Dharma · AI Companion

煩惱習

kleśa-vāsanā

烦恼断后仍残存的习气AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span outside the four-fold two-truths frameworkInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

*Fannao xi* (煩惱習, *kleśa-vāsanā*) means the residual habit-energy of affliction: even after the afflictions themselves have been eliminated, bodily and verbal behavior may still display patterns that look as though they were driven by greed, hatred, or delusion.

The key word is “residual.” The *Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom* (*Dazhidu Lun*, 《大智度論》) also calls it simply *xi* (習, habit) or the “remaining scent” (*canqi*, 殘氣) of affliction. Its decisive statement is:

“Habit is not affliction.”(「習非煩惱。」《大智度論》)

This is not a minor terminological distinction. It separates two levels of liberation:

1. Eliminating affliction means that greed, hatred, and delusion no longer function as the inner causes of bondage and karmic appropriation. 2. Eliminating the residual habits of affliction means that even the bodily and verbal patterns formed under their long influence have been completely purified and brought into perfect accord with wisdom.

In brief, the text calls the afflictions the three poisons (*sandu*, 三毒): greed or craving, hatred or aversion, and delusion. In its more extensive classification, it speaks of the ninety-eight proclivities operative throughout the three realms. The residual habit is neither another name for these afflictions nor a subtle portion of them left undiscovered. It is the continuing form of behavior after their binding cause has ceased.

A simple analogy is learning to walk again after a leg iron has been removed. The shackle is genuinely gone, yet the person may continue to limp because the body has learned the posture of captivity. The limp does not prove that the chain remains. But it does show how thoroughly captivity once trained the person’s movement.

The treatise supplies three closely related images, each preserving this distinction between removal and residue:

- A person long confined by a leg iron may retain the old gait after the iron is removed. - A nurse’s soiled garment may be washed clean while a lingering odor remains. - A weak fire may go out after burning wood but leave ash and charcoal behind.

It contrasts the last image with the cosmic fire at the end of an age, which consumes the world without residue. The Buddha’s fire of omniscience is said to be like this: it destroys both the afflictions and everything left by their former operation.

This distinction also explains why an outward action cannot, by itself, disclose the actor’s inner condition. The treatise says that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas may have bodily or verbal appearances resembling lust, anger, or delusion even though their afflictions have been cut off. It gives individual examples rather than flattening all residual habits into one vague category:

- Nanda’s eyes first turned toward women because of a residual habit associated with sensual desire. - Śāriputra vomited his food after hearing the Buddha speak about impure food; the treatise classifies this as an anger-like residue. - Mahākāśyapa took Ānanda by the hand and led him out during the compilation of the teachings; this too is described as an anger-like residue. - Pilindavatsa habitually addressed a river deity in disparaging language. - Another disciple retained a habit of jumping and playful performance. - Gavāṃpati displayed a ruminating motion connected in the account with former bovine karma.

These examples are not permission to romanticize rude, impulsive, or degrading behavior. The treatise immediately preserves a crucial asymmetry: when an ordinary person performs similar actions under the power of the three poisons, that person still creates blameworthy karma. Similar appearances do not imply identical causes.

Nor does “habit is not affliction” mean that every habit remaining in an advanced practitioner is morally neutral. It is a technical judgment about persons whose afflictions have actually been eliminated. An ordinary person cannot turn the doctrine into a self-issued certificate: “My anger is gone; this is merely its aftertaste.” Whether anger remains must be known from the absence of grasping, hostility, delusion, and karmic bondage—not inferred from an appealing theory about oneself.

The concept’s place on the path is therefore quite precise. According to the bodhisattva schema presented in the *Dazhidu Lun*:

“At the attainment of the patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, afflictions are eliminated; at Buddhahood, the habits of affliction are eliminated.”(「得無生法忍時斷煩惱、得佛時斷煩惱習。」《大智度論》)

The patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (*wusheng fa ren*, 無生法忍) is not merely intellectual agreement that things are empty. It marks a profound bodhisattva realization. Yet the treatise maintains a remaining distinction between that realization and Buddhahood: the three poisons have been cut off, but their residual habits are not yet completely exhausted.

The treatise rejects both of two extremes. If a bodhisattva’s afflictions and all their residues had already disappeared upon attaining this acceptance, there would be no relevant distinction from a Buddha. But if the bodhisattva still possessed the three poisons in their binding form, perfectly pure buddhahood-producing qualities could not be accumulated. Its formulation is exact:

“The three poisons are eliminated, while their habits are not yet exhausted; thus one can accumulate the qualities.”(「三毒斷、習未盡,可得集諸功德。」《大智度論》)

By practicing the perfection of wisdom, entering the bodhisattva stage, completing the qualities of a Buddha, and attaining knowledge of all modes (*yiqiezhong zhi*, 一切種智), the bodhisattva finally eliminates every residual habit and becomes a Buddha. The treatise sometimes describes the three knowledges—knowledge of the path, all-knowledge, and knowledge of all modes—as a pedagogical sequence culminating in the destruction of residual habit. Elsewhere it speaks from the standpoint of awakening itself, where the three are accomplished together. These are different perspectives on the path and its consummation, not competing psychological theories.

This is why the concept matters within the whole path of liberation. Liberation is not merely learning to suppress an impulse, nor merely having a correct view. It reaches from the destruction of the causes of bondage to the complete transparency of body, speech, and wisdom at Buddhahood. Residual habit names the distance between being no longer enslaved and being wholly perfected.

A walkthrough in everyday life

Imagine someone named Mira receiving a terse message from her partner during an exhausting commute: “We need to talk tonight.”

Her stomach tightens. Her eyes repeatedly return to the screen. Memories of earlier conflicts arise. She drafts a defensive reply, deletes it, opens social media, and complains under her breath about being treated unfairly.

For an ordinary person, the episode can be mapped carefully:

1. The screen, words, bodily tension, sounds, and surrounding train are not themselves “residual affliction.” They are conditions and objects within the event. 2. Recognition occurs: Mira identifies the sender, reads the sentence, remembers its tone in previous conversations, and labels it threatening. This ordinary recognition should not be confused with affliction merely because it happens quickly. 3. Aversion arises: she does not simply recognize possible conflict; she wants the discomfort pushed away and begins mentally opposing her partner. This is the operation of hatred or aversion, one of the three poisons. 4. Delusion contributes: she treats her first interpretation—“I am about to be attacked”—as established reality, overlooking how much she does not know. 5. Craving contributes: she wants immediate reassurance, control, and vindication. 6. Body and speech follow: tightened posture, compulsive checking, muttered accusations, and the almost-sent hostile reply express the poisons through bodily and verbal action.

In Mira’s case, it would be inaccurate to say, “The irritation is only a residual habit.” The afflictive cause is visibly active: she is grasping at a preferred outcome, resisting discomfort, and taking an uncertain story as fact. Her bodily and verbal patterns are not merely similar to aversion; they are currently being propelled by it.

Now imagine a practitioner in whom aversion has truly ceased, using the special case described by the treatise rather than making a claim about an ordinary person. A sharp message arrives. Because of a pattern acquired over many years, the shoulders may briefly assume an old defensive posture, or the voice may come out more abrupt than intended. Yet there is no inward wish to injure, defeat, or expel the other person; no hostile story is appropriated as “me and mine”; and no anger-driven karma is being formed. The outward trace resembles aversion, but its afflictive engine is absent. That is the kind of distinction the phrase “habit is not affliction” is meant to protect.

One can picture it in three moments:

- Before liberation: trigger, afflictive interpretation, craving or resistance, appropriation, and bodily or verbal reaction reinforce one another. - After affliction is eliminated but habit remains: a learned bodily or verbal form may still appear, but it is not powered by the poison that originally trained it. - At Buddhahood: neither the poison nor its remaining bodily and verbal distortion persists; conduct is fully consonant with wisdom.

The most common mapping error is to call any automatic reaction a “residual affliction.” Automatism alone is not the criterion. A phone-checking habit, a regional manner of speech, trauma-related vigilance, a motor tic, and *fannao xi* are not interchangeable categories. The treatise is speaking specifically about bodily and verbal patterns that remain after the corresponding affliction has been eliminated and that resemble actions formerly arising from greed, hatred, or delusion.

Modern discussion of neural pathways or algorithmically reinforced habits may offer a useful comparison. Repeated behavior can outlast the situation that trained it, just as a recommendation system continues using patterns learned from earlier data. But this is only an analogy. Neuroscience has no settled experimental measure for the Buddhist elimination of greed, hatred, and delusion, and an algorithm has neither karmic intention nor liberation. Such comparisons illuminate persistence of pattern; they do not scientifically prove the Buddhist account or define its soteriological claims.

Why contemporary people need it

This teaching gives us a more mature account of transformation than either perfectionism or complacency.

Perfectionism says: “If an old reaction appeared, nothing has changed.” The doctrine replies that causes and traces are not identical. A chain may be gone even while the gait it trained is still being relearned. Genuine freedom need not mean that every conditioned mannerism disappears at the same instant.

Complacency says: “Because behavior is only conditioning, I bear no responsibility for it.” The doctrine replies that this special category applies only where affliction has truly ceased. For ordinary practitioners, bodily and verbal conduct is often still driven by craving, hostility, and confusion. We must examine causes honestly and make amends where harm has occurred.

The concept therefore supports compassion without weakening ethical discernment. A person may be sincerely changing and still speak in a defensive tone learned in childhood. A parent may understand that shouting harms a child yet feel the old bodily sequence assembling under stress. A worker may no longer endorse status competition yet automatically scan every meeting for signs of rank. Such patterns should neither be treated as an unchangeable essence nor excused as harmless. They can be met as conditioned formations: understood, restrained, retrained, and gradually brought under the guidance of wisdom.

At the same time, *fannao xi* prevents us from reducing liberation to behavioral polish. A charming person may remain governed by craving. A blunt person may possess much less malice than their style suggests. Etiquette and awakening are not the same achievement. The Buddhist path asks about the roots of action: Is there grasping? Is there ill will? Is there ignorance and appropriation? What kind of karma is being formed?

Yet the doctrine does not stop at inward purity while dismissing outward effects. The Buddha is distinguished precisely by the complete elimination of residual habit. Full awakening is portrayed as a consummation in which wisdom is not merely hidden behind awkward conduct; body and speech have become wholly responsive instruments of benefit. The endpoint is not “I meant well, so appearances do not matter.” It is the complete integration of intention, understanding, expression, and compassionate efficacy.

That makes this teaching particularly valuable in an age of rapid public judgment. Short video clips, screenshots, and isolated phrases encourage us to infer an entire mind from a visible act. The treatise warns that identical-looking behavior may have profoundly different inner causes. But it also warns us not to use invisible motives to erase visible responsibility. We need both truths:

- Appearances alone do not reveal the full spiritual cause of an act. - Until affliction is genuinely uprooted, we should not presume that our harmful patterns are merely innocent residue.

For practice, the useful question is therefore not “Was that the real me or just a habit?” Buddhism does not require defending a permanent “real me.” Better questions are: What conditions were present? Was craving, hostility, or delusion active? What did the body and speech enact? What suffering followed? What restraint, understanding, or repair is now possible?

In this way, residual habit locates a very subtle frontier on the path: the frontier between freedom from bondage and the perfection of wisdom’s expression. It allows gradual cultivation to be taken seriously while keeping Buddhahood—not mere self-improvement—as the horizon.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“Residual affliction means a weak affliction.” Not in the usage under discussion. A weakened poison is still a poison. *Fannao xi* is the bodily or verbal residue present after the affliction itself has been eliminated. The treatise explicitly says, “Habit is not affliction.”

“If someone behaves angrily, there must be anger inside.” Not necessarily. According to the treatise, some liberated disciples retained anger-like verbal or bodily patterns without the affliction of hatred. But for an ordinary person, anger-like conduct commonly is driven by anger and produces karmic consequences. The exceptional doctrinal case must not erase the ordinary ethical diagnosis.

**“Anything unconscious or automatic is *fannao xi*.”** No. The concept has a narrower boundary. It concerns patterns resembling the operation of the three poisons after those poisons have been cut off. Reflexes, skills, cultural gestures, psychiatric symptoms, trauma responses, and ordinary habits should not automatically be placed in this category.

“It is just karma.” The ideas overlap in the treatise’s stories but are not interchangeable. Some examples are connected with conduct carried over from former karma, while the defining issue is the residual form manifested by body or speech after affliction has ceased. “Karma” is too broad to serve as a synonym.

“It is simply the storehouse consciousness.” That imports a different doctrinal framework. The supplied discussion in the *Dazhidu Lun* uses the terms “residual habit,” “habit,” and “remaining scent,” and explains their elimination through the bodhisattva stages and the three knowledges. It does not identify this phenomenon with storehouse consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*, 阿賴耶識). Later traditions may construct broader theories of seeds and habit-energy, but they should not be retroactively inserted into this passage as though they were its own vocabulary.

“An arhat who retains a habit has only incomplete liberation.” This formulation blurs two standards. In the treatise, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas can truly eliminate the afflictions responsible for bondage. What remains incomplete relative to Buddhahood is the exhaustion of every residual habit and the perfection of all-knowing, universally beneficial expression. Their freedom from affliction is not declared false; it is distinguished from the Buddha’s unsurpassed completeness.

“The bodhisattva must keep a little greed, hatred, and delusion in order to remain in the world.” The treatise says the opposite. The bodhisattva at the relevant stage is described as having eliminated the three poisons while not yet exhausting their habits. It argues that possessing the poisons would obstruct the accumulation of perfectly pure qualities. Compassionate activity does not require retaining bondage.

“If the inner affliction is gone, outward harm no longer matters.” This is not the trajectory of the doctrine. Buddhahood is marked by the elimination of even the residues that prevent body and speech from perfectly following wisdom. The teaching may complicate how we judge a liberated person’s motive, but it gives ordinary practitioners no warrant to ignore consequences, refuse correction, or evade repair.

“Practice has failed whenever an old mannerism returns.” Not necessarily. The images of the removed shackle, washed garment, and extinguished fire show that conditioning can have layers. But these images are not invitations to declare victory prematurely. Their practical lesson is double: do not mistake a lingering pattern for an eternal self, and do not mistake intellectual insight or temporary calm for the uprooting of affliction.

The deepest point is neither that habits are trivial nor that they are destiny. Affliction binds; residual habit bears its shape after the binding force is gone; Buddhahood exhausts both. The path therefore proceeds beyond managing symptoms, beyond suppressing impulses, and even beyond freedom from personal bondage, toward a state in which wisdom has no remaining obstruction in the way it appears through body and speech.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

「煩惱習」(klesa-vāsanā)在《大智度論》中又简称「習」,并称为烦恼的「殘氣」。烦恼本身,略说是贪、瞋、痴三毒,广说是三界九十八使;烦恼习则是烦恼断后,身、口二业仍不完全随顺智慧,显现仿佛从淫欲、瞋恚、愚痴而起的惯习相状。论中特别说「習非煩惱」,表明残习虽与既往烦恼相续相关,却不等同于仍有烦恼。

其核心判别在于:断烦恼与断烦恼习并非同一层次。声闻、辟支佛及其余贤圣能够断除烦恼,但残习未必穷尽;诸佛则烦恼及其残习皆悉断除。因此,有似三毒的身口表现,不必即表示圣者尚有三毒烦恼;然而凡夫若作同类行为,仍会由烦恼造业得罪。

2. 主要阐述

《大智度論》从佛果与二乘的差别说明断习:诸佛的烦恼习全部断尽,声闻、辟支佛则「煩惱習不悉斷」。论中列举多种事例:难陀因淫欲习,于女众中先看女人;舍利弗因瞋习,听佛说不净食便吐食;摩诃迦叶集法时牵阿难之手令其出去,也被说为瞋习。此外,毕陵迦婆蹉常以轻贱之语称恒神,摩头婆和吒有跳戏之习,憍梵钵提则因过去牛业而常作吐呞之相。这些均用来显示:烦恼虽断,身口仍可能保留近似烦恼或宿业所成的惯习形态。

论以数喻说明「残而非有」:久被脚锁之人,锁虽解除,行走姿态仍留旧习;乳母之衣虽已洗净污垢,垢气尚存;薄火烧薪,火灭之后仍有灰炭。与此相对,劫尽大火能烧尽三千大千世界,不留遗余;佛的一切智火亦复如是,能焚烧诸烦恼而无复残习。

在菩萨行位上,论立「得無生法忍時斷煩惱、得佛時斷煩惱習」。它同时记载并否定两种判说:一是得无生法忍时烦恼及习已经全尽;二是坐道场时才把三毒及其习一并断除。论所申明的次第是:若得无生法忍时习已尽,便应与佛无异,不应再受法性生身;若三毒具足,则不能积集纯净功德;三毒虽薄,也只能感得转轮圣王或诸天王等身。菩萨须处于「三毒斷、習未盡」的状态,方能继续积集成佛功德。

菩萨行般若波罗蜜、入菩萨位、具足佛法并得一切种智,乃能断尽一切烦恼习而成佛。 就道果次第而言,菩萨行于无碍道,至解脱道时一切闇蔽皆无;成就白净无漏法后,能现种种身利益众生而不受众苦,以此显明佛果断习的究竟性。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

本题所据材料仅属释经论部《大智度論》(《大智度論》),未提供其他经部、论部或同经异译本,故无法据现有引文列举跨部类或异译用词分歧。就本论内部而言,同一义理主要使用三种表述:完整名称作「煩惱習」,省称作「習」,解释其性质时作「殘氣」。三者均置于断烦恼与断习的阶位差别中,并未以「藏識」或「阿賴耶識」称说这一现象。

论又以三智说明佛果断习:道智具足一切智,一切智具足一切种智,一切种智断烦恼习;另一方面,又说一切种智即一切智,道智即金刚三昧,佛初心时三智一时成就、烦恼习断。前者依次第差品而说,使众生心得清净;后者就佛成道时的成就而说。

4. 与相关概念的关系

「煩惱」是所断的三毒或三界九十八使;「煩惱習」则是烦恼已断后尚存的身口惯习,故二者相关而不相同。「三毒習」专指身口所现似淫欲、瞋恚、愚痴之相,是烦恼习的具体说明。

「無生法忍」标示菩萨断烦恼而习未尽的阶段;「一切種智」及佛果则与烦恼习的究竟断除相连。「無礙道」至「解脫道」表示由行道至一切闇蔽皆除的差别。由此,本论以菩萨阶位及道智、一切智、一切种智的次第建立断习之教,而非借藏识等名义解释。

5. 代表性原文引用

- 「習非煩惱。」 - 「諸佛煩惱習一切悉斷,聲聞、辟支佛煩惱習不悉斷。」 - 「聲聞、辟支佛身口有似婬欲瞋恚愚癡相,凡夫愚人為之得罪,是三毒習,諸佛無有。」 - 「得無生法忍時斷煩惱、得佛時斷煩惱習。」 - 「三毒斷、習未盡,可得集諸功德。」

By SutraAI-generated

大智度論T1509 · 釋經論部

《大智度論》以「煩惱習」一詞指稱煩惱斷後猶存的殘餘之氣,明確定義為「煩惱殘氣」,又稱「煩惱習氣」「殘習」「餘氣」。論中先界定「煩惱」:略說為三毒,廣說為三界九十八使;而「煩惱習」則是「若身業、口業不隨智慧,似從煩惱起」——並非真實煩惱,乃久習煩惱所起的似煩惱業相。須菩提問佛時,佛亦明言「習非煩惱」,謂聲聞、辟支佛身口有「似婬欲、瞋恚、愚癡相」,凡夫愚人見之以為得罪,而此三毒習「諸佛無有」。

論中用兩組譬喻說明習之性質:一、久鎖腳人卒得解脫,行時雖無鎖,猶有習在;二、乳母衣久垢著,以淳灰淨浣,垢雖無而垢氣猶在——「衣如聖人心,垢如諸煩惱,雖以智慧水浣,煩惱垢氣猶在」。又舉諸聖實例:難陀婬欲習故,得阿羅漢道後眼先視女眾;舍利弗瞋習故,聞佛言食不淨即吐食、終不復受請;摩訶迦葉瞋習故,集法時牽阿難手出;畢陵迦婆蹉常罵恒神為小婢;摩頭婆和吒跳戲習故從衣枷踔上梁;憍梵鉢提牛業習故常吐食而呞——「如是等諸聖人,雖漏盡而有煩惱習」。

何以二乘有習而佛無?論以火力為喻:如火焚薪已,灰炭猶在,火力薄故不能令盡;劫盡時火燒三千大千世界無復遺餘,火力大故。「佛一切智火亦如是,燒諸煩惱,無復殘習。」 又釋:聲聞、辟支佛集功德智慧不過一世至三世,佛則於無量阿僧祇劫廣修廣習,善法久熏,故煩惱習無復餘氣;且佛斷結智慧甚利,「用十力為大刀,以無礙智直過」,誅拔根本令無遺餘。論中更以婆羅門五百惡口罵佛、佛無異色異心,還以五百語讚佛、佛無喜色悅心,乃至旃遮謗佛、孫陀利死、食馬麥、受天食、提婆達推石、羅睺羅敬禮等諸事,證佛於毀譽好惡中心無增減,「譬如真閻浮檀金,火燒不異,搥打磨斫,不敗不異」,故知佛諸煩惱習都盡無餘。

在修行位次上,論明判:「得無生法忍時斷煩惱,得佛時斷煩惱習,是則實說。」 菩薩得無生法忍,捨生身得法性生身,若煩惱習都盡則與佛無異,不應更受法性生身。菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜,過聲聞、辟支佛地,入菩薩位,得一切種智,斷一切煩惱習,作佛;「從初發意,應當學具足一切善根;學善根已,當得一切種智,當斷一切煩惱習」。菩薩法與佛法之別在於:菩薩當知一切種、得一切種智、斷一切煩惱習,而佛以一念相應慧知一切法已得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提;「無礙道中行,是名菩薩摩訶薩;解脫道中無一切闇蔽,是為佛」。

論中又設難:三乘同用無漏智斷煩惱,煩惱斷無差別,何以習有盡不盡?佛答:「煩惱斷無差別;諸佛煩惱習一切悉斷,聲聞、辟支佛煩惱習不悉斷。」 須菩提追問:無為法中可得差別不?佛言不也,差別乃「世間言說故有差別,非第一義,第一義中無有分別說」。論釋:三乘聖人皆以無為法而有差別,雖因無為有差別,而有為法中可得說;第一義中一切語言道斷、心所行斷,但以諸聖人結使斷故說有後際。須菩提更問:若有法相尚不得順忍,何況得道?佛答:「若無有法者,則有順忍乃至斷一切煩惱習」;菩薩行般若時「無有法相、非法相,即是菩薩順忍」,「有法是菩薩道,無法是菩薩果」,以是因緣當知一切法無所有性。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》將「煩惱習」明確界定為「有漏麁重」:煩惱隨眠斷除之時,由漏所生、為漏所熏發的本所得性,以及不安隱性、苦依附性、與煩惱相似的無堪能性,雖皆轉得微薄,卻尚未究竟消失。論中即以「有漏麁重」名「煩惱習」,這是本論記述此概念時最關鍵的術語形式。

本論又嚴格區分「漏麁重」與「有漏麁重」。前者是有隨眠者之有識身中的不安隱性與無堪能性,在阿羅漢等斷除修道所斷煩惱時即悉皆永離;後者則是煩惱斷後仍由既往熏發而存的殘餘性質,只能變得微薄。因此,「煩惱習」並非尚未斷除的煩惱隨眠,也不是正在現行的煩惱纏,而是煩惱及其隨眠已斷之後仍存的有漏麁重。

為說明上述差別,本論以「纏」稱現行、現起的煩惱,以「隨眠」稱尚未斷害的煩惱種子,並說隨眠亦名「麁重」;在不覺位名隨眠,在覺位則名纏。修行者正式斷煩惱時,所捨的是隨眠,因為煩惱纏已先由對治伏捨;若只伏纏而未斷隨眠,煩惱仍會屢次現起,只有隨眠斷後,纏與隨眠才畢竟不起。 本論另將煩惱斷略分為「諸纏斷」與「隨眠斷」,並說「離繫斷」即是隨眠斷,進一步顯示煩惱習不能與這兩者混同。

就能斷者而言,本論指出,阿羅漢與獨覺尚不能斷盡煩惱習,唯有如來能究竟斷除;因此將此稱為「永斷習氣不共佛法」。此處所謂如來究竟斷習,所斷的正是阿羅漢等斷惑後仍未盡除的有漏麁重,而不是仍有煩惱現行或隨眠未斷。

本論又從外在行止描寫「永害習氣」:如來在動轉、瞻視、言論或安住之中,似由煩惱引起的作業大多不再現行,故名「如來永害習氣」;諸阿羅漢雖已斷煩惱,在這些行儀中仍可能出現種種彷彿由煩惱所起的作業。 這一表述把「習氣」落實為斷惑後仍可能顯於動作、目視、言談與安住中的相似作業,同時以如來與阿羅漢的差別,標明「斷煩惱」與「永害習氣」並非同一層次。

總括而言,本論主要使用「煩惱習」「習氣」「有漏麁重」三種相聯用語:以「有漏麁重」說其體性,以「煩惱習」標舉其名,以「永害習氣」或「永斷習氣」表示如來究竟斷除。其論述核心是:纏與隨眠可以畢竟不起,而由漏熏發的相似無堪能性仍可能殘存;阿羅漢、獨覺止於未能盡斷,唯如來究竟永斷。

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