Dharma · AI Companion

無因生

ahetuka-utpāda

谓执诸法不由因缘、自然而生之邪见,为四边生之一。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span II · emptinessInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is Actually Saying

The concept of 無因生 (*ahetuka-utpāda*, "uncaused arising") names a specific wrong view (邪見): that things come into being without any cause, simply "naturally" (自然). It is not a casual remark—it is a philosophical position that the Buddhist tradition treats as one of the four fundamental errors about how phenomena arise.

The four extremes of arising (四邊生) are meant to exhaust every possible way something could "self-arise" with inherent nature (*svabhāva*, 自性):

1. Self-arising (自生) — a thing produces itself 2. Other-arising (他生) — a thing is produced by something entirely other 3. Both-arising (共生) — a thing is produced by self and other together 4. Uncaused arising (無因生) — a thing simply appears, no cause at all

These four are exhaustive. 《入中論善顯密意疏》 points out that if you grant the assumption that things arise with inherent nature, there is no fifth option. Even the three "caused" forms (自因、他因、共因) collapse into the four categories—any view of inherent arising must land somewhere among them, and what doesn't fit the first three is dragged into 無因生. The 《中論》 encapsulates the whole analysis in its most quoted verse:

「諸法不自生,亦不從他生,不共不無因,是故知無生。」 *Things do not arise from themselves, nor from others, nor from both, nor without cause; therefore we know there is no [inherent] arising.*

What does the view look like in practice? The classical sources describe it as the position someone takes when they observe the intricate variety of nature—lotus stems thick, petals soft, the precise colors and shapes of stamens, pomegranates, peacocks—and notice no craftsman is visible. From this observation, they conclude: things must simply arise naturally, without cause.

The 《瑜伽師地論》 traces how this view typically takes root:

- Through meditation (靜慮): someone achieves a state of absorption and observes phenomena appearing and disappearing without apparent connection. - Through reasoning (尋思): someone notices wild winds starting and stopping, rivers flooding and drying, trees flourishing and withering suddenly—and concludes there is no reliable cause-and-effect.

Once installed, the view operates in two characteristic ways (二相) according to the 《瑜伽師地論》:

- First aspect: it claims "what exists definitely exists, what does not definitely does not; the non-existent cannot be born, the existent cannot be destroyed" (有者定有,無者定無;無不可生,有不可滅). - Second aspect: it contradicts what ordinary experience plainly shows—pregnancy taking eight or nine months, children being born, lifespans varying, fresh experiences appearing moment by moment (新新而非古古).

Several distinctions need to be held firmly:

無因生 is not the same as denying a creator god. The 《入中論善顯密意疏》 explicitly lists creator-god views (自在等因生)—time (時), atoms (微塵), self-nature (自性), a person (士夫), Nārāyaṇa (那羅延天)—as a separate category from 無因生. A creator-god view says things have a *cause*—a god. The 無因生 view says things have *no* cause at all. These are different errors.

Refuting 無因生 does NOT mean Buddhism denies cause-and-effect. The 《入中論善顯密意疏》 is unambiguous: after refuting all four extremes, it still affirms dependent origination (緣起生) — "此有故彼有,此生故彼生" (because this exists, that exists; because this arises, that arises). The wrong view being attacked is the view of uncaused arising with inherent nature. Conventional causality remains intact. The 《中論》 itself uses cause-and-effect (業果次第) as the primary evidence against 無因生—more on this below.

無因生 is also distinct from a third position the 《瑜伽師地論》 identifies: the "non-self-non-other" cause view (非自非他所作因生), which acknowledges causes but fails to perceive their subtle nature, attributing effects to mere "contact" (觸) without understanding its conditions.

In the larger picture of the path of liberation, 無因生 is one of the foundational wrong views (邪見) that need to be cleared away before proper understanding of emptiness and dependent origination can be established. It is not the deepest truth—it is the error that obscures the truth. In the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamaka (應成派中觀) framework, demonstrating that none of the four extremes can hold is itself the demonstration of selflessness (無我)—phenomena have no inherent nature of arising. Refuting 無因生 is therefore not a philosophical exercise. It is a clearing of the ground on which the entire Dharma stands: if things truly arose without cause, there would be nothing to transform, no path to walk, no possibility of liberation.


Life Investigation: Walking Through the Concept

Let me walk through several contemporary scenes where 無因生 hides in plain sight—mostly in forms so culturally accepted we don't even recognize them as views.

Scenario 1: "I Just Got Lucky"

Someone wins a contract at work. Colleagues say, "You're so lucky!" The person believes it: "Yeah, it just happened. No real reason."

What's actually present: A chain of conditions—their years of experience, a colleague's illness that opened a slot, a particular meeting where they said the right thing, the client's current pain point, the budget cycle timing, the chemistry of the room.

Where 無因生 creeps in: The phrase "it just happened" erases the causal chain. The view isn't even conscious—it is the default operating assumption. Events feel like they pop into being out of nothing.

The Buddhist diagnosis: This is the unexamined form of 無因生. The 《瑜伽師地論》 specifically describes people who see phenomena appearing without perceiving their antecedents and conclude there is no cause. The lottery winner's worldview is the popular, watered-down version—more culturally acceptable than the philosophical position, but structurally identical.

Common misreading: "I'm not religious, I don't believe in uncaused things." But believing "it just happened" *is* a form of 無因生—the refined, secular kind that never gets examined because no one is looking for it.

Scenario 2: "We Just Clicked"

A relationship begins. "It was instant chemistry," they say. "No reason, just two people meant for each other."

Where 無因生 hides: The belief that the connection is fundamentally uncaused, even magical—as if it sprang from nowhere. Notice that the older version of this narrative often said "the gods willed it" (自在等因生). The more modern version often drops the god part and just leaves the uncaused spontaneity. The structure is the same; only the agent has been removed.

What gets missed: The two people's histories, the social context that brought them into proximity, the psychological patterns each carried in, the specific timing in their lives that made them available.

The deeper point: The 《中論》 refutation applies here. If the relationship truly arose without cause, the same uncaused spontaneity should appear *everywhere*—why this person, why this time, why this chemistry? "Uncaused" cannot be selective. The very selectivity points to causes. If uncaused spontaneity were the rule, every meeting would feel like love.

Scenario 3: "I Just Feel This Way"

A wave of anxiety or depression arrives. "I don't know why I feel this way," the person says. "It just came over me."

Where 無因生 hides: Mental states treated as causeless weather. The implicit theory: moods are random atmospheric events without antecedents.

The 《瑜伽師地論》 insight: Mental states are conditioned by the "three-fold union" (三事和合) of sense faculty (根), object (境), and consciousness (識). What just happened in the morning? What did the eye see? What sound entered the ear? What thought preceded this feeling? There is always a chain, even when it's hard to trace. The classical text notes that some people dismiss causation precisely because they cannot perceive the "subtle causal touch" (微細因觸)—they notice only the gross feeling, not its triggers.

Common misreading: Believing that noticing a causal chain means "blaming" someone for your feelings. Buddhism is not doing psychological blame; it is pointing to the actual structure of how experience arises. You can recognize causes without being a victim to them—or, more precisely, recognizing causes is the beginning of freedom *from* being a victim to them.

Scenario 4: "The Algorithm Just Showed Me This"

Someone scrolls their feed and sees a piece of content that perfectly matches their current interest. "Weird how that happened," they think.

Where 無因生 hides: The visible hand of the algorithm disappears from perception. The user experiences the result as spontaneous, even though their past behavior, search history, engagement patterns, and dwell time have trained the system to predict them.

This is a particularly instructive modern form: the algorithm is a kind of engineered causal chain whose entire purpose is to make causation invisible. The user's subjective experience is genuinely of "it just appeared." Their experience of 無因生 has been *manufactured* by very deliberate causes.

Where most people map wrong: They think the algorithmic context is irrelevant to the spiritual discussion. But the algorithm is a teacher—it demonstrates, in slow motion, how causation can be hidden so effectively that the result feels uncaused. Recognizing this helps see through other "uncaused" experiences in life.

Scenario 5: The Modern Physics Trap

Someone reads about quantum uncertainty or chaos theory and concludes: "See? Science proves things happen randomly."

What got smuggled in: A category error. Probabilistic causation is not uncaused arising. A quantum event has conditions—wave function, measurement context, energy states—even if the specific outcome is unpredictable. A chaotic system is exquisitely sensitive to initial conditions; that is the opposite of uncaused. The scientific findings show that determinism at the macroscopic level was an oversimplification. They do not show that events occur *without* causes. The Buddhist refutation of 無因生 targets a much stronger claim: that something can arise with *no* conditions whatsoever. No physics actually supports this stronger claim, even when the popular interpretation of physics seems to.


Why Contemporary People Need This Concept

The concept of 無因生 is more relevant today than it was when these texts were composed, and that is not a casual observation.

First, modern life is structurally designed to hide causes. The algorithm example above is one instance. Modern supply chains hide the labor that produces our goods. Economic systems obscure the chain between our consumption and its environmental consequences. The psychological training of modern consumer culture encourages us to experience products, opportunities, relationships, and moods as spontaneously arising rather than as results of conditions. We are, in a sense, systematically trained into a shallow version of 無因生—one that never presents itself as a view because it is the default texture of experience.

Second, the cultural prestige of randomness. Contemporary physics and biology have popularized ideas about quantum uncertainty, chaos theory, evolutionary contingency, and "random" mutation. These are genuine insights within their domains. But they have been popularly transmuted into a worldview that "things happen randomly." A casual conversation invokes "chaos" or "randomness" as explanations for outcomes. Buddhism's response is not to deny these findings but to draw a careful line: the uncaused arising of any specific event is a *metaphysical* position, not a scientific one. Quantum events have causes in a specific sense (probabilistic fields, measurement conditions); they are not "uncaused" in the metaphysical sense the Buddhist tradition is refuting. To say "science has shown things are random" is to mistake scientific findings about *predictability* for findings about *causation*. These are different things, and conflating them is itself a subtle form of 無因生 thinking.

Third, the appeal of nihilism about meaning. When people feel powerless, the view "things just happen, nothing connects to anything else" is psychologically attractive because it releases one from responsibility and from the anxiety of seeing patterns. 無因生 is, in this sense, a comfort view. But it is a comfort view that corrodes agency. If nothing connects, then nothing we do matters. The Buddha's framework, by contrast, affirms connection (緣起, dependent origination) without affirming a fixed, inherently existing controller. This is a more demanding view—but also a more empowering one, because it means our actions genuinely contribute to outcomes, even if there is no "self" that rigidly endures through them.

In the larger architecture of the path, the function of refuting 無因生 is to make room for understanding proper dependent origination. Dependent origination is one of the deep structural teachings of the Dharma, intimately tied to the nature of phenomena themselves. If things truly arose without cause, there would be nothing to transform, no path to walk, no possibility of freedom. The refutation of 無因生 is therefore not just a philosophical correction—it is a clearing of the ground on which the entire structure of practice stands.


Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading 1: "Buddhism denies causality"

Wrong. The 《入中論善顯密意疏》 explicitly affirms "此有故彼有,此生故彼生" after refuting the four extremes. Buddhism denies inherent, self-existent arising (自性生)—not conventional cause-and-effect. When you say "the cup fell because I knocked it," that is not 無因生; that is ordinary dependent origination, which Buddhism affirms. Refuting 無因生 is not the same as denying karma (業), which is precisely the doctrine of causal moral consequence.

Misreading 2: "無因生 is the same as atheism"

Wrong. Refuting 無因生 does not make one an atheist, and asserting 無因生 is not necessarily theism. The Buddhist tradition refutes *both* the view of an uncaused universe (無因生) *and* the view of a creator god (自在等因生). Atheism, in the colloquial sense, usually means rejecting a creator god—Buddhism also rejects the creator god, but for different reasons (the creator would itself be a conditioned thing, so it cannot be the unconditioned source). The position is subtler: there is no unconditioned creator, no uncaused arising, only the ongoing play of conditions.

Misreading 3: "If there's no self, then nothing causes anything"

Wrong—and a subtle form of 無因生 itself. The absence of a permanent self does not entail the absence of causes. A wave has no permanent self, but it is caused by wind, water, and geography. The 《中論》 refutation of 無因生 is specifically designed to prevent this confusion. Phenomena arise dependently without having inherent self-nature—and this dependent arising *is* causation, not its absence.

Misreading 4: "Modern physics shows things happen randomly, so Buddhism is wrong"

As discussed above: this conflates *probabilistic causation* with *no causation*. Quantum events, random mutations, and chaotic dynamics are not examples of uncaused arising; they are examples of complex, probabilistic causation. A mutation is caused by radiation, replication errors, environmental conditions—even if the specific mutation is unpredictable. The Buddhist refutation of 無因生 targets a much stronger claim: that something can arise with NO conditions whatsoever. No physics actually supports this stronger claim.

Misreading 5: "Karma is just 無因生 dressed up"

Wrong, and this is a serious confusion worth facing head-on. Karma (業) is precisely the *opposite* of 無因生—it is the doctrine that intentional actions produce effects, that causes have consequences. The 《中論》 uses karma itself to refute 無因生: if results came without causes, then generosity and ethical conduct should land one in hell, while the five grave offenses should land one in heaven. The existence of moral cause-and-effect is part of the *refutation*, not an example of the view being refuted. This is one of the cleanest pieces of reasoning in the 《中論》: the view of 無因生 and the structure of karma cannot coexist—if you accept karma, you have already abandoned 無因生.

Misreading 6: "I just intuitively feel things happen for no reason—that's my direct experience"

A careful response: what we directly experience is always the *present moment's arising* of phenomena. We do not directly experience the absence of causes; we simply do not perceive the causes. The 《瑜伽師地論》 is helpful here: it notes that the 無因 view often arises because the "subtle causal touch" (微細因觸) is hard to perceive. Not perceiving a cause is not the same as perceiving the absence of a cause. This is a subtle but crucial distinction—absence of perception is not perception of absence. The contemplative traditions develop practices precisely for perceiving the subtle causal touches that ordinary attention skips over.

Misreading 7: "If I just think causes are everywhere, I'm a Buddhist now"

No. Simply affirming that "everything has a cause" can be a kind of materialist or naturalist position that is itself different from the Buddhist view. Buddhism affirms dependent origination (緣起), not a flat "everything is caused by something else." Dependent origination is a specific structural claim: phenomena arise *in dependence on* conditions, and crucially, neither the phenomena nor the conditions have inherent self-nature. The 《入中論善顯密意疏》 emphasizes this when it states the conclusion after refuting all four extremes: "唯是依緣生" (only dependently originated arising)—a precise claim about how arising works, not a generic commitment to "causes exist."


Closing Reflection

無因生 is one of those concepts that, once you see it, you cannot stop seeing it. The world is full of "it just happened" narratives—about careers, relationships, moods, ideas, even spiritual experiences. Most of these are not held as philosophical positions; they are held as the default texture of experience.

The Buddhist tradition is not asking you to abandon noticing spontaneity. Spontaneity, as a feature of phenomena, can be real—a friend surprises you, an unexpected opportunity appears, a sudden insight arises. The Buddhist claim is subtler: spontaneity is not the same as uncaused arising. Even the most surprising event has conditions—often many, often invisible, often including the habits of mind that shape what one notices.

The 《中論》 verse that opens this whole line of inquiry—「諸法不自生,亦不從他生,不共不無因,是故知無生」—is not a denial of arising. It is a precise analysis showing that none of the four ways of conceiving arising as inherently existing actually works. What remains, after the philosophical dust settles, is the arising that depends on conditions: 「此有故彼有,此生故彼生」.

This dependent arising is what enables the path, makes transformation possible, and grounds the entire structure of liberation. To see through 無因生 is to see, finally, that nothing just happens—and that this is not a depressing realization, but a liberating one. If nothing arises without conditions, then the conditions for awakening are themselves arising, here, now, in dependence on what we do and how we attend. The clearing away of this wrong view is not the end of the inquiry; it is the place where the inquiry can begin to bear fruit.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「无因生」(ahetuka-utpāda)谓执诸法不由因缘、自然而有之主张,为中观宗所破斥的四边生之一。此说否认因果相续,认为万物皆自然生起,无有能生之因。三部经论皆将此执列为邪见加以破斥,但对其具体内涵及所破焦点之描述各有侧重。

二、主要阐述

《入中论善显密意疏》将「无因生」置于四边生之框架:若执事物以自性而生,其生起不出自生、他生、共生、无因生四类;有因生摄自因、他因、共因三类,余即无因生,故四宗足以穷尽一切自性生之主张,无第五能生之因。 所破对象乃不承认从因而生者,彼以莲茎之粗、莲瓣之柔、花瓣须蕊之色彩形状、波那娑果、石榴、孔雀等差别皆未见作者制造,遂执诸法唯自然生;此「自然生」即该论所叙无因生之形式。 此论以「诸法非是无因生」直接否定,并并列否定自在等因生、自生、他生、共生;「时、微尘、自性、士夫、那罗延天」等为自在等因所摄之例。 破除无因生并非否定名言因果,论中明言破四生后仍许缘起生,以「此有故彼有,此生故彼生」明因缘关系;所破者乃无因自然生及具自性之四边生,非世间因果名言。 论证形式上以「无自生、他生、共生、无因生」为正因,「诸法」为有法,「永离自性」为所立宗。 又从名言假立补充:诸法由虚妄遍计增上而生,唯由名言分别假立,因果如幻事,自性不生;虽无自性,仍是名言分别安立之境。

《瑜伽师地论》以「无因见论」「无因论」「无因生」三种术语指陈此邪见,分三层面论述。其一,起见之所依:无因见论者依止静虑或寻思而起邪见,或见内外万法前后不相连续而执无因,或见诸因缘空无果报(如风忽起忽止、瀑河忽漫忽竭、果木忽荣忽衰)而立无因之论。 其二,执无因转之二相:第一相于诸行生起因缘、灭尽因缘皆不能了知,遂执「有者定有,无者定无;无不可生,有不可灭」之谬见;第二相毁谤世间共了现量,否认生住灭三位中现可证得之诸行生灭,如男女和合因缘经八月九月而生、寿尽中夭或存活支持、苦乐非苦乐受位差别诸心法皆新新而非古古等。 其三,四种苦乐邪论中之无因生:有沙门或婆罗门依前际或现法建立四种苦乐邪论,依无因生立「非自非他所作因生」,彼于现法中见非自他功用为先所生起者,但由境界现在前故不能了达微细因触,遂起邪执;论主破斥唯有根、境、识三事和合所生之触遍行一切为苦乐因,并无前际或现法中实在之自他可得,唯即于三事和合假立自他。

《中论》以「诸法不自生,亦不从他生,不共不无因」总摄生起之考察,依次排除四者,结论为诸法「无生」;此处「无因生」非承认有一种无因生法,而是列为诸法不能成立之生法之一。 就直接破斥而言,指出万物若无因而有便应常住,然「无因则无果」;并以业果次第作反证:若无因得果,则布施持戒应堕地狱、十恶五逆应生天,因果全无相应。 又区分「无因而有法」与仅有名称言说之无因法,论三无为、虚空、时、方、神、微尘、涅槃等虽常故无因,然但有言说,思惟分别不可得;又区分「作因」与「言说因」,判言说因亦不能成立,总结「无因法世间所无」。 在「法」与「非法」分别中,从生灭关系显示无因之过:若从法生法,因已至或已失皆导向无因;若从非法之无生出法之有,亦是无因而有,如兔角不生龟毛。 又运用于前后世之我:若过去我不作成今日之我,今日之我先无今有,便成作法且是「无因生」,并造成前后我相异、作者受报者分离、业果报失坏、堕于断边等过。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

各经所用术语不同:《入中论善显密意疏》并用「无因生」「从无因生」「自然生」三词,科判称「破无因生」;「自然生」即无因生之异名。《瑜伽师地论》「无因见论」「无因论」「无因生」三词并用,前二者侧重见论之名,后者侧重生起之表述;其独特名相有「诸行」(有为迁流之诸相)、「三位」(生、住、灭或生、变、灭之现可证得位次)、「三事和合」(根、境、识和合)、「触」(遍行心所之一)。《中论》主要使用「无因」「无因无缘」「无因有果」「无因生」等形式,并另用「无因法」「作因」「言说因」等专门术语,且以「今我」「过去世我」「作法」「业果报」等语检验其在人身相续中之矛盾。

三论破斥角度亦各异:《入中论善显密意疏》侧重以四边生框架穷尽自性生之主张;《瑜伽师地论》侧重从禅定或寻思之观察、世间共了现量、苦乐之微细因触三面向加以显破;《中论》从法与非法之生灭关系、业果次第、常住之过、前后世我等四角度展开破斥。

四、与相关概念的关系

「无因生」为四边生(自生、他生、共生、无因生)之一,与其他三边同为执自性生之主张,《中论》以一颂统破四者。 《入中论善显密意疏》以破四边生为成立诸法无自性之正因。「无因生」与「自在等因生」相对:前者否认一切能生之因,后者执大自在天、那罗延天等实在作者。 其否定并不取消缘起生,《入中论善显密意疏》明言破四生后仍许「此有故彼有,此生故彼生」之因缘因果。

五、代表性原文引用

1.《中论》:「诸法不自生,亦不从他生,不共不无因,是故知无生。」 2.《中论》:「若无因有果……布施、持戒应堕地狱,十恶、五逆应生天。」 3.《瑜伽师地论》:「于三位中现可证得诸行生灭,刹帝利、婆罗门、吠舍等家男女和合因缘,经八月或九月而生男女。」 4.《瑜伽师地论》:「唯有诸根、境、识三事和合所生之触,遍行一切为苦乐因。」 5.《入中论善显密意疏》:「诸法非是无因生,亦非自在等因生,非自生,非他生,非共生……唯是依缘生,此有故彼有,此生故彼生。」

By SutraAI-generated

入中論善顯密意疏B0044 · 藏傳論典部

《入中論善顯密意疏》將「無因生」置於「四邊生」的考察中:若主張事物以自性而生,其生起必定不出自生、他生、共生、無因生四類;其中有因生又攝為自因、他因及共因三類,餘者即為無因生,故四宗已足以窮盡一切自性生的主張,並無第五種能生之因。

本經論及此概念時,明確使用「無因生」「從無因生」「自然生」等詞;在科判中則稱「破無因生」。所破的主張,是不承認從因而生,並以蓮莖之粗、蓮瓣之柔,以及花瓣、鬚、蕊的色彩形狀,乃至波那娑果、石榴、孔雀等種種差別,皆未見作者製造為理由,遂認為諸法唯是自然生。此處「自然生」即該論所敘述的無因生形式。

對此,《入中論善顯密意疏》以「諸法非是無因生」直接否定自然、無因的生起,同時並列否定由自在等因而生、自生、他生與共生;文中又以「時、微塵、自性、士夫、那羅延天」等為「自在等因」所攝的例子。由於諸法不從上述方式生起,故論中正面說「唯是依緣生」,亦即依此因緣而有彼果生。

破除無因生並非否定一切名言中的生起與因果。本經明言,破四生之後仍許緣起生,並以「此有故彼有,此生故彼生」說明因緣關係;因此,所否定的是無因自然生及具有自性的四邊生,而不是世間因果名言。論中並警示,不應把「四邊不生」倒說為「全無生」,其所申明的是諸法雖無自性,仍唯依因緣而生。

在論證形式上,本經以「無自生、他生、共生、無因生」為正因,以「諸法」為有法,以「永離自性」為所立宗,說明破四邊生後如何成立諸法無自性。其核心不是另立一種有自性的生法,而是由四種自性生皆不可成立,顯示諸法自性不生。

本經又從名言假立的角度補充:諸法由虛妄遍計增上而生,唯由名言分別假立;因果如幻事,自性不生。雖然無自性,仍是名言分別安立之境,世間在不作自性觀察時所許的因果等皆可成立。故其對「無因生」的否定,與承認名言因果及依緣生相互配合。

中論T1564 · 中觀部

《中論》以「諸法不自生,亦不從他生,不共不無因」總攝對生起的考察,依次排除自生、他生、共生與無因生,並由此說「是故知無生」。因此,本經論及「無因生」時,不是承認有一種無因的生起方式,而是把「無因」列為諸法不能成立的生法之一;其核心結論仍是諸法「無生」。

就無因生的直接破斥而言,《中論》指出:萬物若無因而有,便應成為常住;然而「無因則無果」,故此說不能成立。正文又以業果次第作反證:若果真可以無因得果,則布施、持戒等善行反應墮地獄,十惡、五逆反應生天,因與果之間將全無相應關係。這裡所用的術語形式主要是「無因」「無因無緣」「無因有果」及「無因生」,並以「無果」和業果顛倒顯示其過失。

《中論》也區分「無因而有法」與僅有名稱言說的所謂無因法。當問者舉佛法的「三無為」、外道所說的虛空、時、方、神、微塵、涅槃,以及世間所說的虛空、時、方等,主張其常故無因時,論中答稱:此等「無因法」但有言說,經思惟分別則不可得;若法從因緣有,便不應稱為無因。即使進一步區分「作因」與「言說因」,主張某法雖無作因而有言說因,論中仍判為不能成立,並總結「無因法世間所無」。因此,本經在此明確使用「無因法」「作因」「言說因」等詞,而非另立一類真實存在、無由而生的法。

在「法」與「非法」的分別中,《中論》又從生滅關係說明無因生的過失。「法」名為有,「非法」名為無所有;若說從法生法,無論其因已至或已失,都會導向無因,並墮於斷、常之過。若因已失而仍生,便是「失因」,使所生者成為無因;若說從「非法」之無生出「法」之有,亦等於從無生有,仍是無因而有。論中遂以「如兔角不生龜毛」說明,無所有不能生無所有,也不能由無生有。

此外,《中論》把無因生的問題運用於前後世之「我」。若說過去世的我不作成今日之我,而今日之我先無今有,則今日之我便成為作法,且是「無因生」;同時還會造成前後之我相異、作者與受報者分離、業果報失壞及墮於斷邊等過失。此處顯示本經不只抽象否定無因生,也以「今我」「過去世我」「作法」「業果報」等語,檢驗其在人身相續與果報問題上的矛盾。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》以「無因見論」、「無因論」、「無因生」三種術語指陳主張事物不依因緣而生之邪見,並從其生起之所依、推理之相貌、與苦樂邪論之分類三個層面加以論述,茲分述如下。

一、起見之所依:論中指出,無因見論者乃「依止靜慮」或「依止尋思」而起如是邪見。其觀察有二:其一,「見不相續以為先故,諸內外事無量差別種種生起」,即見內外萬法前後不相連續,遂執無因;其二,「見諸因緣空無果報」,如觀世間忽起大風又忽然止息、瀑河忽爾彌漫又頓然空竭、果木忽然敷榮又忽然衰顇等現象,遂起無因之見,立無因之論。

二、執無因轉之二相:論云「由二種相,無因論者於諸行中執無因轉」。第一相,於「諸行生起因緣、滅盡因緣」皆不能了知,遂執「有者定有,無者定無;無不可生,有不可滅」之謬見。第二相,彼等毀謗世間共所了達之現量,即「於三位中現可證得諸行生滅」之麁淺事實:剎帝利、婆羅門、吠舍等家男女和合因緣,經八月或九月而生男女;生已或壽盡中夭、或存活支持;苦、樂、非苦樂受位差別之諸心法,皆是「新新而非古古」。

三、四種苦樂邪論中之無因生:論又敘述有沙門或婆羅門「越勝現量」,依前際或現法建立四種苦樂邪論:依宿作因立「一向自作」、依自在變化立「一向他作」、依先自在作後宿作因立「自作他作」、依無因生立「非自非他所作因生」。其中無因生者,乃於現法中「非自他功用為先所生起者,但由境界現在前故,不能了達微細因觸」,遂起邪執。論主破斥云:唯有諸根、境、識三事和合所生之觸,遍行一切為苦樂因,並無前際或現法中實在之自、他可得,唯即於此三事和合假立自他。

綜觀全論,本論以「無因見」、「無因論」、「無因生」並用之詞指陳此一邪見,並從禪定或尋思之觀察、世間共了之現量、苦樂之微細因觸三個面向加以顯破。所用術語如「諸行」(有為遷流之諸相)、「三位」(生、住、滅或生、變、滅之現可證得位次)、「三事和合」(根、境、識和合)、「觸」(遍行心所之一),皆本論特有之名相,讀者宜留意其用語之特色。

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