Dharma · AI Companion

功用

abhisaṃskāra

功用,指有所施力而发起行业或勤求修习的造作性力量。AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arising ⇢ II · emptinessInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

造作功用属行蕴,第一重完整安立;大乘遮其自性至第二重(对照八地无功用道)。

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

功用 (*gōngyòng*, here: “deliberate exertion” or “constructive effort”; Sanskrit *abhisaṃskāra*) is the formative force by which one applies effort, initiates karmic activity, or deliberately undertakes cultivation. It is not merely a thing’s “function,” nor is it simply the amount of physical energy spent. It is the element of intentional making: something has not yet become spontaneous, so one must arouse, direct, and sustain the conditions that bring it about.

The *Commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha* by Asaṅga’s commentator Asvabhāva (*She dasheng lun shi*, 無性釋) states the point compactly: “行謂功用”—“formation or activity (*xing*, 行) means deliberate exertion.” It then distinguishes “small exertion” and “great exertion”: small exertion initiates a small karmic activity; great exertion initiates a great one. The statement is not a moral equation saying that strain is automatically virtuous. It says that conditioned activity differs according to the formative force invested in producing it. Intention is mobilized, conditions are assembled, and an activity is brought into being.

This gives 功用 several closely related dimensions:

- It is initiating: it sets an activity in motion. - It is formative: it organizes causes and conditions into a particular course of action. - It is intentional: the action has not simply unfolded without directed application. - In cultivation, it is sustaining: one repeatedly returns, collects the mind, and keeps the practice correctly oriented.

These dimensions should not be collapsed into one vague translation such as “function.” In modern Chinese, 功用 can mean utility or efficacy. In these Yogācāra discussions, however, it often points more specifically to applied, constructive effort. Context still matters: the *Xianyang shengjiao lun* uses both 功能 (“capacity” or “function”) and 功用, while the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* employs 功用 when examining the arising of activity and speaks of 斷功用 (“relinquishing deliberate exertion”) at a decisive stage of the bodhisattva path.

Nor is 功用 identical with 精進 (*vīrya*, “diligent energy”). Diligence is the wholesome persistence that resists laziness and sustains the good. 功用 emphasizes the deliberately constructed or effortful character of the operation. The two frequently work together, but they answer different questions: 精進 asks whether wholesome effort is energetically maintained; 功用 asks whether the activity still has to be intentionally made to occur.

The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* preserves these distinctions by describing practice through several operational terms rather than replacing them all with the single abstraction 功用. Cultivation rests upon 欲 (*chanda*, wholesome aspiration or desire-to-act); from that basis one 起勤 (“arouses application”) and 起精進 (“arouses diligent energy”), while also 攝心 (“collecting the mind”) and 正持 (“maintaining it correctly”). This is important. Buddhist effort is not indiscriminate tension. If aspiration lacks collectedness, it becomes agitation; if energy lacks correct maintenance, it can efficiently carry the practitioner in the wrong direction.

The same treatise speaks of 正修 (“correct cultivation”) and 數修 (“repeated cultivation”). Practice must be appropriate to the Dharma and must be repeated. By nourishing wholesome qualities, repeated cultivation becomes an accumulation; by accomplishing benefit for oneself and others, it becomes effective activity. 功用 is therefore not a heroic moment of spiritual intensity. More often, it is the modest and repeated work of constructing reliable conditions.

Yet the path does not end with effortful construction. The sources place 有功用 (“with deliberate exertion”) and 無功用 (“without deliberate exertion”) in a developmental relation.

For ordinary beings and bodhisattvas still training, deliberate effort is indispensable. The *Commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha* addresses an apparent objection: if the Dharma-body of the buddhas is beginningless, immeasurable, and without differentiation, why should anyone still exert effort to attain buddhahood? The answer is causal and practical. Another being’s attainment does not eliminate the causes that must mature in this continuum. If buddhahood could be realized without the cause of 正勤 (*samyak-prahāṇa*, “right effort”), every being should already have realized it. Therefore the bodhisattva does not abandon the cause of right effort but, moved by compassion and vow, “arouses diligent exertion” (發勤功用) for the welfare and happiness of beings.

This is the first great lesson of 功用: the universality of awakening does not cancel the particular work of the path. Buddha-nature, emptiness, or the beginningless presence of the Dharma-realm must not be turned into excuses for causal negligence. A destination’s openness to everyone does not mean that walking has already occurred.

At the other end of the path stands 無功用 (*wú gōngyòng*, “non-deliberate” or “effortless functioning”). The *Commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says that all the buddhas’ deeds are without deliberate exertion. This does not mean that buddhas are inactive, indifferent, or inert. It means that beneficial activity no longer has to be manufactured through hesitant calculation, self-coercion, or differentiated degrees of effort. The commentary explicitly joins such effortless beneficial activity with continuing faith, aspiration, resolve, and uninterrupted cultivation. 無功用 is therefore not the absence of the good; it is the absence of strain in producing the good.

The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* locates a major transition at the eighth bodhisattva ground, where realization of non-arising is associated with 斷慢 (“relinquishing conceit”) and 斷功用 (“relinquishing deliberate exertion”). Earlier intentional cultivation has not been exposed as pointless. It has matured to the point at which the bodhisattva no longer advances by constructing each movement in the former way. Deliberate practice fulfills itself by making a different mode of activity possible.

A simple analogy is learning to read. At first, a child identifies letters one by one, sounds them out, and laboriously joins them into words. Eventually, reading is immediate. The mature reader has not “abandoned literacy”; the earlier effort has become embodied competence. The analogy is limited, because the eighth bodhisattva ground concerns a profound transformation in wisdom and conduct, not merely an acquired cognitive skill. Still, it helps show why 無功用 is not laziness: effortless fluency and failure to learn may look equally free from visible strain, but they arise from opposite histories.

There is also a philosophical boundary to observe. 功用 must not be reified into a hidden controller inside the person. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, while refuting a substantially existent “person” (實人), asks how the operations of the eye and other faculties arise. If their operations arise naturally, a separate person is not needed to perform them. If an independent person must activate them, the faculties themselves would have no efficacy. And if an eternally existing person causes an operation that was previously absent and later present, the alleged permanence of that person cannot explain the change. The analysis uses 功用 to dismantle the fantasy of a permanent inner operator.

Thus deliberate exertion exists conventionally as conditioned activity, but it is not evidence for a metaphysical executive self. “Effort is occurring” does not entail “an unchanging owner of effort exists.”

The *Xianyang shengjiao lun* presses this critical side further. Rather than positively defining 功用 as an ultimate entity, it subjects “function,” “efficacy,” and “exertion” to tests concerning inclusion and exclusion, usefulness and uselessness, and causal coherence. Its purpose is not to deny the everyday efficacy of practice. It warns against converting a useful explanatory category into a self-existing philosophical foundation. 功用 can describe conditioned operations; it cannot serve as an independently established essence behind them.

Its position in the path of liberation can therefore be summarized as a movement:

untrained habit → deliberately constructed wholesome practice → repeated and correctly held cultivation → spontaneous, non-appropriated beneficial activity.

The middle cannot be skipped, and the final stage must not be mistaken for the beginning.

A walk-through in everyday life

Imagine an evening commute. You are tired after work. A message from someone close to you appears on your phone: “You never really listen to me.” Almost immediately, you feel accused and begin composing a defensive reply.

First, habitual conditions are already operating. The eyes register shapes and colors; recognition identifies them as words and interprets their interpersonal significance; feeling registers unpleasantness; memories and tendencies supply an old defensive script. None of this requires a permanent inner commander. A conditioned sequence is unfolding.

Now 功用 enters—not as every event in that sequence, but as the applied formative force that takes up and directs it.

You may exert yourself in an unwholesome direction. You reread the message selectively, collect evidence against the sender, draft a cutting response, and polish it until it lands exactly where it will hurt. This is genuine 功用: attention, intention, and energy have been organized to initiate an activity. It is not spiritual merely because it required effort. “Great exertion can initiate great activity” does not mean that great exertion produces great virtue. Considerable effort can construct considerable harm.

Or you may begin a different course of cultivation. You notice the bodily contraction and choose not to send the first reply. A wholesome aspiration arises: “I want to understand before reacting.” On that basis you arouse effort, keep returning attention to the actual message, collect the mind when it rehearses accusations, and correctly maintain the intention not to retaliate. These correspond, without collapsing their differences, to 欲, 起勤, 起精進, 攝心, and 正持.

The mapping matters:

- Wanting to be seen as “the calm one” is not necessarily wholesome aspiration; it may still be self-protection. - The unpleasant feeling is not itself 功用. It has arisen; 功用 is the constructive exertion with which you elaborate, redirect, or refrain from elaborating the situation. - The angry reply is not called 功用 merely because it is an external action. The relevant point is the intentional formative force that initiates and shapes the karmic activity. - Suppressing every feeling is not 攝心. Collecting the mind means preventing dispersal and keeping it available for accurate, wholesome response; it does not mean becoming numb. - Repeating “I must be compassionate” while tightening inwardly is not yet 無功用. It remains deliberate training, and honesty about that is healthier than pretending to spontaneity.

Suppose you put the phone away for two minutes, feel the discomfort without immediately weaponizing it, and then write: “That landed hard, and I notice I want to defend myself. Can you tell me what happened today that left you feeling unheard?” This response still required effort. It is 有功用, and there is nothing inferior or shameful about that. At this stage, effort is precisely what interrupts the automatic reproduction of suffering.

Now imagine repeating this kind of practice across years—not mechanically, but with ethical discernment, meditation, wisdom, and concern for the other person. Gradually, the interval of restraint becomes less forced. Listening begins before the defensive story fully crystallizes. Care does not need to win a prolonged internal argument each time.

That relative ease offers an everyday glimpse of the direction indicated by 無功用, but it should not be equated with a buddha’s effortless activity or the bodhisattva’s attainment at the eighth ground. Ordinary psychological habituation can make generosity easier, but it can also make prejudice, avoidance, or manipulation effortless. Ease by itself proves nothing. Buddhist 無功用 is intelligible only in relation to wisdom, compassion, the purification of obstruction, and the path that precedes it.

The same walk-through applies to algorithmic life. When a recommendation feed presents one short video after another, much of the sequence is engineered to minimize reflective effort. “Effortless” scrolling, however, is not 無功用 in the liberative sense. It is often highly conditioned reactivity, supported by another party’s deliberate design. To stop, notice craving, set the device down, and recover attention may initially require considerable 功用. What feels effortful may be the beginning of freedom; what feels frictionless may be bondage operating efficiently.

This comparison does not establish a scientific identity between Buddhist analysis and contemporary cognitive science. Research on habit, attention, executive control, and reward learning can illuminate certain mechanisms, but scientific models remain contested, method-dependent, and concerned with different questions. They neither prove the Yogācāra path nor exhaust its ethical and soteriological claims.

Why contemporary people need it

功用 corrects two opposite confusions that flourish in contemporary culture.

The first is the worship of strain. We are often taught that visible effort certifies worth: exhaustion means commitment, anxiety means responsibility, and relentless optimization means progress. From the Buddhist perspective, exertion has no independent moral halo. One can work extremely hard to deepen greed, protect status, perfect resentment, or make exploitation efficient. The question is not merely, “How much effort did I expend?” It is, “What activity is this effort constructing, from what intention, under what view, and toward whose suffering or freedom?”

The second confusion is the romance of effortlessness. Spiritual language can make spontaneity sound like an immediate entitlement: “Do nothing,” “There is nowhere to go,” or “Everything is already complete.” Such statements may point toward profound truths in the right doctrinal and contemplative setting, but they become dangerous when used to evade causality. The *Commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha* is unambiguous on this practical issue: the attainment of buddhas does not permit other beings to discard the cause of right effort.

This is especially important wherever “acceptance” masks avoidance. A parent who refuses to apologize cannot call that non-attachment. A manager who ignores harm cannot call it equanimity. A practitioner who has never trained attention cannot rename distraction “effortless awareness.” 無功用 is a fruit of transformation, not a flattering description of whatever happens automatically.

At the same time, 功用 prevents practice from becoming self-punishment. Correct exertion includes collecting the mind and maintaining it rightly. It is intelligent, proportionate, and responsive to conditions. Sometimes the required exertion is to begin; sometimes it is to persist; sometimes it is to stop compulsively forcing. Rest can support right effort, while frantic activity can sabotage it.

The concept also clarifies how freedom develops. Liberation is not achieved by installing a spiritually improved controller-self. Yogācāra analysis asks us to cultivate causes while seeing that no permanent agent owns them. Vows, attention, ethical restraint, meditative stability, and wisdom operate dependently. This makes responsibility possible without turning responsibility into metaphysical self-ownership.

That combination is subtle but humane. “There is no permanent controller” need not lead to fatalism, because conditioned effort changes conditions. “Effort changes conditions” need not lead to ego-inflation, because the effort itself arises dependently. One practices seriously without building an eternal practitioner out of the practice.

Finally, 功用 places compassion inside the architecture of awakening. Bodhisattva exertion is not presented merely as a private self-improvement project. Compassion and vow impel the search for buddhahood so that the welfare of beings may be accomplished. The path moves from constructed wholesome activity toward spontaneous benefit, not from worldly busyness toward private serenity alone.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“功用 simply means function or usefulness.”

Not in every passage. 功能 and 功用 can both concern capacity or operation, and the *Xianyang shengjiao lun* employs both terms. But in the central cultivation passages, 功用 carries the more specific sense of applied, formative exertion: effort that initiates karmic activity or deliberately undertakes practice. Translating it mechanically as “function” conceals its relation to intentional cultivation.

“All effort is wholesome.”

No. Effort can construct beneficial or harmful karma. The size of the exertion helps explain differences in the activity produced; it does not by itself determine ethical quality. Right view, intention, object, method, and result remain decisive.

“功用 is just 精進.”

They overlap but are not interchangeable. 精進 is diligent energy in cultivating the wholesome and abandoning the unwholesome. 功用 highlights the activity’s deliberately produced character. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* keeps aspiration, application, energetic perseverance, collecting the mind, and correct maintenance verbally distinct because each performs a different role.

“功用 means external action.”

No. It is not synonymous with visible behavior. Silently sustaining resentment can involve strong formative exertion; refraining from sending a message can involve wholesome exertion; an apparently dramatic action can occur with little reflective application. The relevant issue is how intentional, conditioning force initiates and shapes activity.

“無功用 means doing nothing.”

This is the most serious mistake. In the *Commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, the buddhas’ deeds are said to be without deliberate exertion, yet beneficial activity continues. Faith, aspiration, resolve, and uninterrupted cultivation are not negated. 無功用 means that benefit no longer depends upon strained construction; it does not mean inactivity, apathy, or cessation of care.

“If the final state is effortless, effort now is an obstacle.”

Not necessarily. Deliberate cultivation is an indispensable phase of the path, while clinging to the identity “I am the one making spiritual progress” is something else. At the eighth ground the bodhisattva’s relinquishing of 功用 marks fruition and transformation, not a beginner’s permission to abandon training. The raft is eventually left behind because it has carried one across—not because one refused to board it.

“Whatever comes naturally is 無功用.”

No. Greed, fear, prejudice, and distraction can all become automatic. Buddhist effortless activity is not defined by subjective ease alone. It is qualified by the wisdom and compassion realized through the path. Habitual impulsiveness and liberated spontaneity may both lack felt strain, but their causes, structures, and consequences are radically different.

“There must be a real inner self performing the effort.”

The Yogācāra arguments cited here reject that inference. Operations arise through conditions; their appearing and disappearing cannot be adequately explained by an unchanging substantial person. Conventional agency and ethical responsibility remain workable, but neither requires a permanent metaphysical operator.

“Because 功用 is criticized logically, practice itself is being denied.”

No. The *Xianyang shengjiao lun* examines whether function or exertion can be established as a self-sufficient essence or ultimate causal principle. Such analysis prevents reification. It does not erase the conventional causal fact that cultivation affects the mind and conduct. Buddhism can affirm operational efficacy while denying independent self-existence.

In the whole path of liberation, then, 功用 names a necessary but transitional power. At first, suffering largely reproduces itself through established conditions. Deliberate cultivation introduces a new direction: aspiration is aroused, energy is sustained, the mind is collected, and wholesome causes are repeatedly established. With deep realization, the practitioner no longer needs to manufacture every beneficial response through the old mode of effort. Practice has ripened into unobstructed activity.

The point is neither “try harder forever” nor “stop trying now.” It is more discerning: apply effort where causes must still be cultivated; do not mistake the effort for a permanent self; and do not mistake effortless habit for liberated spontaneity. 功用 belongs to the craftsmanship of awakening—until the craftsmanship has so completely transformed the craftsperson that compassionate activity no longer feels constructed at all.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「功用」(abhisaṃskāra)为瑜伽行派所论之概念,指有所施力而发起行业或勤求修习的造作性力量。据《摄大乘论释(无性释)》,「行谓功用」,凡俗行业因功用大小而有差别,小功用起小业,大功用起大业。 此概念既可正面指称用力修习之相,亦可于特殊情境中以「无功用」表示不待施力造作之境,如诸佛「一切所作皆无功用」。

二、主要阐述

《摄大乘论释(无性释)》从三个层面展示功用与无功用的差别。其一,以小功用起小业、大功用起大业说明行业因功用差别而异; 其二,以诸佛为无功用的特殊情形,诸佛之业不因功用差别而成为彼此不同的业; 其三,菩萨求佛果时不可舍离正勤,面对「诸佛法身无始时来无别无量,何须更作功用」之疑,释文指出若有情因佛之证得而舍弃求佛果的正勤之因,便不能成就证得,故求佛果而发起勤勉用力的功用,此即「发勤功用」; 其四,「无功用」并非停止修习,而是利业不待着力造作,同时内在信欲与意乐之修仍相续不断,常修无懈废。

《显扬圣教论》对功用的论述采取以逻辑过失(因明式破析)为核心的方法论,并不从正面定义其体性,而是透过列举承认此范畴所引生的矛盾与过失加以检破。论中以四句式结构展开逻辑破析:「功能无有故,摄不摄相违,有用及无用,为因成过失」 及「功能无体性,摄不摄相违,有用及无用,为因成过失」, 显示对功能的检验着眼于含摄范围的逻辑自洽性与因果上的可用性,二者皆破。又以「觉、我、因、功用、自在等各二,有因及无因,当知十种过」之偈, 将功用纳入统一的哲学检验体系,作为一组被检视的哲学范畴之一,其设立本身即构成需要逐一破析的论题。

《大乘庄严经论》呈现修习过程中由有意勤作而至断除造作的两个层面。其一,论中虽未在正修次第的偈文直接使用「功用」,却以「正修」「数修」说明修习须如理修行且反复修习,能资益善法,积集而名为「聚」,并以成就自利、他利而名为「业」; 其二,以「依止于欲」而后「起勤」「起精进」,并须「摄心」与「正持」,总摄为「十治修」,显示发勤用力并非散乱造作,而是含有收摄其心与正确任持的修治作用; 其三,在破斥实有之「人」时直接使用「功用」,讨论眼等诸根作用如何生起,指出若主张眼等功用自然生起,则人在眼等方面不作事业而仍有作用;若主张以「人」为缘而使功用生起,则眼等诸根自身便全然没有功用, 并进一步以常住之人无法解释功用「先无后有」破除实人假设; 其四,以「断功用」标示修道中的转折,至八地得无生时,与「断慢」并列而说「断功用」,偈文并续以诸佛与佛子「一体同如」说明其所契之同一真如。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

三部论典虽同属瑜伽部,然用词各异。《摄大乘论释(无性释)》明确使用「功用」、「小功用」、「大功用」、「无功用」及「发勤功用」等语,并以「行谓功用」作直接界说;修证语境中配合「正勤」、「勤求」与「常修无懈废」说明,原文未另立其他同义译名。

《显扬圣教论》对此概念的指称并不单一,兼用「功能」与「功用」二词。chunk 33545 与 chunk 33882 使用「功能」,chunk 33612 则使用「功用」。两词于汉语中皆涉作用、能力之义,但分别承担不同的分析位置——「功能」见于四句式偈颂的独立破析,「功用」则见于多范畴并列的归类架构。此一用词差异本身即值得记录。

《大乘庄严经论》的具体用词呈现两类:一为修习时的「起勤」「起精进」「摄心」「正持」等操作性语词,不宜仅以一个抽象的「功用」取代其分别表述; 二为破斥实人时的「功用」, 以及八地所得无生之后明文标出的「断功用」。

四、与相关概念的关系

「功用」与「正勤」、「精进」、「修习」等概念关系密切。据《摄大乘论释(无性释)》,「正勤」、「勤求」与「发勤功用」连用,鲜明呈现有意修习、精进造作的一面; 「无功用」则与信、欲、意乐之修相续不断并列,利业不待着力造作,内在修习仍以意乐恒常修习而不懈废。 《大乘庄严经论》中,「功用」与「作事业」相连,指能够发动、成办作用的活动; 而「欲」、「勤」、「精进」、「摄心」、「正持」总摄为「十治修」,显示功用与修治之关联。 「断功用」与「断慢」并列出现于八地得无生之位,标志造作性作用的断除,而诸佛与佛子「一体同如」。

五、代表性原文引用

1. 「行谓功用……小功用能起小业,大功用能起大业。」 2. 「诸佛……一切所作皆无功用。」 3. 「若有情因佛之证得而舍弃求佛果的正勤之因,便不能成就证得……不应断除正勤之因。」 4. 「佛法界普为证得之因,使诸菩萨由悲愿缠心而勤求佛果……求佛果而发起勤勉用力的功用。」 5. 「虽于利益之业无须功用,却仍对佛教生起殊胜信解……以意乐恒常修习而不懈废。」 6. 「功能无有故,摄不摄相违,有用及无用,为因成过失。」 7. 「功能无体性,摄不摄相违,有用及无用,为因成过失。」 8. 「觉、我、因、功用、自在等各二,有因及无因,当知十种过。」 9. 「如理修行且反复修习……能资益善法,积集而名为聚,并以成就自利、他利而名为业。」 10. 「依止于欲,而后起勤、起精进,并须摄心与正持,总摄为十治修。」 11. 「若主张眼等功用自然生起……若主张以人为缘而使功用生起。」 12. 「若谓常住之人是功用生起的因缘,便无法解释功用何以先无后有……实人不可得。」 13. 「至八地得无生时……断慢、断功用。」

By SutraAI-generated

攝大乘論釋(無性釋)T1598 · 瑜伽部

《攝大乘論釋(無性釋)》論「功用」,主要以「有所施力而發起行業或勤求修習」為義,並由凡俗行業、求證佛果及諸佛利生三個層面,顯示「功用」與「無功用」的差別。

其一,本論直接以「行謂功用」解釋「行」,並依用力大小說明業的差異:小功用能起小業,大功用能起大業;由於功用有別,所起之業亦異。此處「功用」不是僅指抽象功能,而是能發起、形成業行的施為之力,並可依其大小而說有差別。

其二,本論以諸佛作為「無功用」的特殊情形。世間之行因功用大小不同而有業的差異,諸佛則「一切所作皆無功用」,所以佛業不因功用差別而成為彼此不同的業。由此可見,本論不只正面使用「功用」,也以「無功用」表達諸佛所作不待分別施力、不由功用大小而呈現差等。

其三,論中另說菩薩求佛果時不可捨離正勤。面對「諸佛法身無始時來無別無量,何須更作功用」的疑難,釋文指出:若有情因佛之證得而捨棄求佛果的正勤之因,便不能成就證得;若可以離開正勤而得佛果,一切有情本來便都應已得。因此,不應斷除正勤之因。

其四,功用在求果利生的脈絡中,具體表述為「發勤功用」。佛法界普為證得之因,使諸菩薩由悲願纏心而勤求佛果;其目的在於成辦一切有情的利樂,所以求佛果而發起勤勉用力的功用。此處本論把「正勤」、「勤求」與「發勤功用」連用,鮮明呈現有意修習、精進造作的一面。

其五,本論亦以「無功用」與持續修習並列描述:雖於利益之業無須功用,卻仍對佛教生起殊勝信解,與信、欲相應,並以意樂恆常修習而不懈廢。故「無功用」在此不等於停止修習或懈怠,而是利業不待著力造作,同時內在信欲與意樂之修仍相續不斷。

就術語形式而言,《攝大乘論釋(無性釋)》明確使用「功用」、「小功用」、「大功用」、「無功用」及「發勤功用」等語,並以「行謂功用」作直接界說;在修證語境中又配合「正勤」、「勤求」與「常修無懈廢」說明。以上是本論自身的用詞,原文未在這些文段中另立其他同義譯名。

顯揚聖教論T1602 · 瑜伽部

《顯揚聖教論》在論述「功用」一概念時,採用以破為立的進路,層層推究若將功用施設為實有所將招致的論理過失。此論所用術語兼出「功能」與「功用」二詞,於本論偈頌脈絡中意義互通,皆指有所施力而發起行業或勤求修習的造作性力量。

第一,論以「功能」一詞立破。先標「功能無體性」,指出若功用被施設為具有自體性,便引生「攝不攝相違」之過——即功用與所造作行業之間,究竟是攝入關係還是不攝入關係,二義不能同時成立;進而論究「有用及無用」之相違,以及「為因」一項亦自成過失,由此構成層層相違之論式。此段以偈頌形式反覆推破,揭示將功用實體化所必然導致的邏輯矛盾。

第二,另一段偈頌以同一結構再度論究「功能」,首句作「功能無有故」,同樣以「攝不攝相違、有用及無用、為因成過失」的論式收束,呈現為定型化的破執格式。兩段文字「功能無體性」與「功能無有故」措辭雖略有出入,所破所立則完全一致,足見此論於「功用」一項的論述是經反覆推敲而固定的偈頌形式。

第三,此論亦將「功用」與「覺、我、因、自在」等概念並列,作為審察過失的對象。經文明言「覺、我、因、功用、自在等各二」,意即對此五項各從兩方面審察,「有因及無因,當知十種過」,共成十種過失。於此,「功用」被列為五個被觀察的概念之一,與「覺」「我」「因」「自在」並列,顯示其在論中是作為一組典型所執對象,被納入同一觀察框架之下加以推破。

綜觀三段原文,此論於「功用」並未正面施設定義,而是從反面切入:先假設功用為實有(功能有體性/有故),再推導其必然招致「攝不攝」「有用無用」「為因」三層過失,從而證成功用不可施設為真實自性。又,「功用」一詞於本論中亦以「功能」之異名出現,二者於瑜伽部此論中語義相通,這一術語並用現象本身即為多譯名歸一所應記錄之信息。

大乘莊嚴經論T1604 · 瑜伽部

《大乘莊嚴經論》對「功用」的論述,呈現出修習過程中由有意勤作而至斷除造作的兩個層面。首先,論中雖未在正修次第的偈文直接使用「功用」一詞,卻以「正修」「數修」說明修習並非一次而止,而須如理修行且反覆修習;此等修習能資益善法,積集而名為「聚」,並以成就自利、他利而名為「業」。由此可見,與功用相應的修習側面,具續續修治、資益善法及成辦利益等作用。

其次,論中以一組更具操作性的語詞說明修行的發動與維持:「依止於欲」,而後「起勤」「起精進」,並須「攝心」與「正持」,總攝為「十治修」。其中「欲」是修習所依,「勤」與「精進」顯示有意發起並持續用力,「攝心」與「正持」則表明此種用力並非散亂造作,而是含有收攝其心與正確任持的修治作用。此處本論的具體用詞是「起勤」「起精進」「攝心」「正持」,不宜僅以一個抽象的「功用」取代其分別表述。

論中又在破斥實有之「人」時,直接使用「功用」一詞,討論眼等諸根作用如何生起。若主張眼等功用自然生起,便會導致人在眼等方面不作事業而仍有作用的過失;若主張以「人」為緣而使功用生起,則眼等諸根自身便全然沒有功用。此處「功用」與「作事業」相連,指能夠發動、成辦作用的活動,而論旨在檢驗其生起是否須依一個實有之人。

進一步說,若謂常住之人是功用生起的因緣,便無法解釋功用何以「先無後有」;若以人的壞滅為緣,則人即成無常;另立一個既不住亦不壞的人,也不成立。論據此說「實人不可得」。因此,本論並未將功用安立為常住主體所支配的作用,而是藉功用前後生起的問題,破除實有之人的假設。

最後,本論以「斷功用」標示修道中的轉折:至八地得無生時,與「斷慢」並列而說「斷功用」。這表明先前有勤作、有修治的造作性作用,在此階位被斷除;偈文並續以諸佛與佛子「一體同如」說明其所契之同一真如。故本論對此概念的核心用語,一方面是修習時的「起勤」「起精進」等有意用力,另一方面則明文稱為「功用」,並以「斷功用」表示八地所得無生之後不復依此造作。