Dharma · AI Companion

不定地

aniyata-bhūmi

心行尚未决定所属的阶位AI-generated

Type AttainmentDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arisingInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

不定地 (*buding di*, “the ground of non-collectedness”) is also called 非三摩呬多地 (*fei sanmoheduo di*, “the ground of the non-composed or non-collected mind”). Here 三摩呬多 (*sanmoheduo*, Sanskrit *samāhita*) means that the mind has been gathered, composed, and established in meditative collectedness. “Ground” here does not mean a physical place. It means a distinguishable condition or stage of mind.

A useful one-sentence definition is therefore:

The ground of non-collectedness comprises twelve conditions in which the mind has not entered meditative collectedness, cannot remain there, has emerged from it, or has lost what it previously attained.

This is considerably broader than “distraction.” An obviously scattered mind belongs here, but so does a concentrated mind lacking meditative pliancy; a meditator who has gained an imperfect absorption; an accomplished practitioner who can enter and leave worldly concentration at will but has not uprooted the latent tendencies of affliction; and even someone whose concentration remains intact but who has simply emerged from it.

The point of the classification is diagnostic. “The mind is not in concentration” does not tell us why. The *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* (《瑜伽師地論》, T1579) distinguishes twelve reasons, and each calls for a different response.

1. 自性不定 — non-collected by intrinsic character. The five sensory consciousnesses—seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and bodily sensing—do not, by their intrinsic character, belong to meditative collectedness. This is not a condemnation of the senses. It distinguishes a moment of sensory cognition from a mind established in *samāhita*. The prescribed cultivation takes such objects as the bluish, swollen, or decomposing aspects of a corpse and holds the mind to their signs. The point is not that sensory consciousness itself becomes absorption; sensory perception supplies a properly apprehended sign upon which the mind can subsequently be established. In its traditional context, this contemplation also weakens fascination with bodily beauty.

2. 闕輕安 — lacking pliancy. A desire-realm mind may possess 心一境性 (*xin yijing xing*, “one-pointedness of mind”) and still not count as meditative collectedness. The treatise states: “欲界繫諸心心法,雖具心一境性,然無輕安含潤轉故不名為定”—although desire-realm minds and mental factors possess one-pointedness, they are not called concentration because they do not operate permeated by 輕安 (*qing’an*, “pliancy” or “ease”).

This is a crucial boundary. A programmer absorbed in debugging, a gamer locked onto a screen, or an anxious person unable to stop monitoring a message may all display narrow attentional stability. That alone is not Buddhist meditative concentration. Pliancy indicates a serviceable, eased, non-coercive condition of body and mind, not merely attentional capture.

3. 不發趣 — not setting out. A person deeply attached to sensual pleasures continually consumes and enjoys them, without turning toward the cultivation of concentration. This is not the ordinary fact that pleasant things feel pleasant. The obstruction is the settled orientation of life: gratification repeatedly wins, so the mind never genuinely sets out toward the fundamental concentration.

4. 極散亂 — extreme distraction. A beginner has begun to cultivate concentration, but the mind streams outward after attractive objects of the five senses. Unlike the third condition, there is already an intention to practise. The difficulty is that attention cannot remain gathered. The remedy begins with establishing mindfulness, gently collecting the mind, and using clear comprehension to recover it quickly.

5. 太略聚 — excessive contraction. The beginner draws the mind inward, but it becomes covered by dullness and sleepiness. “Collected” is not always good: attention can be so contracted that clarity disappears. The traditional response is to contemplate a bright, inspiring, or beautiful sign and to recognize accurately the way the mind is sinking. Distraction requires gathering; dull contraction requires brightening. Treating both with tighter effort can make the second worse.

6. 未證得 — not yet attained. Gross distraction and excessive contraction may have subsided, yet the practitioner has not obtained the relevant 作意 (*zuoyi*, “modes of attention” or “mental application”) belonging to the progress of concentration. Quietness is therefore not automatically attainment. At this stage the practitioner is told not to forget the teacher’s instruction, but to maintain strong recollection, employ an appropriate method, and practise continuously and earnestly.

7. 未圓滿 — not brought to completion. The appropriate mental application has arisen, but 加行究竟及彼果 (*jiāxíng jiùjìng jí bǐ guǒ*, “the culmination of preparatory practice and its result”) has not yet been realized. The danger here is premature satisfaction: a modest calm, unusual clarity, or memorable meditative experience is mistaken for completion. The remedy is not to become content with an inferior attainment.

8. 雜染污 — contaminated. The practitioner has reached the culminating mental application and its result, yet the mind is stained by 愛味 (*aiwei*, “relishing” or “savouring attachment”) and related afflictions. Concentration itself has become an object of craving: “I want that bliss again”; “I am now an advanced meditator”; “This state proves what I am.” The treatise instructs the practitioner to contemplate the defects of such contamination and to remove attachment as soon as it appears.

9. 不自在 — lacking mastery. The mind is no longer contaminated in that way, but the practitioner lacks command over entering, remaining in, and emerging from the concentrations. An occasional successful sitting is not mastery. The remedy is uninterrupted cultivation of *samādhi* and skilful understanding of its characteristic signs.

10. 不清淨 — not purified. The practitioner can enter, remain in, and emerge from concentration as desired, but has attained only 世間定 (*shijian ding*, “worldly concentration”). The latent tendencies of the afflictions have not been permanently injured or eliminated. This is one of the classification’s deepest warnings: mastery of altered or exalted states is not identical with liberation. The prescribed response is vigorous cultivation of skilfulness concerning the truths—that is, insight directed toward reality and release, not the indefinite refinement of peaceful experience.

11. 起 — emergence. The concentration has not deteriorated, but the mind has emerged from it. The treatise says: “所得定雖不退失,然出定故不名為定”—although the concentration attained has not been lost, because one has emerged from it, the present condition is not called concentration. The remedy is heedfulness so that the attainment does not decline.

12. 退 — loss or regression. The previously attained *samādhi* has actually been lost: “退,謂退失所得三摩地故.” This differs strictly from emergence. Leaving a meditation session is not necessarily regression; regression means that the capacity previously established has deteriorated. The response is renewed seclusion, 如理作意 (*ruli zuoyi*, “wise or reality-conforming attention”), and sustained, earnest application.

Seen as a whole, the sequence resembles a map of the contemplative path:

sensory and desire-bound life → failure to set out → distraction or dullness → initial attainment → incomplete attainment → attachment to attainment → incomplete mastery → worldly mastery without liberation → emergence → possible loss.

It is not necessarily a rigid biography through which everyone passes once. A practitioner may move between several conditions. The sequence instead helps identify the present fault precisely enough to apply the corresponding cultivation.

The treatise also maps the desire realm to the ground of non-collectedness and the form and formless realms to the ground of collectedness: “欲界是不定地,猶如其皮;色、無色界俱是定地,猶如其肉”—the desire realm is the ground of non-collectedness, like the skin, while the form and formless realms are grounds of collectedness, like the flesh. This is a technical cosmological and contemplative classification. It should not be flattened into “everything in ordinary life is distraction,” nor taken to mean that no wholesome attention occurs in the desire realm. Indeed, generosity, ethical conduct, and other wholesome practices can be cultivated outside concentration. The treatise calls this 非修所成法修, cultivation of wholesome qualities that are not thereby “produced by meditative cultivation.” They remain genuinely wholesome; they simply should not be mislabeled as qualities specifically formed through meditative absorption.

A walkthrough in everyday life

Imagine an exhausted office worker named Maya. After weeks of late nights, algorithmically selected videos, and constant message alerts, she decides to learn meditation. Following her over several months lets us see why the twelve conditions cannot be compressed into the single word “distracted.”

On the train, Maya sees a bright advertisement, hears a notification, smells breakfast, tastes her coffee, and feels the carriage sway. These are events of the five sensory consciousnesses. They illustrate non-collectedness by intrinsic character. The sights and sounds are not “bad,” and her body is not itself the definition of this first condition. The technical point concerns the five sensory consciousnesses as sensory consciousnesses. A common mistake would be to say, “She noticed the train very carefully, so she was in meditative absorption.” Exact sensory detection and *samāhita* are not identical.

At work she focuses intensely on a spreadsheet for forty minutes. She barely notices the room, but her shoulders are rigid and her mind is driven by fear of missing a deadline. This can illustrate lack of pliancy. Her attention is one-pointed in an everyday sense, yet one-pointedness alone does not establish meditative concentration. The easiest mapping error is to equate being “in the zone,” compulsive scrolling, or algorithmically captured attention with *samādhi*. Their psychological and ethical conditions may be quite different.

That evening she intends to meditate but opens a streaming app “for five minutes.” Several episodes later, she goes to bed. Repeated across weeks, this becomes not setting out: not a momentary distraction during meditation, but a life continually oriented toward available gratification. The issue is not that entertainment is inherently sinful. The issue is that her declared aspiration never becomes a practised direction.

Eventually Maya sits down. Within a minute, the mind runs after a remembered conversation, traffic noise, dinner, an attractive image, and tomorrow’s presentation. This is extreme distraction. She is now different from someone who never set out: she has begun, but the mind follows enticing sensory objects. She establishes mindfulness, collects attention without panic, and uses clear comprehension to notice wandering sooner.

On another evening she fights distraction by squeezing attention tightly onto the breath. Thought diminishes, but so do brightness and alertness. Her head nods; the meditation becomes a warm blur. This is excessive contraction, not successful concentration. She needs to brighten and uplift the mind—perhaps by opening her eyes, improving posture, contemplating a lucid and elevating theme, and learning the felt signs of sinking—rather than merely applying more inward pressure.

After some weeks she is neither noticeably scattered nor sleepy. The sitting is quiet, but she has not yet developed the relevant modes of mental application. This is not yet attained. “Nothing disturbed me” does not prove that a defined meditative attainment occurred. She returns carefully to her teacher’s instructions and practises consistently instead of manufacturing a grand interpretation of an ambiguous calm.

Later she does acquire a more stable mode of attention. Because it is more peaceful than anything she has known, she announces inwardly that she has “arrived.” Yet the preparatory cultivation and its result are not complete. This is not brought to completion. The appropriate response is neither self-contempt nor public self-promotion, but freedom from premature satisfaction.

One weekend a particularly blissful sitting occurs. For the next month she spends every meditation trying to reproduce it. She compares herself with others and begins to cherish the identity of “someone who has deep experiences.” This is contamination by relishing. The pleasant meditative state need not itself be the problem; appropriation and craving contaminate the mind’s relationship to it. She examines the instability and burden of attachment and relinquishes the demand for repetition.

With practice, Maya’s mind becomes less entangled in such attachment, but concentration still arrives unpredictably. Sometimes she can enter it; sometimes she cannot. Sometimes she becomes unsettled when trying to leave. This is lack of mastery over entry, abiding, and emergence. Having had an experience is not the same as being able to work skilfully with the condition.

Eventually she gains considerable mastery. She can enter a refined peaceful state, remain for the intended period, and emerge clearly. Yet irritability, self-protection, and the latent disposition to grasp still return under pressure—especially at home, where her child interrupts her or her partner criticizes her. This exemplifies not purified: worldly concentration can suppress or temporarily quiet afflictions without permanently uprooting their underlying tendencies. The next requirement is liberating insight, here expressed as vigorous cultivation of understanding concerning the truths. Calm becomes a basis for seeing rather than a private sanctuary from what must be seen.

When the meditation period ends and Maya stands up, this is emergence. Her capacity has not been lost; she simply is no longer presently in concentration. Calling every post-meditation moment “regression” would confuse the eleventh condition with the twelfth. What matters now is heedfulness: can the clarity and ethical restraint cultivated in practice inform the school run, the meeting, and the disagreement?

After a long period of neglect, however, Maya finds that she can no longer enter the concentration she formerly commanded. That is loss or regression. It calls not for shame but for accurate recognition and renewed causes: suitable seclusion, wise attention, continuity, and earnest practice.

This walkthrough also shows why an AI analogy must be used cautiously. One might compare distraction, over-constrained attention, incomplete training, overfitting to pleasant states, and loss of a learned capacity with different failure modes in a computational system. The comparison can clarify why one remedy does not fit every fault. But an algorithm has no demonstrated equivalent of Buddhist craving, karmic intention, meditative pliancy, direct insight, or liberation. Neither AI terminology nor neuroscience proves the Buddhist analysis; each works with different methods, assumptions, and unresolved questions.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary culture often treats attention as a single quantity: more focus is good, less focus is bad. The twelvefold account is wiser and more exact. It asks not only, “How much attention is present?” but also:

- Is the mind merely captured, or freely composed? - Is concentration accompanied by pliancy? - Is it bright, or has it contracted into dullness? - Has an initial calm been mistaken for attainment? - Has an attainment been mistaken for completion? - Is the mind attached to its own peacefulness? - Is concentration available at will, or only accidentally? - Has calm uprooted affliction, or merely suspended its expression? - Has the practitioner simply emerged, or actually lost the capacity?

These distinctions matter in an economy built to seize and monetize attention. A person may stare at a short-video feed with extraordinary continuity, yet the continuity is being continually solicited by novelty and reward. Another may work with fierce concentration while driven by dread. A third may use meditation to become more productive while leaving greed, hostility, and delusion untouched. The category of non-collectedness prevents all three from being casually baptized as *samādhi*.

It also prevents meditation from becoming another arena of perfectionism. If every difficulty is called “failure,” practitioners respond with more force. But distraction and dull contraction require opposite adjustments. Lack of attainment requires instruction and continuity; contamination requires relinquishment; lack of mastery requires familiarization; worldly concentration without purification requires insight; emergence requires heedfulness; actual loss requires rebuilding conditions. Precision makes compassion practical.

Most importantly, this classification locates concentration within the whole path of liberation. Concentration is indispensable because a scattered, dull, or unstable mind cannot see clearly. But concentration is not the final goal merely because it is peaceful, blissful, or extraordinary. The tenth condition—mastery of worldly concentration without eradication of latent affliction—draws the decisive line. A mind may become extraordinarily refined and still remain within conditioned existence.

Thus the movement of the path is not simply:

ordinary attention → stronger attention → maximum attention.

It is closer to:

ethical and wholesome orientation → skilful collection of mind → pliancy and mastery → freedom from attachment to concentration → insight into the truths → weakening and eradication of the causes of bondage.

Generosity and ethical discipline undertaken outside absorption retain their importance. They shape intention, relationships, remorse, and the conditions under which concentration becomes possible. Concentration then makes the mind serviceable for insight. Insight ensures that concentration does not become an exquisitely furnished room inside the same prison.

The final measure is therefore not “How impressive was my state?” but “What happened to grasping, aversion, delusion, and the latent dispositions from which they arise?” A peaceful experience may be valuable, but liberation concerns the ending of bondage, not the collection of exceptional experiences.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“Non-collectedness just means distraction.” No. Extreme distraction is only the fourth of twelve conditions. The category also includes sensory consciousness by intrinsic character, concentration lacking pliancy, failure to begin, dull contraction, incomplete attainment, attachment to attainment, lack of mastery, merely worldly concentration, emergence, and actual regression.

“The five sensory consciousnesses are bad and must be shut down.” That is not what “non-collected by intrinsic character” means. It classifies sensory cognitions as not themselves belonging to meditative collectedness. Sensory objects may nevertheless supply a sign used in cultivation. The traditional contemplation of bodily decay is intended to establish the mind and counter infatuation, not to declare that seeing or the body is morally impure.

“If I can focus on one thing, I have concentration.” Not in the full technical sense used here. The treatise explicitly says that desire-realm minds may possess one-pointedness but, lacking the permeation of pliancy, are not called concentration. Anxiety, obsession, flow, and attentional capture can all be stable without constituting *samāhita*.

“太略聚 means good, deep inward collection.” Here it means excessive contraction covered by dullness or sleep. Its defining feature is not peaceful inwardness but loss of clarity. The corresponding remedy is to brighten the mind and recognize sinking, not to contract it further.

“未證得 means nothing at all has improved.” No. Gross distraction and contraction may already be absent. What is missing is the relevant attainment of the modes of mental application. Progress and attainment are not identical.

“A powerful meditative experience proves completion.” The distinctions between not yet attained, not yet complete, and contaminated were designed to block precisely this conclusion. An experience may be genuine yet preliminary; an attainment may be genuine yet incomplete; a completed stage of concentration may still be appropriated by craving.

“Bliss in meditation is itself an affliction.” The eighth condition is more exact. The problem described is contamination by relishing and related afflictions. Pleasantness should not automatically be equated with attachment to pleasantness. The diagnostic question is whether the mind savours, claims, depends upon, or constructs identity around the state.

“Mastery of concentration is enlightenment.” No. The tenth condition explicitly includes someone who can enter, remain in, and emerge from concentration at will but has obtained only worldly concentration and has not permanently damaged the latent tendencies of affliction. Concentration supplies power and stability; liberating insight determines whether that stability serves release.

“Coming out of meditation means I lost it.” The treatise carefully separates 起, emergence, from 退, regression. In emergence, the attainment remains although the present mind is out of concentration. In regression, the attained *samādhi* itself has been lost.

“The desire realm being called an ‘uncollected ground’ means wholesome cultivation there is impossible.” No. Generosity, ethical conduct, and other wholesome qualities can be cultivated outside meditative absorption. The technical point is that such practice is not, merely for being wholesome, a quality produced specifically through meditative cultivation.

“The twelve items are twelve kinds of people.” They are better understood as diagnosable conditions or phases. One person may encounter several, sometimes within a short period. Turning them into identities—“I am a distracted type,” “I am an advanced type”—would itself encourage the appropriation the analysis is meant to expose.

“Every difficulty should be answered by trying harder.” The paired treatment of distraction and excessive contraction shows why this fails. A mind flowing outward must be gathered; a mind sinking inward must be brightened. Elsewhere, effort must be joined to instruction, discernment, relinquishment, insight, heedfulness, or renewed seclusion. The path requires intelligently directed effort, not indiscriminate force.

Ultimately, 不定地 is a teaching about honesty. It gives practitioners enough vocabulary not to confuse stimulation with vitality, fixation with concentration, quietness with attainment, attainment with mastery, mastery with purification, or emergence with loss. Its twelve conditions protect meditation from both discouragement and grandiosity.

They also place concentration in its rightful position: neither a dispensable wellness technique nor liberation itself, but a disciplined gathering of mind that becomes liberative only when joined to ethical orientation, wise attention, insight, non-attachment, and the work of uprooting affliction.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

不定地,又称「非三摩呬多地」,是《瑜伽师地论》对心识未能安住等持之境的总称。它不仅指通常所说的散乱心,也包括由于自性不属定、缺乏轻安、未得定、定未圆满、定受染污、于定不自在、所得唯是世间定,以及出定或退定等情形。因此,「不定」涵盖从尚未发趣修定,直到虽已得定而出定、退失的完整序列。

论中又以界地说明其范围:欲界名为不定地,譬如其皮;色界、无色界俱名定地,譬如其肉。 不定地中的布施、持戒等善法之修,则称为「非修所成法修」,表明善法虽可在未入定时修习,却不因此即成为由定中修习所成之法。

二、主要阐述

《瑜伽师地论》将不定地概括为十二相。第一「自性不定」,指五识身自性不属于定。第二「阙轻安」,指欲界诸心心法纵有心一境性,仍因没有轻安含润而不得名定。第三「不发趣」,指受欲者深著诸欲而恒常受用。第四「极散乱」,指初修定者的心随妙五欲流散。第五「太略聚」,指初修者向内收摄其心,却为昏沉、睡眠所覆。第六「未证得」,指虽已没有散乱、略聚等扰恼,仍未获得诸作意。第七「未圆满」,指虽得作意,尚未证得加行究竟及其果。第八「杂染污」,指虽证加行究竟果作意,心仍为爱味等惑染污。第九「不自在」,指心虽不受烦恼染污,却不能自在掌握入定、住定与出定。第十「不清净」,指虽能随欲自在入、住、出定,但仅得世间定,尚未永害烦恼随眠。第十一「起」,指所得定虽未退失,心已经出定。第十二「退」,指先前所得三摩地已经退失。

论中并依十二相次第建立对治。对自性不定,应正取青瘀、脓烂等相而安住其心;对阙轻安,应勤修习以获得作意;对不发趣,应为获得根本定而勤修;散乱现前时,先正安住其念,略摄其心,并以正知迅速摄受;太聚现前时,思惟净妙之相,善知心的沉没。未证得时,于师长教授不应忘失,以猛利护念、如理方便,无间而殷重地修习;未圆满时,不应满足于微劣所得之定;杂染现前时,应观杂染过失,若生爱味便立即除遣;不自在时,应无间修习三摩地,善巧通达定相;不清净时,应猛利修习谛善巧;出定之「起」现前时,为防退失而修不放逸;已经退失时,则修远离及如理作意,随顺无间、殷重的方便。

由此可见,十二不定地既是对非定状态的分类,也是修定过程中辨认障碍、决定相应加行的依据;其分类并不局限于入定以前,也包括得定以后尚不清净、出定与退定等阶段。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

现有材料均出自瑜伽部《瑜伽师地论》(《瑜伽師地論》),未见其他部类经典或同经异译本可供对列;但本论不同分位之间存在名称和措辞差异。

本地分以「非三摩呬多地」为总名,其中「三摩呬多」是 samāhita 的音译,前加「非」表示不在等持之中;摄释分则以意译「不定地」重述同一组十二相。两名所指大体相同,而「不定地」亦用于欲界、善法修习等较广的论述场合。

十二相的个别名称亦有异文:本地分所作「极散乱」,摄释分略作「散乱」;「太略聚」作「太聚」;「杂染污」作「杂染」。这些差异主要是详略与措辞之别,两处分列的整体结构基本相同。

四、与相关概念的关系

不定地与「三摩呬多地」或「定地」构成相对关系:前者总摄不属于定、未得定、定不圆满乃至出定、退定等状态;后者表示心处于等持。就界地而言,论中以欲界配不定地,以色界、无色界配定地。

「心一境性」并不必然等同于定。欲界心心法虽可具有心一境性,但若缺少轻安含润,仍列入不定地。 「作意」「加行究竟及彼果」则标示修定进程中的不同层次:未得作意为「未证得」,虽得作意而未得加行究竟及其果为「未圆满」。

不定地也与烦恼杂染、世间定及退失相关。爱味等惑染心,属于「杂染污」;虽于定自在而未永害烦恼随眠,属于「不清净」;离定而起但定未失,属于「起」;所得三摩地已经失坏,方称为「退」。

五、代表性原文引用

论中概括相关界地说:「欲界是不定地,犹如其皮;色、无色界俱是定地,犹如其肉。」

关于欲界心虽专一而仍非定,论述为:「欲界系诸心心法,虽具心一境性,然无轻安含润转故不名为定。」

关于得定之后仍可能属于不定地,论中分别说:「起,谓所得定虽不退失,然出定故不名为定」;「退,谓退失所得三摩地故。」

关于相应修习原则,论中依杂染、不清净与退失等相,分别教令观察杂染过失、猛利修谛善巧,并修远离如理作意及无间殷重方便。

By SutraAI-generated

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》對「不定地」的論述極為系統化,主要從兩個層面展開:一是以十二種因由界定何謂不定地,二是依此十二種不定地逐一開示對治修習之方。

一、十二種不定地之建立。本論以「或有……故,名不定地」的句式,列舉十二類情形:(1)由自性故——五識身,其性本不定;(2)闕輕安故——欲界諸心心法,因缺乏輕安而屬不定;(3)未發趣故——受欲者尚未發心趣向修證;(4)散亂故——始業者雖修定而心流散於五欲;(5)太聚故——始業者略聚其心於內境便生沈沒;(6)未得故——散心相應諸法;(7)未圓滿故——未證得加行究竟作意;(8)雜染故——雖證加行究竟果作意而於定多生愛味;(9)不自在故——由染污心故不得自在;(10)不清淨故——未永害煩惱隨眠;(11)出定故——從已得三摩地起而不退失;(12)有退故——從所得三摩地退失。此十二義涵蓋凡夫散心、初修沈掉、加行未滿、得定而染、出定與退定等階段,將「不定」從純粹未修一直延伸到已得定而尚未穩固清淨的全部光譜。

二、依十二不定地之對治行。本論緊接以「依止第幾不定地」為綱,逐一指示修行要領:依第一不定地,為安住心應正取青瘀、膿爛等不淨相;依第二,為得作意應勤修習;依第三,為得根本應勤修習;依第四,應正安住其念、以正知速疾攝心;依第五,應思惟淨妙之相並善達沈沒之相;依第六,於師教授能不忘失,安住猛利護念如理方便,無間殷重修習;依第七,於微劣所得定中不生喜足;依第八,觀雜染過失,設生愛味尋即除遣;依第九,於三摩地無間修且善巧通達其相;依第十,猛利修諦善巧;依第十一,為令不退應不放逸;依第十二,應修遠離如理作意,隨順前修無間殷重方便。此段顯示本論將不定地並非僅視為消極的「未定」狀態,而是積極的修行所依,每一種不定皆有其對應的加行方向。

三、不定地與三界之配屬及譬喻。本論明確判定「欲界是不定地」,色界、無色界俱是定地,並以皮、肉、血為喻:欲界如皮,色無色界如肉,無明如血;三界中由三種漏而有淋漏之義。此處以「皮」喻欲界,暗示不定地乃最外層、最粗顯之心行狀態。

四、不定地所攝善法之定位。本論於辨別修所成法時指出:「不定地諸施、戒等所有善法修,名非修所成法修」。意謂布施、持戒等善法若在不定地中修,雖是善法,尚不名為修所成(即非由定力所成之修),從而將不定地與定地所攝之修作了明確分際。

五、術語形式。本論始終使用「不定地」一詞,與「定地」對舉;所涉定境用「三摩地」而非「三昧」或「等持」;沈沒、散亂、輕安、加行究竟作意、煩惱隨眠等皆為本論特有之瑜伽行派術語體系。此外,本論於有心地決擇之後即轉入無心地決擇,不定地之討論正處於有心地決擇的收束段落中,屬有心地範疇內之判攝。

大乘莊嚴經論T1604 · 瑜伽部

《大乘莊嚴經論》直接採用「不定地」一詞,並以品級差別說明其內部層次。論中稱「彼不定地自性,前六品為下」,把不定地自身的前六品判為「下」;相對而言,文末以「翻此下則為上應知」指示,與諸「下」相反者即屬「上」。此處的重點不是為不定地另立異名,而是依「品」建立上下差別;本論記錄此概念時,應保留其原用語「不定地」,以及「前六品為下」的品級表述。

同一結構在另一段解釋中再度出現:「不定地中前六品有羞為下。」此處把不定地的六品分判運用於「有羞」的上下差別:不定地之前六品所有的「有羞」屬下,並以「翻此諸下有羞,應知即是諸上有羞」說明反面即為上有羞。由此可見,本論談不定地時,不僅稱其為一個階位範圍,也在特定法義的比較中,以其中前六品作為下位的判準。

本論亦多次並舉「決定」與「不定」。偈言「決定及不定,不退或退墮,遇緣如次第,品類有四種」,顯示「不定」是用來區分品類的一項條件,並與「決定」、「不退」、「退墮」等語交錯配列;偈文又說「遇緣如次第」,表明所列品類與遇緣後呈現的次第情形相關。然而本段原文僅標舉四類,未在所給文字中逐項展開,故不宜越出原文補定各類的完整定義。

另一偈以「有依及不定」並列,繼而說「緣俗亦不普,退屈忖度人,寧解大乘義?」此處的不定與有所依、所緣在俗、所解不普遍、心有退屈及忖度等情形共同出現,用以反問此等人何以能解大乘義。就原文可確知者,本論將「不定」置於理解大乘義的限制性描述之中;但偈文並未明言此處必然等同於後文按六品分級的「不定地」,因此只能記錄其術語上的相應,不宜強行合併。

此外,本論又有「聲聞二不定」之語,將聲聞中的不定分作二類,後文以「見義不見義」、「見義不斷愛」、「斷愛俱軟根」等語標示相關差別。此段顯示「不定」亦可作人物或修行狀態的分類語,而非僅以「不定地」的完整形式出現;惟所給偈句簡約,分類彼此的精確配屬不宜另作推演。

至於「未成就成就,成復未成成,如地建立知,分別無分別」一偈,明示應「如地建立」理解成就與未成就,以及分別、無分別的差異。它提供了以「地」建立差別的語境,但未直接出現「不定地」三字,故只能作為本論依地位安立差別的旁證,不能據此增添不定地的具體義項。

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