I. What This Concept Is About
"Existence and non-existence" (有無, bhāvābhāva) may sound like a pair of antonyms from a philosophy seminar, but in the *Middle Treatise* (*中論*, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, by Nāgārjuna, translated by Kumārajīva, with commentary by Piṅgala), it is not a concept to be defined—it is an attachment to be dismantled layer by layer. It refers to the deepest, most subtle binary judgment in the mind: this thing before me, this person, this self—is it "existent" or "non-existent"?
The Madhyamaka approach is distinctive. It neither defends "existence" nor falls to the side of "non-existence," nor does it seek a "middle value" between the two. Its strategy is—to walk through each of the three propositions "existent," "non-existent," and "both existent and non-existent," and see whether each can stand; if none can stand, the category itself collapses.
Layer One: Where Does the Effect Come From? — The Three-Proposition Analysis
Madhyamaka first presses the question of "existence and non-existence" onto the problem of "arising" (生). How does an effect (this cup of coffee, this encounter, this job loss) actually arise?
- If it pre-exists—the effect already existed before causes and conditions came together—then it was already there, and one should no longer speak of "arising"; - If it pre-existed as non-existent—completely absent beforehand—how can an existent thing arise out of nothing? - If it is both existent and non-existent—half existent, half non-existent—then it carries both defects: the "existent" part should not arise again, and the "non-existent" part should not arise either.
The *Middle Treatise* summarizes this passage: "An existent dharma should not arise; a non-existent one should not arise; both existent and non-existent should not arise—this meaning has already been stated earlier." Each of the three propositions is refuted one by one, and the effect's "arising through self-nature" (自性生) becomes unobtainable. This does not mean the effect does not appear, but that the effect cannot appear as "something that was already so by itself"—it can only arise dependently on conditions, and conditions themselves have no fixed self-nature.
Layer Two: Existence and Non-existence Mutually Exclude Each Other
Piṅgala's commentary uses a remarkably plain statement to dismantle this problem: "Existence is determinate; non-existence is indeterminate. How can one person, one matter, be both existent and non-existent?" — How can the same person, the same matter, simultaneously be both "existent" and "non-existent"? The verses state it directly: "Existence cannot become non-existence; non-existence cannot become existence." If "existence" truly possesses determinate self-nature, it cannot change into "non-existence"; if "non-existence" is also determinate, it cannot change into "existence." If each is determinate, they cannot generate each other; if they can generate each other, then so-called determinate self-nature is broken.
This is hard intellectual work: when we say "this matter is 'over'" or "that person 'has' a problem," we have already tacitly assumed some fixed, unchanging essence. What Madhyamaka dismantles is precisely this tacit assumption.
Layer Three: The One Who Knows "Existence and Non-existence" Also Cannot Stand
Pushing further, Madhyamaka makes a deeper move—it not only refutes the "known" (existence and non-existence), but also refutes the "knower" (the one who knows existence and non-existence). The verse says:
「若使無有有，云何當有無？有無既已無，知有無者誰？」
Piṅgala's commentary explains: the concept of "non-existence" cannot originally stand independently; it must be posited relative to "existence." Since even the "existence" we can see with our eyes, hear with our ears, and point to has already been found unobtainable through analysis, how much more so that "non-existence" which is nothing at all? Since both ends of the "known"—"existence" and "non-existence"—have been dismantled, the "I" as a fixed subject who knows existence and knows non-existence has no ground to stand on.
This step is extremely crucial—it means "I" cannot stand aside, observe "existence" and "non-existence," and then declare which is right and which is wrong. When you are still an "I" standing there adjudicating "this exists, that does not," that "I" itself is the object being dismantled.
Layer Four: Seeing Existence and Non-existence, One Does Not See the True Meaning of the Dharma
Madhyamaka connects this problem to the ultimate aim of the entire Dharma:
「若人見有無，見自性他性；如是則不見，佛法真實義。」
This single sentence binds several things together: once one discriminates dharmas as "existent" or "non-existent" in terms of fixed self-nature, one is already seeing "self-nature" and "other-nature"—seeing what is intrinsically so by itself and what is opposed to oneself. And this way of seeing contradicts the "true meaning" (真實義) shown by dependent origination and emptiness.
The *Middle Treatise* further says: "If dharmas abide in self-nature, there should be no existence or non-existence; if nirvāṇa extinguishes the continuum, one falls into annihilation." The meaning is: if one first assumes a real self-nature is there, and then says nirvāṇa is "extinguishing" it, then this "extinguishing" is actually the continuation of another thing (the continuum, 相續), and the result is falling into another view of annihilation.
To the question "After the Tathāgata's final passing, is he existent or non-existent?" the Madhyamaka answer is: this itself is an inappropriate discrimination—you should not use these two extremes to frame a person who was never limited by these two extremes.
Layer Five: Existence and Non-existence Are Not Nirvāṇa
This layer is extremely easy to overlook, but it is extremely important. People sometimes think: "Since one cannot cling to existence, perhaps nirvāṇa is 'everything is non-existent'?" Madhyamaka repeatedly refutes this idea:
- "Existence is still not nirvāṇa; how much less non-existence! Nirvāṇa has no existence—where could non-existence be?" - Nirvāṇa is called "unconditioned" (無為, asaṃskṛta), while "existence and non-existence" belong to the "conditioned" (有為, saṃskṛta); - Nirvāṇa is called "non-grasping" (無受), while "existence" and "non-existence" arise from grasping; - "The two gates of existence and non-existence do not reach nirvāṇa"—fitting nirvāṇa into the two gates of existence and non-existence simply cannot arrive at nirvāṇa.
In other words, nirvāṇa is neither the "highest existence," nor "complete non-existence," nor a collage of the two. It is what is shown when these binary frameworks themselves are loosened.
Layer Six: The Buddha Can Extinguish Existence and Non-existence
Finally, the verses give a positive direction: "The Buddha can extinguish existence and non-existence, like transforming Kātyāyana; as stated in the sūtra, free from existence and also free from non-existence." This does not mean the Buddha commands us "do not think of existence, do not think of non-existence." It means: the Buddha's awakening itself is the state in which this binary attachment is completely extinguished—free from existence, free from non-existence, yet not landing on a third entity of "neither existent nor non-existent."
It is worth noting that although the source material comes mainly from the *Middle Treatise*, the spirit of "free from both extremes" was already echoed in the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures. The *Heart Sūtra* (*心經*) says "illuminating the five aggregates as empty, one crosses beyond all suffering" (照見五蘊皆空，度一切苦厄)—it is by seeing the five aggregates as neither "really existent" nor "annihilated" that one can truly cross beyond suffering. The *Diamond Sūtra* (*金剛經*) also says "All conditioned marks are illusory. If one sees that all marks are not marks, one sees the Tathāgata" (凡所有相，皆是虛妄。若見諸相非相，即見如來)—not negating all marks, but seeing that marks cannot be locked by either "real existence" or "real non-existence." Both sūtras and the *Middle Treatise* point in the same direction here.
II. A Walk-Through in Daily Life
The Madhyamaka refutation sounds abstract, but what it targets is precisely the binary judgments we make every day. Let us walk through it step by step with several contemporary scenarios.
Scenario One: The Afternoon of Being Laid Off
The HR email has just closed. You sit at your desk, and two voices immediately jump into your head:
- Voice A: "I'm finished. I 'have' a problem—incompetent, too old, chose the wrong industry." - Voice B: "No I don't! I actually 'don't' have a problem—it's the company that has a problem, the manager who has a problem, the times that have a problem."
Both voices are doing the same thing: using "existence" and "non-existence" to define "me." Voice A treats "failure" as your real self-nature; Voice B pushes all the problems outward, but tacitly assumes that a "real me" should be without flaws.
The Madhyamaka dismantling would arrive here: - In "I have a problem," who is the "I"? Is it that fixed, unchanging entity?—Yesterday after overtime you still felt you could handle things; today, laid off, you are "always" incompetent? Is this "always" real? - In "I don't have a problem," who is the "I" again? That eternally innocent, eternally correct "I"—is this fixed image real? - Both voices assume a "self with self-nature" sitting there being labeled. But as you sit there, the fatigue of the body, the flow of thoughts, the temperature of tears—all of these change within conditions; no single moment is "originally like this."
This is the contemporary version of the three-proposition analysis of "existent, non-existent, both existent and non-existent": you cannot say "I was inherently a failure," nor "I have absolutely no problem," nor "half a problem and half no problem." When all three propositions cannot stand, the "I" as the "object being defined" also loosens—not becoming zero, but turning from a nailed-down image back into a process occurring within conditions.
But one must be careful of a misunderstanding here: loosening is not numbness. Madhyamaka does not tell you "just don't think about anything" or "what's done is done." What it dismantles is the fixed judgment treated as "self-nature." After the dismantling, the pain is still there—it is just no longer held hostage by a fixed story.
Scenario Two: Two Extremes After a Breakup
A person in the throes of heartbreak is often torn by two thoughts:
- "He still loves me"—there "is" real feeling between you; the relationship "still exists," just temporarily obscured; - "He never loved me at all"—everything is "non-existent"; all the memories were illusions.
Both thoughts use "existence" and "non-existence" to define the past relationship. But recall: those concrete moments—the water he handed you after an argument, an afternoon of sleeping in together on a weekend, a detail that annoyed you but actually revealed his care—these were real conditions that occurred. They are not judged as "non-existent" merely because the new condition of "breaking up" now obtains. Similarly, now that he has left, "love" was not extracted from his heart as some substantial form—it is that the conditions changed, the mode of expression changed.
Piṅgala's line "Existence is determinate, non-existence is indeterminate—how can one person, one matter, be both existent and non-existent?" applies here: you cannot judge the same relationship, the same person, as simultaneously "really existent" and "really non-existent." Your love once manifested under certain conditions; now it does not manifest under other conditions—this is not "changing from existence to non-existence," but the flow of conditions. "Existence cannot become non-existence; non-existence cannot become existence"—it did not become "non-existence"; the conditions simply changed.
And the step "who is the one who knows existence and non-existence?" dismantles the attachment of "I must know the answer": you must render a verdict—does he love me or not? This "there must be a definitive conclusion" is itself the object being dismantled.
Scenario Three: The Sense of Presence on Social Media
Scrolling late at night, a thought arises: "If I don't post, I 'don't exist.'" Or conversely: "If I delete my account and vanish, those noises truly become 'non-existent,' nothing to do with me."
This is a very typical attachment to existence and non-existence. You tacitly assume a thing called "my sense of presence" that is either "existent"—being seen, liked, commented on—or "non-existent"—disappearing, going offline, no one knowing me. But look closely: this morning you spent ten minutes on the balcony drinking coffee; no one saw you. In those ten minutes, were you "existent" or "non-existent"? The sunlight, the wind, the heartbeat you yourself felt in those ten minutes—are they "existent" or "non-existent"?
Madhyamaka is not telling you "loosen up, don't care." It targets the mindset that grasps "sense of presence" as a fixed thing—once it is treated as "really existent," you are held hostage by follower counts, likes, and comments; once it is treated as "really non-existent," you use account deletion and cutting off contact to prove "I don't care." Both extremes nail something that is already changing within dependent origination into an entity that is either existent or non-existent.
This step also corresponds to the *Diamond Sūtra*'s "All conditioned marks are illusory"—not that marks do not exist (the sunlight, the wind, the heartbeat are all there), but that marks cannot be locked by "real existence," and therefore need not be frightened away by "real non-existence."
Scenario Four: "Either I Can or I Can't" in Learning
Learning a new skill—an instrument, a programming language, a foreign language—many people get stuck in two judgments:
- "I 'have' talent; I can learn this"; - "I 'don't have' the knack; no matter how much I practice it's useless."
Madhyamaka would proceed: what is "talent" in "having talent"? Is it that experience of practicing for two hours and learning a piece? Is it a fixed self-nature? What is the "not" in "not having the knack"? Is it the memory of falling asleep through every music class since childhood? Both judgments freeze a changing process into "existent" or "non-existent."
A finer dismantling: right now you have attention, time, curiosity, a bit of frustration, concrete practice exercises—these are conditions. They are not determined by any verdict of "I have / don't have talent." Tomorrow's you and today's you have different conditions and can learn different things.
Scenario Five: Caution Regarding "I Have Attained Enlightenment"
Contemporary people who practice yoga, meditation, or psychotherapy sometimes develop two extreme self-narratives:
- "I finally attained it, that state of 'existence'—inner peace, spiritual awakening"; - "Nothing happened; it's all fake; the method doesn't work."
This is precisely what Madhyamaka repeatedly refutes. "Existence is still not nirvāṇa; how much less non-existence"—you cannot grasp that peaceful moment as a "really existent state"; nor can you declare everything "really non-existent" because you did not experience something one time. Experiences flow within conditions. The moment you say "I attained it," it has already been nailed down as "existent"; the moment you say "it was nothing," it has been nailed down as "non-existent."
What Madhyamaka points to with "free from existence and free from non-existence" is not "exactly in the middle," but rather not treating the experience of any single moment as an entity to be clung to or negated.
Where the Walk-Through Most Easily Goes Wrong
Gathering the scenarios above, contemporary people most easily mis-map "existence and non-existence" in the following places:
1. Thinking "non-existence" means "nihilism"—understanding Madhyamaka's refutation of "non-existence" as "everything does not exist, nothing has meaning." In fact, Madhyamaka refutes "real non-existence" (實無)—the rigid judgment that "originally there was nothing at all"—and even "everything is non-existent" itself is further refuted. 2. Thinking "the middle way" is a compromise between the two—"then let's make it 50% existent, 50% non-existent." This is precisely the defect of the "both existent and non-existent" proposition. 3. Thinking dismantling equals indifference—"since nothing is obtainable, nothing matters." This is mistaking loosening for numbness. After loosening, compassion, responsibility, and feeling are all still there; they are just no longer grasped by an "I" as an entity. 4. Thinking "the knower being refuted" means having no self—what is refuted is the "I" as a fixed entity, not the body, speech, and mind of everyday functioning. The body, emotions, cognition are all still there; they are just not grasped as "that self-existent, eternal I." 5. Displaying states as "existence"—"I have already transcended both extremes; I am already empty." This is precisely what the *Middle Treatise* calls "generating views based on nirvāṇa" (依涅槃而生諸見)—you have generated a new attachment from nirvāṇa itself.
III. Why Contemporary People Need It
This ancient dismantling is useful in the contemporary era not because of "nostalgia," but because our environment is systematically reinforcing the binary judgment of "existence / non-existence."
1. Algorithms Turn People into Labelable Objects
Social media, search engines, and recommendation systems all essentially do one thing: label people and things as classifiable entities. Are you a user "with" interest, or a "without"-interest potential churn; is this article "valuable" or "valueless"; is this person "harmful" or "harmless."
These systems do not truly understand dependent origination; they can only operate on binary labels. Steeped in such an environment for a long time, we unconsciously internalize the same mode of thinking: dividing people into "hostile / not hostile," "talented / untalented," "valuable / valueless." In this sense, the Madhyamaka dismantling gives us a space to escape being labeled—not a specific anti-algorithm action, but an inner capacity that is no longer defined by labels.
2. Issue Polarization and "Either-Or"
The most common form of contemporary public discourse: Side A declares "X definitely has a problem," Side B retorts "X has absolutely no problem." Both sides are doing the same thing—stuffing complex social phenomena into a single "existent / non-existent" judgment. Madhyamaka reminds us: the same matter manifests differently under different conditions and in different contexts. Forcing it into the single framework of "has a problem / has no problem" loses precisely the understanding of conditions.
This also corresponds to the *Middle Treatise*'s treatment of "extreme views" (邊見)—the refutation of the four propositions "existent, non-existent, both, neither" is not merely at the purely philosophical level; it trains a capacity "not to be sucked in by any one side."
3. The Inner Pressure of Identity Politics
Contemporary people are increasingly required to declare identity: Are you a member of this group or that group? Do you belong to this gender or that gender? Do you support this position or that position?
Madhyamaka does not directly address contemporary identity politics, but it deals with a deeper problem—once you treat "I am X" as a judgment of real self-nature, you are nailed inside X; once you are judged as "not X" (non-X), you are pushed to the "non-existent" end. What can function is not "not declaring identity," but not treating identity as fixed self-nature—this allows you to act when you should speak for a certain group, and to remain complex when you should not be reduced to a single label.
4. The Trap of Self-Growth Narratives
Psychology and spirituality books talk extensively about "finding your true self," "living out your authentic self," "becoming who you want to be." These narratives presuppose a "true self" sitting there, waiting to be discovered or lived out.
The Madhyamaka dismantling is sobering on this: you do not need to find a "true self," because that "true self" as self-existent self-nature was never a fact. Your experiences, character, and abilities all change within conditions. So-called "becoming yourself" is not about finding a fixed goal to achieve, but about honesty and compassion toward this process of change.
5. The Fear of Death and Disappearance
One of the deepest anxieties of contemporary people is "will I disappear?" The Madhyamaka answer to the question "after the Tathāgata's final passing"—"discriminating existence or non-existence is inappropriate"—also responds to this anxiety: you should not use "existence" or "non-existence" to frame a person who was never limited by these two extremes. Likewise, regarding one's own death, the end of a relationship, the loss of a professional identity—forcibly judging it as "really existent" or "really non-existent" is itself the source of anxiety.
Note: this does not mean death or disappearance "does not exist," nor that "everything is an illusion, so there is no need to care." What Madhyamaka dismantles is the two extremes of "real existence" and "real non-existence." After the dismantling, birth and death within dependent origination remain clear, and sorrow remains real—just no longer locked by either "existence" or "non-existence."
IV. Common Misreadings and Clarifications
Misreading 1: "Non-existence" Means Nihilism
Clarification: Madhyamaka refutes "real non-existence" (實無)—the rigid judgment that "originally nothing was there at all." But it also refutes "real existence" (實有). It does not say everything is nothing; it says that no thing can be locked by either end of "existence" or "non-existence." Even the proposition "everything is non-existent" itself, if grasped as a real assertion, is refuted. This is a double refutation.
Misreading 2: The Middle Way Is "Between the Two"
Clarification: "Free from existence and free from non-existence" is not "taking a middle value." If "existence" and "non-existence" are both unobtainable, then "the middle"—this third position—also cannot stand on self-nature. The middle way is not a position; it is the state in which the binary framework itself is loosened—a view and practice in which both "existence" and "non-existence" lose their power to fix.
Misreading 3: Dismantling the "Knower" Means Having No Self
Clarification: What is dismantled is the "I" in the sense of a fixed entity (the so-called "I that is permanent, independent, eternal"), not the body and mind of everyday functioning. The body, emotions, cognition, and behavioral tendencies are all still there; they are just not grasped as a "self with self-nature." Madhyamaka does not ask you to deny experience; it asks you not to fixate experience.
Misreading 4: Emptiness Means "Nothing at All"
Clarification: Emptiness is not "nothing at all." Emptiness is "cannot be established through self-nature"—anything (including the concept of "emptiness" itself) cannot be grasped as an independent, determinate, unchanging entity. If you grasp "emptiness" as really existent, you have returned to the "existence" end. Madhyamaka keeps even the concept of "emptiness" empty—this can be read in the *Heart Sūtra*'s "form is emptiness, emptiness is form" (空即是色，色即是空).
Misreading 5: Being Free from Both Extremes Means "Not Taking a Stand"
Clarification: Being free from both extremes does not mean not taking a stand, not judging, not acting. Make the everyday judgments you need to make: whether to accept this job, whether to end this relationship, whether to help this person. Only, in making these judgments, you no longer treat the conclusion as "truth with self-nature"—it is a decision based on present conditions; when conditions change, the decision changes. This is judgment and loosening in parallel, not indifference.
Misreading 6: Nirvāṇa Equals "the Highest Existence" or "Complete Non-existence"
Clarification: The *Middle Treatise* repeatedly emphasizes that nirvāṇa is neither existence, nor non-existence, nor the two combined. It is not a state that can be described as "having attribute X" or "not having attribute X." Fitting nirvāṇa into the two extremes of existence and non-existence is "views generated based on nirvāṇa"—this itself is the object Madhyamaka dismantles.
Misreading 7: After the Dismantling, Everything Is Unknowable
Clarification: Madhyamaka dismantles "knowable through self-nature," "knowable as real"—not "knowability" itself. We can still know conditions, know dependent origination, know what we are doing at this moment. Only, we no longer treat that "knowing" as a fixed subject independent of the known. Knowledge remains valid; it just no longer bears the burden of "eternal, unchanging truth."
Misreading 8: This Is Merely Philosophy, Unrelated to Practice
Clarification: The refutations of the *Middle Treatise* have never been pure logic games. Its purpose is to loosen attachment—and the loosening of attachment is precisely a key step on the path of liberation. When you can avoid being sucked in between the two extremes of "I am negated" and "I am affirmed," an inner space opens up, and it is there that genuine stability is found. This stability is not a "really existent state," but it is real, experienceable, and something that can hold you up in difficult times.
At this point, the category of "existence and non-existence" is, in our daily lives, everywhere: each time we use "has / does not have" to pass a final judgment on ourselves or others, each time we stamp a flowing process into a fixed label, each time we are torn back and forth between two extremes—at that moment, the gentle yet sharp dismantling of the *Middle Treatise* is waiting for us.
It does not tell us not to judge, not to feel, not to act. It only says: that "existence" or "non-existence" in your hand, which you take to be real and hardest of all—can be loosened, just a little. In the moment of loosening, there is not nothingness, but a space in which all that is real—sorrow, joy, encounter, farewell, responsibility, love—can be experienced more lightly, more clearly.
This may be the most plain version of "the Buddha can extinguish existence and non-existence" in our era: when that voice of "I must know whether this is existent or non-existent" quiets down a little, the thing itself often reveals itself to you in a way closer to its actual mode of being.