句遍歷五蘊,構成凡夫於六見處起我執的完整圖景。

就各蘊的具體界定而言,本經有明確的術語選擇:「受即是我」指「六受身」——眼觸生受,耳、鼻、舌、身、意觸生受,於此六受身一一見是我;「想即是我」指「六想身」——眼觸生想乃至意觸生想;「行是我」指「六思身」——眼觸生思乃至意觸生思;「識即是我」指「六識身」——眼識,耳、鼻、舌、身、意識身。經文以「六X身」格式將每一蘊開為六分,再於其上安立我見,是本經論述六見處時的獨特用語。

「色中我」一段的表述尤為具體:謂見受即是我,「於色中住,入於色,周遍其四體」;見想、行、識是我,亦「於色中住,周遍其四體」。其餘各蘊的「中我」句皆沿用「於X中住,周遍其四體」此一句式,呈現我見將自我想像為住於所緣之中、遍滿肢體的空間化執取。

「異我」句則以「我所」界定:如「見色是我,受是我所」或「謂想、行、識是我,受是我所」,是名受異我。四句之中,「即是」與「異我」屬同一層次的肯定判斷,「我中」與「中我」則屬空間包含關係,經文以「在中住」與「於X中住,周遍其四體」分別表述,方向相反。

對治之道,本經以「多聞聖弟子於此六見處觀察非我、非我所」一句總括。如是觀者,「於苦狐疑斷,於習、滅、道狐疑斷」——即於四聖諦(苦、集、滅、道)之狐疑永斷。 另一處經文將所斷擴展為「於佛狐疑斷,於法、僧、苦、集、滅、道狐疑斷」,即三寶與四諦合為七事狐疑斷。 兩處皆以「不復堪任作身、口、意業,趣三惡道」及「作苦邊」為果證描述。

術語方面須注意:本經以「六見處」立名,以「非我、非我所」為觀法核心句式,以「狐疑斷」而非「疑斷」或「疑惑斷」表述斷疑,以「作苦邊」表述究竟離苦,以「趣三惡道」表述退墮之不可能。五蘊在本經中徑稱色、受、想、行、識,未另立「五陰」「五眾」等異名。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》論「六見處」,主要就「六處」(眼等六內處)與「所緣」立說,並以「薩迦耶見」統攝諸見,此即本論的用詞特色——不徑稱「我見」而多用「薩迦耶見」,又以「六處」「所緣」「取蘊(五取蘊)」為核心術語。

一、所緣範圍。論中明言我見等「彼所緣者,謂一切法,如其所應」;其不共所緣則為「受想行蘊、無為、無見無對色、六內處,及一切種子」,顯示見處所緣極廣,非僅限於一類法。

二、薩迦耶見之生起與體性。論謂由「親近不善丈夫、聞非正法、不如理作意」,及「任運失念」故,「等隨觀執五種取蘊」,以「若分別、不分別染污慧為體」;邊執見則於執五取蘊為我性已,「等隨觀執為斷為常」。邪見、見取、戒禁取、貪、恚、慢、無明、疑等,亦皆依此三因(及任運失念)而轉,各以染污慧或染著、憎恚、高舉、無知、異覺為體。

三、六相事差別與我執。論「依六相,宣說八種有情事差別」,為令墮我、有情、命者見等眾生「趣入無我」;於我所依事、境界事、自性事、受用因事、受用事、隨說事、作用事、希望事等差別中,「未善純熟修觀行者,便謂有我」,若已善純熟修觀行,則「妄計皆不得生」。

四、六處與三世三受之煩惱差別。論就六處細立多名:「執我故名藏,執我所故名護」,以薩迦耶為根本名「覆」;於順樂受六處有貪名「味」,順苦受六處有瞋名「結」,順不苦不樂受六處有癡名「合」;於過去六處顧戀名「隨眠」,未來六處希望名「繫屬」,現在六處耽染名「執著」。

五、我見作雜染之四相。論以因緣、自性、果、等流四相說明:因緣即「事愚癡」與「見愚癡」二愚,先聞邪法後起我見,復於無明觸所生受妄計為我,恒為我愛隨逐;以薩迦耶見為依止,不能遠離我慢隨眠,二隨眠增上力故引當來諸根令起;等流上則見種子隨逐於後有意,發起「俱生薩迦耶見」,於善說法毘奈耶中亦能為障礙。

六、六轉現行與同分義。此見「由世故」(我於過去為曾有、為曾無等)與「由慢故」(我為勝等)六轉現行;論並謂我見與無我見「同緣諸行為境」,所緣同而邪取正取、染污清淨有別,故名同分、不同分。

七、不如正理之見處。論列於三世諸行分別有我、復離諸行分別有我,並計實我能作、等作、能起、等起、能生、等生、能說、能受、等受、領受,乃至捨此蘊續餘蘊;此等「皆以薩迦耶見為其自性」,能生餘以薩迦耶見為根本之見趣,故名「見處」;復因障礙真實慧名「見稠林」,損善法名「見曠野」,勞役他名「見厭背」,欲求有求所歷名「見行歷」,詰責動搖名「見動搖」,結構後有苦名「見結」。

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