Dharma · AI Companion

二緣

dvi-pratyaya

二缘:经论随文所立二种缘之通称,最常指等无间缘与所缘缘(《瑜伽》二缘依处);亦用于如所有性、尽所有性二门施设缘起。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arising ⇢ II · emptinessInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

取缘起法相义:四缘之分于缘生层教授(1),如所有性一门指向胜义(2)

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

这个概念在说什么 (What This Concept Is Saying)

If you have ever tried to explain *why* something happened—a breakup, a burnout, a sudden burst of creativity—you know the feeling of running into a wall. We say "because of this," and then someone asks "but why *that*?" We trace the thread back, and it forks, and forks again, until we are holding a tangled web instead of a single rope. The Buddhist concept of 二緣 (dvi-pratyaya, "two conditions") is not an attempt to untangle that web into a single thread. It is an attempt to map the *kinds* of threads that make up the web.

The term 二緣 is a slippery one. It is not a single, fixed pair like "yin and yang." It is, as the classical sources show, a *structural label*—a way of saying "there are two fundamental modes in which conditions operate." Depending on which door you enter through in the 瑜伽師地論 (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) or the 顯揚聖教論 (Xianyang Shengjiao Lun), you will find a different pair standing behind that label. But if you look closely, they are all variations of a single profound insight: reality does not arise from a single cause, nor from a chaotic heap of causes, but from a precisely structured two-fold interplay of generative power and facilitating context.

Let me walk you through the three main pairs that the texts offer, because understanding the variety here is itself part of the teaching.

First, the pair within the Four Conditions (四緣). The 瑜伽師地論 lays out the full framework of conditionality as four types: 因緣 (causal condition, the seed), 等無間緣 (equanimous immediately antecedent condition, the unbroken flow of preceding moments), 所緣緣 (object condition, the field that the mind apprehends), and 增上緣 (dominant/supporting condition, the faculties and auxiliary factors). Then comes the crucial line: 「因緣一種,亦因亦緣,餘唯是緣」 ("The causal condition alone is both cause and condition; the rest are merely conditions"). This carves the four into a natural two-fold division. On one side stands 因緣—the seed—which carries the full generative weight of being a *cause* (因). On the other side stand the remaining three—等無間緣, 所緣緣, 增上緣—which are *conditions* (緣) in the pure sense: they do not generate, but they make generation possible. They are the soil, the water, the sunlight, and the gardener's care; the 因緣 is the acorn.

Second, the pair used to set up Dependent Origination itself. The same 瑜伽師地論 explicitly establishes what it calls 二因緣 ("two causes/conditions") for mapping all the aspects of dependent arising (緣起一切種相): 「云何為二?一、如所有性故;二、盡所有性故」 ("What are the two? First, the nature of reality-as-it-is; second, the nature of reality-in-its-totality"). 如所有性 (yathāvat-tathatā, suchness) refers to the *structural law* of dependent arising—the fact that 無明 (ignorance) and the other links arise in a gradual, commensurate causal sequence, with the specific logic that "有此因未斷故,有彼果未斷;此未斷因生故,彼未斷果生" ("because this cause is not cut off, that fruit is not cut off; because this not-cut-off cause arises, that not-cut-off fruit arises"). 盡所有性 (yāvad-bhāvikatā, completeness) refers to the *exhaustive map* of all the specific instances, all the distinctions, all the particular forms of ignorance and action, past and present, laid out in their full variety. One is the grammar of conditionality; the other is the full dictionary of its actual sentences.

Third, the pair in the 顯揚聖教論. Here the text, after dismantling a rival six-cause system, builds its own two-fold 因相 ("aspects of cause"): 繫縛相因 (the cause characterized by binding) and 和合相因 (the cause characterized by conjunction). 繫縛相因 is identified with 煩惱隨眠 (the latent afflictions, the dormant defilements) and is so named because it binds us to future existence (後有)—it is the invisible tether that pulls us into the next round of becoming. 和合相因 is the coming-together of various conditions in the present moment (現在時) that allows a specific phenomenon to arise. The text explains this 和合 through a triple structure: a phenomenon arises when something serves as its 為先 (antecedent/forerunner), its 為建立 (foundation/support), and its 和合 (conjunction/assistance). For example, for a sprout to arise, the seed is the antecedent, soil and water are the foundation, and warmth and season are the conjunction.

Notice the deep resonance among these three pairs. The 因緣 vs. 餘三緣 pair is about *generative power* versus *facilitating support*. The 如所有性 vs. 盡所有性 pair is about *structural law* versus *specific instance*. The 繫縛相因 vs. 和合相因 pair is about *latent continuity across time* versus *active assembly in the present moment*. They are not the same thing, but they rhyme. They all point to the same fundamental rhythm of reality: something deep and continuous carries the momentum of the past, while something active and conjunctive assembles the present. Cut either one, and the arising stops.

生活里的走查 (Walking Through It in Life)

Let's take a scene almost everyone in the contemporary world knows intimately. It is 2 a.m. You are exhausted. Your eyes are dry, your body aches with that particular hollow fatigue of the late night. And yet you are lying in bed, thumb scrolling through a social media feed, or cycling through the same three apps, or watching videos that you don't even enjoy anymore. You *know* you should stop. You *want* to stop. And you don't.

Let's walk through this using the 二緣 framework, and let's be very careful to map each element to its correct category, because this is where the teaching gets sharp.

First, apply the 四緣 division from the 瑜伽師地論. What is the 因緣 here—the seed? The common contemporary answer, the one you'll find in a thousand think-pieces, is "the phone." The phone is the cause of your doom-scrolling. But the 瑜伽師地論 is very precise: 因緣 is defined as 種子 (seed). The phone is not a seed; it is an object. In the four-condition framework, the phone is the 所緣緣—the object condition. It is what the mind takes as its field. The 等無間緣 is the unbroken stream of mental moments—the fact that one thought of "let me check just one more" immediately gives rise to the next thought, with no gap, no interruption. The 增上緣 includes your eyes (the physical faculty), the neural pathways in your brain, the algorithm serving you content—all the supporting conditions that make the act possible.

So where is the 因緣, the seed? The seed is the deep-seated habitual tendency (vāsanā) of the mind to seek stimulation to escape discomfort. It is the accumulated momentum of years of using distraction to avoid boredom, anxiety, loneliness, or even the simple weight of being awake in one's own body. This seed is not the phone. It is the urge that reaches for the phone. It is the reason you pick it up in the first place, and the reason that picking it up feels like relief for exactly three seconds before the itch returns.

Here is where the contemporary mind almost always makes its error. We blame the 所緣緣 (the object—the phone, the app) and try to solve the problem by removing the object. We delete the app, buy a "dumb phone," put the device in another room. And yet the pull remains. Why? Because we have only cut the 所緣緣, while the 因緣—the seed—remains alive in the ground, waiting for the next object to attach to. The 瑜伽師地論's line, 「因緣一種,亦因亦緣,餘唯是緣」, is telling us that only the seed actually *generates*; the rest merely *support*. Remove the support and the seed goes dormant, but it does not die.

Now, apply the 如所有性 and 盡所有性 pair. The 盡所有性 is the exhaustive list of the specific conditions in this moment: the blue light of the screen, the dopamine spikes, the algorithm's predictive targeting, your empty stomach, the unresolved argument from earlier in the day, the caffeine still in your bloodstream, the fact that you haven't exercised in a week. All of these are true. All of these are specific, enumerable causes. A neuroscientist could measure the dopamine, a psychologist could chart the habit loop, a data scientist could explain the algorithm's reward schedule. And all of them together—the full inventory of this moment's conditions—constitute the 盡所有性.

But the 如所有性 is something else. It is the *structural law* that underlies all these specifics. It is the fact that "有此因未斷故,有彼果未斷"—because this cause (the seed of seeking-stimulation-to-avoid-discomfort) is not cut off, the result (the compulsive scrolling) is not cut off. The specific conditions change—today it's the phone, ten years ago it was the television, in another era it might have been a book of gossip or a flask of wine—but the structure remains identical. The 如所有性 is the grammar of the sentence; the 盡所有性 is the particular words you use. Most of our contemporary self-help culture is obsessed with the 盡所有性—the specific habit, the specific app, the specific trigger. The Buddhist teaching says: understand the 如所有性, and you can rewrite the grammar, not just swap the words.

Finally, apply the 顯揚聖教論's 繫縛相因 and 和合相因. This is perhaps the most psychologically acute analysis of all. The 繫縛相因 is the 煩惱隨眠—the latent affliction. In this scenario, it is the dormant craving for escape, the underlying restlessness that you carry with you even when you are not scrolling. It is "sleeping" during the day when you are busy, but it is always there, binding you to the next instance of its satisfaction. This is why, even when you manage to put the phone down for a week, the urge does not die—it merely sleeps. It is a binding cause that connects this present moment to the future moment of relapse.

The 和合相因 is the active conjunction in the present. Look at how the 顯揚聖教論 describes it: something must be 為先 (antecedent), something must be 為建立 (foundation), something must be 和合 (conjunction). In the 2 a.m. moment: the *antecedent* is your initial intention or the automatic habit that "it is time to wind down" (which triggers the phone reach); the *foundation* is your physical body with its fatigue, your brain's reward circuitry, the bed, the darkness; the *conjunction* is the specific alignment of all these—the phone in your hand, the Wi-Fi on, the silence of the house. When these three come together, the act of scrolling arises. And because the 繫縛相因 (the latent craving) is still there, undissolved, the conjunction is almost inevitable.

The crucial insight for the walkthrough is this: you cannot solve the problem by only attacking the 和合相因 (the conjunction—by hiding the phone) or only attacking the 盡所有性 (the specific conditions—by turning off notifications). Those are real and necessary interventions, but they are surface-level. The deep cut must go into the 繫縛相因 and the 因緣—the seed, the latent binding tendency. And that requires a different kind of work: not removal, but *observation*. It requires seeing the craving as craving, watching it arise without feeding it, letting it remain unfulfilled until it learns, slowly, that it does not own you. That is what the texts mean when they speak of cutting off the cause.

当代人为什么需要它 (Why Contemporary People Need It)

The contemporary world has a peculiar relationship with causality. On the one hand, we are obsessed with it—we want root causes, single explanations, clean narratives. We want to know "why" so we can "fix." This is the logic of the algorithm: identify the input, adjust the weight, predict the output. It is a powerful logic, but it is a logic of single-track causation, and it misses what the 二緣 framework is pointing at.

Consider how the tech industry thinks about human behavior. The algorithm models your 所緣緣 (what you click, what you linger on) and adjusts its 增上緣 (what it serves you next). It is extraordinarily sophisticated at manipulating the facilitating conditions. But it has no model of the 因緣, the seed. It cannot see the 繫縛相因, the latent binding affliction. This is why the algorithm can predict your behavior with eerie accuracy and yet cannot change it—it is a master of the conditions that surround the seed, but it cannot touch the seed itself. The tech industry has built a civilization of 增上緣 and 所緣緣, and in doing so, it has shown us precisely how powerful those conditions are—and how, without touching the 因緣, they only deepen the binding.

We also live in an age of "root cause" mentalities in psychology and self-help. We dig for the single trauma, the single chemical imbalance, the single belief that, if corrected, will fix everything. This is a search for a single 因, and it often ends in frustration, because reality does not work that way. The 二緣 framework offers a more mature, more spacious view. It says: yes, there is a seed, but the seed cannot grow without the conjunction. Yes, there is a structural law, but the law always manifests in specific instances. This is neither fatalism ("it's all in my genes") nor magical thinking ("just change your thoughts and everything changes"). It is a precise, workable map of how change actually happens: you work on the seed (through insight and ethical living), you work on the conditions (through environment and habit), and you understand the structure (so you stop blaming a single element).

There is also a deep psychological relief in this framework. When you understand the 二緣, you stop the exhausting game of self-blame. You stop saying "I am the problem" (as if you were a single, solid cause) and you also stop saying "the world is the problem" (as if you were a passive victim of conditions). Instead, you see yourself as a node in a matrix of conditions—some of which you carry from the past, some of which you are actively assembling in the present, and all of which you can learn to observe, understand, and gradually loosen.

Contemporary neuroscience and AI research can offer fascinating parallels here. We now know that habits are encoded in neural pathways (a kind of physical trace of the seed) and that context—environmental cues, objects, even the time of day—massively influences whether a habit fires (the 增上緣 and 所緣緣 doing their work). But we must be honest about the limits of these parallels. Neuroscience can observe the correlates of craving; it cannot yet tell us what craving *is* in its own nature. AI can model behavioral prediction with stunning accuracy, but it does not suffer, and it has no insight into its own conditionality. The Buddhist framework is not a primitive version of these sciences; it is a different mode of inquiry—one that is not about predicting or controlling, but about *seeing through* the very structure of arising. The sciences map the 盡所有性 with increasing precision; the Dharma points to the 如所有性, which no amount of data accumulation will ever reveal, because it is not a fact to be discovered but a structure to be understood.

常见误读与澄清 (Common Misunderstandings and Clarifications)

Misreading 1: "二緣" is a single, fixed pair. This is perhaps the most common error. As we have seen, the term appears in different contexts with different referents. In the 瑜伽師地論, it can mean the division between 因緣 and the other three conditions, or it can mean the 二因緣 of 如所有性 and 盡所有性 used to set up dependent arising. In the 顯揚聖教論, the primary classification is called 二種因 (繫縛相因 and 和合相因), and the term "二緣" appears only in a fragmentary phrase—「二緣通上地」—whose precise content the text itself does not explain. Intellectual honesty requires us to say: we do not know exactly what that fragment refers to, and we should not pretend otherwise. The beauty of the concept is not in a single rigid definition, but in the recurring structural insight across all these formulations.

Misreading 2: "因緣" is just a fancy word for "cause" in general. No. In the four-condition framework, 因緣 is specifically the 種子 (seed). It is the generative, continuous potential that is carried within a lineage—whether that is the karmic seed in the mindstream or the biological seed in the soil. The other three conditions (等無間緣, 所緣緣, 增上緣) are not "lesser" causes; they are *different kinds* of conditions. The line 「因緣一種,亦因亦緣,餘唯是緣」 is not a ranking of importance; it is a division of labor. Without the 餘三緣, the 因緣 remains dormant forever. An acorn is fully a cause of an oak, but it will never become one without soil, water, and sun. To say "the phone is the cause of my addiction" is to mistake a 所緣緣 for a 因緣—a category error with real practical consequences, because it leads you to treat the object as the root problem and ignore the seed.

Misreading 3: 如所有性 is some kind of mystical "oneness," while 盡所有性 is just mundane detail. This is a misunderstanding of the relationship between the two. 如所有性 is not a vague "everything is connected" feeling. It is the specific, precise *structure* of dependent arising—the law that "this being, that arises; this not being, that does not arise," understood as the gradual, commensurate causal sequence of 無明 and the other links. 盡所有性 is not "lesser" detail; it is the exhaustive map of all the particular forms that this structure takes. They are not two different levels of reality (one high, one low). They are two ways of understanding the *same* reality: the grammar and the lexicon, the law and its instances. You need both. The 瑜伽師地論 explicitly says that the setting up of dependent arising requires both 總標舉 (general statement—the 如所有性) and 別分別 (specific distinctions—the 盡所有性). To focus on one at the expense of the other is to have either a skeleton without flesh or a flesh without a skeleton.

Misreading 4: The 繫縛相因 and 和合相因 are two separate "things" that exist independently. No. They are two *aspects* (相) of how causation operates. The 繫縛相因 (the latent afflictions) is what provides continuity across time—it binds the past to the future. The 和合相因 (the conjunction of conditions) is what produces the present moment. You cannot find one without the other in any actual event. The latent craving (繫縛) only manifests through a specific conjunction (和合); the conjunction only has power because it activates a latent binding. This is a relational, two-sided analysis, not a list of two separate items.

Misreading 5: The 二緣 framework means we are helpless victims of conditions. This is the opposite of the truth. The entire purpose of analyzing conditions is to find the *point of intervention*. If you understand that the 因緣 is the seed and the 餘三緣 are the supports, you know that you can work on both—you can weaken the seed through insight and meditation, and you can adjust the supports through environment and behavior. If you understand the 如所有性, you can see the structural law that governs your suffering, and in seeing it, you begin to loosen its hold. If you understand the 繫縛相因, you stop trying to fight the present moment and instead address the latent binding itself. The 二緣 is not a cage; it is a map, and a map is only useful to someone who intends to move.

The deepest teaching of the 二緣 is that conditionality is not a chain that imprisons you, but a structure that can be understood—and understanding, in the Buddhist sense, is not merely intellectual. It is the act of seeing the seed as seed, the support as support, the binding as binding. In that seeing, something shifts. The seed loses its absolute power. The binding begins to loosen. And the web of conditions, which once felt like a trap, becomes what it always was: the very texture of a life that can be walked through with clarity, rather than stumbled through in blindness.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

于瑜伽部相关论典中,「二缘」一概念主要呈现两条论述脉络:其一,依《瑜伽师地论》四缘框架,「因缘亦因亦缘,余唯是缘」之判摄,隐然区分因缘与纯缘两类助成条件;其二,于缘起法相之施设中,以「如所有性」「尽所有性」二门为缘起一切种相之施设所依,是为经文明文标举之「二因缘」。

二、主要阐述

《瑜伽师地论》中的二缘

《瑜伽师地论》主要以四缘(因缘、等无间缘、所缘缘、增上缘)框架展开对助成条件之论述。于因与缘之概念区分上,论中作出明确判摄:「因缘一种,亦因亦缘,余唯是缘」,即四缘之中,唯有因缘兼具因与缘之双重性质,而等无间缘、所缘缘、增上缘三者则纯属缘而非因。此一区分于四缘框架内形成「因缘」与「余三缘」之两类助成条件之归纳,可视为二缘区分之理论基础。

就四缘各自之定义,论云:因缘者谓种子;等无间缘者谓「若此识无间,诸识决定生,此是彼等无间缘」;所缘缘者谓诸心心所所缘境界;增上缘者则除种子外,包括眼等所依及助伴法,「望眼识,所余识亦尔」。又善不善性能取爱非爱果,如是等类亦名增上缘。其后总括云:「由种子故,建立因缘;由自性故,立等无间缘;由所缘境故,立所缘缘;由所依及助伴等故,立增上缘」,并引经证成:「诸因诸缘能生识者,彼即此四」。

在缘起法相施设中,《瑜伽师地论》明文立「二因缘」以施设缘起一切种相:「云何为二?一、如所有性故;二、尽所有性故」。如所有性者,谓无明等诸缘生法渐次相称因果体性,及「有此因未断故,有彼果未断;此未断因生故,彼未断果生」;尽所有性者,谓无明等诸缘生行一切种相,广如前际无智等差别体相之开示。即依此如所有性、尽所有性二门,若总标举,若别分别;先总标举说名为初,后即于此复广开示说名分别。

至于具体提到「二缘」之段落,论中有「如是名为由二缘故,以时觉寤,起不过时」之文,惜此句孤立,未见上下文明载二缘之具体所指。又在四相所摄之正方便相中,论言「正方便相一切种别,皆因缘相;如正方便,邪方便亦尔」,就因缘相之白品与黑品分别而论。另论中亦列人身因缘之三种:一切身共相因缘(四大种各别自相)、未生令生因缘(父母不净和合)、已生令住因缘(糜饭等之所长养),可见同为因缘,所指各随其境而别。

《显扬圣教论》中的相关分类

《显扬圣教论》对此处所归纳之「二缘」,其最完整之正文表述实作「二种因」,即「系缚相因」与「和合相因」。论先破斥另一异计所立同类因、遍行因、俱有因、相应因、异熟因、能作因等六因,指出除异熟因外,其余五因皆有已成、不定及名言虚设等过失;其后方建立所认为如理之因相。

第一,「系缚相因」指「烦恼随眠」,是依其能生后有而说。此类因所标示之侧面,是烦恼随眠与后续有之生起相连,故名系缚;原文于此未另列更细之支分。

第二,「和合相因」指因缘和合而令彼彼法生,是依能生现在时而说。论中进一步总释因相:若某法由「此为先」、「此为建立」、「此和合」而使其他诸法或生、或得、或成立、或成办、或起作用,便说此是彼因。

论以「生」与「得」具体说明此因相。就诸法之生而言,以自种子为先,以除所依种外之色、非色所依及业为建立,以伴与所缘境为和合,随其所应而生欲系、色系、无色系及不系诸法。就证得离系涅槃而言,以声闻、独觉及如来种性为先,以内因力为建立,以外因力为和合。内因力包括如理作意、少欲知足,以及得人身、生于圣处、诸根无缺、无业障、于如来所具净信等;外因力则包括诸佛出世宣说妙法、住正法者为伴侣、具悲信者为施主等。

本论另有「二缘通上地」之简略语句,并与「世俗有二种」、「胜义谓遍行」及「无现染」连文;然所给原文未解释此处「二缘」各自所指,故只能记录其术语及「通上地」之叙述。

就多译名归一而言,本论详论这组助成条件时所用之明确名目为「二种因」、「系缚相因」、「和合相因」,并以「为先」、「为建立」、「为和合」说明因相;虽另见「二缘」一语,却未在该句中列名解说。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

1. 《瑜伽师地论》于四缘判摄中以「因缘一种,亦因亦缘,余唯是缘」之对照,隐然显示因缘与余三缘之二分;并于缘起法相之施设中明文标举「二因缘」,此二处所明之义不同。 2. 《瑜伽师地论》另有孤立出现之「二缘」一语:「如是名为由二缘故,以时觉寤,起不过时」,惜上下文未明载所摄具体内容。 3. 《显扬圣教论》对此概念所用之主要分类名称为「二种因」(系缚相因、和合相因),而非径称「二缘」;本论另见「二缘通上地」之简略语句,然未列名解说。 4. 二论之分类标准与分类对象各有不同:《瑜伽师地论》之「二因缘」系施设缘起法相之两门(以如所有性、尽所有性施设缘起一切种相),《显扬圣教论》之「二种因」则为破斥异计六因后所建立之如理因相分类,二者虽同归因缘法系统,所摄义涵各有侧重。 5. 同经中「因缘」一词亦具多义:《瑜伽师地论》列人身因缘之三种(一身共相因缘、未生令生因缘、已生令住因缘),可见同一论中因缘所指随境而别。

四、与相关概念之关系

1. 与「四缘」之关系:「二缘」之论述常嵌于四缘框架之内,于《瑜伽师地论》中「因缘」与「余三缘」之区分即据四缘而立。 2. 与「十因」「五果」之关系:《瑜伽师地论》将十因(随说因、观待因、牵引因、生起因、摄受因、引发因、定异因、同事因、相违因、不相违因)、四缘、五果(异熟果、等流果、离系果、士用果、增上果)并列为「因等差别」之整体内容,可见缘(条件)与因、果同属该论因缘果法相系统之重要环节。 3. 与「正方便相」之关系:《瑜伽师地论》明言正方便相一切种别皆因缘相,如正方便,邪方便亦尔,显示因缘相有白品与黑品之别。 4. 与「因缘」一词之多义关系:因缘一词随所明之境不同而所指各别,如《瑜伽师地论》列人身因缘三种,故「因缘」与「二缘」之实际所指当随文而定。 5. 与「系缚」「和合」之关系:《显扬圣教论》之系缚相因与和合相因之分,与烦恼随眠之能生后有、因缘和合之能生现在时密切相关。 6. 与「为先、为建立、为和合」之关系:《显扬圣教论》以先导、依立及助伴等条件共同具足之形式总释因相,三者摄于「和合相因」之内。

五、代表性原文引用

1. 《瑜伽师地论》:「因缘一种,亦因亦缘,余唯是缘。」 2. 《瑜伽师地论》:「由种子故,建立因缘;由自性故,立等无间缘;由所缘境故,立所缘缘;由所依及助伴等故,立增上缘。」「诸因诸缘能生识者,彼即此四。」 3. 《瑜伽师地论》:「如是名为由二缘故,以时觉寤,起不过时。」 4. 《瑜伽师地论》:「正方便相一切种别,皆因缘相;如正方便,邪方便亦尔。」 5. 《瑜伽师地论》:「云何为二?一、如所有性故;二、尽所有性故。」 6. 《瑜伽师地论》:列人身因缘三种——一切身共相因缘、未生令生因缘、已生令住因缘。 7. 《显扬圣教论》:明立「二种因」——系缚相因(烦恼随眠,能生后有)与和合相因(因缘和合,能生现在时),并以「此为先」、「此为建立」、「此和合」说明因相。 8. 《显扬圣教论》:「二缘通上地」(简略语句,并与「世俗有二种」、「胜义谓遍行」、「无现染」连文,未列名解说)。

By SutraAI-generated

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》主要以「四緣」框架展開對助成條件的論述,依次為因緣、等無間緣、所緣緣、增上緣。然而在因與緣的概念區分上,經中作出明確判攝:「因緣一種,亦因亦緣,餘唯是緣」,即在四緣之中,唯有因緣兼具因與緣之雙重性質,而等無間緣、所緣緣、增上緣三者則純屬緣而非因。此一區分於四緣框架內形成了「因緣」與「餘三緣」兩類助成條件之歸納,可視為二緣之分的理論基礎。

就四緣各自之定義與建立所依而言,經中云:因緣者謂種子;等無間緣者謂「若此識無間,諸識決定生,此是彼等無間緣」;所緣緣者謂諸心心所所緣境界;增上緣者則除種子外,包括眼等所依及助伴法,「望眼識,所餘識亦爾」。又善不善性能取愛非愛果,如是等類亦名增上緣。其後總括云:「由種子故,建立因緣;由自性故,立等無間緣;由所緣境故,立所緣緣;由所依及助伴等故,立增上緣」,並引經證成:「諸因諸緣能生識者,彼即此四」。

在部類分類上,《瑜伽師地論》將十因、四緣、五果並列為「因等差別」的整體內容,其中十因為隨說因、觀待因、牽引因、生起因、攝受因、引發因、定異因、同事因、相違因、不相違因;五果為異熟果、等流果、離繫果、士用果、增上果,可見緣(條件)與因、果同屬該論因緣果法相系統之重要環節。

至於具體提到「二緣」的段落,經中亦有「如是名為由二緣故,以時覺寤,起不過時」之文,惜此句孤立,未見上下文明載二緣之具體所指。又在四相所攝之正方便相中,經中明言「正方便相一切種別,皆因緣相;如正方便,邪方便亦爾」,就因緣相之白品與黑品分別而論。

在緣起法相施設中,《瑜伽師地論》明文立「二因緣」以施設緣起一切種相:「云何為二?一、如所有性故;二、盡所有性故」。如所有性者,謂無明等諸緣生法漸次相稱因果體性,及「有此因未斷故,有彼果未斷;此未斷因生故,彼未斷果生」;盡所有性者,謂無明等諸緣生行一切種相,廣如前際無智等差別體相之開示。即依此如所有性、盡所有性二門,若總標舉,若別分別;先總標舉說名為初,後即於此復廣開示說名分別。

另就「因緣」一詞之多義而言,經中曾列人身因緣之三種:一切身共相因緣(四大種各別自相)、未生令生因緣(父母不淨和合)、已生令住因緣(糜飯等之所長養),可見同為因緣,所指各隨其境而別。

綜合而言,《瑜伽師地論》對二緣之處理呈現兩條主線:其一,於四緣整體架構中,藉「因緣亦因亦緣」與「餘三唯是緣」之對照,隱然區分出因緣與純緣兩類;其二,於緣起法相之施設中,以「如所有性」「盡所有性」二門為緣起一切種相之施設所依,此即該論中明文標舉之「二因緣」。其他論及因緣之段落,則因所明義不同而各有側重。

顯揚聖教論T1602 · 瑜伽部

《顯揚聖教論》對此處所歸納之「二緣」,其最完整的正文表述實作「二種因」,即「繫縛相因」與「和合相因」。論先破斥另一異計所立同類因、遍行因、俱有因、相應因、異熟因、能作因等六因,指出除異熟因外,其餘五因皆有已成、不定及名言虛設等過失;其後才建立所認為如理的因相。因此,這一對分類是在破除不如理因說之後提出的略攝性因相。

第一,「繫縛相因」指「煩惱隨眠」,是依其能生後有而說。此類因所標示的側面,是煩惱隨眠與後續有之生起相連,故名繫縛;原文並未在此另列更細的支分。

第二,「和合相因」指因緣和合而令彼彼法生,是依能生現在時而說。論中進一步總釋因相:若某法由「此為先」、「此為建立」、「此和合」而使其他諸法或生、或得、或成立、或成辦、或起作用,便說此是彼因。可見「和合相因」不只是一項單獨條件,而著重先導、依立及助伴等條件共同具足的形式。

論以「生」與「得」具體說明此因相。就諸法之生而言,以自種子為先,以除所依種外的色、非色所依及業為建立,以伴與所緣境為和合,隨其所應而生欲繫、色繫、無色繫及不繫諸法。就證得離繫涅槃而言,以聲聞、獨覺及如來種性為先,以內因力為建立,以外因力為和合。內因力包括如理作意、少欲知足,以及得人身、生於聖處、諸根無缺、無業障、於如來所具淨信等;外因力則包括諸佛出世宣說妙法、住正法者為伴侶、具悲信者為施主等。

本論另有「二緣通上地」的簡略語句,並與「世俗有二種」、「勝義謂遍行」及「無現染」連文;但所給原文未解釋此處「二緣」各自所指,故只能記錄其術語及「通上地」之敘述,不宜據此補定內容。

就多譯名歸一而言,本論詳論這組助成條件時所用的明確名目是「二種因」、「繫縛相因」、「和合相因」,並以「為先」、「為建立」、「為和合」說明因相;雖另見「二緣」一語,卻未在該句中列名解說。因此整理此概念時,應保留本論以「二種因」為主要分類名稱的用詞特色,不宜逕將兩項改寫成原文未用的固定「二緣」名目。

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