Dharma · AI Companion

第一義諦智

paramārthasatyajñāna

菩萨于胜义谛中远离一切身相分别、得身平等之智,不同于声闻辟支佛所得者。AI-generated

Type AttainmentDifficulty AdvancedTruth-level span II · emptiness ⇢ IV · beyond wordsInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

二重证胜义性空立,究竟为离言身平等智;大乘不共声闻辟支所得,涉判教分野

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

A bodhisattva, in the unfolding of "wisdom-liberated spontaneous conduct" (智正覺自在行), turns the mind toward how things truly are. Paramārthasatyajñāna is the wisdom of that turn. Translated literally: paramārtha = "ultimate end / final meaning" (勝義, 究竟), satya = "truth" (諦, real), jñāna = "knowing" (智, direct acquaintance). So this is "ultimate-truth knowing" — but in the *Daśabhūmikā-vyākhyā* (《十地經論》, the commentary on the Ten Grounds), the masters do not let the term stay abstract. They make a single, very concrete move. They pin the whole thing to a specific experiential shift:

「是菩薩遠離一切身相分別,得身平等。此是不同聲聞辟支佛第一義智示現。」 "This bodhisattva abandons all discrimination based on bodily marks (身相) and attains the equality of bodies (身平等). This is a manifestation of the first-truth wisdom distinct from the first-truth wisdom of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas."

That sentence is the spine of the concept. Everything below is unpacking its vertebrae.


What this concept is actually saying

To read "first-truth wisdom" flatly as "seeing emptiness" or "knowing ultimate reality" is a Western philosophy reflex — and a tempting one, because the words almost line up. The *Vyākhyā* refuses that shortcut. It tells us exactly *what* about ultimate reality is being known here, and *how*: by no longer using the distinctions that come from "body-marks" (身相) as a ground for separating self from other.

The "ten bodies" that must be leveled — but not erased

The text names ten distinct kinds of "body" or "form of being" (身) that ordinary cognition uses to rank, file, like, and reject:

| Body (身) | Plain sense | |---|---| | 眾生身 (sattva-kāya) | the body of ordinary sentient beings — me, you, the barista, the co-worker | | 國土身 (kṣetra-kāya) | the body of a land/realm — physical environments, nations, neighborhoods | | 業報身 (karma-vipāka-kāya) | the body shaped by karma — the conditioned body one receives | | 聲聞身 (śrāvaka-kāya) | the body of a "hearer" disciple — one oriented toward personal nirvana | | 辟支佛身 (pratyekabuddha-kāya) | the body of a "solitary realizer" — one who awakens alone, without a teacher | | 菩薩身 (bodhisattva-kāya) | the body of a bodhisattva — oriented toward liberating all beings | | 如來身 (tathāgata-kāya) | the body of a thus-come one — a fully awakened buddha's manifest form | | 智身 (jñāna-kāya) | the body of knowing itself — wisdom embodied | | 法身 (dharma-kāya) | the body of truth-as-such — reality-as-such embodied | | 虛空身 (ākāśa-kāya) | the body of space — the boundless, unobstructed |

This is a striking list because it covers the entire Avataṃsaka spectrum: from the cement of a city block (國土身) to the emptiness of space (虛空身), from the person you brush past (眾生身) to a fully awakened buddha walking into a room (如來身). It even includes the *bodies* of people you've already grouped and labeled — "he's a type-B person," "she's a seeker, not a householder," "that's an elite institution." Every body you sort life into is on this list.

"Discrimination of bodily marks" — what exactly is being dropped?

The phrase is 一切身相分別 (all discrimination of bodily marks). Three words do real work here:

- 一切 (all) — not "most," not "some." The discrimination being relaxed is comprehensive: every form-bound distinction that ordinarily orients judgment. - 身相 (bodily marks / signs of embodiment) — *相* is the technical term for distinguishable signs-by-which-something-is-recognized: appearance, status, role, capability, attainments, aesthetic, social positioning. "Body-marks" gathers these into a single field — anything perceptible about a being (or place, or institution) that becomes the ground for an "us / them," "higher / lower," "more / less." - 分別 (discrimination / distinguishing) — not "perception" and not "judgment" in a casual sense. It is the act of *cutting apart* (別) by way of *differential marks* (相). Seeing color is not yet this. Saying "this is the one who hurt me, that one is safe" — that is.

The *Vyākhyā* is not denying that forms differ. It is targeting the move of using those differences as the *basis of grasping and rejection* (執取的依據).

"Equality of bodies" (身平等) — what is attained?

Note the verb: 得身平等. "Attain" (得), not "realize the abstract proposition that all things are equal." Something changes in how cognition works. When discrimination of body-marks relaxes, what shows up is 身平等 — the equality *among* and *within* bodies. This is not oneness as a philosophical position. It is closer to a perceptual event:

- The barista behind the counter and the chief executive in the corner office are not flatly the same person, but the body-mark gap that previously set up a small internal hierarchy is no longer the operative frame. - The "spiritual seeker" friend and the "shallow worldly" friend are not interchangeable, but the body-marks that justified quietly dismissing one and admiring the other no longer carry weight as basis.

The classical text goes further and adds a clarifying negation: 自身他身不分別 — this is the equality where *self-body and other-body are no longer being held apart by mark-based discrimination.* That last phrase is doing work most readers will miss. The wisdom is not collapsing self and other into a metaphysical point. It is refusing to use any body-marks to *set the self apart as privileged or set others apart as inferior*. Equality here is a *non-discriminating mode of knowing*, not a leveled picture.

The pair it travels with — 世諦智 (worldly-truth wisdom)

The first-truth wisdom is never taught alone. It always sits opposite 世諦智, "worldly-truth wisdom." The *Vyākhyā* characterizes worldly-truth wisdom as 善知眾生身等的染分、淨分、不二分, 能善加分別:

- 染分 (the impure / afflicted aspect) - 淨分 (the pure / awakened aspect) - 不二分 (the aspect in which these two are not two)

And crucially: 能善加分別 — it can *skillfully discriminate* (善加 = add good skill to the differentiating act). So worldly-truth wisdom is the wisdom that sees, *with skill*, the differences: where there is suffering, where there is freedom, where those are not ultimately two — and acts accordingly. First-truth wisdom, by contrast, is described with *not-discriminating* language.

This pairing — not-discriminating vs. skillfully discriminating — is the structural rhythm of the bodhisattva path, not a contradiction. The same practitioner holds both. First-truth wisdom *is not* the agnostic suppression of differences; it is precisely the meeting-point at which differences are no longer used as a ground for self-grasping. Worldly-truth wisdom can then proceed *skillfully* rather than greedily.

The marker that distinguishes it from śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha first-truth wisdom

The text is terse but emphatic: 「此是不同聲聞辟支佛第一義智示現」. The bodhisattva's first-truth wisdom "is shown here as different from the first-truth wisdom of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas."

The text doesn't within this passage spell out *how* it differs. Holding back from speculation, the most we can responsibly say is that the bodhisattva's attainment is marked precisely by that combination the passage actually emphasizes: discrimination of body-marks is abandoned, AND skillful discrimination of the impure/pure/nondual is retained as worldly-truth wisdom functioning in the same practitioner. So the bodhisattva doesn't stop discriminating, but the discrimination is *no longer rooted in body-marks as a basis of self-other partition*. That dual structure — no longer using body-marks to divide self from other, while continuing to skillfully act in the differential world — is the marker of difference from those on the two-vehicle paths.

(A common contemporary reader will reach here and almost reflexively say, "Aha, the bodhisattva stays in the world while the arhat leaves it." That is a popular Tibetan / East-Asian commentary spin, but it goes beyond what this passage of the *Vyākhyā* actually says; the classical text here uses different language and stays closer to the epistemic shift in how the body-marks are held.)


Walking through the concept in contemporary life

Take a single working day. Walk through it with the lens of *身相分別* and the load of body-marks it brings.

1. The commute — activating the "body-marks" engine

On a crowded subway car in a major city, the mind is hard at work sorting bodies:

- The rough-sleeping passenger at one end of the car. - The woman holding a branded handbag, late for something, reading texts. - The elderly man gripping a pole. - A toddler being raised by a clean-cut person in sportswear on someone's lap.

Each is a separate body. Each carries marks. In milliseconds, the mental classifier is running: rough-sleeping → lower-status, less safe, less deserving of attention; luxury handbag → higher-status, more admirable; clean-cut adult with toddler → safe, respectable, trustworthy. None of these are technically wrong as perceptions. The discrimination is real, accurate, often even useful for navigation. But it isn't, by itself, first-truth wisdom. The *bodhisattva path's* first-fruit here is to notice that the classifier is making discriminations one has not authored, and that the discriminations are already *using the body-marks as a ground for partitioning* — sorting out who is "in" (safe / like-me / admirable) and who is "out" (other / less / to be kept at distance).

身平等 isn't the abolition of noticing those distinctions. You can still move down the car to give the toddler's guardian more space, still be courteous to the elderly man, still register that the person living on the street is suffering. The shift is that you are no longer using these marks as a basis for *setting the self apart* ("I am not like that person, and I would like to keep it that way"). The difference between "guiding my behavior toward safety and respect" and "ranking by body-marks" is precise: the first is skill, the second is discrimination (分別).

A common mis-mapping: people translate "don't discriminate" into "don't notice." That is the mis-translation. The text is undermining *using marks to set up partitions* (分別執取), not the act of seeing.

2. At the office — the perilous edge of 世諦智 / 第一義諦智

Now picture a difficult workplace scenario. Two teams are reporting up to a manager. The "elite" team consistently gets the most prestigious projects; the "lower-status" team gets the support work. The team leader has to plan next quarter's resourcing.

This is where the pairing of the two wisdoms earns its keep. 世諦智, when functioning well, will gracefully articulate the differentiation it sees: budget has limited slots for prestige projects, the elite team has more developed capacity, the support team is being developed, here is the plan for capacity-building, etc. Skillful discrimination (善加分別) is the analytical work. Without it, the manager would be useless.

But here is the catch: the same manager, with the best analytical skill in the world, can still be running discriminations of body-marks at a level *below* the analytical work — using the marks of who is "in" and who is "out" to inform what counts as skilled, what capacities are real, which team is "ours." The friends of friends get listened to first. The lower-status team has quietly become a darker background. This is the ordinary failure mode: 世諦智 runs without 第一義諦智 as its silent witness.

First-truth wisdom applied here is not the demand "they are all equal so treat everyone identically." It is the constraint: **I will not let any body-mark (seniority, insider-chumminess, accent, institutional pedigree, "not from our program") function as a ground for ranking the *myself-ness* of one team against another.** That is what 自身他身不分別 looks like in practice. The work of calibration gets sharper; the residue of grace-pointing at the "us" team doesn't keep making the decisions.

3. In intimate life — when "body-marks" become the whole story

Take a long-term couple at a moment of friction. Each has noticed that over the years, the partner is somewhat shorter than they found ideal in their twenties; the partner's social register is less urban-academic than theirs; the partner's body has changed after two pregnancies; the partner's earning power is lower than hoped. None of these are allusions to mistreatment; they are simply present in the room.

Now, none of those marks are wrong as facts. The first-truth wisdom's move here does not say "those marks must be erased from perception." It says the marks have been allowed to recede from being *grounds of acceptance*. The partner's body is, in the first-truth wisdom sense, equivalent in dignity to one's own body — not in shape, not in capacity, but in that you cannot use any of its visible marks to argue, however silently, that you are entitled to more or less love.

"Doesn't everybody feel some attraction to certain marks?" Yes — and that isn't the problem. The problem comes when, on top of attraction, an unexamined second layer of *self-other ranking by body-marks* slips in: a quiet ledger of "I could do better" or "they got lucky with me." That ledger is 身相分別 used as a partition. Removing it doesn't have to remove taste, desire, or preference — those are part of being human, and they belong to 世諦智's proper arena. What is being named is the falseness of using them as the *ultimatum* of acceptance.

4. The body one inhabits — 業報身 as a special case

Most contemporary readers find the hardest move to be applied to one's own *career-encumbered* body or *ageing* body. The karmic-retribution body (業報身) is the body one receives through causes ripening — in contemporary parlance, the body shaped by everything: genes, childhood, education, debt, gender, the parents one had.

First-truth wisdom applied here famously *does not require rejecting those features*. It sees that using such features to argue for the self's superiority or inferiority over another's self is exactly the mark-based partition. Two people meet: one is able-bodied, well-paid, and rested; the other is exhausted, in chronic pain, in a borrowed apartment. First-truth wisdom does not say these are the same. It says the body-marks cannot be used to justify one person as the necessary substrate of well-being and the other as a substrate of pity. Equanimity here is the cognitive event of refusing to let body-marks shape the inner self/other cut.

This is one of the most subtle moves, and contemporary culture, with its aesthetic brutalism, makes it the hardest one. Most "self-acceptance" work pointed at the audience still keeps the frame of comparison — "I am okay, *compared to* the worse-off." First-truth wisdom gently dismantles that comparison frame too, because even in self-acceptance, body-marks are being used as the basis of a self-versus-others ranking.

5. Where this lands in the larger Vaibhāṣika-cum-Huayan grammar

In the *Daśabhūmika*-milieu, *first-truth wisdom* is one face of a bodhisattva's "wisdom-liberated" (智正覺) activities. The matching face is *worldly-truth wisdom*. These two faces recur at multiple stages of bodhisattva training. What makes the bodhisattva version distinct from the two-vehicle version is precisely the *co-presence* of the two faces: the bodhisattva has attained (at least functionally) the equality of bodies, yet continues to operate in the differentiated world with skill. Therefore: do not mistake this wisdom for quietism, the demand for personal liberation in a cave, or the proclamation that the world of forms is illusory and so the body can be neglected. It is the wisdom by which the bodhisattva *no longer weighs beings against each other by their marks,* and yet continues to act in a world where appearances *do* differ and *do* matter for action.


Why contemporaries need this

The argument here is not that the world is more fallen than before; the point is structural. Three features of the current cultural moment make the body-marks partition unusually heavy:

A. Body-marks have become the dominant medium of social attention. Curated profiles, follower counts, brand affiliations, wardrobes, BMI readings, color-coded status-badges — the body and its signs are the primary legibility surface. The discursive load on any single mark is, by orders of magnitude, larger than in a rural agricultural context. The first-truth wisdom's restraint is therefore asked to function over a much bigger input.

B. Algorithmic mediation intensifies the partition. Ranking, sorting, recommending — by design — re-assert *body-marks as scalable units of partition*. Recommendation systems, search ranking, even feed ordering, partition "me" (the recommended) from "you" (the repressor or amplifier) by quantitative marks: clicks, watch-time, latency. This is not "AI proving" the bodhisattva's claim; the comparison is analogue. Algorithmic partition is a refined, industrial-scale instance of what the *Vyākhyā* calls 身相分別. The wisdom being taught here is that the sureness of these ranks need not be the final court. (We should be honest: contemporary AI systems are not conscious subjects adjudicating these partitions. The reduction is in the structural resemblance of the partition operation, not in claiming machine cognition confirms doctrinal truth.)

C. Identity politics, in its coarsest register, runs entirely on body-marks as the ground of belonging. *First-truth wisdom's* contribution here is not to refuse identity — it is to refuse to let any body-mark be the final word on *who deserves to be heard.* It also does not propose sameness of outcome; it proposes equality of intrinsic regard, in the precise sense that body-marks no longer license setting the self-group apart. It is therefore compatible with legal equality, with robust reparative policy, with serious attention to fairness and harm — these are all part of *世諦智's* skillful differentiating. But the liturgy that runs underneath all policy: "the body-mark gap is a *truth*-claim, not a *destiny*-claim," is the orientation the wisdom is meant to nourish.

D. Climate and planetary awareness sharpen the 國土身 problem. The world-body, 國土身, is on the list. Land, water, air are on the list. Seeing these *equally* with the sentient-body — as the *Daśabhūmika* worldview places them — does not mean sentimentalizing rivers. It means refusing to let proximity, citizenship, or species-mark license differential concern. The line is exact: not "all lives matter equally as a slogan," but "the structural move that makes any body-mark license unequal concern is what is being undone."

The wisdom, in short, is for the world the *Daśabhūmika* corpus saw itself addressing: a world of multiplying forms and growing partitions among them, in which no practitioner could simply shrug off the demand for an *equality* that does not flatten.


Common misreadings, and how the *Vyākhyā* quietly corrects them

Misreading 1: "This means the world is an illusion"

A popular translation of "ultimate" is "the world is unreal; only ultimate reality is real." The *Vyākhyā* does not endorse this reading here. It is not saying the ten bodies are illusions. It is saying discriminations of body-marks *as grounds of partition and grasping* (分別執取) are what is being quieted. The bodies themselves remain — with all their variety — as the field in which 世諦智 acts skillfully. Treating the world as illusion in the strong sense collapses the world's role as the field of bodhisattva action. The bodhisattva path needs *both* faces of wisdom to be intact.

Misreading 2: "Stop noticing distinctions"

Not seeing differences is not the move. The very paragraph pairs the move with 世諦智, *skillful* discrimination of impure/pure/nondual. To drop distinctions entirely is to lose the bodhisattva's capacity, and it isn't what is being taught. What is being given up is not noticing — it is *ranking by marks used as ground of self-other partition*. The difference is a small turn inside the verb "to discriminate." People who read this as mystical flatness miss the whole point.

Misreading 3: "Equality = identical worth, identical outcomes"

Equality, in classical Buddhist grammar at this stage, is *equality of intrinsic regard* (同等地位 in the moral sense), not equality of *condition*. The bodhisattva's first-truth wisdom can co-exist with deep practical inequality visible in the world. Calling such things "equal" in a flat sameness would undercut the wisdom's working world. What it strikes at is the move that uses outer condition to license inner ranking of self against others.

Misreading 4: "The śrāvaka is selfish, the bodhisattva is altruistic — that's the difference"

This is a popular framing in some modern commentary circles, and it does have classical sources in some Mahāyāna texts. But **for this passage of the *Daśabhūmikā-vyākhyā***, it is going further than the text warrants. The text here draws the distinction by *what the wisdom is doing* — the bodhisattva's first-truth wisdom is shown distinct through the simultaneous functioning of worldly-truth wisdom in the same practitioner. Jumping to "moral character difference" over-reads the textual marker. The misreading is worth catching because it smuggles in later Mahāyāna commen‖tary of which this *Vyākhyā* passage is not the source.

Misreading 5: "This is about mysticism; the brain can't access it"

A contemporary reader may reach for transcendence-mysticism. The text is more sober. It is a cognitive shift with cognitive preconditions: the gradual quieting of *a particular kind of discrimination* through training. The comparison to contemplative science can be made: studies on the effect of contemplative training show changes in how we react to social and material markers. That analogy is useful, but it should not be over-stretched — no claim is being made that neuroscience *proves* the doctrinally specific content of body-mark equality; rather, that the kind of *cognitive shift* described is at least not unrelated to phenomena some contemplative-science literature is exploring. The doctrinal grammar of *身平等* is more specific than any contemporary science constructs.

Misreading 6: "First-truth wisdom means: be calm and look the same at everything"

Calm, in the meditative sense, is related but different. First-truth wisdom does not give you a fixed expression to wear on the subway. It is the *inner structural adjustment* of how body-marks are held. Externally, the bodhisattva will still engage with discrimination through 世諦智. Internally, the resting tendency to rank beings by their body-marks has been softened, in favor of an equal-regard orientation. The expression will fit the context.

Misreading 7: "This is achieved all at once"

Most contemporary talk about non-discrimination speaks as if it were a switch. The bodhisattva path grammar does not. The wisdom is attained through stages; at any given stage it may be functioning more or less in a practitioner. The *Daśabhūmika*-system describes such wisdoms as growing in their function across the grounds. Reading "in one dose" flattens the path-texture of the bodhisattva course.


Holding the two faces together

The deepest single sentence the *Vyākhyā* places in this passage is 遠離一切身相分別得身平等. Everything circles around it. To follow it correctly:

- Drop the *using* of body-marks as grounds of self/other partition. - Do not drop the *seeing* of body-marks; you need them to act skillfully in the world. - Recognize that the two moves happen *together*, in the same practitioner, in the same moment, as the two faces of a bodhisattva's wisdom.

Ten bodies are on the screen. They differ. The marker is not the equalizer — it is the witness that the marker no longer *judges the soul's standing*. When that adjustment is real, two things happen at once: differences become *more visible, more accurate, more respondable* (because no longer shadowed by self-other ranking), and the practitioner's love for any of those ten bodies does not waver in dignity because of the body it happens to wear.

That is what is held together when first-truth wisdom is fully on stage.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

定义与核心要义

第一义谛智(paramārthasatyajñāna),依《十地经论》之说,乃菩萨于「智正觉自在行」中所起之智慧,观照胜义谛的一面,与「世谛智」相对并举。其核心表述为:远离对一切身相的分别,证得身平等,于自身、他身不起分别执取。

主要阐述

《十地经论》以「第一义谛智」为主要术语,并在论释中另见略称「第一义智」;与之相对并举者为「世谛智」。论中以「无量智慧」所摄之智说明「世谛智、第一义谛智」,显示菩萨所起智慧兼具二谛之智,而第一义谛智是其中观照胜义的一面。

在「智正觉自在行」的论述次第中,《十地经论》直接以「第一义谛智、世谛智等」标举其内容。经文随即说:「是菩萨远离一切身相分别得身平等。」论释据此界定第一义谛智:远离对一切身相的分别,显示证得身平等,于自身、他身不起分别。故本论对此智的核心表述,不是抽象列举胜义谛的义理,而是以「远离一切身相分别」、「得身平等」及「自身他身不分别」具体说明其所证知的平等性。

此处所谓「身相」涵盖经文所列众生身、国土身、业报身、声闻身、辟支佛身、菩萨身、如来身、智身、法身、虚空身等。菩萨虽能知种种身,并随众生深心与乐欲,于各种身之间自在示现,第一义谛智所显者则是超越这些身相差别的分别而得平等。换言之,种种身的差别知见与示现并未被抹除,但在第一义谛智中,自他诸身不成为分别执取的依据。

不同部类与译本的表述差异

本次所据原典资料仅见《十地经论》(释经论部·《十地經論》)之论述,故暂无不同部类或异译本之间的用词差异可供比较。

至于本论本身的内部用词:正文使用「第一义谛智」,论释亦使用「第一义智」作略称;相应的世俗层面称为「世谛智」。此外,原文以「辟支佛」而非其他同义译名,并以「声闻辟支佛第一义智」作比较。这些都是《十地经论》此段实际采用的用词形式。

与相关概念的关系

与世谛智的关系:与第一义谛智相对,《十地经论》将世谛智解释为善知众生身等的「染分、净分、不二分」,并能善加分别。本论以一组相反而相成的表述区分二智:第一义谛智重在离一切身相分别而证身平等;世谛智则重在对众生身等差别相作如实而善巧的分别知。其特色正在于以「不分别」说第一义,以「善分别知」说世谛。

与声闻辟支佛第一义智的关系:《十地经论》明言:「此是不同声闻辟支佛第一义智示现。」此语将菩萨所得的第一义智标示为不同于声闻、辟支佛者;原文仅如此指出其差异,未在此段进一步展开差异的具体内容。故本论对此差异仅作限定性的标示,不作进一步的展开。

代表性原文引用

- 「世谛智、第一义谛智。」 - 「第一义谛智、世谛智等。是菩萨远离一切身相分别得身平等。」 - 「此是不同声闻辟支佛第一义智示现。」

By SutraAI-generated

十地經論T1522 · 釋經論部

《十地經論》以「第一義諦智」為主要術語,並在論釋中另見略稱「第一義智」;與之相對並舉者為「世諦智」。論中以「無量智慧」所攝之智說明「世諦智、第一義諦智」,顯示菩薩所起智慧兼具二諦之智,而第一義諦智是其中觀照勝義的一面。

在「智正覺自在行」的論述次第中,《十地經論》直接以「第一義諦智、世諦智等」標舉其內容。經文隨即說:「是菩薩遠離一切身相分別得身平等。」論釋據此界定第一義諦智:遠離對一切身相的分別,顯示證得身平等,於自身、他身不起分別。故本論對此智的核心表述,不是抽象列舉勝義諦的義理,而是以「遠離一切身相分別」、「得身平等」及「自身他身不分別」具體說明其所證知的平等性。

此處所謂「身相」涵蓋經文所列眾生身、國土身、業報身、聲聞身、辟支佛身、菩薩身、如來身、智身、法身、虛空身等。菩薩雖能知種種身,並隨眾生深心與樂欲,於各種身之間自在示現,第一義諦智所顯者則是超越這些身相差別的分別而得平等。換言之,種種身的差別知見與示現並未被抹除,但在第一義諦智中,自他諸身不成為分別執取的依據。

《十地經論》又明言:「此是不同聲聞辟支佛第一義智示現。」此語將菩薩所得的第一義智標示為不同於聲聞、辟支佛者;原文僅如此指出其差異,未在此段進一步展開差異的具體內容。因此,小結時宜保留本論的限定,不另作宗派性推演。

與第一義諦智相對,世諦智被解釋為善知眾生身等的「染分、淨分、不二分」,並能善加分別。由此可見,本論以一組相反而相成的表述區分二智:第一義諦智重在離一切身相分別而證身平等;世諦智則重在對眾生身等差別相作如實而善巧的分別知。其特色正在於以「不分別」說第一義,以「善分別知」說世諦。

術語方面,本論正文使用「第一義諦智」,論釋亦使用「第一義智」作略稱;相應的世俗層面稱為「世諦智」。此外,原文以「辟支佛」而非其他同義譯名,並以「聲聞辟支佛第一義智」作比較。這些都是《十地經論》此段實際採用的用詞形式。

Related