所取

I. What This Concept Is Saying

所取 (grāhya, "the grasped object-side") is, in Yogācāra (唯識, vijñapti-mātra, "consciousness-only"), a term that appears simple but actually carries the entire blueprint of the path. It refers to the object-side that consciousness takes as its support and grasps — the "this matter," "this image," "this person," "this sentence" that you are presently identifying. Its other half is called 能取 (grāhaka, "the grasping subject-side"), the "I" side that is doing the identifying. The two stand in mutual dependence and are jointly called 二取 (the two graspings).

But Yogācāra is by no means merely redescribing the "subject–object" structure once more. Its core thesis is: the grasped object is not an independent reality apart from consciousness. In other words, the object you think stands firmly before you is not something that stands on its own; it is a manifestation jointly "propped up" by your consciousness, your discrimination (分別, vikalpa), and your predominance-conviction (勝解, adhimokṣa). This must be grasped before reading all the details, or you will get lost later.

Let us unpack it layer by layer.

1. It Must Be Read Together with "能取" — This Is a Relational Structure

This is the pitfall most easily stumbled into when understanding 所取: 所取 is not "a thing" but a relation. It is a role-name established on the premise that "there is consciousness engaging in apprehending."

The *Triṃśikā* (《唯識三十論頌》, Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only, T1586) — here we must first correct a conflation in the source material: T1586 is the *Triṃśikā*, not the *Cheng Weishi Lun* (《成唯識論》) — gives a very condensed summary:

"若时于所缘，智都无所得，尔时住唯识，离二取相故。" *"When, with respect to the cognitive object (所緣, ālambana), wisdom obtains nothing at all, at that time one abides in consciousness-only, because the marks of the two graspings are abandoned."*

When wisdom reaches "obtaining nothing at all" with respect to the cognitive object, one abides in the reality of consciousness-only, departing from the marks of the "two graspings." Note the final clause: "離二取相故" — it is not "leaving one of the two graspings," but "the marks of the two graspings" simultaneously ceasing to hold. The mark of the grasper and the mark of the grasped are two faces of the same act of splitting; the ultimate point of Yogācāra is not to keep a real subject and throw away the object, but to fold up the entire "subject–object" picture together.

The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (《攝大乘論本》, Compendium of the Great Vehicle, T1594 — likewise, this cannot be called the *Yogācārabhūmi* (《瑜伽師地論》)) explains this relation in more detail:

"如是住内心，知所取非有，次能取亦无，后触无所得。" *"Thus abiding within the mind, one knows the grasped object to be non-existent; next the grasper too is absent; afterward one touches non-acquisition (無所得)."*

First the grasped object is non-existent → next the grasper is also absent → afterward one touches non-acquisition — this is the contemplative sequence given in the treatise. Why this order and not the reverse? Because the logical chain of grasping itself begins from the grasped-object end: you first firmly identify "there is this matter," and only then does an "I am experiencing it" arise in retrospect. The dismantling begins with that "matter" you had firmly identified — but when the dismantling is complete, even the "I who is dismantling" obtains nothing.

2. It Is Not a Single Thing — Yogācāra Uses Multiple Terms to Describe It

Yogācāra recognized that simply saying "object" would be read as some kind of entity. So the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* uses several sets of terms in rotation to depict the content of 所取, transforming it from a single solid "thing" into multi-layered manifestation:

- 義 / 義性 (artha / artha-tā, "meaning / meaning-nature"): the "content layer" of the grasped object — a meaning designated by consciousness. - 義相 / 影像 (artha-ākāra / pratibimba, "meaning-appearance / image"): the concrete appearance through which that meaning is presented — the "image" you see in your conscious picture. - 境相 (viṣaya-ākāra, "object-field appearance"): the appearance on the object-field (the environment you face), closer to "the scene presently displayed before you." - 自想 (svacitta-vikalpa, "own thought"): explicitly pointing out that all of this does not depart from one's own mind's thought — the object-field you see, traced to its root, is what one's own mind "thinks." - 所緣 (ālambana, "cognitive object"): the side of the object that consciousness faces — the structural counterpart term.

Setting these five layers side by side, Yogācāra is in effect saying: 所取 is not a standing entity, but layer after layer of "manifesting — being designated as a certain meaning — being reflected as an appearance by consciousness — being understood as not apart from one's own mind's thought." The so-called "not a reality apart from consciousness" means that at every layer it points out that there is no independent own-nature.

3. Its "Non-Existence" Does Not Mean Non-Manifestation — This Is the Second Pitfall

Judging the grasped object as empty is not about wiping away manifestation altogether. The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* states explicitly:

"于过去事等，梦像，二影中，虽所缘非实，而境相成就。" *"In the case of past matters, dream images, and the two [types of] reflections, although the cognitive object is not real, the object-field appearance is nevertheless accomplished."*

Past matters, dream images, mirror reflections — these cognitive objects are not really existent, yet the object-field appearance is accomplished all the same. You dream of your grandmother who passed away years ago; awake, you know no such grandmother was really walking around, but the scene in the dream in which you conversed with her did not give you one frame less.

So Yogācāra's "the grasped object is non-existent" is a highly refined judgment: the own-nature of this thing is empty, but its manifestation is not entirely absent. Confusing these two things leads either to the annihilationist view (斷滅見, uccheda-dṛṣṭi) that "nothing ever happened," or to the scattered heedlessness of "it's all empty anyway, so nothing matters" — neither is the Yogācāra position.

4. Why Is It "Unreal"? Three Independent Lines of Evidence

Yogācāra does not declare the non-existence of 所取 with a slogan; it proves it progressively from three angles:

First: it varies with predominance-conviction (勝解, adhimokṣa). The treatise cites a far-reaching example:

"鬼、傍生、人、天，各随其所应，等事心异故，许义非真实。" *"Ghosts, animals, humans, and gods, each according to their kind, have different minds toward the same thing; therefore it is admitted that the meaning (義, artha) is not real."*

The same thing — say, a piece of damp rotten wood — for a hungry ghost appears as a dwelling it depends on for survival, for an animal as a place to play, for a human as a pile of wood to be cleared away, and for a god may not even be worth looking at. The same cognitive object, beings' minds differ, and the grasped object differs accordingly. If the grasped object "stood on its own," it should not appear this way to different consciousnesses. Hence the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* directly asserts: "許義非真實" (it is admitted that the meaning is not real).

Furthermore, a bodhisattva who has attained mastery and one who has attained meditative concentration can, by the power of predominance-conviction, turn earth into gold and water into fire — the object-field appearance of the grasped follows the predominance-conviction. This dismantles "the fixedness of the grasped object" thoroughly.

Second: yogis see different things. The treatise further cites:

"诸瑜伽师于一物，胜解种种故，种种所见成。" *"Yogis (瑜伽師, yogin), with respect to a single object, due to various predominance-convictions, various perceptions are accomplished."*

Several practitioners, each forming a different predominance-conviction toward the same object, find that what each sees "holds up" on its own. This line is not about ghosts and gods; it targets the most serious practitioners — even yogis deep in samādhi do not see alike. This pulls out the foundation of "the fixedness of the grasped object."

Third: when non-discriminative wisdom is operative, all meanings do not appear.

"无分别智行，诸义皆不现，当知无有义，由此亦无识。" *"When non-discriminative wisdom (無分別智, nirvikalpa-jñāna) operates, all meanings do not appear; know that there is no meaning, and thereby there is also no consciousness."*

This is the most powerful disproof. When non-discriminative wisdom actually arises — that wisdom which does not discriminate, does not mentally construct, does not fall into verbal designation — all marks of "meaning" do not appear. This, from the side of noble wisdom, positively proves that 所取 (meaning) has no own-nature from the start, because only when it truly has no own-nature can the wisdom in which nothing appears be established. Moreover, this argument has an important follow-up: "由此亦無識" (thereby there is also no consciousness) — because the grasped and the grasper arise in mutual dependence, the grasper side (consciousness) is likewise proven to be non-real.

5. Its Place in the Contemplative Sequence — "Gradual Suppression and Removal" at the Prayoga Stage

The *Triṃśikā* gives a clear specification of the contemplative position of 所取:

"二、加行位，谓修大乘顺抉择分，在加行位能渐伏除所取、能取。" *"Second, the prayoga stage (加行位, prayoga-mārga): cultivating the Mahāyāna factors conducive to definite discrimination (順抉擇分, nirvedha-bhāgīya), at the prayoga stage one can gradually suppress and remove the grasped object and the grasper."*

"加行位" refers to the stage of cultivating the Mahāyāna factors conducive to definite discrimination — namely the four wholesome roots: warmth (暖, ūṣman), summit (頂, mūrdhan), patience (忍, kṣānti), and the foremost worldly dharma (世第一法, laukikāgra-dharma). Note two key words: gradually (漸) and suppress (伏).

- It is not realized in a single moment — it is progressive. - Nor is the grasped object treated as an enemy to be cut off — "伏" means to keep it from arising, from taking control, not to deny its manifestation.

After attaining the path of seeing (見道, darśana-mārga), the marks of the two graspings are left behind — not "the grasped object is eliminated while the grasper remains," but "this mark no longer holds." Thus the role 所取 plays on the entire path of liberation is: first, see it clearly and refuse to take it as real; second, even the "I who is seeing it clearly" is seen through; third, touch and realize fundamental non-acquisition.

6. Boundaries: It Is Not the Same as These Other Terms

Terms in Yogācāra related to 所取 that must be distinguished from it:

- 遍計所執 (parikalpita-svabhāva, "the imaginary nature"): refers to that class of objects which, through various pervasive discrimination (遍計, parikalpa), is grasped as having established own-nature. Related, but the two are not synonyms in the treatise — "所取" is a structural role-name, while "遍計所執" refers to the class of objects wrongly grasped as having own-nature. The *Triṃśikā* says: "此遍计所执，自性无所有" (this imaginary nature has no own-nature whatsoever). This is the facet in which 所取 is frequently misconceived in terms of content. - 所緣 (ālambana, "cognitive object"): the object-field that consciousness faces — a broader term; "所取" additionally carries a flavor of "being grasped." - 執受 (upādāna, "retention"): the function by which the storehouse consciousness (阿賴耶識, ālayavijñāna) maintains the material sense-faculties and the seeds — it corresponds only to the feeling of equanimity (捨受, upekṣā-vedanā); it is an entirely different domain, not to be conflated. - 無分別智 / 勝解 (nirvikalpa-jñāna / adhimokṣa): the former proves the unreality of 所取 from the side of wisdom's operation, the latter proves the non-fixedness of 所取 from the side of the mutability of object-field appearances — both are Yogācāra's argumentative implements from different angles, not synonyms for 所取.

II. A Walk-Through in Daily Life

In this section we run the classical arguments above through contemporary scenarios. After each scenario I will mark which classical definition is being mapped onto it, and the most common erroneous mapping.

Scene One: The Same News, Two People's Reactions

In the evening you and your partner each scroll through your phone and come across the same news item about a celebrity incident. After reading, you think "this is clearly workplace sexual harassment with the evidence in hand, nothing to whitewash," while the other person thinks "the media today is spinning the narrative, the motive is suspicious." The grasped objects are different.

- Classical correspondence: The same cognitive object — minds differ, therefore the grasped differs (the ghost/human simile in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*). "That original thing" of this news item presents in the two consciousnesses as entirely different meanings and meaning-appearances. - Most common mis-mapping: attributing the difference in the other's grasped object to "they're being irrational" or "insufficient information." The Yogācāra observation is: the difference itself shows that the grasped object is not established by own-nature — this is not a matter of stance, but of epistemological structure.

Scene Two: One Sentence in an Intimate Relationship

On your birthday, the other person says one sentence. What you hear is "perfunctory, careless, not taking it to heart"; but what the other person meant was "expressing affection in an understated way." The grasped objects are completely opposite.

- Classical correspondence: Different predominance-convictions, different perceptions. Your predominance-conviction (compounded of long-held expectations, self-worth, and similar past experiences) reflects that sentence as perfunctory; the other's predominance-conviction reflects the same sentence as deep affection. - Most common mis-mapping: assuming "the other person's meaning is the meaning I heard." The Yogācāra reminder is: what you hear is not "the sentence itself," but the reflected appearance of the sentence passing through your consciousness. This does not cancel the need to communicate, to ask — on the contrary, because the grasped object is not a reality apart from consciousness, the two consciousnesses need to be calibrated with each other.

Scene Three: A Building on Your Commute

Every day on your way to and from work you pass a building. Before the pandemic you saw it as "an office building"; after years of vacancy you see it as "a footnote to the economic downturn"; when a friend visits and you walk past it with him, he says "wow, this building has so much character."

- Classical correspondence: The same object, three grasped objects coexisting simultaneously. "The office building's own-nature" manifests as three different meaning-appearances in three consciousnesses. - Most common mis-mapping: treating your own grasped object as "this is just how it is."

Scene Four: A Dream

Last night you dreamed of a family member who left years ago, and you even cried before waking.

- Classical correspondence: The cognitive object is not real, yet the object-field appearance is accomplished (the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*'s "in the case of past matters, dream images... although the cognitive object is not real, the object-field appearance is accomplished"). That family member did not appear beside your bed, but the entire sequence of the dream was not one frame short. - Most common mis-mapping: either treating the dream as "some kind of mysterious signal," or treating it as "it's fake so it doesn't matter." Yogācāra neither says it has any own-nature-established reality, nor says it is "nothing." It is manifestation, but without own-nature.

Scene Five: Two Hours of Scrolling Through a Feed

You open an app, intending to look something up, but two hours later you've only been scrolling through content of the kind you happened to tap once. Another friend uses the same app and sees an entirely different world. The "world of facts" each of you faces may even be two different worlds.

- Classical correspondence: The algorithm is already a rough approximation of "predominance-conviction power" — the system, based on your clicks, dwell time, and interactions, forms the predominance-conviction that "you want to see this," and so the grasped object pushed to you is shaped accordingly. This is an external confirmation: the grasped object can indeed be systematically shaped by another kind of "predominance-conviction." This is also an interesting contemporary observation: the algorithm is the engineering instantiation of the plasticity of the grasped object. - Most common mis-mapping: treating the feed as "objective reality being pushed to you." This one is jarring for contemporary people — but note, analogy is not equivalence: an algorithm is a mathematically describable "predominance-conviction transformation," while what Yogācāra means by predominance-conviction is far broader and deeper.

Scene Six: AI-Generated Video or a VR Meeting

You put on a VR headset and see a lifelike meeting room; across from you sits a person who smiles at you.

- Classical correspondence: The cognitive object is not real, yet the object-field appearance is accomplished + the power of predominance-conviction brings object-field appearances into being as desired (the power of the bodhisattva who has attained mastery and of one who has attained meditative concentration). VR/AI is, in a certain sense, the engineered extension of the bodhisattva's mastery-conviction power. - Most common mis-mapping: either being shocked that "reality can be virtualized" (it always could; it just was never engineered before), or conversely concluding "since it can be virtualized, reality is also virtual, so nothing means anything" (that leap does not hold).

Scene Seven: An Office Moment When You Were "Seen" or "Not Seen"

At a meeting you offer an opinion and a colleague immediately rebuts it; at another similar occasion you offer almost the same opinion and the boss nods and says "good." Twice, the "self-worth" grasped object inside you was pushed to two opposite positions.

- Classical correspondence: Your "grasped object" of yourself manifests as completely different meaning-appearances under different states of consciousness (tense/relaxed, acknowledged/denied). - Most common mis-mapping: taking that moment's "I'm not good enough" or "I'm great" as the reality about yourself. Yogācāra does not say you should become numb; it points out that moment's "grasped object" is a product of the state of consciousness and is not established by own-nature.

Scene Eight: In Parenting — "What Does He Want Right Now"

A crying child: after half an hour of observation you think "he wants candy, and cries if he doesn't get it"; another time in a similar situation, the grandmother judges "he's sleepy."

- Classical correspondence: The same kind of crying — the same cognitive object — different meaning-appearances. It could be hunger, could be sleepiness, could be fear, could be a need to be held. - Most common mis-mapping: taking your own predominance-conviction as the child's truth. The Yogācāra reminder is, in reverse, compassionate: your grasped object is not the child's reality; please do not take your consciousness as their reality.

String these eight scenes together, and you should be able to feel how the concept of 所取 runs through daily life: what we take ourselves to be dealing with as "the world" is, in the vast majority, the grasped objects in our consciousness; and the grasped object is never apart from consciousness, never apart from predominance-conviction, never apart from the subject–object split.

III. Why Contemporary People Need It

The era we live in has several features that have pushed the concept of "所取" to a position of unprecedented practicality:

First, the grasped object has been industrialized on a massive scale. Algorithmic recommendation, AIGC, deepfakes, personalized advertising — contemporary technology has, for the first time, turned "shaping your grasped object" into an industrial process. A cultivator a thousand years ago needed long meditative training to realize "what I see is not real"; today, scrolling through an app for an hour achieves roughly the same effect of "predominance-conviction being externally shaped." This several-thousand-year-old remedy of Yogācāra has suddenly become remarkably apt — it precisely tells you that the grasped object is plastic, mutable, and not a reality apart from consciousness.

Second, the two-graspings-style sense of schism is unprecedented in intensity. The "me vs. you" tearing on social media, the "individual vs. system" opposition in the workplace, the "the you I think I know vs. the you who thinks you know me" misalignment in intimate relationships — the essence of these contemporary predicaments, viewed through Yogācāra, is the mutual hardening of the grasped object and the grasper. Everyone firmly insists on the version in their own consciousness, and the other person just as firmly insists on the version in theirs, so the two "grasped objects" refuse to yield to each other. If even the most basic loosening — "what I grasp may be only a manifestation in my consciousness" — is absent, communication is just a collision of two grasped objects.

Third, the temptation of nihilism is unprecedentedly real. "Nothing means anything anyway" — this is a thought many contemporary people have at some moment. If one follows the materialist "external-realism" path, setbacks or disillusionment easily slide into "everything is empty, so nothing matters." Yogācāra gives a completely different answer: "the grasped object is non-existent" does not equal "there is no manifestation at all." The light you see, the crying you hear, the love you feel — all these manifestations have their occurrence, but they have no "objective reality" that is established by own-nature, independent of you and of the consciousness of all beings. This is not nihilism; it is leaving room: neither pasting the label "absolute reality" onto manifestations, nor throwing them into the void.

Fourth, the contemplative sequence beginning from the grasped object gives contemporary people a concrete, walkable path. Yogācāra does not stop at philosophy; it gives the thread "first contemplate the grasped object as non-existent → then contemplate the grasper as also absent → afterward touch non-acquisition." This is a path that starts from the easiest point — you do not need to first solve the grand question of "who am I"; you only need, at this moment, to look seriously at the grasped object you are tightly holding: does its "this is really so" appearance change with the state of your present consciousness? Is it so different from another person's grasped object? Does it switch to another form when you change your predominance-conviction?

Fifth, it is open to contemporary dialogue with neuroscience, cognitive science, and phenomenology. Phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) has long been deconstructing the rigid "subject–object" opposition; cognitive science continually reveals that our perception is constructive (the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio's "somatic markers," Anil Seth's work on "controlled hallucination"); Buddhist Yogācāra has striking structural similarity with these contemporary dialogues. But analogy is not equivalence: what Yogācāra speaks of is not a phenomenon of some brain neurons, but a thorough insight into the structure of cognition itself; and Yogācāra further gives a contemplative sequence, which has no direct counterpart in phenomenology or cognitive science. When citing these contemporary materials, one must clearly see at which level they overlap with Yogācāra and at which level they differ.

One final remark: contemporary people do not need this theory to "prove" the wisdom of the Dharma, but they do need it to remind themselves — the "reality" you hold in your hand every day has never been what you thought it was. If this insight is truly received even a little, you will be looser with others and less tight with yourself.

IV. Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading 1: "所取 is the objective external world"

This is the most common and most fatal misreading. On hearing "所取," many people immediately map it to the English "object," the external world, an independent object. This is a projection from the habitual subject–object dualistic thinking.

Clarification: 所取 is an appearance manifested and grasped by your consciousness; its "object-ness" is precisely propped up by your consciousness. Yogācāra explicitly states that 所取 is not a reality apart from consciousness — this is not denying the existence of the external environment (Yogācāra does not deny manifestation), but denying the independent entity that "stands outside on its own, waiting to be looked at by consciousness."

Misreading 2: "Removing the grasped object is denying all manifestation, so nothing means anything"

Reading "the grasped object is non-existent," one immediately slides into nihilism.

Clarification: This is reading "empty own-nature" as "utter nothingness." The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* explicitly distinguishes the cognitive object being non-real from the object-field appearance being accomplished: although the dream's cognitive object is non-real, the object-field appearance is accomplished; although past matters are not present before you, the image can manifest. "The grasped object is non-existent" is a judgment about own-nature, not a denial of manifestation. If, after reading this, you become more cold, more indifferent, more powerless — then you have certainly read in the wrong direction.

Misreading 3: "所取 = 遍計所執, so they are the same word"

Because the two often appear side by side, many people use them interchangeably.

Clarification: 所取 is a structural role-name (the apprehended side of consciousness), while 遍計所執 is the class of objects wrongly grasped as "really having own-nature." The two frequently cite each other in discussion (because among what is grasped, that which is firmly held as real is precisely the object of the imaginary nature), but 所取 is not equal to 遍計所執.

Misreading 4: "所取 = 所緣, so they are synonyms"

The two are indeed extremely related, but there is a subtle difference.

Clarification: 所緣 is broader — anything that consciousness faces or is oriented toward as an object-field appearance is called 所緣; 所取 additionally carries a flavor of "being grasped and not let go." One could say 所取 is the portion of 所緣 that is wrongly grasped as having own-nature, but the scope of 所緣 is wider.

Misreading 5: "Since nothing is obtained, practice is also empty, and effort is meaningless"

Some people misread the *Triṃśikā*'s line "wisdom obtains nothing at all" as "there is nothing to be gained from practice, so forget it."

Clarification: "Non-acquisition" (無所得) is precisely what is seen after practice has arrived — one must first pass through the prayoga stage of "gradually suppressing and removing the grasped object and the grasper" (warmth, summit, patience, foremost worldly dharma), and then, at the moment of the path of seeing, truly abide in "departing from the marks of the two graspings." Without the preceding gradual suppression, there is no subsequent non-acquisition. This is the exact opposite of "nothing needs to be done."

Misreading 6: "Non-discriminative wisdom = numbness, non-responsiveness, suppression"

Seeing "all meanings do not appear," some people immediately think of the stereotype of "a monk with a blank face, unmoved by anything."

Clarification: Non-discriminative wisdom is not numbness, nor is it emotional suppression. It is a state of wisdom — in that state, the "meanings" designated by consciousness no longer arise, but it is not that feeling disappears, or that compassion disappears. Yogācāra holds precisely that the compassion arising from this wisdom is clearer, because it is no longer defiled by the split between grasped and grasper. It is the opposite state from "suppressing feelings."

Misreading 7: "The grasped object is non-existent, so dreams, memories, and future imaginings are all false and worthless"

Pushing "the grasped object is non-existent" toward a total epistemological negation.

Clarification: What Yogācāra means by "non-existent" is emptiness at the level of own-nature, not "not worth mentioning" at the level of existence. A dream may have genuine therapeutic meaning for your present body-mind; although the object of a memory is gone, the object-field appearance in your consciousness is genuinely accomplished; a future imagining has a genuine guiding function for present decision-making. All of these stand. It is only that — none of them is a fixed thing with own-nature reality. You do not have to deny their occurrence in order to acknowledge their non-reality.

Misreading 8: "This is pessimism, because nothing can be grasped"

This is an overreaction in the other direction.

Clarification: The Yogācāra position is precisely optimistic — since the grasped object has never been a reality apart from consciousness, has always turned with predominance-conviction, it has always been constructed by your consciousness. This means: delusion has structural room for loosening. You do not need to wait for that "external environment" to obediently cooperate with your change; you can begin loosening from the side of your own consciousness — this is a supremely compassionate optimism.

Finally, let me say a closing word. The truly difficult thing about the concept of 所取 is not understanding "what it is," but the way it is tightly fused with the "reality" in your hand: the more you read into it, the more you notice that what your consciousness tightly grasps has in fact been loosening all along. This observation itself is the starting point of practice.

That line from the *Triṃśikā* — "若时于所缘，智都无所得，尔时住唯识，离二取相故" (When, with respect to the cognitive object, wisdom obtains nothing at all, at that time one abides in consciousness-only, free from the marks of the two graspings) — is worth taking out and reading once more on some quiet morning. It is not trying to pull you away from the world, but inviting you to abide within it in a different way: no longer grasping with the schismatic schema of "I + some object," but letting that split itself settle. On the grasped side, loosen; on the grasping side, loosen naturally as well; and finally, the tight grip of "I am letting go" loosens too. What remains? The treatise does not say. It only says that is "non-acquisition" — that step is left for you.