Dharma · AI Companion

補特伽羅

pudgala

依五蕴假立的个体或人格。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arising ⇢ II · emptinessInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

初立第一重:依五蘊假立個體,破常一主宰我;究竟第二重〔中觀:所假立之補特伽羅亦無自性,唯名施設〕。〔犢子部:立「不可說補特伽羅」為實有所依,與大乘假名說直接衝突,屬部派立場敏感詞。〕

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is talking about

The Chinese term 補特伽羅 is a transliteration of the Sanskrit *pudgala*, and the tradition also renders it as 人 (*person*), 數取趣 (*one who takes up realms in succession*), or simply 眾生 (*sentient being*). The definition in our source — "依五蘊假立而相續流轉的人" (a person conventionally designated upon the five aggregates who continues to flow and transmigrate) — is one sentence, but it bundles together several high-stakes decisions that the Buddhist tradition spent centuries debating. To unpack it we have to walk through three moves: what the five aggregates are, what "假立" (conventional designation) means, and what it means for such a person to "相續流轉" (continuously flow and turn).

The five aggregates that the pudgala is designated *upon*

The pudgala is not a sixth thing lurking behind the five aggregates. It is a *designation* based on them. So we have to know what those five are, in their classical full reach, not their colloquial shrinkage.

1. 色 (rūpa, form-matter) — characterized classically as 一切四大所造色: everything made of the four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind). This includes the body *and* the external environment. The five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) and their corresponding objects (visible form, sound, smell, taste, tangible things) all belong to 色. This is a frequent misreading: people shrink 色 to "the body" or "physical stuff." In the sūtras, the mountain outside your window, the phone in your hand, and the breath in your lungs are all equally 色.

2. 受 (vedanā, feeling) — 領納為相: characterized as the experiencing/receiving of an object. The hedonic tone of any moment of experience: pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. Critically, classical Buddhism does not reduce 受 to "emotions." A bare bodily sensation of warmth, the slight pleasure of soft light, the neutrality of a passing thought — all are 受. The Tibetan translations render it as "the feeling that has been thoroughly experienced," emphasizing how it is the *felt quality* of experience as it strikes the sense faculty.

3. 想 (saṃjñā, perception) — 取相為相: characterized as taking on marks, recognizing. This is the cognitive function that labels, classifies, and identifies: "this is a cup," "this is my boss," "this is the same stop as yesterday." In Abhidharma analysis, 想 is what marks an object off from other objects, gives it a name, and lets memory recall it. It is *not* the same as emotion or thought-content; it is the recognitional marking function.

4. 行 (saṃskāra, volitional formations) — 造作為相: characterized as constructing and acting. This is the cluster of mental factors dominated by *volition* (cetanā) — intention, will, attention, resolve, the conative push behind action. Misreadings collapse 行 into "outward behavior" or "thoughts," but in classical usage it is the *will-side* of mind: the choosing, the deciding, the pushing toward. The 50 or so cetasikas (mental factors) that are not 受, 想, or 識 are mostly bundled here.

5. 識 (vijñāna, consciousness) — 了別為相: characterized as basic discriminating awareness. The sixfold consciousness — eye-, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mind-consciousness — each cognizes its respective object. 識 is the *fact of awareness at all*, the simplest "something is appearing" rather than the content of what appears.

The classical sūtras, especially the 雜阿含經, give each of these five a distinct metaphor. The user has asked me to preserve this one-to-one mapping rather than flatten them, so here they are:

- 色如聚沫 (form is like foam): foam appears substantial from a distance, but on close inspection has no core, no fixed thing inside it that could be grasped. - 受如水泡 (feeling is like a water bubble): feelings rise, hold for a moment, and burst — bright and alluring on the surface, hollow inside. - 想如野馬 (perception is like a wild horse, or a mirage): the marks and labels we project onto things dart rapidly, superimposing shapes that aren't really there. - 行如芭蕉 (volitional formations are like a banana tree): a banana tree looks solid, but if you peel layer after layer, you never find a core; it is hollow through and through. - 識如幻 (consciousness is like an illusion): 識 presents things as appearing, but the appearing is not the thing itself, and not a stable subject who has the appearing.

These five together, in constant causal interaction, are what the pudgala is designated *upon*. The pudgala is not a sixth thing standing behind them; it is the name we give to the pattern they form.

"假立" — what kind of existence does the pudgala have?

The word 假立 is doing serious work here. 假 means relatively, provisionally, by way of designation — not "fake" in the dismissive sense, but not "ultimately real" either. 立 means to set up, to posit, to establish.

This puts the pudgala squarely in the zone of 世俗諦 (conventional truth) as the Buddhist tradition uses it. At the conventional level, we can talk about persons, name them, hold them responsible, grieve them, love them, punish them. At the ultimate level (勝義諦), what we call a "person" turns out to be a process of five aggregates, none of which is a self, none of which is "mine" in the way a self would be mine. The pudgala is therefore not a metaphysical entity, but it is not a hallucination either. It is a *useful and accurate pointer* to a reliable pattern.

This is the middle way (中道) between two bad attractors: - *常見* (eternalism): the view that there is a real, persisting self (ātman, 我) inside the body-mind. - *斷見* (nihilism): the view that there is no continuity at all, no cause-and-effect, no moral responsibility.

The pudgala-by-designation sidesteps both. Patterns exist; they just aren't *things* in the final sense.

The Heart Sutra's famous line — 「照見五蘊皆空, 度一切苦厄」 ("clearly seeing that the five aggregates are all empty, one passes beyond all suffering") — is precisely the insight that the pudgala, taken as the five aggregates, is empty of separate self-nature. Even safer to evoke here is the 雜阿含經's framing: the five aggregates are each to be seen as not-mine, not-I, not-my-self (非我, 非我所).

The Diamond Sutra's warning, 「若以色見我, 以音聲求我, 是人行邪道, 不能見如來」 ("if one sees me in form, or seeks me in sound, such a person walks a wrong path and cannot see the Thus Come One"), is the same point from the negative side: the pudgala cannot be located *inside* any of the aggregates or any combination of them.

"相續流轉" — why the pudgala continues

The second half of the definition — "相續流轉" — is what makes pudgala different from merely a mental construct. The pudgala is not a static label; it is a *continuously flowing* designation that has been reborn, has aged, has died, will be reborn again. The classical 數取趣 translation — "one who takes up realms in succession" — emphasizes this: the pudgala is what *gathers* a body-and-mind in one realm, *uses* it up, and *grabs* another.

Where does this continuity come from? Mainstream Abhidharma answers: from the causal chain of dharmas. The five aggregates at moment t1 condition the five aggregates at moment t2, and so on without a discoverable first moment, but also without a persisting underlying owner. Different schools explain this continuity differently: - Sarvāstivāda (說一切有部) speaks of dharmas that have past, present, and future modes of existence, with causal continuity. - Sautrāntika (經量部) emphasizes seeds and moment-to-moment functional continuity. - Yogācāra (唯識) introduces the ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness) as the deep continuity that carries the seeds between lives. - Madhyamaka (中觀) declines to posit a substrate and explains continuity through interdependent arising (緣起) and conventional designation alone.

The point is: the pudgala does not have continuity *in itself*; it is the name we give to a continuity that operates through the aggregates.

The historical shadow: the Pudgalavāda controversy

A discussion of 補特伽羅 is not complete without mentioning the controversy that this term triggered. The Vātsīputrīya school (犢子部), an early sectarian group, took "pudgala" at face value and posited a real, indescribable (不可說) pudgala that was neither identical to the five aggregates nor separate from them. They argued that without such a real pudgala, oneness and difference across time, karma, and liberation would be inexplicable.

Mainstream Buddhism — including the Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins, the Yogācārins, and the Mādhyamikas — rejected this as a subtle form of ātman-vāda (the doctrine of a self). The《大智度論》 (Mahāprajñāpāramita Śāstra) explicitly critiques the pudgala-as-self position. The mainstream view is that the pudgala is *reliable conventional designation*, not a metaphysical entity. (The Vātsīputrīya view is sometimes summarized as "the pudgala is neither the same as the aggregates nor different from them" — 第三聚, a third category beyond identity and difference — which is exactly what mainstream Buddhism saw as a sleight of hand.)

This controversy is worth knowing because today's students often encounter fragments of it in popular Buddhist-modernist writing and don't know which side is speaking.

Where the pudgala sits in the path of liberation

Insight into the pudgala is half of the central liberating realization in Buddhism. The ābhidharmic and Mahāyāna traditions routinely distinguish: - 人空 / 補特伽羅無我 (pudgala-nairātmya): the absence of a self in the person. The five aggregates are not "I" or "mine." - 法空 / 法無我 (dharma-nairātmya): the absence of self in phenomena. Even the five aggregates themselves have no fixed essence.

Seeing the pudgala correctly — as a *designation* on a flowing process, not a real entity — is itself the first stage of wisdom (prajñā). It is what unsticks the chain of suffering: when there is no solid self to defend, the whole reactive architecture of craving, aversion, and self-clinging begins to loosen.

In the Yogācāra tradition, the term 補特伽羅種性 (pudgala-gotra) is also used: the "person-family" or "person-seed" that is gradually cultivated on the bodhisattva path. This is the same word used in a slightly different constructive sense — the *capacity* of a person to attain Buddhahood — but the underlying view is the same: the "person" is a real, useful, workable designation, not a metaphysical substance.


Life walkthrough

Take one ordinary morning. You wake up in your apartment, brush your teeth, check your phone, walk to the train. Every phrase I've just written assumes a "you" — a 補特伽羅. Here is what is actually happening, mapped onto the five aggregates, with the metaphors held in view.

The body and the room are 色 (form). Your arm is color, the floor is color, the toothbrush is color, the steam from the shower is color, the light from the window is color, the train carriage is color. There is no privileged "real" color and "fake" color. The skid-grip socks your partner keeps complaining about, the chipped enamel on the sink, the dorsum of your hand against the toothbrush — all are equally clumps of the four great elements, all 聚沫 (foam — looking solid, with no core to be grasped when examined closely).

The feelings are 受 (feeling). The hot water on your shoulders is pleasant. The slight tightness in your lower back from sleeping wrong is unpleasant. The neutral whiteness of the pillow you touched just now is neutral. None of these is "you." The pleasant one doesn't last, the unpleasant one doesn't last, the neutral one is already replaced. 水泡 (water bubble) — they rise, glimmer, and burst.

The recognition is 想 (perception). "That is my toothbrush." "That's an email from my boss." "That's the third station from here." 想 marks each chunk of experience with a label and file it goes to. Without 想, you could not navigate the morning, but 想 is also what smears qualities onto objects that aren't really there — the way the half-awake mind superimposes a "stress glow" on the train interior or a "love-glow" on a familiar face. 野馬 (wild horse) — the labels dart, often past the actual thing.

The willing is 行 (volitional formation). Your decision to scroll, your decision not to open a particular email, the tiny push behind standing up from the chair, the urge to check the time again — these are all 行. 行 is the conative push. It is what makes the morning *movement* rather than static awareness.芭蕉 (banana tree) — peel layer after layer and you don't find a stable thing called "my will" at the center, only a layered process of decision-making and reaction.

The awareness is 識 (consciousness). There is a hearing of the kettle. There is a seeing of the screen. There is the bare "something is happening" awareness of being on the train. 識 is the *fact* of awareness occurring, not the content. 幻 (illusion) — the contents shift, the appearing is not the thing, and there is no separate witnesser standing behind.

And the pudgala is the name we give to this fivefold happening continuing across the morning. "I" am the one who slept, who brushed, who is now on the train. But "I" is not a sixth thing — it is the practical label pinned to the continuity of these five aggregates as they flow.

Where do people go wrong in this mapping? Three quick points:

1. They put the pudgala *inside* the body. The body is one of the five aggregates (色), and it is changing; the pudgala-as-designation also includes the morning's thoughts, the email's content, the memory of the argument with your partner last night. The pudgala is not coextensive with the body. 2. They put the pudgala *inside* the feelings. "I am anxious" — but 受 is just one stripe of the five, and the anxiety is already changing. The pudgala is the whole pattern, not the mood of the moment. 3. They think the pudgala is the *private inner self*. But the pudgala's content includes the external environment (also 色), the cultural context that gives significance to the email, the language in which you think. The pudgala is not a sealed inner chamber.

Now take a harder moment. In a relationship, you say "I am hurt." Five-aggregate walkthrough: - 色: the chair across from you, the lowered face, the tears - 受: the sharp unpleasant feeling in the chest - 想: the recognition of the partner's expression, the narrative "they don't care" - 行: the urge to retaliate, the impulse to suppress, the pull toward either cold silence or a tirade - 識: the bare awareness of the situation

The pudgala is "you" in this moment. But "you" is not a wound standing behind the chest pain. The wound is one of the five aggregates, and your "you" is the whole pattern. Knowing this doesn't make you cold to the partner; it loosens the grip that says "this pain is my identity, I must avenge it, I am the wronged one." The pudgala-by-designation view is not cynical detachment; it is the recognition that the situation is more open than it appears when held by ātman-clinging.

And the partner across the table is *also* a pudgala — a designation pinned to *their* five aggregates. Their silence is not "their true self" either; it is one current item in their 色/受/想/行/識 flow. This is why the pudgala concept underwrites empathy: once you see that even you are not a self, the idea that the other is a closed self with a fixed coldness softens.


Why contemporary people need it

The twenty-first century has a particular relationship with the self that the pudgala concept addresses with unusual precision.

Identity is everywhere and shaky. In a single day, a person might be a parent, a remote employee, a fan of a particular band, a person in recovery, a person with a particular diagnosis, a person who is everyone's emotional support, a person who is invisible to others. The contemporary pull is to *totalize* one of these into the real self and live there. The pudgala teaching says: all of these are designations, none of them is the pudgala in the ultimate sense, and none of them has a fixed essence. The "real you" is a useful pointer to a pattern, not a noun you can defend.

The narrative self is real but not metaphysical. Cognitive scientists and philosophers like Daniel Dennett, Antonio Damasio, and Derek Parfit have independently argued that the self is something like a useful narrative the brain constructs to manage its own continuity. The Buddhist claim is similar but more radical: the narrative is real at the conventional level (this is what 假立 means), but if you look for the storyteller underneath the story, you don't find one. The difference from a hard-narrative-self view is that the Buddhist tradition also offers a method (meditation, ethical training, contemplative inquiry) for *dis-investing* the narrative, not just philosophically analyzing it.

Karma and continuity need a substrate, but not a self. Modern ethics struggles with this: if no one is the same person over time, can they be held responsible? Parfit's "Reasons and Persons" famously argued that personal identity is not what matters for ethics — what matters is *psychological continuity*. The Buddhist pudgala specializes exactly this: there is continuity (the aggregates flow in causal chains), but no metaphysical self. This is a sophisticated position that survives modern critique of revenge-based ethics and utilitarian aggregation.

Mental health benefits. The contemporary mental-health vocabulary has many names for the suffering caused by self-clinging — "ego-inflation," "imposter syndrome," "narcissistic injury," "identity foreclosure," "role engulfment." What the pudgala teaching offers is *not* a self-help technique to "lower your self-esteem" or "build a different self," but a different framing: the self that you are trying to protect, defend, expand, or attack does not have the fixed nature you are assuming it has. This re-framing is psychologically useful precisely because it doesn't add a new layer of self-management; it changes the relationship to all layers.

Ethics and the other as pudgala. The pudgala concept, paired with dependent origination, is the foundational tool for the bodhisattva path (the path of awakening for the sake of all beings). To see another person as a pudgala — a designation upon five aggregates, suffering, not-self, yet worthy of care — is to be released from the implicit metaphysics that traps the other into being "essentially them" (and therefore essentially predictable, dismissible, or already known). This is a powerful resource for cross-cultural work, conflict resolution, and any place where the encounter with "the other" tends to fix them prematurely.


Common misreadings and clarifications

1. "補特伽羅 is the same as ātman (我, the eternal self)." This is the original wrong view that the Buddhist tradition spent centuries correcting. 補特伽羅 is a *conventional designation* on a flowing process; ātman is a permanent metaphysical essence. The Pudgalavāda school's mistake was to harden the pudgala into a kind of subtle ātman; the mainstream Buddhist response is that the pudgala is reliable but not ultimate. The Diamond Sutra's repudiation of the 我相, 人相, 眾生相, 壽者相 (the four marks of self) is precisely against treating the pudgala as a fixed mark.

2. "補特伽羅 means there is no continuity at all." This is the opposite error, the 斷見 (nihilism). The pudgala is not an illusion; it is a *reliable* designation. If you kill someone, you have killed a pudgala in the full sense — the aggregates that constituted their pattern are scattered, and their continuity in this life is cut. The Buddhist tradition in East Asia strongly affirms rebirth, karma, and the serious continuity of the pudgala across lives. The 空 (emptiness) of the pudgala is not the 非有 (non-existence) of the pudgala.

3. "補特伽羅 is the same as 眾生 (sentient being)." They are close but not identical. 眾生 (sattva) emphasizes the *suffering* and *life* aspect — a sentient being that is caught in birth-and-death. 補特伽羅 emphasizes the *designation* and *counting* aspect — the person who is taken as the countable subject of actions, karma, and continuity. In many contexts they are interchangeable; in technical contexts the difference matters (e.g., 補特伽羅無我 versus 眾生無我 are sometimes distinguished in some Yogācāra texts).

4. "The pudgala is the 'real inner self' that Buddhism really believes in but doesn't admit." This is a common secular-retelling error. The pudgala is the *designation* on the five aggregates, not a hidden inner self. The Pudgalavāda school did go in this direction, but the mainstream Buddhist tradition explicitly rejected it. Reading the pudgala as a "real but hidden inner self" is importing Vedic intuitions into a Buddhist framework that has carefully excluded them.

5. "The five aggregates are the pudgala. The pudgala is the five aggregates. They're the same." This is true at the conventional level but obscures the function of designation. The five aggregates are the *reality*; the pudgala is a *name we give to a particular pattern* of them. The shift from "I am my aggregates" to "I am a designation pinned to my aggregates" is the entire shift that the contemplative practice is trying to make. The language is doing two kinds of work.

6. "The Heart Sutra says the five aggregates are empty, so the pudgala is fake." The Heart Sutra says they are empty of *self-nature* (自性), not non-existent. The standard Mādhyamika reading is that the pudgala is empty of self-nature but is a valid conventional designation. The Heart Sutra 「照見五蘊皆空」 is not a denial of persons; it is an invitation to see the pudgala clearly as a designation rather than as a metaphysical substance.

In the end, 補特伽羅 is the Buddhist tradition's most careful word for *you* — but it is careful in a particular way: it gives you the term without granting you the metaphysics. It lets you act, speak, and take responsibility *as* a continuous person, while quietly withdrawing the most stubborn assumption behind your back: that there is a fixed self there to defend. The pudgala is the gift of a self-shaped handle, attached to a self-less reality, so that the practice of liberation can happen without the metaphysical errors that otherwise hold us in place.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

依五蕴假立而相续流转的人。

By SutraAI-generated

入中論善顯密意疏B0044 · 藏傳論典部

【補特伽羅——《入中論善顯密意疏》之論述】

一、概念定位:依五蘊假立之個體 本疏將「補特伽羅」定義為依五蘊假立的個體。疏云:「如即攬支聚,假想立為車,世俗立有情,應知攬諸蘊」,明補特伽羅乃依諸蘊施設之假有。又云:「由分別心安立補特伽羅之理,由分別心安立餘一切法」。

二、非一非異之施設 補特伽羅既非與蘊一性,亦非異性。疏云:「凡諸實法,決定唯見彼一異二相。故我非實有,以離一異實法理故」。此破實有補特伽羅,成立假有。

三、依六界、六觸處假立 依《父子相見經》,補特伽羅是依六界(地水火風識界及鼻孔等空界)、六觸處、十八意近行假說名我。六界等為所具之法,補特伽羅為能具之人。

四、自性空之核心主張 疏之核心在於成立補特伽羅自性空。疏云:「補特伽羅是自性空」,又云:「依此道理,便能安立補特伽羅是自性空」。又云:「一切諸法皆是依緣安立……皆無自性,皆無不由他名增上安立之自在體」。

五、為俱生我執之所緣 疏中明示,五蘊若總若別及離五蘊,皆非俱生我執所緣,唯依蘊假立之補特伽羅方為我執所緣。疏云:「經言『唯見諸蘊』者,當知是說緣依蘊假立之我。計即蘊離蘊為我執所緣,皆已破故」。

六、於業果緣起中作為假立之能作者 補特伽羅於名言中作為能作者與受報者。疏云:「勝義空經,說無作者,有業有報。當知是破有自性之作者,非破名言支分假立之我」,並引「補特伽羅無明隨轉,作諸福行」。

七、與阿賴耶識同為密意言教 補特伽羅與阿賴耶識皆為密意教。疏云:「亦說實有補特伽羅。對須說有實補特伽羅,方能調伏之眾生,即說有實補特伽羅而攝受故」,並引經:「五蘊即重擔,荷重擔者謂補特伽羅」。

八、相配於人無我 疏云:「諸法無自性之無我,佛說為二,謂人無我,及法無我……是由所依有法,有蘊等法與補特伽羅之差別而分」。

九、區別於外道所計之實我 疏云:「凡說補特伽羅與諸蘊為實物者……是故當知永離有無二邊之教義,唯是正法差別,是為他宗所無之勝法」。

十、宗派之不共勝法 此安立補特伽羅之理被視為不共勝法。疏云:「若知此宗安立補特伽羅之不共道理」,「此不共理,是內教大乘各宗論師解釋契經密意者所未能闡發之契經密意」。

菩提道次第廣論B0067 · 藏傳論典部

《菩提道次第廣論》一貫以「補特伽羅」指稱依蘊施設的個體,並明言薩迦耶見所緣之我「唯緣補特伽羅」,是依諸蘊假立之我;此名言之我可以成立,但若執其不待名言安立、由自身方面本來成立,即成所破的「補特伽羅我」。因此,本論的標準用詞是「補特伽羅」,論析前後生命相續時亦用「數取趣」為異稱,而不以五蘊本身直接等同於我。

本論區分「補特伽羅無我」與「法無我」:若在補特伽羅上,沒有不依內心名言安立而從境上自體成立的本性,即名補特伽羅無我;若在眼等諸法上無此本性,即名法無我。所謂「我」「自性」「自體」「自在」等,在此皆指不仗名言識安立而本住於境上的自性。

補特伽羅雖是假有,卻非全無。本論特別辨明:其他論師所說的「假有補特伽羅」,雖與本論名稱相同,意義未必相同;若仍執諸蘊實有,便尚未通達本論所說補特伽羅勝義無自性。因此,僅有「假有」之名,不能取代對其無自性的抉擇。

觀察補特伽羅無自性時,本論以我與取蘊是一或是異為核心進路。若我與蘊自性是一,則我只是蘊的異名,且多蘊應成多我;若自性相異,離蘊之我便應如色、心各別而可得,然而實不可得。故真實補特伽羅不能成立為與蘊自性一或自性異。

通達補特伽羅無自性,亦能進而斷除對其所依諸蘊的自性增益;但本論不將通達補特伽羅無我的慧與通達法無我的慧說成同一。前者雖不直接以諸蘊無自性為所緣,卻能不待其他因緣,引發決定諸蘊無自性的定智。

本論又以如幻說明補特伽羅:一方面,補特伽羅在名言識中顯現而不可遮止;另一方面,理智決定其自性本空。兩者相合,方能說補特伽羅如幻。若因無自性便說補特伽羅如兔角般全無,連造業、受果等作用也一概否定,即墮入破壞緣起的歧途。

因此,無自性的補特伽羅仍可安立為造業者與受果者:雖以正理求其生死、自性皆不可得,黑白業果卻不失壞,也不是一位補特伽羅造業而由另一位無因領受。修習時須同時確立「全無自性」與「名言中緣起作用成立」,並藉影像等譬喻理解二者並不相違。

在實踐論述中,「補特伽羅」也泛指具有不同根性、行為或修習條件的人,如行善與不善者、能忍者,以及貪、瞋、癡、慢、尋思增上或等分、薄塵者;不同補特伽羅須依其差別選擇相應所緣。這顯示本論除以該詞討論無我,也用它作為分類修行者與行為主體的通稱。

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

本論以「補特伽羅」一詞貫穿全篇(亦用「數取趣」作為同義異名),指依五取蘊假立的有情個體。

一、補特伽羅的施設基礎與定義 本論明示:「業、愛及無明,為因招後行,令諸有相續,名補特伽羅」,謂補特伽羅乃由業、愛、無明三因而招感後有,使諸有相續,假立此名。又云:「但可依內現在世攝有執受諸蘊立補特伽羅」,強調補特伽羅唯依現在世有執受之諸蘊假施設,非離蘊別有實體。

二、破斥犢子部「不一不異」之計 犢子部執補特伽羅與蘊「不一不異」、不可施設。論主設多重宗過(與蘊異應常、與蘊一應斷、實有須無為因、假有同乳酪),並以「依薪立火」喻反覆辯難,結論:「補特伽羅與色等蘊定應是一,無理能遮」、「進退推徵,理不成立」;若許假施設,則「猶如世間總依色等施設乳等,是假非實」。

三、廣引經文證無實我 《人契經》:「眼及色為緣生於眼識……唯由此量說名為人……此唯名想,此唯自稱,但隨世俗假施設有」。又:「一切沙門婆羅門等諸有執我等隨觀見,一切唯於五取蘊起」;頻毘婆羅契經:「隨逐假名計為我者,此中無有我我所性」;婆拕梨頌:「審思此一切,無補特伽羅」;《筏蹉經》「分明說故」無實我;勝義空經:「有業有異熟,作者不可得,唯除法假」「我終不說有能取者」。論主並舉世尊言:「色乃至識皆無有我」。

四、流轉所依之解難 設難:「若定無有補特伽羅,為說阿誰流轉生死?」 答:「如燎原火雖剎那滅,而由相續說有流轉,如是蘊聚假說有情,愛取為緣流轉生死」。「昔我即今」之常住難,以「一相續」喻消弭:「如言此火曾燒彼事」。

五、補特伽羅一詞之其他用例 論中「補特伽羅」亦泛指修行者個體:「住別解脫補特伽羅」、「由得彼故僧成八種補特伽羅」、「一補特伽羅從無學位數數退已」、「或造此業補特伽羅」。又區分「緣法補特伽羅」(通三界)與「緣補特伽羅」(唯欲色界)。於五無間業中,「補特伽羅」與處、趣、生、果並列為易知之五因緣。

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