Dharma · AI Companion

不相應

viprayukta

不相应,指与心不相伴随和合之一类行蕴所摄法,亦用以表述彼此不相契合之关系。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arising ⇢ III · nominal designationInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

有部于实法层立十四心不相应行(1);经部/唯识重释为分位假立之名言施设(3),属正面重释而非遮破,故升至第三重。

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is Really About

If you've spent any time around Buddhist philosophy, you've probably noticed that the tradition is unusually precise about classifying experience. Mind here, matter there, mental factors over yonder — and then there's a strange residual category that refuses to fit. The Abhidharma masters (those meticulous analysts of dharmas, the irreducible elements of experience) noticed this too. They called it 不相應, viprayukta — literally "dis-associated," "un-combined," "not paired with."

The provided classical sources show that "不相應" is not one thing but a family of related moves the Buddhist tradition makes with language. To read it deeply, we need to hold four usages side by side without collapsing them.

Usage One: A category within the Formation Aggregate (行蘊). This is the most famous form: 心不相應行 (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra), "formations not associated with mind." The *Abhidharmakośa* (《阿毘達磨俱舍論》) gives the canonical list: 得 (acquisition/prāpti), 非得 (non-acquisition/aprāpti), 同分 (equivalence/sabhāgatā), 無想 (the "no-thought" state/asañjñikā), 二定 (the two attainments — cessation and unconscious absorption), 命 (lifespan/jīvit), 相 (characteristic/lakṣaṇa), and 名身 (the word-as-entity, nāmakāya), among others.

The naming itself carries three explicit constraints, and each one excludes something:

1. 心不相應 — they do not accompany or co-arise with mind. This rules them out as citta (心) or caitta (心所, mental factors). 2. 非色等性 — they are not of the nature of form (色), nor of the other aggregates' characteristic nature. This rules them out as physical phenomena. 3. 行蘊所攝 — they *are* included within the formation aggregate (行蘊). This is the affirmative side: they belong somewhere, and that somewhere is among the formations (saṃskāra) — that is, among the conditioned, the constructed, the conditioned-by-something-else.

So the category is defined by a double exclusion and a single inclusion. It is the "neither mind, nor matter, but still conditioned" slot. For modern readers, this might sound suspiciously like the philosophy of language or social ontology — and indeed, the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* (《瑜伽師地論》) confirms this hunch with a striking confession: "何因緣故,名心不相應耶?此是假想,於諸事中為起言說" — "Why are they called 'mind-non-associated'? This is a conceptual designation (*prajñapti*, 假想), established in order to initiate speech about various matters."

This single sentence changes everything. The category exists *so that we can talk about* certain features of experience that don't reduce to either subjectivity (mind) or objectivity (matter). It is a linguistic-conventional allocation carved out for practical descriptive purposes.

Usage Two: A relational term, paired with "相應." In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, we find constructions like "因聖見、惡見,相應不相應" — "due to right view and wrong view, [the differences are] associated or non-associated." Here 不相應 is not establishing a new kind of entity; it is describing the *relationship* between two things — whether they accompany and cohere with each other, or fail to. "相應" means "accompanying, fitting together, in concert"; "不相應" means precisely the opposite.

Usage Three: A double negation — 非相應非不相應. The same text uses "與所餘依,非相應非不相應" to mark something that *neither* fits *nor* fails to fit — it falls outside the binary entirely, and is described as "依施設安立" (established through conceptual designation). This is a sophisticated logical move: refusing to force certain relational claims into either the "fits" or "doesn't fit" bucket.

Usage Four: 義不相應 — "incompatible in meaning." The *Abhidharmakośa* uses this when explaining why unconditioned dharmas (無為法) are not included in the five aggregates: "the unconditioned and the aggregates are *meaning-incompatible*, hence aggregates do not include the unconditioned." The non-fit here is semantic and categorical, not experiential.

Holding all four together: 不相應 is at once a technical category name, a relational verb, a double-negation operator, and a label for semantic non-fit. The classical materials urge us *not* to flatten these into a single sense.


Life's Walkthrough

Now to the part where many readers find the concept hard — because the items in the list (得, 非得, 同分, 命, 名身, etc.) sound arcane. Let me walk through them with contemporary scenes and try to preserve the *classical boundaries* precisely. The temptation is to translate these terms loosely; the discipline is to keep their edges sharp.

得 (prāpti, "acquisition"). You've just received a job offer after six months of searching. The moment the email lands, something shifts. The "having it" — your new status as an employee, the relational fact of now-belonging-to-that-organization — is not a thought (you may not be thinking about it), not a feeling (you may not yet feel anything), and not a physical object (no one can point to it on a desk). It is a designated condition: the acquisition. The classical analysts placed this in the heart-non-associated formations precisely because it has effects — you now have access to a building, a salary, certain legal protections — yet it isn't mental and isn't material.

Common mis-mapping: people hear 得 and think "gain" or "possession" as a feeling. But the classical point is more subtle. The *having* is structural; it changes what can and cannot occur around you without requiring you to be in any particular mental state.

非得 (aprāpti, "non-acquisition"). You have never had children. The "not-having" — your childlessness as an ongoing condition — similarly is not a thought (you might not be thinking about it), not a feeling (you might be at peace), not a physical object. But it shapes possibilities: certain conversations open and close, certain rooms you can walk into. It is a designated non-acquisition.

Common mis-mapping: assuming 非得 means "loss" or "absence as a feeling." No. It means the *designated fact* that something hasn't been acquired, treated as a dharma in its own right.

同分 (sabhāgatā, "equivalence" or "commonality"). You are at a gathering and notice that everyone in the room is roughly your age. What makes them "your generation"? It isn't that they share a single thought, nor that they share a body. It is a designated commonality — a sameness in kind — that groups beings without requiring them to be linked mentally or physically. 同分 is the dharma that allows categorization by kind. The classical text also notes that 名身等 are "有情數所攝" (counted among sentient beings) and arise in continuity (等流); the same applies to 同分: generations, cohorts, categories are real enough to organize action and speech, but they are designated, not intrinsically existent.

Common mis-mapping: mistaking 同分 for a shared feeling or shared DNA. The classical account is more abstract: it is the dharma of being "of the same kind," a relational-typological designation.

命 (jīvit, "lifespan" or "life-force"). Your grandmother is 92. The "92-ness" — the designated span she has traversed — is not a thought (she may have forgotten her age), not a physical object (you cannot extract "92" from her body), and yet it determines much: how she is treated, what is planned for her, how her remaining years are estimated. 命 in the *Abhidharmakośa* is the dharma that registers the duration or life-condition of a being. Modern parallels include cohort membership, generational identity, projected longevity — all the designated temporal frames we apply.

Common mis-mapping: confusing 命 with a "soul" or vital essence. The classical 心不相應行 account explicitly refuses this — it is a designated dharma, not a metaphysical substrate.

相 (lakṣaṇa, "characteristic" or "mark"). A wine is described as "smooth, earthy, with notes of blackberry." None of those notes are mental events (you aren't yet drinking) nor physical (the bottle is closed). The "characteristic" attached to the wine — its ascribed quality — is a designated feature that organizes behavior: you pay more, you store it differently, you speak of it in particular ways. 相 in the Abhidharma sense covers the qualities we impute to things.

Common mis-mapping: thinking 相 is just "appearance." No, it is the *designated qualitative mark* that may or may not correspond to anything intrinsic.

名身 (nāmakāya, "the word-as-entity") and its relatives 句身 (phrase) and 文身 (syllable). The word "freedom" or "burnout" or "senior developer" circulates. That *word itself* — not the sound waves, not your mental image when you read it, but the designated entity "freedom" as a term used in discourse — is treated as a 心不相應行 in the classical analysis. The *Abhidharmakośa* notes that 名身 is "produced by the speaker," is causally continuous (等流), and morally neutral (無覆無記). The point: language is not just mental and not just physical — it is the designated structure that makes discourse possible.

Common mis-mapping: thinking 名身 means "name" in the casual sense. No — it is the technical recognition that *words themselves, as functional units*, are designated dharmas distinct from their physical sound or mental apprehension.

無想 (asañjñikā) and 二定 (the two attainments). These are states where mental activity has been deliberately suspended — the "no-thought" realm and the attainment of cessation, for example. Yet the *state itself* — the fact of being in such an absorption — is classified under 心不相應行. This is philosophically rich: even when mind stops, the *designation* of the stopped-state is registered as a dharma, included in the formation aggregate precisely because it is conditioned and arises from causes.

Common mis-mapping: hearing "心不相應" and assuming "therefore unconscious." The classical point is the opposite — it shows the thoroughness of the analytical system that even certain "blank" or "stopped" states are accounted for within the formation aggregate.

僧破不和合 (the non-harmony of a schismatic sangha). When a monastic community breaks apart, the *brokenness* — the 和合 being lost — is itself treated as a designated dharma (心不相應行, neutral in moral valence, produced by the community that broke). This extends the concept into the social-relational realm: 不相應 names the *designated reality of disconnection*, distinct from any individual's mind or any physical structure.

義不相應 (meaning-incompatibility). Sometimes in a discussion you say, "Well, that's just not the same kind of thing as this." The word "just" hides a sophisticated move: you are declaring semantic non-fit, not empirical separation. The classical use of 義不相應 for unconditioned dharmas vs. the aggregates works the same way — it's saying they belong to different conceptual categories and shouldn't be forced into the same basket.

And then there is the double-negation usage (非相應非不相應). In contemporary life, this is rarer but real. Consider a piece of art that is neither "fitting" the gallery's aesthetic nor "not fitting" it — it occupies an interstitial space, forcing the gallery to redesign its category rather than slot the work in. The classical text says such cases are "established through conceptual designation" — meaning we don't find a positive essence; we carve out a new conceptual place for them.

Throughout all of this, the *Abhidharmakośa* adds a crucial corrective at the end of its discussion: even though these are called "不相應" (non-associated), they are still *conditioned*. The chapter's closing line, "已說不相應行," is followed by the reminder that their arising still requires the harmony of supporting causes. The name "non-associated" does not mean "independent" or "self-standing." It only means: not paired with mind, not of the nature of form, but included in the formation aggregate — i.e., conditioned.


Why Contemporary People Need This

In contemporary life, we are awash in 心不相應行 dharmas. We may not call them that, but we navigate through them constantly — through status designations (single, partnered, married, divorced, employed, between roles), through qualifications (licensed, certified, tenured), through belonging categories (generation X, millennial, immigrant, native, alumni), through evaluative marks ("premium," "eco-friendly," "ethical"), and through linguistic entities that travel without anyone fully owning them (the phrase "quiet quitting," the term "gaslighting," the hashtag that organizes a movement).

Three reasons these classical distinctions matter now:

First, they prevent a false dichotomy between subjective and objective. Modern culture often frames reality as either "in your head" (a feeling, an opinion) or "out there" (a fact, a thing). The 心不相應行 category reveals a third zone: designated structures that are not reducible to either. When we say a coworker is "in good standing" with management, that designation isn't in the coworker's head and isn't pinned to any physical feature — yet it organizes the room. Recognizing this third zone weakens the grip of both pure subjectivism (everything is just opinion) and crude objectivism (only matter is real).

Second, they prepare us for the doctrine of emptiness. "此是假想,於諸事中為起言說" — *the category itself is a designated convention for the sake of speech.* This is a startling admission from a tradition often accused of metaphysical over-elaboration. The point is not that nothing exists, but that *some of the most influential features of our world are designations we collectively maintain through language and practice.* Once we see this, we no longer grasp them as having *svabhāva* (自性, self-nature), and that loosening is the entry point into the deeper insight that all dharmas, designated or not, lack fixed essence. The category of 心不相應行 thus functions as a school for emptiness training: easier to see through than a person or a self, but showing the same structure.

Third, the double-negation usage (非相應非不相應) is a profound tool for contemporary discourse. Much of our social friction comes from forcing things into binary categories — "is this person allied or opposed?", "is this behavior right or wrong?", "is this content true or false?" The classical double-negation says: sometimes the honest answer is *neither fits and neither fails to fit*, and we must establish a new conceptual place. In ethics, this maps onto situations that resist both approval and condemnation; in epistemology, onto evidence that doesn't confirm and doesn't disconfirm; in personal life, onto transitions (a friendship that is no longer close but not yet ended; a job that is no longer right but not yet left). Naming this third zone is itself liberating.

A brief honest note on analogies with contemporary science and AI: contemporary cognitive science recognizes that much of what we experience as "the world" is constructed through language, categorization, and predictive models — features that are neither purely neural events nor purely external objects. Philosophers of social ontology describe "institutional facts" (Searle) and "status functions" that share family resemblances with 心不相應行. AI systems work with embedding spaces where category membership is statistical, not intrinsic. These analogies are illuminating, but they should not be overstated. The Buddhist analysis is not making a neuroscientific claim about brains, nor a sociological claim about institutions in the empirical sense. It is making a *phenomenological and soteriological* claim: certain features of experience are designated, they shape liberation because we grasp them as substantial, and seeing through them is part of the path. The analogies can guide intuition; they cannot substitute for the practice.


Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading 1: "心不相應行 means unconscious or below-thought." No. The "不相應" specifies a relation to *citta* (mind as principal consciousness), not to consciousness in general. These dharmas may be known, named, discussed, and tracked. They are not "deeper than mind"; they are *classified outside* mind while remaining within the conditioned realm.

Misreading 2: "These are physical or material phenomena we just haven't located yet." No. The second criterion — 非色等性 — explicitly excludes them from the nature of form (色). They are not hidden matter. They are designated dharmas in their own category.

Misreading 3: "不相應 = 'doesn't match' in a loose sense." No, this collapses all four usages. The relational use (相應 vs. 不相應) is different from the classificatory use (心不相應行 as a category), which is different from the double-negation use (非相應非不相應), which is different from the semantic use (義不相應). Each has its own scope and use.

Misreading 4: "These are unimportant technical oddities." The reverse: by including 得 (acquisition), 命 (lifespan), 名身 (language), and 僧破不和合 (community breakdown) in this category, the tradition signals that *acquisition, lifespan, language, and relational harmony* — four things contemporary people treat as foundational — are designated dharmas, not self-existing facts. They are powerful precisely because they shape experience; they are liberating to see through precisely because we so rarely question them.

Misreading 5: "Since these are 假想 (conceptual designations), they don't really exist or matter." The classical position is more careful. Designations function — they organize action, speech, and community. The point of calling them designations is not to dismiss them but to *prevent grasping*. They matter operationally; they are empty ontologically. The closing of the *Abhidharmakośa*'s discussion insists that even these dharmas arise dependent on conditions — they are not unreal (they have effects), but they are not intrinsically real either.

Misreading 6: "雙遮 (double negation) is just fence-sitting or agnosticism." No. 非相應非不相應 is not "I don't know whether it fits or not." It is a precise logical move: *the relation does not belong to either pole of this binary*. The classical text immediately specifies that what remains is to be "established through conceptual designation" — i.e., we must do the constructive work of carving out a new category appropriate to the case. Double negation here is a doorway to refined conceptualization, not an excuse for vagueness.


A final image to carry. The classical materials leave us not with a metaphor for 不相應 (none is provided in the source passages, unlike the famous images for the five aggregates) but with a confession: "此是假想,於諸事中為起言說." This is the tradition telling us, in its most analytical voice, that even its own most careful category is *a tool for speaking well about how things hang together*. It is a tool we can use skillfully or grasp at rigidly. Practicing with it means noticing the designated structures through which our lives run — status, qualification, belonging, language, lifespan, community harmony — and loosening just enough to stop being pushed around by them, while still engaging clearly and compassionately with the people and situations in which they operate.

That is the place of 不相應 in the path of liberation: not a footnote, not a curiosity, but one of the tradition's most honest acknowledgments that much of what feels most solid in our world is, on close inspection, designated — and that seeing this is itself a stage of freedom.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

「不相应」(viprayukta),梵文中 viprayukta 含「离开、不结合、不相配」之义。在汉译佛典中,「不相应」主要用于两类语境:一是作为行蕴所摄法中的分类名称,即「心不相应行」;二是作为表述关系的辞汇,用以说明两者之间不具伴随、和合之性质。此概念涉及法与法之间是否具有相应关系的判别,在不同部类的论书中有不同的使用方式与论述重点。

2. 主要阐述

从概念功能上看,「不相应」在经论中可分为以下数个层面:

其一,作为分类术语,指与心不相伴随、非属色等之性、而又摄于行蕴的一类法。《阿毘达磨俱舍论》以「心不相应行」为名,列举得、非得、同分、无想、二定、命、相、名身等。其命名由三项限定构成:心不相应、非色等性、行蕴所摄。

其二,作为关系判别的词语,与「相应」对举使用,用以说明某一法与另一法之间是否具有伴随、和合之关系。《瑜伽师地论》以「圣见、恶见,相应不相应」表述圣见、恶见与心之间的关系差别,此处「不相应」并非建立一项实体,而是与「相应」相对的关系语式。

其三,作为双重遮遣的术语,即同时遮止「相应」与「不相应」两端。《瑜伽师地论》在说明依施设安立时,使用「与所余依,非相应非不相应」的形式,并以「二种俱非」的方式表述,显示其重点在于如何依所依而作施设、安立。

其四,作为命名缘由的说明。《瑜伽师地论》明确设问「何因缘故,名心不相应耶?」并回答:「此是假想,于诸事中为起言说。」意即「心不相应」之名乃依假想施设,作用是在诸事中发起言说。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

不同部类的论书对「不相应」的用语与论述位置各有不同,兹逐一列举:

《阿毘达磨俱舍论》(毘昙部)使用以下数种语式:

- 「义不相应」:用以说明无为法不摄于蕴,指出无为与蕴的意义彼此不相契合,故有「蕴不摄无为」之结论。 - 「心不相应行」:作为行蕴所摄一类法的固定术语,列举得、非得、同分、无想、二定、命、相、名身等,并明解其命名之三项限定。 - 「余不相应」:用以统摄名身等法的范围,说明名身等唯系欲界、色界(另有说亦通无色界而不可说),判为有情数所摄,是能说者所成,并说其唯是等流、唯属无覆无记性。 - 「不相应行」(总结语):《阿毘达磨俱舍论》结束此部分时称「已说不相应行」,随即转入生相及因缘和合的讨论,指出生相生起所生法时不能离开其余因缘的和合。 - 「不和合」:用于僧破的界定,原文直说「僧破不和合」,并将之判为心不相应行、无覆无记性,由所破之僧所成。

《瑜伽师地论》(瑜伽部)使用以下数种语式:

- 「相应不相应」:与「相应」成对出现,标示圣见、恶见与心之间的关系差别,原文仅标举而未进一步逐项判定何者相应、何者不相应。 - 「非相应非不相应」:双遮语式,同时遮止「相应」与「不相应」两端,用于说明依施设安立。 - 「心不相应」:作为完整名称出现,被解释为假想施设、为起言说而立;并以「于有色等二种俱非,于有见等二种俱非」表述其不落于所举两类中的任何一类。

两部论书在用语上的差异主要在于:《阿毘达磨俱舍论》以「心不相应行」为核心术语,将其作为行蕴所摄的一类法的分类名称,并列举具体法数;《瑜伽师地论》则更侧重于以「相应」与「不相应」的关系判别来表述概念,并引入「非相应非不相应」的双遮语式,以及说明「心不相应」之名乃依假想与言说施设而立。

4. 与相关概念的关系

「不相应」与多个相关概念构成对应或互补关系:

- 与「相应」的关系:「相应」指相伴随、和合之关系,「不相应」则指不具此关系。两者在《瑜伽师地论》中常成对出现,用以判别法与法之间的关系性质。 - 与「心」、「色」的关系:「心不相应行」之名同时排除「心」与「色」两端,即既非与心相应,亦非属色等之性。 - 与「行蕴」的关系:「心不相应行」摄于行蕴之中,是行蕴所摄的一类法,而非独立于行蕴之外的法类。 - 与「无为法」的关系:《阿毘达磨俱舍论》以「义不相应」说明无为法与蕴的意义不相契合,故不摄于蕴。 - 与「和合」的关系:僧破以「不和合」界定,而「不和合」本身被视为心不相应行,显示「不相应」亦可具体呈现群体和合关系的破坏或缺失。

5. 代表性原文引用

《阿毘达磨俱舍论》:「颂文列举得、非得、同分、无想、二定、命、相、名身等类……这些法『心不相应』,又不是色等性,并由行蕴所摄,因此得名『心不相应行』。」

《阿毘达磨俱舍论》:「僧破不和合……将之判为『心不相应行』、无覆无记性,且由所破之僧所成。」

《阿毘达磨俱舍论》:「已说不相应行……生相生起所生法时,不能离开其余因缘的和合。」

《瑜伽师地论》:「因圣见、恶见,相应不相应。」以「相应不相应」表述圣见、恶见与心的关系差别。

《瑜伽师地论》:「与所余依,非相应非不相应……依施设安立。」以双遮语式说明依施设安立。

《瑜伽师地论》:「何因缘故,名心不相应耶?此是假想,于诸事中为起言说。」

By SutraAI-generated

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》對「不相應」的運用並非只有單一層次。其一,論中以「義不相應」說明無為法不攝於蘊:無為與蘊的意義彼此不相契合,故有「蘊不攝無為」之結論。此處「不相應」表示義理或類別上的不相合,而非專指某一法類的名稱。

其二,《阿毘達磨俱舍論》使用固定術語「心不相應行」,並以頌文列舉得、非得、同分、無想、二定、命、相、名身等類。這是該論記述此概念時最重要的術語形式;原文所用的是「心不相應行」,並非僅稱「不相應」或其他近似名稱。

對此術語,《阿毘達磨俱舍論》明確解釋:這些法「心不相應」,又不是色等性,並由行蘊所攝,因此得名「心不相應行」。換言之,其命名同時包含三項限定:與心不相應、非屬色等之性、歸入行蘊。論文隨後先從得與非得加以辨析,顯示「不相應」在此是統攝一組行蘊法的分類名稱。

在名身等法的說明中,《阿毘達磨俱舍論》又把它們置於「餘不相應」的範圍內。原文說名身等唯繫欲界、色界,另述有說亦通無色界而不可說;又判其為有情數所攝,是能說者所成,而非所顯之義,並說其唯是等流、唯屬無覆無記性。這些敘述呈現「不相應」諸法之中,名身等另有其界繫、所攝及性類等差別。

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》在結束這一部分時稱「已說不相應行」,隨即轉入生相及因緣和合的討論。原文特別指出,生相生起所生法時,不能離開其餘因緣的和合;因此,「不相應行」雖為一類法,相關法的生起仍須依其餘因緣和合,不能由「不相應」一名推作全然孤立或不待因緣。

此外,「不相應」還用於僧破的界定。頌文直說「僧破不和合」,並將之判為「心不相應行」、無覆無記性,且由所破之僧所成。此處把「不和合」直接作為僧破的核心表述,並把僧破納入心不相應行,顯示「不相應」亦可具體呈現群體和合關係的破壞或缺失。

綜合而言,《阿毘達磨俱舍論》的用詞須分辨三種語境:以「義不相應」說明無為不攝於蘊,以「心不相應行」標示行蘊所攝的一類法,又以「不和合」界定僧破。三者皆含不相合或不具伴隨、和合關係之意,但原文各有特定論述位置,不宜混作完全相同的單一判語。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》對「不相應」的論述,主要呈現為三種相互關聯而不可混同的用法:一是與「相應」對舉,以說明某些見與心之間是否具有伴隨、和合的關係;二是以「非相應非不相應」構成雙重遮遣;三是直接解釋「心不相應」之名乃依假想與言說施設而立。

其一,論中說「若善住根本,其心便寂靜」,隨即以「因聖見、惡見,相應不相應」表述聖見、惡見與心之間的關係差別。此處「不相應」並非單獨建立一項實體,而是與「相應」成對出現;原文所突出的,是二者作為判別關係的相對語式。就所給原文而言,論中僅標舉聖見、惡見及其「相應不相應」,未進一步逐項判定何者相應、何者不相應,故不宜越出文句另作配屬。

其二,論在說明「依施設安立」時,使用「與所餘依,非相應非不相應」的形式。這不是簡單地說「不相應」,而是同時遮止「相應」與「不相應」兩端,以「非相應非不相應」限定其與其餘所依的關係;此一雙遮語式,是本論論及本概念時值得特別記錄的術語側面。原文並將這一說法歸結為「依施設安立」,顯示其重點在於如何依所依而作施設、安立。

其三,本論明確設問:「何因緣故,名心不相應耶?」答曰:「此是假想,於諸事中為起言說。」由此可見,「心不相應」是本論直接使用的完整名稱;其命名被說明為假想施設,作用是在諸事之中發起言說。原文又說它「於有色等二種俱非,於有見等二種俱非」,並以「如是廣說安立道理,一切當知」收束。此處再度採取「二種俱非」的表述,即不落入所舉兩類中的任何一類;論述焦點仍是名言安立的道理,而非將「心不相應」說成有色或有見等某一固定類別。

總括而言,《瑜伽師地論》的用詞包含「不相應」、「相應不相應」、「非相應非不相應」及「心不相應」。其中,「相應不相應」以成對方式標示關係差別;「非相應非不相應」與「二種俱非」呈現雙遮式安立;「心不相應」則被明說為因假想、為起言說而施設的名稱。這些文句共同顯示,本論在所引段落中不是只給出「彼此不和合」的單一釋義,而是著重於相應與否的關係表述,以及相關名稱如何依言說而安立。

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