Dharma · AI Companion

宗門中事

禅宗语录中所指须学人亲自明辨体取之根本事。AI-generated

Type FrameworkDifficulty AdvancedTruth-level span ultimately points to IV · beyond wordsInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

宗门中事为统摄本分之伞称,不藉某重谛层立足;所指之根本事为离言本分,给究竟读法并注明。

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

*Zōngmén zhōng shì* (宗門中事, “the fundamental matter within the Chan school”) is a Chan expression for what a practitioner must personally discern and embody. It is not primarily a doctrine to be defined, an object to be found, or a secret message transmitted among initiates. It is “the matter” for which Chan teaching, questioning, and practice exist: directly seeing what one is doing with mind here and now, and becoming free rather than merely acquiring a description of freedom.

This is why the expression is difficult to translate. “The central concern of Chan” conveys its importance but can sound theoretical. “The fundamental matter” is closer, provided that *matter* is not imagined as a hidden metaphysical substance. The records deliberately refuse to turn it into a thing with a location, shape, age, dimensions, or measurable properties.

Longjing Tong (龍井通) gives the most compact formulation in the supplied passages. Asked whether there is such a thing as *zōngmén zhōng shì*, he answers, “There is.” Asked what it is, he says:

“從來無形段,應物不曾虧。” “It has never had a form or configuration; in responding to things, it has never been deficient.”

The two halves must be kept together.

First, it has “no form or configuration.” It cannot be displayed as an inner object, isolated as a special mental state, or possessed as a spiritual achievement. Whatever can be pictured, named, remembered, and shown off is already something one has made into an object of consciousness.

Second, it is “never deficient in responding to things.” Formlessness does not mean blankness, withdrawal, unconsciousness, or an inert absolute standing behind experience. Hearing a sound, answering a question, feeling uncertainty, bowing, working, and meeting another person all occur in the field in which the matter must be discerned. The records do not direct the student away from functioning; they test freedom in functioning.

This explains the unusual answers preserved in the Chan records. A monk asks about the fundamental matter and is told, “Bow three times—quickly.” Another is told simply, “Bow.” Elsewhere a teacher responds with a sideways movement of the palm, a shout, a blow, or a summons to come closer. One teacher calls the immediate intervention “這箇是提撕”—“this is a prompting”—but explicitly refuses to let the student identify that gesture itself as the fundamental matter.

The gesture is therefore neither a coded definition nor a magical performance. It interrupts the student’s attempt to stand outside life and obtain an answer about life. The student asks for something portable: a sentence to remember, repeat, compare, and perhaps use to certify attainment. The teacher returns the student to the living event—asking, hearing, hesitating, approaching, bowing. What is exposed is not merely the content of the question but the grasping posture behind it.

That is also the point of Xuansha Shibei’s (玄沙師備) exchange. Asked about “the fundamental matter handed down in the Chan school,” he says, “少人聽”—“few people hear it.” When pressed to state it directly, he replies, “患聾作麼”—roughly, “Why worry about being deaf?” The paradox is exact: the obstacle is not a shortage of audible information. The student wants one more statement to hear, while the teacher is questioning the very assumption that hearing and retaining a statement would amount to realization.

The classical material accordingly warns against three substitutions:

- substituting explanation for personal discernment; - substituting imitation of a master’s words or gestures for responsive freedom; - substituting competitive skill in encounter-dialogue for liberation.

A person may memorize cases, recognize styles, quote “Zhaozhou’s cypress,” imitate a Linji shout, and answer quickly, yet remain what the record calls a “識路中人”—someone who knows the routes—without “自由分,” any share of freedom. A map can be learned while the habits of craving, defensiveness, self-display, and delusion remain intact.

Hence the admonition in the *Records of Ancient Worthies* (*Guzunsu yulu*, 《古尊宿語錄》):

“直須擺動精神,莫空記說。多虗不如少實。” “You must directly rouse your spirit; do not merely memorize sayings. Much that is empty is not as good as a little that is real.”

This is not a rejection of Buddhist teaching. Sanping Yizhong (三平義忠) acknowledges the paths of practice found in the teachings and the skillful approaches established by the sages. His warning is more precise: “若論宗門中事,切不得錯用心”—“When speaking of the fundamental matter within the Chan school, you absolutely must not apply the mind wrongly.” Scripture, doctrine, and disciplined cultivation have their legitimate functions. The error lies in using conceptual acquisition to replace the seeing to which those teachings point.

Nor should related expressions simply be collapsed into synonyms. The records also speak of *běnfèn shì* (本分事, one’s own fundamental matter), “the ancestral teacher’s meaning in coming from the West,” “the mind transmitted by Bodhidharma,” and *xiàngshàng shì* (向上事, the matter beyond or above). They inhabit overlapping Chan contexts, but each belongs to a particular question-and-response. None should automatically overwrite the attested term *zōngmén zhōng shì*. Likewise, “宗門中事,” “從上宗門中事,” and “宗乘中事” vary in wording in the cited records without being assigned separate doctrinal levels there.

Its place on the path of liberation is now clearer. Buddhist teachings diagnose bondage as a process: experience is appropriated as “I” and “mine”; attraction and aversion become craving and resistance; repeated grasping sustains suffering. Chan’s “fundamental matter” concerns the decisive personal verification without which this diagnosis remains secondhand. It asks: before you manufacture a position to defend, quote a teaching, or search elsewhere, can you see directly how bondage is being made—and can there be unobstructed response without taking up that position?

This is why the *Guzunsu yulu* places the matter in the Chan context of “不立文字,直指人心,見性成佛”—“not establishing [the teaching] upon written words, directly pointing to the human mind, seeing one’s nature and becoming Buddha.” This celebrated formula is recorded in Chan transmission literature; it should not be misrepresented as a saying spoken by the historical Buddha. “Not establishing upon written words” also does not mean that words are useless: the very tradition announcing it produced extensive written records. It means that no wording can perform the practitioner’s seeing on the practitioner’s behalf.

A walk-through in ordinary life

Imagine an evening commute. You are tired after overtime work. On the train, you open your phone and see that someone else has received the promotion you wanted.

The first movement is almost instantaneous: the eyes meet shapes and colors; the name and photograph are recognized; the message is understood. Then come bodily tightening, disappointment, envy, and perhaps embarrassment about feeling envious. A narrative appears: “I am falling behind. They are valued; I am not.” The thumb begins scrolling for more evidence.

At this point, it is easy to map the Chan teaching incorrectly. One might think that the “fundamental matter” is a pure witness hidden behind the unpleasant thoughts, and that practice means retreating into that witness. But Longjing’s formulation does not authorize such a reified inner observer. Something imagined as a permanent, locatable entity watching experience would itself be another object of conception.

One might instead repeat, “Everything is empty,” hoping to erase the hurt. That is another substitution: a Buddhist sentence is being used to avoid an experience. The sentence may be doctrinally important, yet here it functions as armor.

Or one might try to reproduce a Chan style: abruptly close the app, shout inwardly, “Just this!” and congratulate oneself for being nonconceptual. That is precisely the danger of memorizing the old masters’ routes. Closing an app may be sensible, but theatrical abruptness is not freedom.

A more faithful walk-through begins with honesty. The screen is seen. The message is recognized. Tightness is present. Comparison is operating. The thought “I am less worthy” is being believed and defended. The impulse to keep scrolling promises control but feeds distress. None of this needs to be denied, beautified, or turned into an abstract lecture.

Now notice the crucial point: before obtaining a final theory about yourself, the whole event is already functioning. Seeing, feeling, recognizing, contracting, and knowing the contraction are not waiting for a spiritual object to arrive. Yet habit immediately tries to seize this living event and turn it into “my failure,” “their success,” and “the self who must escape.” The fundamental matter is not one more item inside that sequence. It is what must be personally discerned so that the sequence is no longer unconsciously governed by appropriation.

Suppose a message from your partner arrives: “Can you pick up medicine on the way home?” If “formless” has been confused with blank detachment, you may regard the request as a disturbance to your spiritual composure. But “in responding to things, never deficient” points in the opposite direction. You read carefully, answer, get off at the appropriate stop, and buy the medicine. Functional responsiveness is not opposed to insight.

The test continues at home. Your partner asks why you seem distant. A rehearsed spiritual response—“There is no self who is upset”—would be both conceptually evasive and relationally unkind. A freer response might be: “I saw the promotion announcement and got caught in comparison. I’m still tense, and I don’t want to take it out on you.” This does not prove awakening. It simply shows the direction in which personal discernment bears fruit: less concealment, less automatic defense, and a response more adequate to the person before you.

The same walk-through applies when parenting. A child spills a drink while you are rushing. Sound, sight, bodily shock, recognition, irritation, and the urge to shout arise quickly. “The Chan matter” is not a mystical experience elsewhere, nor a slogan that makes irritation disappear. Can the arising reaction be known before it hardens into “You always ruin everything”? Can you wipe up the spill, protect the child from broken glass, and speak firmly without turning one accident into an identity? If insight has no expression in such responsive conduct, its practical meaning remains doubtful.

It also applies to algorithmic life. A recommendation system predicts what will hold attention; it does not need to understand you in any complete sense. You see a provocative post, recognize a familiar enemy, feel outrage, compose a reply, and await social confirmation. The algorithm participates in shaping the conditions, but it is not solely responsible for the grasping. The Chan question is intimate: at what point do you surrender responsiveness and become carried by the ready-made route?

Contemporary cognitive science can help describe aspects of attention, prediction, habit, and affect, while AI offers useful comparisons with pattern recognition and generated language. But these comparisons have limits. There is no scientific consensus that resolves the nature of consciousness, and no laboratory finding simply “proves” Chan realization. A model that produces excellent Zen-style dialogue demonstrates, at minimum, that stylistic fluency can be generated without establishing liberation. That makes the old warning newly vivid: plausible language, rapid replies, and mastery of textual patterns are not the same thing as freedom from grasping.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary culture is extraordinarily good at turning every difficulty into more content. Anxiety invites another podcast; grief invites a reading list; uncertainty invites a search; spiritual longing invites courses, quotations, rankings, and a public identity. Information can genuinely help, but it can also become a refined postponement. We learn how awakened people supposedly speak while avoiding the places where we ourselves cling, blame, perform, or flee.

The teaching of *zōngmén zhōng shì* cuts through this postponement. It asks whether knowledge has entered conduct. Can one meet praise without feeding upon it? Can one hear criticism without instantly constructing a prosecutor and defendant? Can one act decisively without making decisiveness into a self-image? Can one apologize without secretly demanding immediate absolution? These are not substitutes for formal practice, but they reveal whether practice is touching bondage.

It also challenges the contemporary hunger to objectify everything. We tend to trust what can be located, measured, visualized, stored, and optimized. Those powers are valuable in their proper domains. But the demand to turn awakening into a measurable possession—an exceptional brain state, a permanent feeling, a score, or a badge—can reproduce the very grasping under examination. The records’ questions about location, date, shape, size, sacredness, and ordinariness prevent the fundamental matter from becoming spiritual merchandise.

At the same time, “no form or configuration” protects us from idolizing experiences. Stillness, unity, clarity, bodily energy, and the temporary absence of thought may be significant, but each has conditions and characteristics. If one declares any passing state to be the final matter, one becomes its custodian and fears its loss. Chan’s demand is harder: what is true amid quiet and noise, success and humiliation, concentration and interruption? How does one respond when the favored state is gone?

The teaching further restores responsibility. If the matter must be personally discerned, no teacher, institution, book, or AI system can complete it for us. Yet “personal” does not mean private whim. A student may need instruction, ethical discipline, meditation, communal correction, and repeated examination. The *Guzunsu yulu* itself says that those slower to discern may need another person’s clarification. Its objection is to mistaking a memorized question-and-answer exchange for that clarification.

This places the expression within the whole liberating path rather than above it. Ethical precepts restrain actions that thicken greed, hatred, and delusion. Meditative cultivation steadies and clarifies the mind. Buddhist teachings provide indispensable orientation, expose mistaken views, and articulate the path. Chan encounter presses for direct verification. These functions need not compete.

Direct seeing without ethical transformation can become self-certifying rhetoric. Meditation without wisdom can become attachment to calm. Learning without embodiment can become intellectual possession. Ethical effort without insight can harden into anxious self-perfection. The “fundamental matter” names the point at which the path can no longer remain somebody else’s account: one must see and live it oneself.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

1. “It is a mysterious entity hidden inside everyone.”

No. The records refuse to give it form, location, dimensions, or an object-like identity. Calling it a hidden “true self” too quickly may merely place a subtler object behind ordinary experience. Longjing’s second clause is essential: it is not an inert something concealed from life, but is tested in unobstructed response to circumstances.

2. “It just means the mind, Buddha-nature, enlightenment, or ultimate reality.”

Such terms may illuminate the wider Chan context, but none should be inserted as an automatic dictionary replacement. *Zōngmén zhōng shì* emphasizes the fundamental concern that the student must personally discern. The records preserve nearby expressions—one’s fundamental matter, Bodhidharma’s transmitted mind, the ancestral teacher’s intention, the matter beyond—without formally declaring them interchangeable in every case.

3. “Because it cannot be captured in words, nothing meaningful can be said.”

The Chan records say a great deal. They diagnose misdirected seeking, imitation, fixation, and secondhand knowledge. Words can orient, question, expose, and correct; they cannot substitute for seeing. A menu cannot nourish, but that does not make menus meaningless.

4. “Chan rejects scriptures and reasoning.”

The supplied material distinguishes the paths and skillful approaches of the teachings from the direct demand of the Chan matter; it does not abolish them. “Not relying on written words” warns against dependence, not literacy. Moreover, carefully distinguishing sound reasoning from confused reasoning is itself necessary if one is not to romanticize every impulse as spontaneous wisdom.

5. “No effort is needed, so practice is unnecessary.”

The statement that this matter does not depend on memorizing a character, performing a special effort, blinking, or breathing is aimed at attempts to manufacture or possess it. It is not permission for negligence. The same records demand personal discernment, energetic engagement, clarification, and freedom in actual conduct. “Not produced by contrivance” and “no cultivation is needed” are not equivalent claims.

6. “Sudden realization cancels the path.”

A direct recognition may be sudden, but entrenched habits, ethical failures, and self-deception cannot be dismissed by announcing it. Within the broader Buddhist path, the credibility of insight appears in diminishing greed, hostility, delusion, and self-centered appropriation. An experience one continually advertises may have become another identity to defend.

7. “The masters’ blows and shouts are the teaching itself.”

They are context-bound interventions recorded in a monastic culture, not techniques for casual imitation or excuses for abuse. One record explicitly calls a particular action a “prompting” and then refuses to identify the action with the fundamental matter. Copying the gesture preserves its shell while losing its function. Contemporary teachers remain accountable to ethical boundaries; claims of “crazy wisdom” do not place harm beyond scrutiny.

8. “Any spontaneous reaction is awakened functioning.”

Compulsion is also spontaneous. Anger, fear, prejudice, and habit can act before reflection. “Responding to things without deficiency” cannot responsibly be reduced to “whatever I happen to do.” Chan responsiveness must be read in the liberative Buddhist context: less fixation, less delusion, and conduct not governed by grasping.

9. “Not thinking” means suppressing thought.”

Sanping’s instruction not to “devise with the mind” targets calculating pursuit and conceptual fabrication as substitutes for direct seeing. It need not mean cognitive blankness. Planning a journey, remembering medicine, or examining doctrine may be entirely appropriate. The issue is whether thought serves the situation or whether one takes refuge in thought to avoid the matter at hand.

10. “Personal verification means whatever feels true to me.”

Personal realization is not mere subjectivism. Feelings can deceive; charismatic experiences can inflate the self; inherited biases can masquerade as intuition. Teachings, precepts, teachers, community, and the observable consequences of conduct provide correction. “Personally discerned” means that borrowed certainty is insufficient, not that scrutiny is unnecessary.

11. “If I can explain all this, I understand the fundamental matter.”

This is the most intimate misunderstanding. A polished account may be accurate and still remain an account. The records repeatedly remove the student’s final place to stand: “事本因人,因人立事,人達即事渾”—“The matter is established because of the person; through the person the matter is established; when the person penetrates, the matter is whole.” Then they refuse to supply a finished sentence in which the student can settle.

The teaching therefore ends where practice begins. When the phone lights up, when resentment forms, when a child calls, when praise arrives, when the mind reaches for a borrowed Zen answer—what is happening before you package it? Can it be met without denial, possession, or theatrical spirituality? Can an appropriate response appear without turning either stillness or activity into “me”?

No paragraph can answer that on another person’s behalf. Yet this is not because the matter is remote. The records suggest almost the opposite: we miss it by trying to obtain elsewhere what must be discerned in the very act of seeing, hearing, questioning, bowing, and responding. It has “never had a form or configuration,” and precisely there, amid the demands of life, it “has never been deficient.”

Canonical EntryAI-generated

定义与核心要义

「宗门中事」是禅宗语录中反复出现的用语,指禅门学人须亲自明辨、当下体取之根本事。此事不可仅凭言句拟议、记诵寻觅而得,亦非可定位、可量度的形相之物;其体证须落在亲身行履与当下机用之中,而非义理解说。禅宗祖师对此事的接引,多以棒喝、侧掌、礼拜等动作破除学人执着语言文字之病。

主要阐述

《古尊宿语录》与《景德传灯录》皆将「宗门中事」置于直指心性的脉络中,强调此事须亲自体取。三平义忠告诫学人,不可把驰求走作当作自己眼目;经教中虽自有修行路与诸圣建立的化门,但若论宗门中事,便「切不得错用心」。其要不在另求一法,而在体取自身本分;所示「一路滑如苔」,亦须「不拟心」而自看。若转向知解义句,反如离乡万里,难得相应。

龙井通禅师正面确认「还有宗门中事也无」之问,答曰「有」;再问其内容,答「从来无形段,应物不曾亏」。这是所引诸段中较凝练的核心表述:宗门中事本无可描画的形段,然应物之际并无亏缺。它既非可执持的形相,也未被说成离开应物作用的空寂。

此事被说成不可依赖言论、知闻而取得。玄沙师备面对「从上宗门中事」之问,只答「少人听」;再被请求直说,则答「患聋作么」。其后更指出,师家不得已而以百千方便苦口相劝,若学人把「如此如彼」的言说当作相知相闻,便成颠倒知见;咽喉唇吻所作的言说,甚至可能只增虚妄。此处突显宗门中事虽可藉问答触发,却不能化约为可听取、可转述的固定言论。

《古尊宿语录》特别警戒记持话路、模倣语句与竞逐问答。师斥只管记说者为虚度信施,劝初心后学「直须摆动精神,莫空记说。多虗不如少实」,指出多闻而寻觅相似语句、印可老宿,终究只是自赚。又说猛利者「撩着便休去」,根性迟回者虽须从人决择,却不可把一问一答当成决择,亦不可在句里相鬭、夸示问话转数;如此所得只成「识路中人」,仍「无自由分」。其要在「事本因人,因人立事,人达即事浑」,而后逼问「无成句」,不许学人安住于现成答案。

鼓山语录更从正面说,此事「不假记一字,亦不用一功,亦不用眨眼,亦不用呵气」,但又追问究竟所「绍」者是佛、法、禅、道,抑或向上事、涅槃后句;若执定绍承某一句,便被斥为「大妄」,与当人分上「了无交涉」。同时追问其凡圣、处所、年月、方圆大小,显示本经不让学人把宗门中事物化为可定位、可量度之物。

在具体接引上,师对「如何是宗门中事」或「宗乘中事」常以侧掌、棒打、喝斥、唤近前等动作作答。有人问「三乘十二分教即不问,如何是宗门中事」,师不作义理解说,却答「老僧入你钵囊里」,又索取槟榔豆蔻,随即斥破问者;另一处问「教中即不问,如何是宗门中事」,师只令「速礼三拜」。问宗门中事,师便「侧掌」;问宗乘中事,师先答「是什么」,又唤近前说「这个是提撕」,但明言不可将这个唤作宗乘中事,待其再问便打一棒。翠岩永明处,僧问「妙机言句尽皆不当,宗乘中事如何」,师仅令其「礼拜着」;安国弘瑫处,僧问「如何是宗乘中事」,师答「不可为老兄散却众也」,仍不正面陈说。

不同部类与译本的表述差异

《古尊宿语录》(禅宗语录部·X1315)所用相关用语最为多样,包括「宗门中事」「宗乘中事」「从上宗乘」「本参底事」「自己亲躳事」等。其中「宗门中事」是本经最直接而反复出现的称法,并常与「教中」「三乘十二分教」相对举。

《景德传灯录》(史传部·《景德傳燈錄》)在所引文字中交替使用「宗门中事」、「从上宗门中事」与「宗乘中事」;三者皆用于学人追问禅门根本之事的语境,原文并未另作层级或义类区分。

两部典籍所记录的重点皆落在当人亲辨、当下受验与不可由言句代替,但其用语变体略有不同:《古尊宿语录》尚有「从上宗乘」之说,《景德传灯录》则无此语形。

与相关概念的关系

《景德传灯录》相关用语尚有「本分事」、「祖师西来意」、「西来意」、「达磨传底心」及「向上事」,但各则皆保留自身问答措辞,不宜径以其中任何一语取代经中明见的「宗门中事」之名。安国弘瑫处,「达磨传底心」答以「素非后躅」,不落因缘方便之事则以譬喻作答,与宗门中事之问答同样不落正面陈说。

《古尊宿语录》明言达磨西来「不立文字,直指人心,见性成佛」,但随即设问「如何是你心」「如何是和尚心」,以「捋虎须」等语截断造次言说;对栢树子、德山棒、临济喝等话头与机用,也不许仅凭口头透过,甚至说「直饶一时透过,也是七九六十八」。又称「祖师心印」为「好消息处无消息;无消息,古篆分明」,并以「拈起」「放下」显示其不可凝滞于一端。

代表性原文引用

- 三平义忠:「若论宗门中事,切不得错用心。」 - 玄沙师备答「从上宗门中事」:「少人听。」「患聋作么。」 - 龙井通禅师答「还有宗门中事也无」:「有。」「从来无形段,应物不曾亏。」 - 翠岩永明答「宗乘中事」:「礼拜着。」 - 安国弘瑫答「宗乘中事」:「不可为老兄散却众也。」 - 《古尊宿语录》答「宗门中事」:「老僧入你钵囊里」「速礼三拜」「侧掌」。 - 鼓山语录:「事本因人,因人立事,人达即事浑。」「直须摆动精神,莫空记说。多虗不如少实。」「这个是提撕。」

By SutraAI-generated

景德傳燈錄T2076 · 史傳部

《景德傳燈錄》所謂「宗門中事」,首先指向人人各具而須親自體取的「本分事」。三平義忠告誡學人,不可把馳求走作當作自己眼目;經教中雖自有修行路與諸聖建立的化門,但若論「宗門中事」,便「切不得錯用心」。其要不在另求一法,而在體取自身本分;所示「一路滑如苔」,亦須「不擬心」而自看。若轉向知解義句,反如離鄉萬里,難得相應。

此事亦被說成不可依賴言論、知聞而取得。玄沙師備面對「從上宗門中事」之問,只答「少人聽」;再被請求直說,則答「患聾作麼」。其後更指出,師家不得已而以百千方便苦口相勸,若學人把「如此如彼」的言說當作相知相聞,便成顛倒知見;咽喉脣吻所作的言說,甚至可能只增虛妄。此處突顯宗門中事雖可藉問答觸發,卻不能化約為可聽取、可轉述的固定言論。

《景德傳燈錄》又以機鋒問答呈現此事,而不下抽象定義。翠巖永明處,僧問「妙機言句盡皆不當,宗乘中事如何」,師僅令其「禮拜著」;僧稱不會,又被反問出家行腳何以連禮拜也不會。此則一方面承認言句不能相當於所問之事,另一方面把回答落在當下行履,而非另立義解。

安國弘瑫處所用詞形為「宗乘中事」。僧問「如何是宗乘中事」,師答「不可為老兄散卻眾也」,仍不正面陳說。相連問答中,「第一句」以反問及良久應之,「達磨傳底心」答以「素非後躅」,不落因緣方便之事則以譬喻作答,均顯示此事不被整理成現成語句,亦不容學人僅憑請益而索取一個可攜去的答案。

龍井通禪師則正面確認「還有宗門中事也無」之問,答曰「有」;再問其內容,答「從來無形段,應物不曾虧」。這是所引諸段中較凝練的核心表述:宗門中事本無可描畫的形段,然而應物之際並無虧缺。它既非可執持的形相,也未被說成離開應物作用的空寂。

就名相歸一而言,《景德傳燈錄》在所引文字中交替使用「宗門中事」、「從上宗門中事」與「宗乘中事」;三者皆用於學人追問禪門根本之事的語境,原文並未另作層級或義類區分。其相關用語尚有「本分事」、「祖師西來意」、「西來意」、「達磨傳底心」及「向上事」,但各則皆保留自身問答措辭,不宜逕以其中任何一語取代經中明見的「宗門中事」之名。

古尊宿語錄X1315 · 禪宗語錄部

《古尊宿語錄》以「宗門中事」「宗乘中事」「從上宗乘」「本參底事」「自己親躳事」等語,指向禪門學人所須親自明辨的根本事;其中「宗門中事」是本經最直接而反覆出現的稱法,並常與「教中」「三乘十二分教」相對舉。有人問「三乘十二分教即不問,如何是宗門中事」,師不作義理解說,卻答「老僧入你鉢囊裏」,又索取檳榔豆蔻,隨即斥破問者;另一處問「教中即不問,如何是宗門中事」,師只令「速禮三拜」。這顯示本經記錄此事時,多以當下應機的言行代替抽象界定。 本經將宗門根本事置於直指心性的脈絡中,明言達磨西來「不立文字,直指人心,見性成佛」,但隨即設問「如何是你心」「如何是和尚心」,以「捋虎鬚」等語截斷造次言說;對栢樹子、德山棒、臨濟喝等話頭與機用,也不許僅憑口頭透過,甚至說「直饒一時透過,也是七九六十八」。又稱「祖師心印」為「好消息處無消息;無消息,古篆分明」,並以「拈起」「放下」顯示其不可凝滯於一端。 對「宗門中事」的參究,本經特別警戒記持話路、模倣語句與競逐問答。師斥只管記說者為虛度信施,勸初心後學「直須擺動精神,莫空記說。多虗不如少實」,指出多聞而尋覓相似語句、印可老宿,終究只是自賺。 又說猛利者「撩著便休去」,根性遲迴者雖須從人決擇,卻不可把一問一答當成決擇,亦不可在句裏相鬭、誇示問話轉數;如此所得只成「識路中人」,仍「無自由分」。其要在「事本因人,因人立事,人達即事渾」,而後逼問「無成句」,不許學人安住於現成答案。 鼓山語錄更從正面說,此事「不假記一字,亦不用一功,亦不用眨眼,亦不用呵氣」,但又追問究竟所「紹」者是佛、法、禪、道,抑或向上事、涅槃後句;若執定紹承某一句,便被斥為「大妄」,與當人分上「了無交涉」。同時追問其凡聖、處所、年月、方圓大小,顯示本經不讓學人把宗門中事物化為可定位、可量度之物。 在具體接引上,師對「如何是宗門中事」或「宗乘中事」常以側掌、棒打、喝斥、喚近前等動作作答。問宗門中事,師便「側掌」;問宗乘中事,師先答「是什麼」,又喚近前說「這箇是提撕」,但明言不可將這箇喚作宗乘中事,待其再問便打一棒。 因而,本經所載的獨特側面,不是建立一套關於此事的名相義說,而是反覆在問答現場破除記誦、擬議、尋覓與命名;其用語雖有「宗門中事」「宗乘中事」「從上宗乘」等變體,所記錄的重點皆落在當人親辨、當下受驗與不可由言句代替。

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