Dharma · AI Companion

有情世間

sattvaloka

由一切有情众生构成的世间。AI-generated

Type PhenomenaDifficulty IntroductoryTruth-level span outside the four-fold two-truths frameworkInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is Saying

The term 有情世間 (sattva-loka) — the "world of sentient beings" — is a precise technical category from the Abhidharma tradition, particularly as systematized in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (《阿毘達磨俱舍論》, T29/No.1558, attributed to Vasubandhu). It names one half of conventional existence. The other half is 器世間 (bhājana-loka) — the "container world," i.e. the physical environment that supports and surrounds life. The two are paired, distinguished, and ordered: the treatise first explains sentient beings, then turns to the world that holds them, marked by the explicit transition, "如是已說有情世間。器世間今當說" ("Thus the world of sentient beings has been explained. The world of containers will now be explained"). Both are also described as having "各多差別" — their respective manifold differences. So 器世間 is not a footnote to 有情世間; it is its conceptual counterpart.

Three structural features carry the meaning, and they must be unfolded in turn, because flattening them is exactly how this concept gets misunderstood.

1. The categories by which sentient beings are sorted

The world of sentient beings is not a vague "humanity plus some animals." It is mapped through three classical grids:

诸趣 (gati, "destinations" or "realms"). The standard list is: hell beings (地狱), hungry ghosts (鬼), animals (傍生), humans (人), and deities (诸天) — the last further subdivided into desire-realm, form-realm, and formless-realm heavens. Sentient beinghood is therefore structurally non-anthropocentric. Humans are one gati among many, not the prototype that the others are deviations from.

四生 (catvāro yonayaḥ, "four kinds of birth"). Every sentient being comes into existence in one (or, for some categories, more than one) of four modes: - 卵生 (oviparous) — hatching from an egg - 胎生 (viviparous) — developing in a womb - 湿生 (born from moisture) — emerging from damp matter, decaying organic stuff, etc. - 化生 (spontaneously born) — appearing directly, without the mediation of egg, womb, or moisture

The distribution matters. Humans and animals can be born in all four ways. Hell beings, deities, and 中有 (intermediate existence) are exclusively 化生. Hungry ghosts occur in two forms: 胎生 and 化生. So 化生 is not exotic or marginal — it is the mode by which the vast majority of sentient beings, in the higher and lower realms, actually come into existence.

中有 (antarābhava, "intermediate existence"). Between one life and the next there is, in the framework the *Kośa* adopts, a transitional being — a kind of momentary sentient continuity that moves from the old body to the new. 中有 is itself classified as 化生. The world of sentient beings therefore includes not only beings presently embodied somewhere, but also those in transit between embodiments.

These three grids are not external to 有情世間 — they are the analytical terms the text uses *inside* it. 四生 answers "how does a sentient being come into being?", 诸趣 answers "where does it belong?", 中有 names the in-between that the others leave out.

2. The temporal arc — at two scales

The world of sentient beings is a temporal world, and the *Kośa* observes time at two scales.

At the individual scale: 生住沒 (birth, dwelling, passing away). The text states that the Teacher "於此有情世間生住沒中建立三聚" — established three groupings within the birth, dwelling, and passing-away of this world of sentient beings. A sentient life is not just the dwelling-phase we tend to identify with. Birth and death are built into the category. The text illustrates this concretely through the *marana-nimitta*, the death-signs of celestial beings: five lesser signs (小衰相) that do not yet constitute certain death, and five greater signs (大衰相) that do. The point is not physiognomy but ontology: to be a sentient being in this world is to be something that is born, dwells, and dies — and the boundary between "still dwelling" and "passing" is itself drawn with care, not assumed.

At the cosmic scale: 劫的成壞 (the formation and destruction of a world-cycle, kalpa). The world of sentient beings is also a structure that arises, matures, empties, and re-arises. And the *Kośa* is at pains to keep this process distinct from the destruction of the physical environment.

In the 壞劫 (destruction-kalpa), the emptying happens in a definite order. Hell beings die out first — they are no longer reborn in hell. Then animals, then hungry ghosts, then humans, then the desire-realm heavens are emptied one by one. Beings in the 梵世 (Brahmā-worlds) who have attained the second dhyāna (二靜慮) pass on at death to the 極光淨天 (Ābhāsvara heaven) and the higher form-realm heavens. Once the Brahmā-worlds too are empty, the text names this state: "已壞有情世間" — the world of sentient beings is destroyed. At this exact moment, the *Kośa* is emphatic, the container world is still there: "器世間空曠而住" — the world of containers stands empty. Only afterward do the seven suns appear, oceans boil dry, mountains burn — then the 器世間 itself goes.

So the order is decisive: sentient beings empty out *first*; the container world, though already uninhabited, continues to exist in an emptied form; only then does the container world itself collapse. The two processes are related but they are not the same event, and the text insists on this.

The 成劫 (formation-kalpa) mirrors this. The text summarizes it: "從風起乃至地獄始有情生" — from the arising of wind, up to the first birth of a being in hell. The container world forms first (wind, then water, then the elements arrange themselves), and only when it has become a livable place do sentient beings begin to appear — and they appear *starting from the lower realms*. The world of sentient beings is therefore not seeded into a pre-existing physical world; it is layered into the world from below upward.

3. What "有情" itself is — the cart simile

The third feature is the most quietly radical, and it sits at the end of the *Kośa*'s treatment as a kind of verdict on the whole category.

"有情" (sattva, "sentient being") is not a permanent, independent entity. The text uses the famous cart simile: just as a "cart" is a conventional designation that arises when one 攬 (assembles, takes together) the various parts — axle, wheels, frame, yoke — and treats them as "a cart," so "有情" is a conventional designation that arises when one takes together the 諸蘊 (skandhas, the five aggregates — form, feeling, perception, formative impulses, consciousness) and treats them as "a being." In the 諸行聚 (the cluster of conditioned formations) — which is empty from the start — one should not grasp at a real, substantial "being." The phrase is precise: "攬諸蘊" — the being is *taken together out of the aggregates*; it is not an additional entity standing behind the aggregates.

This is why the *Kośa* can use 有情 so freely to describe the manifold of realms, births, and deaths, while simultaneously undermining any reification of it. The conventional term is allowed to do its full conventional work; it is the metaphysical reading of it that is refused.

A well-known canonical resonance: the *Heart Sūtra* (《般若波羅蜜多心經》) declares, "照見五蘊皆空,度一切苦厄" — "having seen that the five aggregates are all empty, one transcends all suffering." The technical apparatus in 有情世間, especially the cart simile, is exactly the conceptual ground from which that radical "emptiness" insight grows. The Kośa is not denying the aggregate; it is denying that any further entity — the "有情" — needs to be added.

A textual note that matters for precision: the *Kośa* uses the term 諸蘊 here, not "五陰." Both refer to the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, formations, consciousness), but the classical source explicitly flags the wording. It would be wrong to silently rewrite one into the other.


Life Examination

Walking this concept through contemporary life means mapping each structural feature onto a scene, because only when you can see what each piece picks out does the meaning become operational rather than abstract.

Mapping 諸趣

Imagine standing at a busy intersection at rush hour. The default reading is "lots of humans." The Buddhist reading is: one gati, that of humans, in a small space. Now extend the field. The pigeons picking at crumbs are 傍生 — animals. The rats under the subway grate are 傍生. The mosquito you swat is 傍生. The bacterium on your phone screen, if it has any sentience at all, would also be 有情 — though which gati it falls in is unspecified.

Now extend inward. The classical "hungry ghost" (鬼) is a being defined by compulsive, never-satisfied craving. The contemporary analogue is not mystical — it is the person at 2 a.m. scrolling a feed that cannot be filled, the smoker who knows the cigarette does not satisfy and lights another, the binge-eater. These are not metaphors about ghosts; they are patterns of being whose structure is recognizably hungry-ghost-like: a mouth bigger than the body, desire outrunning nourishment. The classical teaching would not say these people *are* 鬼, but it would say the gati-pattern is observable here.

"Hell realms" (地獄) and "deities" (诸天) sound mythological but the structural pattern is recognizable. Hell-patterns are states of unbearable, closed-in suffering — chronic pain that does not respond to treatment, severe depression, situations of entrapment. Deity-patterns are states of pleasure, control, and invulnerability so complete that the inhabitant forgets the conditions that sustain them — and so is at risk of a great fall. Both are conditions a human life can pass through, even if the classical system gives them their own realms.

Mapping 四生

In ordinary conversation, "birth" means 胎生. The *Kośa* is asking you to widen the lens. 卵生 is the chick hatching, the salmon returning to spawn, the sea turtle. 湿生 is the fly emerging from rotting matter, the mosquito from stagnant water — and the Buddhist view would count mold and bacteria as at least candidates. 化生 is the one that strains the contemporary imagination: it is the mode of hell beings, deities, and 中有, which is to say, the mode of appearance without an ordinary biological parent.

The contemporary analogue is not "literal spontaneous generation," but rather: certain forms of life appear without the standard developmental chain. A new idea "appears" in a culture not by being born from a single womb but by emerging into form. A panic attack "appears" without traceable cause. So does a vocation, a fall in love, a sudden clarity in meditation. The *Kośa* is not biologizing these — it is pointing out that "birth" itself is more plural than one word suggests.

Mapping 中有

The intermediate existence is the in-between. You will not, in the contemporary frame, meet a 中有 on the street. But you live in 中有-states often. The gap between jobs. The week after a relationship ends. The dream-state between waking and sleep. The first day in a new city. The "liminal" is a name contemporary anthropology gives to the same structure: you are no longer who you were, not yet who you will become. The text lists 中有 under 有情世間 precisely to mark that being-in-transition is itself a mode of being, not a nothing.

Mapping 生住沒

A single human life, walked honestly, is the template. Birth: a beginning no one remembers. Dwelling: the part we treat as the whole — school, work, relationships, aging. Passing: the part we structurally avoid thinking about until we cannot. The *Kośa*'s insistence that all three belong to the definition of 有情世間 is a quiet rebuke of dwelling-privilege. We behave as if only the middle matters; the concept refuses this.

The five small and five great death-signs of celestial beings are not in the text for casual entertainment — they are evidence that even in the highest, longest, most pleasant dwellings, the dwelling-phase is not endless, and the signs of its end are themselves part of what it means to be a sentient being in this world.

Mapping 劫的成壞

Stretch the time-scale. A city — Detroit, say, or parts of older post-industrial towns — loses population over decades, becomes depopulated; the buildings stand empty. That is "已壞有情世間, 器世間空曠而住" — the sentient world has emptied, the container world still stands. Then, much later, the buildings too may be demolished, the land repurposed, the infrastructure fails — that is the container world itself collapsing. The *Kośa* is offering a way to read long historical processes in which a place first becomes *uninhabited* and only later becomes *physically gone*. The first is the death of 有情世間; the second is the death of 器世間.

The reverse, 成劫, is observable in a new neighborhood, an emerging online ecosystem, a settlement on a frontier — first the roads and buildings, then the first inhabitants, and the first inhabitants are not the most refined but the roughest (the text: hell beings come first).

Mapping the cart simile

Sit quietly and try to locate "you." The body is here. Sensations of tiredness, warmth, pressure — these are forms. Feelings of pleasant or unpleasant around those sensations — these are feelings. The recognition that this is a phone, this is a wall, this is self — these are perceptions. The wanting to continue sitting, the planning of the next sentence, the subtle avoidance of certain thoughts — these are formations. The bare knowing that all of the above is occurring — this is consciousness. None of these is "you." None of these is not-"you." The word "you" works because convention has bundled them; without the bundling, "you" is as findable as "the cart" without its parts.

The place where contemporary people most often misread this is *also* the place where this concept is most useful. We say "I am anxious," "I am tired," "I am my trauma," "I am my achievement" — and we then treat those identities as solid. The cart simile does not deny that the cart moves; it denies that there is a driver-without-the-cart directing it.


Why Contemporary People Need It

Three reasons stand out, and they are not the same.

First, it corrects a deep anthropocentrism that almost every modern worldview carries. Even people who love animals tend to mean by "sentient life" something like "mammals and birds, perhaps fish." The classical framework widens this enormously: 傍生 includes insects and bacteria; 諸趣 includes human, animal, hungry-ghost, hell, and divine states; 中有 includes beings in transition. We need this widening because the ecological crisis we now live inside is partly *constituted by* our under-counting of who counts. The *Kośa*'s categories are not science, but the disciplinary effect of asking "who, exactly, is a 有情?" is one that contemporary ethics, ecology, and AI-rights debates badly need.

Second, it separates "me" from "my world" without severing them. 器世間 and 有情世間 are paired, ordered, and interdependent. The text will not let you say "only consciousness matters" and it will not let you say "only the environment matters." They come up together, fail together, but they fail in different orders. This is a sophisticated framework for thinking about entangled systems where two distinct kinds of thing depend on each other but are not reducible to each other. The contemporary parallel — two co-arising but non-identical realities — is everywhere: body and mind, individual and society, infrastructure and community.

Third, it gives time its dignity at every scale. Most contemporary attention lives in the medium-scale present: weeks, months, the working life. The *Kośa* insists on three time-scales — the moment, the lifetime, the world-cycle — and places sentient beings within all three at once. To live well is to be able to hold all three simultaneously. The concept refuses the contemporary capture of attention by the medium-term present.


Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading 1: "有情" means humans. No. 有情世間 includes all sentient beings across all 諸趣. Humans are one gati among five (or six, with the sub-divisions). A sermon on 有情世間 that talks only about people has already misread the term.

Misreading 2: "有情" is a soul, an ātman, a fixed self. No, and this is the heart of the matter. The cart simile exists precisely to deny this. 有情 is a conventional designation (世俗安立) made by assembling the 諸蘊. It functions in language and practice; it does not refer to a hidden entity behind the aggregates. Re-read in the light of the *Heart Sūtra*'s "照見五蘊皆空," the cart simile is not nihilistic — it does not deny the cart's motion — but it is uncompromisingly anti-substantialist.

Misreading 3: 有情世間 = everything that exists. No. The physical environment is 器世間, a paired but distinct category. A Buddhist analysis of "the world" that talks only about minds, or only about matter, has already lost half the framework.

Misreading 4: 諸蘊 = 五陰 = the same word in different clothes. Substantially, yes — both refer to the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, formations, consciousness). Lexically, the *Kośa* in this context uses 諸蘊 and does not authorize its rewriting as 五陰. The distinction is small but real: the *Kośa* is part of the Abhidharma / 毘曇 tradition, where 蘊 is the standard term; 五陰 belongs to a different but overlapping lexicon. Treat them as equivalent in content, but respect the source's wording.

Misreading 5: The cart simile is saying "you don't exist." It is not. It is saying that *you* does not exist *as the kind of thing you have been assuming exists* — namely, a separately-existing, permanent owner of the aggregates. The cart moves. The being lives, suffers, acts, is reborn. What is denied is the additional metaphysical entity. This is why the *Kośa* can use 有情 everywhere as if it were real, while teaching that it is not a real entity: the term is doing conventional work, and conventions can do their work without metaphysical backing.

Misreading 6: The 壞劫 sequence is poetic imagery, not a serious claim. Read it literally if you want, but the analytical work it does is what matters: sentient beings empty first, the container world empties second; the two are real processes with real order. This ordering is what gives the framework its diagnostic power when applied to any long-cycle, mixed-process situation — an ecosystem collapse, a civilizational decline, a community dissolving — and the framework does not require you to commit to a literal seven-suns cosmology to use it.

Misreading 7: This is about cosmology, not about me. The cart simile exists to tell you, the reader, something about what *you* are. The whole architecture of 諸趣, 四生, 生住沒, 劫成壞 is, in the end, in service of the practical point: when you say "I," inspect the cart. When you say "the world," count who is in it. When you say "my time," look at all three scales. 有情世間 is not a chart of distant realms; it is a chart of who, exactly, is here right now — and how that "here right now" is part of a much longer and wider arrangement than the word "I" suggests.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「有情世間」是《阿毘達磨俱舍論》用以总摄诸趣生命及其受生、存续、死亡与劫中成坏差别的专门术语,与承载众生的「器世間」相对。论中在说明众生方面之后,明言「如是已說有情世間。器世間今當說」,又并举「有情世間及器世間各多差別」,表明二者既相互关联,又各有自身的差别与论述范围。外在环境除称「器世間」外,也称「外器」。

此处的「有情」不是一个常住、独立的实体。论末以车为譬喻:如总揽车的各个部分而世俗假立为车,有情也是「攬諸蘊」而立;在本为空的诸行聚中,不应执取实有的有情。因此,「有情世間」虽可依世俗言说而广泛描述诸趣众生及其生灭迁转,其所指的有情仍只是依诸蕴、诸行聚而安立的名称。

二、主要阐述

《俱舍论》首先通过趣、生与中有等门类展开有情世间。论列四种受生方式,即卵生、胎生、湿生、化生。人及傍生兼具四生;地狱、诸天与中有唯属化生;鬼则通于胎生与化生。由此可见,有情世间遍摄人、傍生、鬼、地狱、诸天以及中有,并不限于人类社会。「四生」「趣」「中有」都是本论辨析有情差别时采用的术语。

其次,论从个体生命的过程观察有情世间,称世尊「於此有情世間生住沒中建立三聚」。所谓世间性,不仅表现为有情分处诸趣,也表现为个体经历出生、住世与死亡。相关论述以天人临终征相为例,分别说明五种尚非决定死亡的小衰相,以及五种表示必定死亡的大衰相。衰相的区分显示,有情世间还包含生命由存续趋向衰变、死亡的具体差别。

再次,有情世间在劫的成坏中具有独立而明确的消退次第。坏劫开始后,先是地狱有情命终,此后不再有新的有情生于地狱;继而地狱、傍生、鬼、人以及欲界诸天等处的有情渐次空尽。梵世有情修得二静虑,命终后生于极光净天;直至梵世有情全部空尽,才称「已壞有情世間」。这一阶段完成时,器世间仍然「空曠而住」,尚未随之毁灭。其后七日轮出现,海水枯竭、山岳燃烧,外器才进一步坏灭。因此,有情世间之坏,是以各处有情不再受生、命终后迁生他界并最终空尽为界定;它与随后发生的外器毁坏并非同一过程。

成劫则呈现相对的次序。论以「從風起乃至地獄始有情生」概括成劫:先有风等外器形成的过程,直至地狱开始出现有情受生,才达到相应阶段。成、坏两方面都说明,有情世间须依器世间而有其处所,但不能因此与器世间混同。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

现有材料只涉及毘曇部《阿毘達磨俱舍論》(《阿毘達磨俱舍論》),没有提供其他部类经典或同经异译本,故不据经外材料补列差异。本论的核心名称固定作「有情世間」;与之相对的外在世界作「器世間」,亦可简称「外器」。论述生命类别时使用「趣」「四生」「中有」等语;说明有情的假立依据时则明确作「諸蘊」「行聚」及「世俗立有情」。尤其应注意,本论此处原文用词是「諸蘊」,不是「五陰」;在没有其他文本依据的情况下,不宜将其改写成另一术语。

四、与相关概念的关系

「器世間」是有情所依止的外在世界,与有情世间并列而相对。论述次序上,先说有情世间,后说器世间;劫坏次序上,先有情空尽,后外器毁坏;成劫次序上,则先形成外器,后出现有情受生。两者彼此为缘而界限分明。

「四生」说明有情如何受生,「诸趣」说明有情所归属的生命处类,「中有」则被列入化生。它们不是有情世间之外的另一世界,而是本论分析有情世间内部差别的范畴。

「生、住、沒」说明个体有情的生命过程;「有情壞」说明整个界处中的有情逐步不再受生而趋于空尽。前者着眼于个体生命,后者置于劫的次第中,但都以有情的生灭为论述中心。

「諸蘊」与「行聚」则关系到有情这一名称如何成立:有情依诸蕴聚合而由世俗安立,并非在诸行之外另有真实、恒常的主体。故诸趣、四生及劫中迁生等说法,皆是在世俗安立的层面使用「有情」之名。

五、代表性原文引用

1. 「如是已說有情世間。器世間今當說。」——标示由有情世间转入器世间的论述界线。

2. 「有情世間及器世間各多差別。」——表明二种世间各具多种差别。

3. 「於此有情世間生住沒中建立三聚。」——从生、住、没观察有情世间。

4. 「已壞有情世間」与「器世間空曠而住」。——说明有情世间坏尽时,器世间仍可暂时存在。

5. 「從風起乃至地獄始有情生。」——概括成劫中由外器形成至有情开始受生的次第。

6. 「攬諸蘊」——说明有情依诸蕴而由世俗假立,不应于诸行聚中执为实有。

By SutraAI-generated

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》以「有情世間」與「器世間」對舉,將整個世間分為正報(有情)與依報(器界)兩大部分來論說。關於有情世間本身,本論有以下幾個論述側面:

一、以「生、住、沒」三時建立有情世間的架構。論中明言:「世尊於此有情世間生住沒中建立三聚」,即在有情世間的生起、安住、沒亡三個階段中施設三種聚(聚即類聚)。在說明死相之前先標舉此一整體框架,顯示本論是把有情世間的流轉放在生住沒的時序中來觀察。

二、把有情世間與器世間區隔為兩大科判,分別演釋。文中以「如是已說有情世間,器世間今當說」作科段過渡,明確表示有情世間的討論已告段落,接著轉入器世間。可見在本論的敘述體例中,有情世間是作為一個獨立完整的章節來處理,而非與器世間混雜而說。

三、詳細演述有情世間的壞滅過程。本論把「壞劫」區分為「趣壞、界壞」與「有情壞、外器壞」四種,並以「有情壞」為重點加以鋪陳:先從地獄有情命終不再新生為壞劫之始,諸地獄定受業者由業力引置他方獄中;其後傍生、鬼趣、人趣、四大王天乃至欲界諸天依次壞盡;欲界盡已,梵世有情由得二靜慮生極光淨天,梵世有情都盡,是名「已壞有情世間」,此時「唯器世間空曠而住」。這是本論對有情世間沒滅的最細緻描寫,依地獄、傍生、鬼、人、天(欲界、色界)次第由下而上壞盡。

四、以「有情」一詞的構成作分析。論云:「有情具名色,名身等處起」,指出有情具足名(心心所)與色(色法)二種,從名色而立名身等。此處以「名色」而非「五蘊」或「五陰」來剖析有情的構成,是本論特有的術語形式。

綜合而言,本論對「有情世間」的論述具有以下特色:用語上始終使用「有情世間」「有情」此一術語,未見以其他譯名取代;結構上把有情世間與器世間對舉分科,於生住沒三時中施設三聚;內容上以壞劫中有情世間的漸次壞盡最為詳備,並以名色二法作為有情的構成要素。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》以「有情世間」一詞指稱由一切有情眾生所構成之世間,並常與「器世間」對舉以明世間之兩面向。

一、與「器世間」對舉為二世間:論中多次將二者並列,攝盡一切行。如「有二世間,攝一切行。一、有情世間,二、器世間。有情世間名種類生死,器世間名器生死」。又於欲界中以喻明之:「諸器世間當知譬如王所王國,有情世間譬如臣民,彼惡天魔譬如君主」,以王國、臣民、君主三事明有情世間依器世間而有。又「依五種世間,即彼世間名墮諸法。謂有情世間、器世間、欲世間、色世間、無色世間」,有情世間為五種世間之一。

二、別以「種類生死」詮表有情世間之體性:論中以「種類生死」一名指有情世間之生滅,與「器生死」對辨,列五種不同分:一、因不同分——器生死由共因所生,種類生死由不共因;二、時不同分——器生死於無始終前後際斷,種類生死相續流轉常無斷絕;三、治不同分——器生死為火水風之所斷壞,種類生死則不如是;四、斷不同分——器生死之因無永斷,種類生死之因則可永斷;五、續不同分——器生死斷而復續,種類生死斷已無續。

三、壞滅與成立之別:器世間為火災、水災、風災之所壞滅,有情世間則「剎那剎那各各內身任運壞滅」。成立之時,諸有情由壽盡、業盡、福盡,從彼處沒而生他處,下三靜慮器及有情世間成已。

四、欲界有情世間有樂有苦之二分:論釋頌義云「意在欲界有樂有苦有情世間」,別立「有樂有情世間」——以十資身具無匱、身康無病、年未衰老為相;「有苦有情世間」——為眾苦逼切身心,有憂、有愁、有箭、有擾惱。

五、以淨天眼觀有情世間無常:世尊依有情世間說「以過人清淨天眼,觀諸有情死時、生時……身壞已後,當生善趣天世界中」,由此顯示有情世間是無常性。

六、五濁中立「有情濁」:菩薩如實了知有情世間極為艱嶮、甚為愚闇,於五濁中別立「有情濁」,謂今時有情多分不識父母、沙門、婆羅門,不見今世後世罪怖,不修惠施、不作福業、不受齋法、不受淨戒。

七、有情同分共聚之理:諸界由勝解力集成,先善惡勝解集成善惡界,相似有情同法而轉,「相往來、同聚、同住、同見、同意勝解相似」,故言「有情諸界共相滋潤、相似而轉」。

大乘阿毘達磨雜集論T1606 · 瑜伽部

《大乘阿毘達磨雜集論》以「有情世間」一詞指稱由一切有情眾生所構成的世間,其論述散見於苦諦決擇及二十四種已生兩處,並與「器世間」對舉。

一、於苦諦決擇中,本論將「有情生及生所依處」分別配屬「有情世間」與「器世間」,明言「有情世間、器世間,如其次第」。所謂「有情生」,即是諸有情生於地獄、畜生、餓鬼、人、天諸趣;其於天趣中詳列四大王眾天、三十三天、夜摩天、覩史多天、樂變化天、他化自在天之欲界六天,並依梵眾天、梵輔天、大梵天等次第列出色界十七處(自梵眾天至色究竟天),及無邊空處天、無邊識處天、無所有處天、非想非非想處天之無色界四處。與「有情世間」相對之「器世間」,即「生所依處」,本論以地水風三輪及蘇迷盧山、四大洲、八小洲、內海外海、千日千月等構成之,並建立小千、中千、大千世界之次第差別。

二、於二十四種已生之抉擇中,本論明示「生死已生者,謂有情世間」,將「有情世間」與「成壞已生」所攝之「器世間」對舉:生死之相續即有情世間之相續,世間之成壞即器世間之成壞。此處之「已生」義攝過去與現在,故有情世間之成立即生死之流轉。

三、術語對照方面,本論一律用「有情世間」、「器世間」之稱,未見以其他異名(如「眾生世間」、「器世界」等)替代之表述;於天趣分類亦用「那落迦」、「阿素洛」等本論特有音譯,與他經或有出入。值得注意者,本論以「生死已生」直接定義「有情世間」,將其歸入世俗有為之範疇,並未賦予其獨立實體之義,此為本論對此概念之特殊著眼點。

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