Dharma · AI Companion

自業

karmasvakatā

谓有情自身所造之业,于自身相续中感得果报。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntroductoryTruth-level span I · dependent arisingInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

Self-karma (自業, *karmasvakatā*) means that karma created by a sentient being bears fruit within that being’s own causal continuum. In brief: what one intentionally plants is not transferred to somebody else’s stream of experience, and another person’s deeds do not simply become one’s own karmic inheritance.

The decisive word is “self” (自). But it must be handled carefully. It indicates the continuity within which action and result occur; it does not establish an independent, permanent self that owns karma like property.

The Buddhist account therefore holds two truths together:

- Karma is not interchangeable: the doer’s continuum is the locus in which its result matures. - No unconditioned, sovereign ego can be found behind the action or the result.

This is why “one makes one’s own karma” is not a Buddhist version of “an immortal soul gets what it deserves.” The teaching is about causal responsibility without a metaphysical owner.

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (《阿毘達磨俱舍論》) defines karma as intention and what intention brings about (思及思所作). Here:

- Mental karma (意業) is intention (思): the mind’s volitional orientation, its movement toward choosing, rejecting, sustaining, or initiating something. - Bodily karma (身業) is bodily activity brought about through intention. - Verbal karma (語業) is speech brought about through intention.

Thus karma is not simply “whatever happens,” nor is it merely visible behavior. Its core is volition. Bodily and verbal deeds are karmically significant as expressions of intention. Conversely, an involuntary movement is not to be classified in exactly the same way as a deliberately executed deed merely because both involve the body.

This also means that bodily karma must not be reduced to “the body,” verbal karma to “words,” or mental karma to “thoughts.” A body is not itself a deed. A sound is not by itself verbal karma. A passing mental image is not necessarily an intention. The relevant question is: what volitional movement is being cultivated and expressed?

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* analyzes the arising of bodily action as a conditioned sequence:

recollection → desire or inclination → examination and deliberation → effort → bodily wind or vital motion → bodily karma.

The vocabulary belongs to classical Buddhist analysis, but the philosophical point is readily visible: what we ordinarily compress into “I did it” is actually a succession of dependent events. A remembered object appears; attraction or aversion forms; the mind turns it over; effort gathers; bodily processes are mobilized; an action occurs.

There is agency here, but no absolutely independent agent. The treatise permits “agent” (作者) as a conventional designation for the factor exercising the predominant function—its effective or pre-eminent capacity (勝用)—within a network of conditions. It rejects an imagined self that could act without depending on causes.

The same applies to receiving results. Buddhism does not need a permanent self to carry merit and wrongdoing through time. The relevant continuity is the causally connected stream of the six internal sense bases (內六處)—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind—together with the conditioned processes dependent upon them. Later experience belongs to the same continuum because it has arisen through causal succession, not because an unchanged substance has travelled from the deed to its reward.

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* explains this with the analogy of a seed. A fruit does not emerge directly from a seed that has already ceased to exist, nor does it appear immediately after the seed. The seed conditions a sequence—sprout, stem, leaves, flower—and through that evolving sequence fruit becomes possible. Likewise, karmic result arises through continuity, transformation, and differentiation (相續、轉變、差別). The original deed need not remain frozen somewhere as an invisible object. It changes the continuum, and the altered continuum later supports a corresponding result.

The analogy has limits. Karma is not a physical seed, and the ripening of karma cannot be reduced to agricultural mechanics. The image is meant to clarify causal continuity without requiring either an eternal deed or an eternal recipient.

The *Prakaranāryavāca-śāstra* or *Xianyang Shengjiao Lun* (《顯揚聖教論》) states: “All sentient beings are formed through their own karma” (一切有情自業所作). It develops one’s own karma (自所作業) through four dimensions:

1. The karma and its result occur within the doer’s own continuum; the fruit is not transferred to another continuum. 2. Counteractive and counteracted qualities operate in the present. A wholesome quality can oppose an unwholesome one, and cultivation can alter the conditions now active. 3. The present existence has arisen in dependence on past karma. 4. Present karma becomes a condition for future existence.

These four dimensions prevent “self-karma” from becoming a doctrine concerned only with punishment after death. It includes inherited conditioning, present ethical conflict, present possibilities of treatment, and the production of future becoming.

The same treatise gives an order in which karmas may mature:

1. Weighty karma matures first. 2. If no such karma determines the issue, karma done near the relevant transition or most recently may mature next. 3. Habitually repeated karma follows. 4. Earlier karma may mature when the preceding factors do not take priority.

This ordering matters because karma is not a simple chronological ledger. A grave deed can outweigh many minor ones. A deeply rehearsed habit can have more causal force than an isolated impulse. What is repeatedly welcomed, praised, rehearsed, or performed becomes a well-travelled route in the continuum.

Yet not every karmic result is fixed. The *Xianyang Shengjiao Lun* distinguishes determinate and indeterminate maturation (決定/不定異熟). Consequently, “your own karma bears fruit” does not mean “everything has already been irrevocably sentenced.” Some karmic potentials are determinate; others remain susceptible to counteraction, weakening, interruption, or changes in supporting conditions. The very existence of a path of cultivation depends on this distinction.

Nor does the pleasantness of an action predict its result in a straight line. The treatise rejects the claim that an action accompanied by pleasure must yield only pleasant maturation, or that one accompanied by pain must yield only painful maturation. A kind deed may be difficult to perform. Cruelty may feel gratifying at the time. Wholesome and unwholesome karma can also issue in complex results involving both painful and pleasant experience. Ethical quality is rooted in wholesome or unwholesome roots—not merely in how the act felt while it was being done.

Furthermore, karma is “one’s own” without being privately manufactured in isolation. Its formation depends on such factors as motive, field or recipient, object, method, basis, attention, understanding, companions, repetition, and collective participation. Repeated cultivation includes not only doing something oneself, but encouraging others, praising it, rejoicing in it, and feeling pleased when seeing people act similarly. Collective conduct is real, but each participant’s intentional involvement conditions that participant’s own continuum.

The *Xianyang Shengjiao Lun* therefore describes conditioned arising as “not from another, not from itself, not jointly made by self and other, and not without cause” (非他、非自、非共、非無因). This is not wordplay. A result is “not from another” because another person cannot directly deposit their karma into one’s continuum. It is “not from itself” because no phenomenon produces itself independently of conditions. It is not made by two substantial agents working together, because no such substantial agents can be found. And it is not causeless, because causal efficacy plainly operates.

Self-karma therefore occupies a crucial place in the path of liberation. It guards responsibility against fatalism, while emptiness of self guards responsibility against eternalism. Because actions matter, practice is necessary. Because there is no fixed actor, transformation is possible.

Life walkthrough

Imagine an exhausted commuter standing in a crowded train after an unpleasant day at work. A colleague has sent a message that sounds dismissive. The commuter opens the phone, begins typing a humiliating reply, pauses, deletes it, and later answers firmly without malice.

Let us walk through this without skipping any of the classical structure.

First comes recollection. The mind recalls the earlier meeting: the colleague’s tone, the embarrassment, perhaps an old history of feeling undervalued. This recollection is not yet identical with karma. A memory can arise involuntarily.

From recollection comes inclination or desire. The commuter wants relief, vindication, or retaliation: “I want them to feel what I felt.” Here the direction of the mind is becoming ethically charged, but we should still distinguish a suddenly arisen impulse from a deliberately embraced intention.

Then comes examination and deliberation. The mind composes possible replies, imagines their effects, interprets the colleague’s motives, and tells a story about what must be done. This is not merely “having thoughts.” The karmically central issue is how volition is organizing and using those thoughts.

Next comes effort. Attention narrows. The hands grip the phone. The reply is edited to make it sharper. Mental karma is already operating as intention; effort strengthens its trajectory.

Then physiological and bodily conditions are mobilized—the classical analysis speaks of wind—and the fingers move. If the reply is sent, bodily movements produce verbal karma, because typed language is an intentional communicative act. The fingers’ motion belongs to bodily activity; the meaningful insult communicated through it belongs to verbal conduct. The two can cooperate without being conceptually identical.

This is where a common mapping error occurs. People often call only the final message “the karma.” But the karmic process includes the intention that organized the act, the bodily execution, and the verbal expression. Conversely, the mere appearance of anger is not equivalent to completing an angry deed. What the person does with the anger matters.

Suppose the commuter pauses. A remembered teaching arises: hostility tends to reproduce hostility. Another inclination appears—the wish not to deepen suffering. This is the present operation of a counteractive quality against what is to be counteracted. It does not erase the first impulse by pretending it never happened. It changes which tendency receives attention, assent, and effort.

The commuter deletes the insult and writes: “I found the comment in today’s meeting dismissive. Can we discuss what happened tomorrow?” This is still firm speech. Buddhism does not require passivity. The ethical difference lies in roots, intention, method, and probable effects—not in whether the sentence sounds agreeable.

What becomes “one’s own karma” here?

- The colleague’s original message belongs to the colleague’s karmic responsibility insofar as it was intentional. - The commuter’s humiliation is not proof of personal guilt and should not be labelled a deserved punishment. - The commuter’s response, however, becomes part of the commuter’s own causal continuum. - If retaliation is repeatedly rehearsed, praised, and enjoyed, it becomes habitual karma. - If mindful restraint, truthful speech, and non-malice are repeatedly cultivated, those too become increasingly available dispositions.

The colleague cannot transfer the karma of insulting speech into the commuter. But the colleague’s behavior can be an external condition that stimulates the commuter’s latent anger. Likewise, the commuter cannot control the colleague’s future response, but can cultivate the qualities from which their own response emerges. “Own karma” marks this precise boundary between causal influence and karmic authorship.

Now extend the scene into algorithmic life. The commuter later sees a stream of posts mocking people from the colleague’s profession. Tapping “like,” forwarding a post, praising its cruelty, or feeling delighted when others join can participate in repeated cultivation. One need not write the original content to nourish the corresponding disposition. Algorithms may amplify what receives engagement, but “the algorithm made me do it” is incomplete. The system conditions attention; it does not become the bearer of one’s intention.

The reverse is also important. Buddhism should not be made into a simplistic theory of individual blame that ignores design, poverty, trauma, workplace coercion, or political power. Conditions affect which choices are visible, affordable, and psychologically accessible. Two people may not face remotely equal conditions. Yet conditioned agency is not no agency: within unequal circumstances, acts of attention, intention, speech, and restraint still shape the continuum.

An AI analogy may help, with serious limits. A system’s later output can be influenced by repeated training signals; similarly, repeatedly endorsed intentions can make certain human responses more likely. But a computational model is not thereby shown to possess karmic consciousness, moral intention, rebirth, or subjective experience. Neither neuroscience nor AI research has scientifically proved Buddhist karma. The comparison illuminates how repetition shapes future availability; it does not establish an identity between machines, brains, and Buddhist accounts of sentient continuity.

Finally, imagine that the commuter has sent cruel messages many times before. The present restraint does not mean that every prior karmic potential has vanished. Nor does the past make restraint pointless. The earlier pattern conditions the present, while the present response becomes a new condition for the future. This is precisely the middle ground between denial and fatalism.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary culture pulls people between two unhelpful extremes.

One is radical individual sovereignty: “I am entirely self-made; everything is my choice.” This ignores dependence on family, language, biology, institutions, history, companions, and innumerable supporting conditions.

The other is complete externalization: “My upbringing, nervous system, employer, partner, or recommendation feed made me do it.” This recognizes conditions but can quietly erase ethical cultivation.

Self-karma refuses both. We are profoundly conditioned, yet our intentional participation in those conditions has consequences. Freedom is not an unconditioned power standing outside causality. On the Buddhist path, practical freedom grows as one understands conditions well enough to stop feeding some and begin cultivating others.

This makes the teaching especially relevant to habitual digital life. Every click is not necessarily a morally weighty karma, but repeated attention, endorsement, delight, hostility, and imitation train dispositions. The question is not only, “What content did I consume?” It is also, “What manner of mind did I repeatedly consent to becoming?”

The teaching also clarifies responsibility in relationships. One is not responsible for another person’s betrayal, rage, addiction, or manipulation merely because one experiences its consequences. “Everyone receives their own karma” must never be used to relocate an aggressor’s responsibility onto the harmed person. At the same time, after harm occurs, one’s responses—seeking safety, telling the truth, retaliating, forgiving, setting boundaries, or cultivating hatred—become new causal factors in one’s own continuum.

For parents, self-karma corrects two fantasies. Parents cannot manufacture a child’s entire character, because a child is not an empty extension of the parent. Nor are parents irrelevant, because caregiving, example, discipline, affection, and the emotional climate of the home are powerful conditions. The parent’s actions belong to the parent’s karma; the child’s intentional responses belong to the child’s. Their lives condition one another without becoming karmically interchangeable.

Most importantly, self-karma explains why liberation must be practised rather than granted from outside. Teachers, scriptures, communities, and compassionate friends can provide instruction and conditions. They cannot perform another person’s seeing, relinquishing, or ethical purification in that person’s place. Even a Buddha shows a path; walking consists in the transformation of one’s own continuum.

But “one’s own” does not mean “alone.” Refuge, friendship, instruction, confession, generosity, meditation, and communal discipline all work through relationship. Their liberating value lies precisely in becoming conditions through which greed, hatred, and delusion are weakened and wisdom is cultivated.

Seen in the whole path, the teaching unfolds in three movements:

- Ethical discipline restrains bodily and verbal expressions rooted in affliction. - Meditative cultivation reveals intentions and habits before they harden into action. - Wisdom sees that actor, action, and result arise dependently and are empty of an independent self.

Without ethical causality, emptiness can be misunderstood as “nothing matters.” Without emptiness, karma can be misunderstood as the permanent record of a permanent soul. Liberation requires both: deeds have consequences, and no fixed doer is imprisoned forever inside them.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“Self-karma means everything that happens to you is your fault.”

No. What happens in a life arises from many conditions. Other people’s choices, natural events, social structures, bodily processes, and present circumstances all have causal roles. The doctrine says that one’s intentional karma bears fruit in one’s own continuum; it does not authorize us to identify every misfortune as punishment for a particular deed. Without reliable knowledge, such claims are speculation—and often cruelty disguised as doctrine.

“If someone suffers, they must deserve it.”

Karmic causation is not a theory of moral desert administered by a cosmic judge. A painful result is painful; it does not make abandonment compassionate or appropriate. Encountering suffering calls for compassion, protection, and skilful help. To use karma to blame a victim is itself a present act of intention and speech whose quality deserves examination.

“Self-karma proves that there is a real self who owns the deed.”

The classical analysis says the opposite. “Self” identifies the relevant causal continuum, not an independent owner. The agent is conventionally designated on the basis of effective conditioned functions. No sovereign self is found outside recollection, inclination, deliberation, effort, bodily conditions, speech, consciousness, and their supporting causes.

“If there is no self, nobody acts and nobody receives the result.”

This confuses absence of an independent substance with absence of continuity. The child and the adult are neither numerically identical in every respect nor wholly unrelated. A flame at one moment is not an unchanged object travelling into the next moment, yet the later flame depends on the earlier conditions. Karma operates through conditioned continuity, transformation, and differentiation.

“Karma means external action.”

No. Its core is intention (思). Bodily and verbal karma are what intention brings about. A reflex, an intrusive image, a deliberate fantasy, a carefully planned deception, and an accidental sound cannot be flattened into one category merely because all “happened.” Their volitional structures differ.

“Mental karma means every thought is morally binding.”

No. A thought may arise due to habit, memory, fear, or sensory association. The crucial issues include intention, assent, repetition, delight, and cultivation. This distinction is vital for people troubled by intrusive thoughts: the involuntary appearance of an image is not the same as choosing, endorsing, rehearsing, or enacting it.

“If I enjoyed doing it, its result will be pleasant; if it hurt, its result will be painful.”

The *Xianyang Shengjiao Lun* explicitly rejects this direct equation. Ethical quality depends on wholesome or unwholesome roots and on a complex field of conditions. Caring for a sick parent may be exhausting yet wholesome; revenge may feel exhilarating yet be rooted in hatred.

“Karma is fixed destiny.”

No. The tradition distinguishes determinate from indeterminate maturation. Weighty karma, recent karma, habitual karma, and earlier karma do not all have equal priority. Present counteractive qualities matter. If nothing could be transformed, discipline, meditation, repentance, and wisdom would be pointless.

This does not mean that every consequence can be cancelled at will. Some deeds produce effects that cannot simply be wished away. Transformation means changing the active causal continuum—not pretending the past did not occur.

“Only actions I personally perform count.”

Too narrow. Encouraging others, praising an act, rejoicing in it, repeatedly cultivating it, and joining collective conduct can all implicate intention. A person who commissions harm cannot become karmically innocent merely by avoiding direct physical contact. At the same time, participants may have different intentions, knowledge, freedom, and degrees of involvement, so collective action does not produce an identical karmic profile in everyone.

“Because karma is one’s own, social conditions do not matter.”

They matter enormously as conditions. The doctrine itself analyzes multiple contributing factors, including objects, methods, bases, attention, companions, repetition, and participation by many people. What it denies is that external conditions eliminate the distinction between another person’s intention and one’s own.

“Another person can purify my karma for me.”

Others can provide powerful supporting conditions: teaching, example, ritual, protection, encouragement, and opportunities for confession or restitution. But cultivation must take effect within one’s own continuum. No one can outsource the relinquishment of greed, hatred, and delusion.

“Self-karma is mainly a promise that bad people will eventually be punished.”

That turns a path of liberation into a fantasy of deferred revenge. The teaching asks us to examine what our own desire for punishment is doing now. Its primary use is not to predict another person’s fate but to illuminate the intentions we are presently nourishing.

At its deepest, self-karma says: you inherit your intentional participation in experience, but there is no fixed essence compelling you to repeat it forever. The past has causal force without possessing absolute sovereignty. The present is conditioned without being spiritually useless. What is repeatedly intended becomes easier to intend again; what is clearly understood, restrained, and relinquished can cease to rule the continuum.

That is why self-karma belongs inside the path to liberation rather than inside a system of cosmic blame. It gives ethical seriousness to every moment of intention, and the teaching of non-self keeps that seriousness from becoming a prison.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「自业」(karmasvakatā)指有情自己所造之业,由自身相续招感果报。此概念之核心在于「自」字——业由自造、果由自受——同时破除有一能自在造业之实体自我。各部论中均以「自业」或「自所作业」等术语标示此义,未另立异名。

二、主要阐述

《阿毘达磨俱舍论》首先以「作不作自业」偈语标示业之自作与不作,将「自业」直接置于造作的判别中。 业之核心界定为「思及思所作」:其中「思」即「意业」,「思所作」摄「身业」与「语业」,故业有身、语、意三种。

本论不承认有一个不待因缘、能自在造业的实我。身业生起必依身心,诸因缘展转相依;只能依诸法生起因缘中之「胜用」假名「作者」,此假名作者并非所执之我。语业与意业之生起,亦应依身业之例理解。 身业之因缘次第为:忆念→乐欲→寻伺→勤勇→风→身业,造业分析为相续条件活动,非由实我主宰。

业果之承受亦不依实我。本论指出我对了别果并无作用,罪福依「内六处」为所依,而我非所依。 已作之业招感未来果,本论以种子生果为喻:果非从已坏之业直接生,亦非无间即生,而是由业展转形成之「相续、转变、差别」次第引果。

《显扬圣教论》以「一切有情自业所作」为核心表述,明确指出业由有情自身造作,于自身相续中产生果报;并说「业为诤本,从业所生,业为依趣」。 论中以四义说明「自所作业」:一、业与果在造者自身相续中;二、能治与所治之法现在前相应;三、现世由过去世之业而生;四、业又成为未来有的条件。「业为依趣」则解作为使业尽而趣向其所依归。

颂文「自业等四种,此先熟亦四」总摄上述四义及业报成熟之四种次第:最先成熟者为重业,其次为最近所作,其次为数数串习,最后为先造作之业。 论中又区分决定与不定之报:不可断业之异熟决定;不定报业则不碍离欲断。

论中驳斥「造乐俱行业便只受乐熟,造苦俱行业便只受苦熟」之说,理由是善与不善业皆可能兼具苦、乐二受之报。 善业与不善业之性质依善根或不善根而成立,其差别由九因显示:因、田、事、方便、依止、作意、欲解、助伴、多修习及多人。其中「多修习」摄自行、教他作、赞叹、随喜、见同法者心生喜悦;「多人」指与多人共同行业。

论中另说诸心法依多种境界而了别,「各为自业生」,即各有情心法之生起各由自身之业而来。 因果条件方面,果法由自身种子而生,非他者直接造成;须待众缘,亦非孤立地由自身成立;既无实在作者,故非自他共同所造;其作用确实呈现,故亦非无因。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

- 《阿毘达磨俱舍论》(毘昙部)所用术语为「自业」、「身业」、「语业」、「意业」;摄身、语二业之词作「思所作」。 - 《显扬圣教论》(瑜伽部)所用术语为「自业」、「自业所作」、「自所作业」及「自业生」,并以「一切有情自业所作」、「业为依趣」、「非自、非他、非共、非无因」等表述为核心框架。 - 两部论同以「自」字贯穿:前者侧重否定实我为作者,以「胜用」假名作者;后者侧重建立业果于自相续中感得之法则,并从决定/不定、苦乐二受等多角度展开差别说明。

四、与相关概念的关系

「自业」与「作者」概念相涉:俱舍论只允许依「胜用」假名作者,否定所执之我;显扬论以「非自、非他、非共、非无因」排除实在作者。「自业」与「异熟」相关:显扬论区分决定与不定之异熟,说明自业所感果报并非一律固定。「自业」复与「相续」、「转变」相关:俱舍论以「业相续转变差别」说明业如何引果,种子喻贯通其义。

五、代表性原文引用

- 《阿毘达磨俱舍论》:「世别由业生」,业之核心为「思及思所作」,「思」即「意业」,「思所作」则「身业」、「语业」。 - 《阿毘达磨俱舍论》身业因缘次第:忆念引生乐欲,乐欲生寻伺,寻伺生勤勇,勤勇生风,风乃发起身业。 - 《阿毘达磨俱舍论》以种子生果喻,说果由「业相续转变差别」而生。 - 《显扬圣教论》:「一切有情自业所作」,「业为诤本,从业所生,业为依趣」。 - 《显扬圣教论》颂:「自业等四种,此先熟亦四。」 - 《显扬圣教论》:诸心法「各为自业生」。 - 《显扬圣教论》:果法「非他、非自、非共、非无因」。

By SutraAI-generated

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》論「自業」,首先以「作不作自業」的偈語形式標示業之自作與不作,將「自業」直接置於造作的判別之中;其措辭簡約,顯示論中採用的術語正是「自業」,而非另立其他名稱。

本論又以「世別由業生」概括業的作用:世間眾生種種差別由業而生。業的核心被界定為「思及思所作」;其中「思」即「意業」,「思所作」則指「身業」與「語業」。因此,本論說業有身、語、意三種,並以思及由思發動的身語造作,說明眾生業行的構成。此處值得記錄的用詞是「意業」「身業」「語業」,合稱三業;又以「思所作」統攝身、語二業。

在作者問題上,本論不承認有一個不待因緣、能自在造業的實我。身業生起必依身心,而身心各依自身因緣運轉,諸因緣又展轉依其因緣;一切有為法皆屬因緣,於其中找不到一個自在發起者。論中只容許依諸法生起因緣中的「勝用」而假名「作者」,並明言此假名作者並非所執之我。語業與意業的生起,也應依身業之例理解。

本論更細述身業的因緣次第:由憶念引生樂欲,樂欲生尋伺,尋伺生勤勇,勤勇生風,風乃發起身業。此說把造業分析為相續的條件活動,而非由實我主宰;所執之我在這一生起次第中沒有作用,故不能稱為身業的作者。

對於業果的承受,本論同樣否定實我為領受者。若說我能了別果,論中指出我對了別並無作用;罪福之所以不依非情處增長,是因非情處不是愛等的所依,唯有「內六處」是其所依,而我並非所依。故本論談眾生承受業果時,所依的術語形式是「內六處」,並不以實我作為業果相續的承載者。

至於已作之業如何招感未來果,本論明確說,聖教並非主張未來果直接從已滅壞之業生起,而是「從業相續轉變差別」生果。論以種子生果為喻:果不從已壞的種子直接生,也不是在種子之後無間即生,而由種子次第引生芽、莖、葉等,最後由花中的生果功能引果。相同地,雖說「從業生果」,實際所指是業展轉形成的相續、轉變與差別而生果。這是本論說明自作業與自受果之間因果連續性的關鍵表述。

顯揚聖教論T1602 · 瑜伽部

《顯揚聖教論》論「自業」,以「一切有情自業所作」為核心表述,並說「業為諍本,從業所生,業為依趣」。此處「自業」不是泛指業力,而是明確指出:業由有情自身造作,並在自身相續中產生果報;因此各有情的生命流轉與果報差別,皆以自己的業為所依。論中所用的術語形式主要是「自業所作」、「自所作業」與「自業」,並未另立異名。

一、論中以四義說明「自所作業」。第一,業能在造業者自己的相續中與果,顯示業果不移轉至他者;第二,能治與所治之法在現在前相應運作;第三,現世由過去世之業而生;第四,業又成為未來有的條件。由此,自業同時貫通自身相續、現在對治、過去生現世及未來有。至於「業為依趣」,論中特別解作為使業盡而趣向其所依歸。

二、頌文以「自業等四種,此先熟亦四」總攝上述自業四義及業報成熟的四種次第。 論釋指出,業報成熟依次為最先成熟的重業、其次最近所作之業、其次數數串習之業,最後才是較早先造作之業。這一說明把「各自承受業果」進一步落實為果報並非雜亂成熟,而有輕重、遠近、習慣與先作等次序。

三、論中又區分決定與不定之報:不可斷業的異熟決定;不定報業則不會妨礙離欲斷。這表示自業雖由自己造作並受果,原文仍依異熟是否決定而作差別說明,不能將一切業都理解為同樣固定、不可轉變。

四、對於業與苦樂果報的關係,論中駁斥「造樂俱行業便只受樂熟、造苦俱行業便只受苦熟」的說法,理由是善業與不善業都可能兼具苦、樂二受之報。因此,自業所感的果報不能僅按造作時伴隨的苦樂,作單一直線式的配對。

五、善業與不善業的性質,依善根或不善根而成立;其差別又由九種因顯示,即因與田、事、方便、依止、作意、欲解、助伴、多修習及多人。其中「多修習」包括自己修行、教他作、讚歎、隨喜,以及見同法者而心生喜悅;「多人」則指與多人共同行業。這些分類說明,自業雖落在各自相續而受果,造業的形成仍可涉及對境、意樂、助伴、反覆修習及共同作業等多重條件。

六、論中另說諸心法依多種境界而了別,且「各為自業生」,並因相似境而轉。此處直接以「自業生」說明各有情心法的生起各由自身之業而來,是「自業」在心法生起方面的具體用語。

七、就因果條件而言,論又說果法由自身種子而生,故非由他者直接造成;但又須等待眾緣,故也不是孤立地由自身成立;既無一個實在作者,故非自他共同作者所造;而其作用確實呈現,故亦非無因。這組「非他、非自、非共、非無因」的表述,使自業之「自」落在自種與自相續受果,而不等同於承認獨立自生或實體作者。

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