Dharma · AI Companion

心受

caitasikī vedanā

与心相应生起的苦乐感受AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span outside the four-fold two-truths frameworkInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

Web search isn't available, but the provided classical materials from the *Abhidharmakośa* (T1558) are internally consistent and detailed enough to work from. Let me write the full interpretation.


心受 (xīn shòu) — Mental Feeling: The Fruit That Only a Stilled Mind Can Bear

What This Concept Is Saying

Most of us, when we hear the word "feeling," think of one undifferentiated stream: I feel good, I feel bad, I feel blah. The *Abhidharmakośa* (《阿毘達磨俱舍論》, T1558) disagrees. It draws a precise line through the middle of every feeling you have ever had, and on one side it writes 身受 (shēn shòu, bodily feeling) and on the other 心受 (xīn shòu, mental feeling). The line is not "physical vs. emotional" in the casual modern sense. It is a line drawn by *which consciousness is doing the feeling*.

Bodily feeling is feeling that arises together with the five sense consciousnesses — eye, ear, nose, tongue, body. The warmth of sunlight on your forearm, the sharp sting of a paper cut, the sweetness of mango on the tongue: these are 身受. They are tied to sensory contact (觸, sparśa) at one of the five physical doors.

Mental feeling is feeling that arises together with the sixth consciousness, 意識 (mano-vijñāna, mental consciousness). This is the consciousness that thinks, reflects, remembers, imagines, and — crucially — *evaluates*. When you feel a wave of satisfaction after finishing a difficult project, when grief washes over you at a funeral, when a quiet equanimity settles in during meditation: these are 心受. They do not require a physical sense-door. They arise in the mind's own space.

Now, the *Kośa* does not stop at this descriptive taxonomy. It presses the concept into service within its architecture of karma and fruition (業果, karmaphala). And here the definition becomes startlingly specific:

心受, in the strict karmic-fruition sense, is the vipāka (異熟, ripening fruit) of 善無尋業 (wholesome non-vitarka karma).

Let me unpack each term, because each one is load-bearing.

異熟 (vipāka, "ripening fruit"). This is not any old consequence. In Abhidharma, vipāka has a technical meaning: it is the *morally neutral* result that matures from a past wholesome or unwholesome act, arriving in its own time, in its own way, like a fruit that ripens on the branch long after the flower has fallen. Your present-moment pleasure from eating chocolate is not vipāka — it is a direct sensory event. But the *capacity* to experience certain kinds of well-being, the baseline tonality of a life, the quality of consciousness that greets you when you wake — these can be vipāka. 心受 as vipāka means: the *kind* of mental feeling you are capable of experiencing is itself a harvest, seeded by past actions.

善無尋業 (wholesome non-vitarka karma). 尋 (vitarka) is the mind's initial "reaching toward" an object — the first coarse movement of attention that grasps, aims, directs. 伺 (vicāra) is the finer "sustained examining" that follows. Together, 尋伺 (vitarka-vicāra) characterize the ordinary, discursive mind: the mind that is always *going toward* something, *commenting on* something, *narrating* something. In the schema of meditative absorption (靜慮, dhyāna), vitarka and vicāra are present in the first dhyāna but fall away from the second dhyāna upward. So "善無尋業" means: wholesome karmic acts performed *without* that coarse reaching-and-sustaining movement of mind — acts done from a consciousness that has already gone still. Concretely, this covers all wholesome karma from the intermediate dhyāna (中間定, the threshold of the second dhyāna) all the way up to 有頂 (bhavāgra, the Peak of Existence, i.e., the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, 非想非非想處).

The *Kośa*'s verse states the thesis bluntly:

「善無尋業,許唯感心受,惡唯感身受。」 "Wholesome non-vitarka karma, it is accepted, ripens only into mental feeling; unwholesome karma ripens only into bodily feeling."

Why? The argument has two prongs, and both are elegant.

Prong one: why wholesome non-vitarka karma cannot ripen into bodily feeling. Bodily feeling (身受) *necessarily* arises together with vitarka and vicāra. The five sense consciousnesses, in the Abhidharma model, do not operate in a vacuum — they are accompanied by a coarse orienting of attention (尋) and a subtle sustaining of examination (伺). If the *cause* (the karma) was performed without vitarka — in a mind beyond seeking and sustaining — then the *fruit* cannot land in a channel that requires vitarka to function. The seed and the soil must be compatible. A still mind plants a seed that only a still mind can receive. So the fruit goes to 心受 — to the mental-consciousness channel, which does not depend on vitarka.

Prong two: why unwholesome karma cannot ripen into mental feeling. This is the mirror argument, and it is subtler. Unwholesome karma produces suffering (苦受) as its fruit. Now, when suffering arises in the *mental* consciousness, it is given a specific name: 憂 (daurmanasya, mental distress, grief, sorrow). And here is the critical Abhidharma ruling: 憂 is not vipāka. Mental distress is always a present-moment reactive formation, not a slowly ripening neutral fruit. It is too hot, too personal, too entangled with aversion (瞋, dveṣa) to qualify as the cool, morally-neutral maturation that vipāka requires. Therefore, unwholesome karma *cannot* produce its suffering-fruit in the mental channel, because the mental channel's version of suffering (憂) is structurally disqualified from being vipāka. The fruit is forced into the bodily channel: 身受. Pain, illness, physical hardship — these are the ripening forms that unwholesome karma takes.

So the architecture locks into place:

| | Bodily feeling (身受) | Mental feeling (心受) | |---|---|---| | Wholesome non-vitarka karma | Cannot ripen here (no vitarka in the cause) | Ripens here | | Unwholesome karma | Ripens here (as physical suffering) | Cannot ripen here (憂 is not vipāka) |

This is not a moralistic table. It is a *structural* claim about how consciousness works. The *Kośa* is saying: the quality of your mind at the moment of action determines *which channel* the fruit will travel through. A mind that has transcended the restless reaching of vitarka creates karma whose fruit can only be tasted by a mind of similar stillness. A mind caught in affliction creates karma whose fruit can only land on the body.

The Threefold Framework of Feeling-Karma

心受 does not float free. It is positioned within the *Kośa*'s threefold classification of feeling-oriented karma (感受業):

1. 順樂受業 — karma that ripens into pleasant feeling (樂受, sukha). Wholesome karma from the desire realm (欲界) up through the third dhyāna belongs here, because pleasant feeling reaches its peak at the third dhyāna. 2. 順苦受業 — karma that ripens into painful feeling (苦受, duḥkha). This is unwholesome karma, and as we have seen, it ripens exclusively into bodily feeling. 3. 順不苦不樂受業 — karma that ripens into neutral feeling (不苦不樂受, upekṣā / aduḥkhāsukha). Wholesome karma from above the third dhyāna belongs here, because the higher realms have neither pleasure nor pain.

心受 spans categories 1 and 3: it can be pleasant (in the second and third dhyānas) or neutral (from the fourth dhyāna upward, where only 捨受, equanimous feeling, remains). But it is *never* painful, because mental pain is 憂, and 憂 is not vipāka. This is a remarkable claim: in the karmic-fruition system, the mind's own ripened fruit is never suffering. Suffering, as vipāka, is always bodily. The mind's harvest is either joy or equanimity.

The Meditative Correspondence

The *Kośa* ties this to the progressive refinement of consciousness through the dhyānas:

- From the second dhyāna upward, there is no longer any "surplus consciousness" (無餘識) operating through the five sense doors in the ordinary way, and the coarse mental joy (心悅) of the first dhyāna has been refined away. - The fourth dhyāna has only 捨受 (equanimous feeling) — neither pleasure nor pain. - This entire range, from the second dhyāna to the Peak of Existence, is precisely the range where 善無尋業 operates and where 心受 is the sole channel of fruition.

The deeper you go into meditative stillness, the more your experience is *purely* 心受. The body drops out of the equation. What remains is consciousness feeling its own quality — luminous, still, self-sustaining.


A Walkthrough in Everyday Life

Now let's take this off the Abhidharma page and walk it through a Tuesday.

Morning commute. You are on the subway, pressed between a backpack and someone's elbow. The elbow in your ribs — that is 身受. It is body-consciousness registering pressure and discomfort at the body door. No story needed, no evaluation, just the raw sensory event. Now: you notice the elbow, and your mind *reaches toward* it (there is 尋, vitarka — the coarse orienting of attention). You think, "This person has no spatial awareness." You sustain that judgment (伺, vicāra). A little heat of irritation arises. That irritation is a mental event, yes, but notice: it is *not* 心受 in the vipāka sense. It is a present-moment reactive formation, entangled with aversion. It is closer to 憂 — mental distress — and the *Kośa* would say it is *not* a ripening fruit. It is something you are *manufacturing right now*, with vitarka and vicāra as your tools.

Here is the common mis-mapping: people say, "I *feel* annoyed" and classify it alongside "I feel the elbow" as if both are the same kind of feeling. The *Kośa* says they are not even in the same category. One is 身受 (sensory, pre-reflective). The other is a mental fabrication that *mimics* feeling but is actually a volitional reaction. True 心受 — the mind's own ripened feeling — would be something more like the baseline mood you woke up with, the tonality of well-being or unease that was *already there* before the elbow arrived.

At work, finishing a long project. You hit "send" on the final deliverable. There is a physical exhale, shoulders dropping — 身受, pleasant, at the body door. And then there is something else: a quiet, wordless satisfaction that seems to come from *nowhere in particular*. It is not located in the body. It did not arrive through a sense door. It is the mind tasting its own accomplishment. This is closer to 心受. Notice its quality: it does not have the "reaching" character of vitarka. You did not *go looking* for this satisfaction. It arose because the mind, for a moment, is not grasping toward the next task. It is *receiving* what is already here. In the *Kośa*'s framework, this small, everyday echo mirrors the logic of 善無尋業: when the mind acts without frantic reaching, the fruit it reaps is a mental feeling that also has no reaching in it. It simply *is*.

Scrolling your phone at midnight. This is where the 尋伺 analysis becomes almost painfully relevant. Every swipe is a micro-vitarka: the mind *reaches toward* the next stimulus. Every pause to read a comment is a micro-vicāra: the mind *sustains examination* of what it found. The entire activity is, in Abhidharma terms, a continuous generation of 尋伺 — coarse orienting and subtle sustaining, hundreds of times per hour. You are, in the *Kośa*'s language, doing the exact opposite of 無尋業. You are generating karma (or at least mental formations) that are *saturated* with vitarka. And what is the fruit? Not 心受. The fruit stays in the 身受 channel: eye strain, the tension in your neck, the vague bodily restlessness that makes you shift position again and again. The mind itself, meanwhile, gets *nothing* — no ripened satisfaction, no settled well-being. It just keeps reaching. The *Kośa* would look at midnight scrolling and say: this is a consciousness that has made itself incapable of receiving its own fruit.

A quiet moment in nature, or in meditation. You are sitting by a window. Rain on the glass. You are not thinking about anything in particular. You are not *reaching* for the next thought. The sound of rain is there (身受, at the ear door), but your attention is not organized around it. What dominates is a soft, diffuse contentment — or, if the stillness deepens, something even more neutral: a simple *okayness*, an equanimous being-here. This is the everyday shadow of what the *Kośa* means by 心受 as the fruit of 善無尋業. The mind, released from vitarka, tastes its own ripened quality. And notice: this feeling did not come *from* the rain. The rain is 身受. The contentment is 心受. They are in different channels, even though they co-occur.

In a close relationship. Your partner says something hurtful. The words hit your ear (身受 at the ear door — just sound waves, technically neutral). Then the mind *reaches* (vitarka): "What did they mean by that?" It *sustains* (vicāra): turning the phrase over, examining tone, replaying. And then: 憂. Grief, or anger, or the cold ache of feeling unseen. The *Kośa*'s crucial insight here is that this 憂 is *not* a karmic fruit landing on you from the past. It is a *present-moment construction*, built from vitarka and vicāra and the latent tendency toward aversion. You are not *receiving* this pain; you are *making* it. This does not mean it doesn't hurt. It means the relationship between your action and your suffering is not the passive "I did bad things, so now I feel bad" that popular karma-talk suggests. The suffering is in the *making*, in the reaching-and-sustaining. If the mind could hear those words without vitarka — fully, clearly, but without the coarse lunge toward interpretation — the 憂 would not arise in the same way. What would arise instead? Perhaps 心受: a clear, sad-but-not-torn knowing. A feeling that the mind *receives* rather than *manufactures*.

The mis-mapping to watch for here: people often say "my feelings" as if all feelings belong to them in the same way. The *Kośa* suggests that 身受 and 心受 have different owners, different origins, and different relationships to your agency. Bodily feeling happens *to* you. Mental distress (憂) is something you *do*. And ripened mental feeling (心受 as vipāka) is something you *receive* — but only if you have created the conditions for it.


Why Contemporary People Need This Concept

1. It rescues "feeling" from vagueness. Contemporary culture talks about feelings constantly — "how does that make you feel?", "honor your feelings," "emotional intelligence." But almost all of this discourse treats feeling as a single, undifferentiated category. The *Kośa*'s 身受/心受 distinction says: *which* feeling? A bodily sensation and a mental evaluation are not the same event, and conflating them leads to confusion. When you say "I feel anxious," is that a tightness in the chest (身受) or a narrative of catastrophic prediction (a mental formation involving vitarka)? The answer changes what you do about it. The body tightness might need movement, rest, breath. The mental narrative might need the vitarka to be seen *as* vitarka — as reaching — and allowed to stop.

2. It offers a precise diagnosis of digital exhaustion. The modern attention economy is, in Abhidharma terms, a mass-production machine for vitarka and vicāra. Notifications, infinite scroll, autoplay, algorithmic recommendation — every design pattern is engineered to keep the mind *reaching* (尋) and *sustaining examination* (伺). The *Kośa*'s framework predicts the result with eerie precision: a consciousness saturated with vitarka cannot generate 善無尋業, and therefore cannot ripen 心受. The fruit stays trapped in the bodily channel — tension, fatigue, restlessness, the somatic hum of overstimulation. People report feeling "numb" or "flat" after hours of scrolling. The *Kośa* would say: of course. You have been doing the one thing that structurally prevents mental feeling from ripening. You have been making yourself, for hours at a time, a mind that *cannot receive its own fruit*.

This is not a moral judgment. It is a structural observation, like saying "if you never water the plant, it will not fruit." The digital environment is not evil. But it is, in the specific technical sense of the *Kośa*, an environment hostile to the conditions under which 心受 arises.

3. It reframes the relationship between effort and happiness. A great deal of contemporary self-help operates on the model: do the right actions → get the right feelings. Work hard, exercise, optimize your routine, and happiness will follow. The *Kośa* agrees that action matters — karma is real — but it adds a crucial qualifier: *the quality of consciousness in which you act determines the channel through which the fruit arrives.* You can work hard with a mind full of vitarka — anxious, grasping, narrating, comparing — and the fruit will land on the body (tension, exhaustion, the physical toll of stress). Or you can work hard with a mind that has, at least in moments, released its frantic reaching — and the fruit can land in the mental channel, as a quiet well-being that does not depend on external validation.

This is not "just relax." The *Kośa* is talking about 善業 — wholesome, intentional, ethically grounded action. The point is not passivity. The point is that *how* you hold your mind while acting is not a decorative add-on to the action; it is the factor that determines *where the fruit will land*. Two people can do the same work. One reaps 身受 (a tired body, a strained nervous system). The other reaps 心受 (a settled mind, a quiet joy). The difference is not in the work. It is in the vitarka.

4. It speaks to the contemplative traditions' deepest claim. The dhyāna framework embedded in this concept is not merely a classification scheme. It is a *map of what becomes possible* as the mind grows still. The claim that from the second dhyāna upward, experience is *purely* 心受 — that the body drops out and consciousness tastes only its own quality — is a claim about the ultimate independence of mind from matter. In the fourth dhyāna, where only equanimity (捨受) remains, the mind is feeling *nothing from the outside*. It is not pleased or pained by any object. It is simply *being*, and that being has a feeling-tone, and that feeling-tone is its own ripened fruit. For a civilization that has staked almost everything on external stimulation as the source of well-being, this is a radical counter-claim: *the mind has a happiness that does not come from objects.* But you can only find it if you stop reaching.

A note on contemporary parallels: certain strands of neuroscience and contemplative science have begun to investigate what happens to default-mode network activity and affective baseline during advanced meditation. Some findings — reduced narrative self-referential processing, shifts in tonic affect — resonate loosely with the Abhidharma picture of vitarka subsiding and 心受 emerging. But the resonance is partial and structural, not confirmatory. Neuroscience measures correlates; the *Kośa* is making claims about karmic causation and the fine structure of consciousness that no brain-imaging paradigm can currently adjudicate. The analogy can illuminate; it cannot validate. And the Abhidharma framework is embedded in a soteriological project — liberation from saṃsāra — that has no counterpart in empirical science. Let the parallel be a bridge for curiosity, not a certificate of proof.


Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading 1: "心受 just means emotional feeling, and 身受 means physical sensation."

This is the most common flattening, and it is wrong in a way that matters. The distinction is not "emotional vs. physical." It is "mental-consciousness-correlated vs. five-sense-consciousness-correlated." A strong emotion like rage can involve massive bodily components (adrenaline, flushed skin, pounding heart — all 身受 at the body door) *and* mental components (the narrative of injustice, the sustained rumination — involving vitarka and vicāra). Conversely, a subtle aesthetic pleasure — the quiet rightness of a well-proportioned room — might be almost entirely 心受, with minimal bodily involvement. The line is drawn by *which consciousness*, not by *how it feels from the inside*.

Misreading 2: "So mental suffering isn't real? The Kośa says 憂 isn't vipāka, so my depression and grief don't count?"

No. The *Kośa* is not saying 憂 is unreal or unimportant. It is making a technical claim about *causal category*. 憂 (daurmanasya) is a real, painful, sometimes devastating mental event. What it is *not*, in the Abhidharma system, is a *vipāka* — a slowly ripening, morally neutral karmic fruit. It is, instead, a present-moment formation (a 行, saṃskāra, in the aggregate schema), arising from conditions here and now: from vitarka, from vicāra, from latent afflictions (隨眠, anuśaya), from contact with disagreeable objects. This distinction is actually *empowering*: if your mental suffering were a vipāka — a fruit you must simply endure until it exhausts itself — you would be stuck. But because it is a present-moment construction, it can be *deconstructed*. You can see the vitarka arising. You can watch the vicāra sustaining. You can, in principle, let them stop. The *Kośa*'s exclusion of 憂 from vipāka is not a dismissal of pain. It is the structural basis for the possibility of freedom from it.

Misreading 3: "Karma is just reward and punishment. Good deeds → good feelings. Bad deeds → bad feelings."

The 心受/身受 framework demolishes this simplistic moral arithmetic. The *Kośa* is not saying "good people feel good and bad people feel bad." It is saying that the *structure of consciousness* at the moment of action determines the *channel* of fruition. A wholesome act done with a frantic, grasping mind (full of vitarka) will not ripen as 心受, no matter how "good" the act looks from outside. And an unwholesome act does not ripen as a mental punishment handed down from above; it ripens as *bodily* suffering, because the mental channel's version of suffering (憂) is structurally disqualified. The system is not retributive. It is *mechanical* — in the sense that it follows from the nature of consciousness itself, the way water follows gravity.

Misreading 4: "This is only relevant to advanced meditators. I'm not going to reach the second dhyāna."

The dhyāna framework is the *Kośa*'s precise laboratory for observing these dynamics, yes. But the underlying principle — that the presence or absence of vitarka changes the *kind* of feeling you experience — operates at every level. You do not need to reach the second dhyāna to notice the difference between a mind that is *reaching* for the next moment and a mind that is *receiving* this one. The person who eats lunch while checking email and the person who eats lunch while actually tasting the food are, in a rough-and-ready sense, living the 尋/無尋 distinction. The fruit of the first meal is mostly 身受 (a vaguely unsatisfied body, a tense jaw). The fruit of the second meal includes 心受 (a small, genuine satisfaction that the mind *received* rather than *chased*). The *Kośa* gives you the precise vocabulary. You do not need to be in a cave to use it.

Misreading 5: "The mind's ripened fruit is never suffering — so Buddhism promises that the mind is always happy?"

No. The claim is narrower and more interesting than that. The *Kośa* says that *as vipāka* — as karmic ripening — the mental channel does not produce suffering. But the mind *does* suffer, constantly, through 憂 — through present-moment reactive formations that are *not* vipāka. The mind's suffering is self-inflicted, in the precise sense that it is *constructed* by vitarka and vicāra and affliction in the present moment. It is not a fruit you are passively receiving; it is a fire you are actively feeding. And that is exactly why it can stop. The *Kośa*'s claim is not "the mind is always happy." It is: "the mind's *ripened nature* is not suffering. The suffering is added. And what is added can be removed."

This, in the end, is where 心受 sits in the larger arc of the path. It is not merely a technical slot in an Abhidharma table. It is a pointer toward the Buddhist claim that cuts deepest: that the mind, in its own nature, is not the problem. The problem is what the mind *does* — the reaching, the sustaining, the narrating, the manufacturing of 憂. Strip that away, and what remains is a consciousness capable of receiving its own fruit: joy, or equanimity, or the simple, unadorned okayness of a mind that has stopped running. The fourth dhyāna's 捨受 — pure equanimity, neither pleased nor pained — is not emptiness in the nihilistic sense. It is fullness. It is the mind, finally, *feeling itself*.

The *Heart Sūtra* (《心經》) speaks of "照見五蘊皆空" — "seeing clearly that the five aggregates are empty." 受 (vedanā, feeling) is the second of those five aggregates. To see feeling as empty is not to deny it. It is to see that what you took to be a solid, unitary "my feeling" is actually a layered, conditioned, channel-specific process — 身受 here, 心受 there, 憂 manufactured in between. And in that seeing, the grip loosens. You stop *being* the feeling and start *watching* it arise. And in the watching, there is a space — a small, still space — where 心受 can land.

That space is what the *Kośa* is pointing at, across all its technical precision. The table of karma and fruition, the arguments about vitarka and vipāka, the mapping of dhyāna upon dhyāna — all of it is scaffolding around one quiet claim: *the mind can feel, without reaching. And that feeling is enough.*


*All classical citations are drawn from the* Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya *(《阿毘達磨俱舍論》, T1558), as synthesized in the provided source materials. The* Heart Sūtra *(《般若波羅蜜多心經》) citation is a widely attested canonical phrase. No quotations have been fabricated or paraphrased as scripture.*

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「心受」指与意识相应之受,即心理层面的感受作用,与五识相应之「身受」构成对举。在《阿毘达磨俱舍论》(《阿毘達磨俱舍論》) 的业果体系中,心受特指善无寻业所招感之异熟果,其范围涵盖从中间定(第二静虑)乃至有顶(非想非非想处)的善业所生感受。

二、主要阐述

感受业的三分框架

《俱舍论》将感受业区分为三类:顺乐受业、顺苦受业、顺不苦不乐受业。其中善业自欲界至第三静虑属顺乐受业,以乐受至此而极;第三静虑以上之善业属顺不苦不乐受业,因上地已无苦乐受故。心受之定位即在此三分框架中确立。

善无寻业唯感心受

论中颂文明确指出:「善无寻业,许唯感心受,恶唯感身受。」此为心受概念最核心之命题。其理据有二:

其一,身受必与寻伺俱起,而善无寻业无寻伺相伴,故不能招感身受,唯感心受。

其二,不善业以苦受为果,而心俱苦受决定名「忧」,忧非异熟生,故不善业之心受不成立为异熟果,不善业遂唯感身受。

本论问答之印证

论中引述本论问答以证成此义:「颇有业感心受异熟非身耶?」答曰:「有,谓善无寻业。」又引:「颇有三业非前非后受异熟耶?」谓顺乐受业感色,顺苦受业感心心所法,顺不苦不乐受业感心不相应行。由此证明下地亦有顺非二业,且善无寻业确能感心受而非身受。

与静虑受类的对应

论于静虑受类中说明:第二静虑以上无有乐受、无余识故、心悦麁故;第四静虑唯有舍受。此与善无寻业感心受之范围相呼应——第二静虑以上既无寻伺,其业唯感心受。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

本条目所据材料仅涉及《阿毘达磨俱舍论》(《阿毘達磨俱舍論》,毘昙部) 一部,未见其他部类经论或异译本之对照材料。就本论内部而言,术语使用一致:以「心受」与「身受」对举;以「善无寻业」标示能感心受之业种;以「异熟」指果报;以「中定」称第二静虑;以「有顶」称非想非非想处。

四、与相关概念的关系

- 身受:五识相应之受,与心受对举。善无寻业唯感心受不感身受,不善业唯感身受不感心受。 - 寻伺:身受必与寻伺俱起,故无寻伺之善业不能感身受;此为心受与身受分界之关键。 - 异熟:心受为善无寻业之异熟果;忧虽为心俱苦受,然非异熟,故不摄入不善业所感心受。 - 顺乐受业、顺苦受业、顺不苦不乐受业:感受业之三分框架,心受之定位依此建立。 - 静虑地:第二静虑以上无寻伺,其善业唯感心受;第四静虑唯有舍受。 - :心俱苦受决定名忧,忧非异熟,此为不善业不感心受之理据。

五、代表性原文引用

- 「善无寻业,许唯感心受,恶唯感身受。」 - 「颇有业感心受异熟非身耶?」「有,谓善无寻业。」 - 「颇有三业非前非后受异熟耶?」——顺乐受业感色,顺苦受业感心心所法,顺不苦不乐受业感心不相应行。 - 身受必与寻伺俱故,无寻业无寻伺相伴,故不能感身受。 - 不善业以苦受为果,心俱苦受决定名忧,忧非异熟。

By SutraAI-generated

大智度論T1509 · 釋經論部

《大智度論》論「心受」,始終置於四念處中「受念處」的觀照脈絡,並與「身受」對舉而成一對核心術語。論中明言:「佛說有二種受:身受、心受。身受是外,心受是內。」 此即心受在本論中的根本定位——屬內、屬心。其判準復以識相應而分:「五識相應受是外,意識相應受是內」,故心受即是與意識相應而起的感受;與此相應,「五識相應樂,是名外樂;意識相應樂,是名內樂」,苦受、不苦不樂受亦依此例而分內外。論中又從所緣立判:「緣內法,是為內受;緣外法,是為外受」,並以「麁受是為外,細受是為內」,心受由此兼攝「細受」之義。此處須記本論用語:論中不單言「受」,而特立「身受」「心受」之二分,並以「意識相應受」詮心受、以「五識相應受」詮身受,此即本論詮表該概念的術語形式。

就苦樂之實,論中進一步細分內苦:「內苦有二種:身苦、心苦。身苦者,身痛、頭痛等四百四種病;心苦者,憂、愁、瞋、怖、嫉妬、疑,如是等是為心苦。二苦和合,是為內苦。」 是知心受所攝之苦,特指憂愁瞋怖等心理之苦,與身痛等身苦有別;外苦則為王者、惡賊、師子虎狼之逼害及風雨寒熱雷電等,名為外受,樂受、不苦不樂受亦如是例推。

心受之所以被提出,關鍵在於觀照實踐中「誰受」之問。論云:「以樂故貪身,誰受是樂?思惟已,知從心受,眾生心狂顛倒故而受此樂。當觀是心無常生滅相,一念不住,無可受樂;人以顛倒故,謂得受樂。」 此明苦樂之受終歸於心,而心復無常生滅、一念不住,實無能受之主体,凡夫以顛倒故妄謂受樂。受念處之要旨亦在於此:「觀世間樂受是苦,觀苦受如箭,不苦不樂受觀無常壞敗相」,遂能「樂受中不生欲著,苦受中不生恚,不苦不樂受中不生愚癡」。於觀內外受空時,行者復問「若樂即是苦,誰受是苦?」,結論仍是「念已則知心受」,然後進而觀心為實為虛。

在受眾之總分別中,論中重述此二分:「復有二種受:身受、心受,內受、外受,麁、細,遠、近,淨、不淨等」,並廣開三受(苦、樂、不苦不樂)、四受(內身受、外身受、內心受、外心受)、五受(樂、苦、憂、喜、捨五根)、六受眾(六識相應受),乃至由意識分別開為十八受、淨垢為三十六、三世合為百八受。可見本論以「心受」為受念處觀內受之樞紐,上通身受之對、下貫意識相應與緣內法諸義。

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》論「心受」,係將感受分為「心受」與「身受」二類,並以業之善惡、有尋無尋為判準,說明何種業感何種受。其核心命題見於頌文:「諸善無尋業,許唯感心受,惡唯感身受,是感受業異。」 此處「心受」與「身受」對舉,構成俱舍論感受分類的一組基本範疇;而「感受業異」一語,表明此分類之目的在於辨析業與受之間的因果對應關係。

論主世親於長行中進一步釋曰:「善無尋業,謂從中定乃至有頂所有善業,於中能招受異熟者,應知但感心受非身,身受必與尋伺俱故。」 此段揭示心受之所以唯屬善無尋業,其理據在於「身受必與尋伺俱」——身受之生起必須與尋、伺二心所相應,而中定(中間靜慮)以上乃至有頂(非想非非想處)之善業已離尋伺,故其所感異熟唯是心受,不復有身受。換言之,心受在此被界定為離尋伺之感受,其存在層級高於身受,屬於上界(色界中定以上、無色界)定地善業所招之異熟果。

相對地,論云:「諸不善業能感受者,應知但感身受非心,以不善因苦受為果。」 不善業所感唯是身受而非心受,理由為不善因以苦受為果。緊接著論主處理一關鍵問題:心俱之苦受何以不名異熟?論曰:「心俱苦受,決定名憂,憂非異熟,如前已辯。」 此句極為要緊——俱舍論將與心相應之苦受「決定」名為「憂」,而憂不被承認為異熟果。由此可知,在俱舍論的術語體系中,「心受」之異熟僅限於善無尋業所感者(即上界定地之悅受或捨受),而與不善業相應之心俱苦受雖亦屬心受範疇,卻被另立為「憂」,且被排除於異熟之外。

就術語形式而言,本論直用「心受」「身受」為對稱概念,未以他名替代;又用「異熟」一詞指稱業果,此為玄奘譯場之固定譯法。論中以「尋伺」說明身受之必要條件,以「中定」「有頂」標定心受所屬之界地範圍,以「憂」專指心俱苦受而別於異熟,皆為本論論述心受時之特有術語配置。

總之,俱舍論對心受之論述,非泛論感受心理,而是置於業感異熟之因果框架中,以「有尋無尋」為分界,將心受定位為離尋伺之定地善業異熟果,並透過「憂非異熟」之判定,將不善心俱苦受排除於心受異熟之外,形成一套嚴密的業—受對應學說。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》論「心受」,以「所依根」與「相應識」為判準,與「身受」對舉而立。論中明言:「此若五識相應,名身受;若意識相應,名心受。」 即樂受、苦受、不苦不樂受三受,若與前五識相應則歸身受,若與意識相應則歸心受,此為本論最核心之界定方式。

於「受自性」問答中,論進一步從所依根說明:「略有六種,謂依眼等六觸所生。此復二種,若色為依名身受,無色為依名心受。何以故?由前五根皆色性故。」 前五根(眼耳鼻舌身)屬色法,依之而生諸受合名身受;意根非色法,唯依意根而生者獨名心受。論中設難:意根亦不離身而轉,何以不名身受?答曰:「生無色界有情,意根離身而轉。是故五根所生諸受合名身受,唯依意者獨名心受。」 此即以意根可離色身獨轉(如無色界有情)為心受獨立成立之理據。論又總括:「一切受皆領納相。」

本論復以五種相安立諸受差別:「一、自性故;二、所依故;三、所緣故;四、助伴故;五、隨轉故。」 自性即苦、樂、不苦不樂三受;所依即眼耳鼻舌身意六根;所緣即色等六境;助伴謂想、思及其餘善、不善、無記心法與受相應;隨轉謂「此相應心,由依彼故,三受隨轉,彼為諸受同生同滅所依止處」,即心王為諸受同生同滅之所依,受與心展轉相應而轉。此五相中,心受即於「所依」屬意根、「助伴」與意識心法相應、「隨轉」依意識同生同滅之受。

就受與識之關係,論以欣慼差別說明:「苦受相應識名慼,此能了別隨順憂苦不可意法;樂受相應識名欣,此能了別隨順喜樂可意諸法;不苦不樂受相應識名非欣非慼。」 心受與意識相應,即於此欣、慼、非欣非慼三類中呈現其了別功能。

本論又就染淨品建立受之分類:「若隨順涅槃、隨順決擇,畢竟出離、畢竟離垢、畢竟能令梵行圓滿,名無愛味受;若墮於界,名有愛味受。若色無色界繫,若隨順離欲,名依出離受;若欲界繫,若不順離欲,名依耽嗜受。」 心受通於染淨二品,非定屬染污。論末更以「二毒箭」喻明:心未解脫者於苦受圓滿領納,由貪瞋癡染心領納,復由生等苦相應領納,如一人中二毒箭;心解脫者則「具領三受」而無染惱。 又「有味受者,諸世間受;無味受者,諸出世受。依耽嗜受者,於妙五欲諸染污受。依出離受者,即是一切出離、遠離所生諸善定不定地俱行諸受。」

要之,《瑜伽師地論》以「意識相應」與「依無色意根」為心受之雙重判準,復以五相(自性、所依、所緣、助伴、隨轉)統攝受之差別,並以有愛味、無愛味、依耽嗜、依出離等染淨門顯示心受通於世間與出世間。

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