Dharma · AI Companion

增益執

samāropa-graha

于本无之法妄执为有AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span II · emptinessInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

增益執 (*zēngyì zhí*, “the grasping that superimposes” or “reifying grasping”) is the mind’s habit of adding something that is not actually present and then treating the addition as an intrinsic feature of reality. The *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* (《瑜伽師地論》) states its core with great economy: 「於實無事起增益執」—“With regard to what is in fact absent, one gives rise to superimposing grasping.”

“Superimposition” does not mean merely having an inaccurate opinion. It means that language, recognition, and conceptual construction place a determinate identity upon what is encountered, after which the mind forgets that this identity was dependently designated. It takes the designation to disclose a self-existing nature in the thing itself.

Suppose someone does not answer a message. What is immediately present may include a screen, the absence of a reply, bodily tension, disappointment, remembered conversations, and uncertainty. The mind then constructs: “She is deliberately ignoring me”; “This proves I am unimportant”; “She is a cold person.” These judgments may contain useful hypotheses, but superimposing grasping begins when the mind no longer experiences them as interpretations. “Cold person” now seems to be a fixed nature residing in the other person, while “unlovable” seems to be an established nature residing in oneself.

The same mechanism operates in more philosophical forms. Names such as 色 (*rūpa*, material form), 受 (*vedanā*, feeling), and even 涅槃 (*nirvāṇa*, liberation or extinguishment) are indispensable conventional designations. But according to the analysis presented here, their names and verbally formulated characteristics are 假立 (*prajñapti*, dependent or provisional designation). They are not intrinsic natures already contained in their supporting conditions, waiting for language merely to uncover them.

The argument is subtle. If every description disclosed a corresponding intrinsic nature, one and the same basis would acquire many incompatible natures whenever it received different names. A person could be “mother,” “doctor,” “immigrant,” “customer,” “rival,” and “stranger.” These names can all function correctly in their respective relations, but it does not follow that six sealed essences inhabit one individual. Conversely, if the object already possessed precisely the nature expressed by a name before that name and its conceptual framework had been established, the corresponding cognition should arise even in someone who had never learned the distinction. Often it does not. Learning a classification changes what one notices and how the field of experience is organized.

This does not make names useless or arbitrary. “Fever,” “debt,” “traffic light,” and “promise” have consequences. A conventional designation can be accurate, ethically important, and causally effective without being an independent essence. The error is not using a map; it is mistaking the map’s boundaries for seams cut into reality from its own side.

The *Yogācārabhūmi* therefore places 增益執 opposite 損減執 (*sǔnjiǎn zhí*, “diminishing” or “nihilistically denying grasping”):

- Superimposition establishes as intrinsically real what is absent. - Diminution denies what is actually present or operative.

Its balanced formula is: 「不於實無起增益執,不於實有起損減執」—do not superimpose upon what is absent, and do not deny what is present.

This twofold refusal is essential. Emptiness is not reached by moving from “everything has a fixed essence” to “nothing exists and nothing matters.” The text calls the sound understanding 善取空 (*shàn qǔ kōng*, “taking emptiness well”). In an experienced and conceptually identified object, the 假說性法—the supposedly self-existing nature conveyed by the designation—is absent. Yet there remains 實有唯事, the “mere actuality” or supporting occurrence on the basis of which designation operates.

That phrase must not be turned into a new metaphysical substance. It does not mean that beneath appearances lies a secret, permanent “thing-in-itself” possessing its own independent essence. It marks the refusal to erase dependent experience and causal functioning merely because the imagined verbal essence cannot be found. Pain is not an intrinsic entity called “Pain,” but pain is not therefore nothing. A promise lacks a freestanding nature, yet breaking it can still injure trust. A person is empty of an immutable self, yet actions still have consequences.

To deny the supporting actuality together with the imagined nature is 惡取空 (*è qǔ kōng*, “taking emptiness badly”). That is the error of diminution, not insight into emptiness. The middle way here is neither substantialism nor nihilism: do not add an essence, and do not subtract dependent actuality.

The text further distinguishes two layers of addition.

差別增益 (*chābié zēngyì*, “superimposition of differentiating characteristics”) adds predicates and contrasts: permanent or impermanent, self or non-self, genuine mind or false mind, wholesome or unwholesome, purified or defiled. The point is not that these distinctions can never be conventionally or pedagogically valid. The error lies in fastening them onto the basis as self-established, exhaustive identities.

自性增益 (*zìxìng zēngyì*, “superimposition of intrinsic nature”) goes deeper. On the strength of those distinctions, the mind takes 言說自性 (“the intrinsic nature constructed in discourse”)—also called 遍計所執自性 (*parikalpita-svabhāva*, “the imagined nature grasped through pervasive conceptual construction”)—to exist in the object itself. First there is “This conduct is harmful”; then, without noticing the transition, “He is a bad person by nature.” First there is “My mind is agitated today”; then “I am fundamentally broken.” A situational distinction hardens into an essence.

The proposed antidote is expressed through 四尋思 and 四如實智—the “four investigations” and the “four knowledges in accordance with reality.” They examine name, supporting actuality, the designation of intrinsic nature, and the designation of differentiating characteristics:

- With regard to a name, see it as a name: a convention established so that people can recognize, think, communicate, and coordinate. - With regard to the supporting occurrence, attend to what is occurring without assuming that the name is its intrinsic nature. - With regard to designated intrinsic nature, understand that it is not the thing’s own self-established nature; it appears as though it belonged to the thing. - With regard to designated differences, examine how predicates and classifications are dependently applied rather than treating them as absolute divisions inherent in reality.

This is not an instruction to become pre-verbal or incapable of judgment. It is training in using concepts without being used by them. The text connects name, recognition, and discourse closely: once a name is established, a corresponding perception or 想 (*saṃjñā*, recognition by taking a mark) can arise; on that basis, reifying grasping becomes possible. The trouble is therefore not sound, vocabulary, or thought as such. It is the unnoticed conversion of a useful designation into an allegedly self-existing nature.

In the path of liberation, this matters because attachment and aversion rarely cling to bare conditions. They cling to conditions already thickened into “my success,” “her betrayal,” “the kind of person I am,” “the security I must possess,” or even “the enlightenment I will obtain.” Superimposition gives craving a solid object and gives hostility an apparently solid enemy. Seeing through it loosens the fabricated solidity on which both depend.

A walk-through in everyday life

Imagine an evening commute after an exhausting day. You open a workplace messaging app and see a short message from your manager: “Let’s discuss your presentation tomorrow.”

First, distinguish the supporting occurrence from the additions. There are visible marks on a screen, a learned linguistic convention, a remembered presentation, sensations in the chest, an unpleasant feeling tone, and emerging images of tomorrow. These are not “nothing.” They form the dependent basis on which interpretation takes place.

Then comes the name. The marks are recognized as words because you have learned a language and the conventions of workplace communication. “Discuss” functions as a designation within that system. Someone unfamiliar with the language would not extract the same meaning from the marks. This illustrates why the cognition is not simply the word’s intrinsic nature leaping out of the pixels.

Next comes recognition. 想 here is not merely “a thought” or a fantasy. It is the taking and identifying of marks: “message,” “manager,” “presentation,” “tomorrow,” “discussion.” This recognition is necessary for ordinary life. Without it, you could not respond responsibly.

Then 差別增益 begins to gather momentum: “good or bad,” “approval or rejection,” “safe or threatened,” “competent or incompetent.” Some evaluation may be reasonable. Perhaps the presentation truly had problems. But the mind now supplies distinctions for which the message itself provides insufficient evidence: “A discussion means criticism”; “criticism means failure.”

Then 自性增益 completes the hardening: “I am a failure”; “My manager is hostile”; “This workplace is fundamentally unsafe.” A conditional event has become evidence of fixed identities. The mind no longer says, “I am interpreting this message as threatening.” It encounters “threat,” “hostile manager,” and “failed self” as though these were fully formed realities delivered by the screen.

Emotional and bodily consequences follow. Anxiety rises, you rehearse defensive replies, and neutral memories are recruited as evidence. An algorithmic feed can intensify the process: after work you watch videos about toxic managers, and the recommendation system supplies more of the same. This may reinforce a category, but it does not prove that the category is the intrinsic nature of your situation. Algorithms infer patterns from selected behavior and engineered objectives; they do not reveal essences.

Now apply the fourfold investigation.

“Let’s discuss” is seen as a name and communicative convention. It has ordinary meaning, but its precise significance here remains underdetermined.

The event is seen as an event: a message was sent; a meeting is proposed; bodily anxiety is present; the quality of the presentation can be reviewed. None of this is erased in the name of emptiness.

The supposed intrinsic nature is examined: where, exactly, is “hostility itself”? Is it in the pixels, the phrase, the manager independently of every condition, or the bodily tension? The interpretation may later prove partly correct, but even then “hostile by intrinsic nature” adds more than the evidence establishes.

The differentiating characteristics are examined: “success/failure,” “safe/unsafe,” and “competent/incompetent” may serve limited purposes, yet do they exhaust the person or situation? Under what standards, relations, timeframes, and causes are they being applied?

A non-reifying response might be: “A meeting has been requested. I feel anxious and am predicting criticism. I can review the presentation, ask what the manager wants to cover, and postpone conclusions about either person’s fixed nature.” This is not passive. It is more capable of precise action because it separates evidence, affect, inference, and identity.

The most common mapping error is to say that the message, the manager, or the anxiety is “only a label” and therefore unreal. That is 損減執. The message functions, the meeting may happen, and anxiety is being experienced. What is absent is not dependent occurrence but the fixed, self-established nature that conceptual construction adds to it.

The same walk-through applies in intimate relationships. “You forgot our anniversary” may name an actual event. Hurt is present. The leap to “You have never cared about me” is an expanded interpretation; the further leap to “You are by nature incapable of love” is reification. Avoiding superimposition does not forbid discussing the forgotten anniversary or patterns of neglect. It helps one address the concrete pattern without turning the other person into a metaphysical verdict.

In parenting, a child may hit another child. Calling the act harmful can guide protection and education. Turning “a harmful act occurred” into “this is a bad child” converts a behavior under conditions into an identity. Conversely, saying “everything is empty, so nothing happened” denies the injured child and abandons ethical responsibility. The middle course neither essentializes the actor nor erases the action.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary life constantly rewards rapid classification. Platforms label content, institutions score performance, political discourse sorts people into camps, and personal brands encourage us to compress a changing life into a stable identity. These systems require categories to operate. The danger is not classification itself but forgetting its conditional, selective character.

A credit score is useful for certain institutional decisions; it is not the intrinsic nature of a borrower. A diagnostic term may organize treatment and bring relief; it is not the exhaustive essence of a patient. A résumé records selected achievements; it is not a person. A predictive model may estimate a probability from past data; it does not uncover a fixed destiny residing in an individual.

Brain science and cognitive science sometimes describe perception as constructive, predictive, or dependent on learned categories. These ideas can provide illuminating comparisons: experience is not always a passive photograph of a ready-made world. But the comparison has limits. Scientific models remain disputed, revisable accounts of measurable processes; they neither prove Buddhist emptiness nor settle the soteriological question of how grasping produces suffering. Buddhism’s concern is not merely that cognition constructs models. It asks why we cling to those constructions as “I,” “mine,” and “what things truly are,” and whether releasing that clinging ends suffering.

Superimposing grasping is especially costly because it turns changeable conditions into prisons. “I failed” becomes “I am a failure.” “I am depressed” becomes “Depression is my permanent identity.” “This relationship contains mistrust” becomes “Love always ends in betrayal.” Once a predicate becomes an essence, alternative action feels dishonest or impossible. The designation begins to police the future.

Seeing dependent designation does not demand positive thinking. “My workplace is abusive” may be a justified conventional judgment supported by recurring evidence. Insight does not require remaining in danger while philosophizing that labels are empty. It asks us to locate the judgment properly: as a serious, evidence-based designation of patterns and conditions, not as an independently existing substance called “abuse” or an immutable essence in every participant. Precisely because conditions are not fixed essences, they can be confronted, interrupted, or left.

This places the teaching within the whole path of liberation. Ethical discipline becomes more intelligent because it responds to actions and consequences without eternally condemning persons. Meditation becomes more penetrating because sensations, moods, and thoughts can be known without immediately becoming “me” or “mine.” Wisdom matures because it sees that the objects of craving and hatred possess neither the solidity nor the independence projected onto them.

Eventually the investigation also reaches Buddhist language. “Defilement,” “purity,” “saṃsāra,” “nirvāṇa,” and “emptiness” are indispensable teachings, but they too must not be converted into fixed verbal essences. The *Yogācārabhūmi* warns that proclaiming a dependently designated phenomenon to possess an independent real nature can become 像似正法—“something resembling the true Dharma.” A statement can sound Buddhist while quietly restoring the very reification the teaching is meant to undo.

The path therefore does not culminate in acquiring the perfect label for reality. It develops the capacity to know and communicate without mistaking verbal construction for reality’s own self-established nature. This is why the text speaks of 真如離言自性: suchness is to be known as free from the intrinsic natures fabricated through discourse. “Free from discourse” does not mean that awakening is a mysterious object hiding beyond all words. It means that no verbal determination can be grasped as its independently established essence.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“Superimposition means every interpretation is false.” No. Conventional interpretations can be accurate, inaccurate, beneficial, harmful, precise, or crude. Superimposition is the added grasping that treats a dependently established description as an intrinsic nature. A weather forecast need not be infallible to be useful; nor need “storm” be an eternal essence for one to carry an umbrella.

“Names create the world out of nothing.” That overstates the teaching. Names organize recognition and make distinctions available, but they operate in dependence on supporting occurrences, capacities, purposes, communities, and causal conditions. The text does not replace object-essentialism with linguistic omnipotence.

“If something is designated, it is unreal.” This confuses the absence of intrinsic nature with nonexistence. Money, laws, borders, appointments, and marriages depend heavily on collective designation, yet they have real conventional effects. Bodies, pain, and material conditions must likewise not be erased. Correct emptiness avoids both addition and subtraction.

“實有唯事 means an ultimately substantial object remains behind language.” Not necessarily. In this context it protects the supporting actuality from nihilistic denial. To turn that protection into a theory of self-existing substances would reinstate the very 自性增益 under examination. The expression must be read together with the insistence that the nature of the experienced basis is beyond the fixed intrinsic character projected by discourse.

“差別增益 means we must stop distinguishing wholesome from unwholesome.” No. The path depends upon discernment. The warning concerns the reification of distinctions, not their responsible conventional use. One can recognize an act as cruel, prevent it, and address its causes without asserting an eternally cruel self. Ethical clarity need not become ontological condemnation.

“Impermanence and non-self are Buddhist truths, so attributing them can never be superimposition.” The text’s inclusion of “permanent/impermanent” and “self/non-self” among possible differentiating additions is a warning about the manner of grasping. Even a correct teaching becomes distorted when converted into a verbal essence and fastened onto things as though repeating the formula were direct realization. Dharma concepts are medicines, not collectible metaphysical properties.

“To avoid superimposition, I should distrust thought and remain blank.” That is another extreme. Recognition and language make communication, compassion, learning, and practice possible. The discipline is to recognize a name as a name, an event as an event, and an inference as an inference. Freedom is not cognitive paralysis but non-captivity to cognition.

“Not judging people means ignoring danger.” No. Careful attention may reveal a stable and dangerous behavioral pattern. You can establish boundaries, leave, seek assistance, or protect others. Non-reification removes the claim that your current description is the person’s independent and unchangeable essence; it does not remove prudence.

“Emptiness means nothing can be known.” The teaching is more exacting than skepticism. It asks us to know dependent conditions more faithfully by ceasing to add an imagined self-nature to them. What is relinquished is not knowledge but the demand that knowledge supply immutable essences.

The practical test is simple but demanding: after naming something, can you still see the conditions from which the name was abstracted? After making a necessary distinction, can you avoid turning it into an absolute identity? After recognizing emptiness, can you still honor pain, causality, responsibility, and care?

增益執 is not merely a technical error in Buddhist philosophy. It is the everyday manufacture of the solid world to which craving, fear, pride, and hostility attach. The way beyond it is not to say that nothing exists. It is to meet what occurs without adding an essence, to use names without kneeling before them, and to let wisdom remove fabrication without allowing emptiness to erase the living world.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「增益执」,《瑜伽师地论》以「于实无事起增益执」为核心表述,指对色等法、色等事,执取由言说假立的自性、自相为实有,即在本无之处妄立有法的颠倒执着。论中将此与「离损减实有妄执」并举,说明胜义自性既非如言说所表般具有固定自性,也非一切都无所有;如实了知须同时远离增益与损减二边。

二、主要阐述

(一)从名言施设辨明增益之成立

色、受乃至涅槃等名称与自相皆是「假立」「假说」,不是所依事自身固有的自性。若一法随不同言说便各有自性,同一法事即应具有众多自性;若事物先有与名称相同的自性,尚未施设名称时亦应能生起相应之觉,然实际并非如此。故把假说所诠表的性相执成事物本身的实性,正是增益所由生起。

(二)与空性观的关联

论中称正确认识者为「善取空者」:于色等想事中,「假说性法」确实无有,而作为假说所依的「实有唯事」仍然存在。故应「不于实无起增益执,不于实有起损减执」,不增不减、不取不舍,如实了知真如离言自性。相反,若把所依实事也一概拨无,则名「恶取空者」,属于损减而非增益。

(三)四寻思、四如实智之对治

论以四种寻思、四种如实智说明对治途径:于名唯见名,了知名称只是为令世间起想、起见、起言说而于事上假立;于事唯见事,观一切色等想事性离言说;于自性假立,了知其并非彼事自性,只是似彼事自性而显现。论中特别指出,若不假立色等名称,便不生色等想;无想则不能起增益执,由此显示增益执与名、想、言说相连。

(四)差别增益与自性增益之细分

论中作更细的分类:「差别增益」包括于事上增益常、无常、我、无我、真实心、不真实心,以及善、不善、清净、杂染等差别相;「自性增益」则是依此差别增益,将愚夫遍计所执的「言说自性」增益为彼事实有。此处亦以「遍计所执自性」说明所增益者,并称损减为执着一切法相全无所有。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

就《瑜伽师地论》的特定用词而言,本论主要称此概念为「增益执」,亦用「增益实无妄执」「自性增益」「差别增益」等形式。所执取者称「假说自性自相」「言说自性」或「遍计所执自性」;所依则常称「事」「想事」及「实有唯事」。另有「由言说假立名字,遍计诸法决定自性」之说,并将善知唯名、不认为诸法有决定性称为「于彼无执」。

四、与相关概念的关系

与损减执的对待:增益执与损减执相对而立,前者于实无处妄立为有,后者于实有处妄拨为无。论中以二者并遮,显示中道了知须不堕二边。

与善取空、恶取空的关系:善取空者离增益而不离实有事,恶取空者于实有事亦执为无,后者属损减边而非增益。

与像似正法的关系:本论把增益执的法义后果说得明确——在假有法中宣说其为实有性,或增益虚事、损减实事,皆名「像似正法」。其所遮止者,并非一切假名施设,而是把依待他法而施设的假有,误说为不待、不依其他事物而成立的实有自性。

五、代表性原文引用

- 「于实无事起增益执。」(《瑜伽师地论》) - 「不于实无起增益执,不于实有起损减执。」(《瑜伽师地论》) - 「由言说假立名字,遍计诸法决定自性。」(《瑜伽师地论》) - 「差别增益」「自性增益」「遍计所执自性」。(《瑜伽师地论》) - 「像似正法。」(《瑜伽师地论》)

By SutraAI-generated

辨了不了義善說藏論B0048 · 藏傳論典部

《辨了不了義善說藏論》以「增益執」指於本來不具某種自性之法,妄執其具有自相、本性或勝義自性。論中引《菩薩地》說,於色等法及色等事之上,執言說假立的「假說自性自相」為實有,即是「於實無事起增益執」;又總結說,若於勝義無者執為有,或執徧計所執為勝義有,皆名增益執。

本論辨明,所增益者並非能施設之言說本身,而是由言說假立的自性、自相。色等是徧計所執之施設處;在假說自性本非實有之處,執其自相實有,便落入增益。論中並以「自相有即勝義有」說明其含義,故「執有自相」「執勝義有」與「增益執」在此論述中緊密相連。

就其發生方式而言,本論特別說明「俱生增益」:凡夫面對色等所詮事,不能了知其義唯由假名安立,反而覺得青等所依事並非由名言施設,而是由自身體性本來如此。若依其顯現而執青等實有,再於其上假立為色,即是把假名所立者增益執著為自相有。心與境顯現為相異二體時,若據此執為實有,也稱「增益法我妄執」。

本論又從離二邊說明其位置:遠離增益執即離有邊,遠離損減執即離無邊。它並不以「一切唯假」而否定假名所依之事;若將所依實事一併撥無,便屬損減,而非正確破除增益。所謂空,是色等事中假說自性為空;所依事及唯假安立仍須如其所是而辨明。

在術語上,《辨了不了義善說藏論》主要使用「增益執」,亦見「俱生增益」「增益法我妄執」「增益自性」等形式;其所執境常表述為「假說自性自相」「自相有」「勝義有」「本性」或「自體」。論中又說,若於色乃至佛增益自性,名為「徧計執」;「所益自性」即稱「本性」或「自體」。因此,本論記述此概念時,不僅說「於無執有」,更具體限定為:於依他起之上增益其本性或自相為有。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》以「增益執」與「損減執」為一對互補之妄執,共構其「離言自性」義理之雙遣框架。論中明言:諸法「非有自性如言所說,亦非一切都無所有」,須「離增益實無妄執,及離損減實有妄執」,方見諸法勝義自性,而此勝義自性「唯是無分別智所行境界」。所謂增益執,即「於色等法、於色等事,謂有假說自性自相,於實無事起增益執」——將唯假建立之名言自性執為實有;損減執則反之,「於假說相處、於假說相依離言自性勝義法性,謂一切種皆無所有,於實有事起損減執」。論中將此二執並列為「於佛所說法毘奈耶俱為失壞」之兩種人。

就篇幅與論述重心而言,本論對損減執之展開遠詳於增益執。論中引「一切唯假是為真實」之邪見,謂彼「於虛假所依處所實有唯事撥為非有」,則一切虛假亦無,遂「於真實及以虛假二種俱謗都無所有」,名為「最極無者」。又引世尊密意:「寧如一類起我見者,不如一類惡取空者」,以起我見者「不謗一切所知境界」「不由此因墮諸惡趣」,惡取空者則「亦謗一切所知境界」「由此因故墮諸惡趣」。

本論繼而正面界定「惡取空者」與「善取空者」之別:惡取空者「由彼故空亦不信受,於此而空亦不信受」;善取空者則「由於此彼無所有,即由彼故正觀為空;復由於此餘實是有,即由餘故如實知有」,其要旨歸於「不於實無起增益執,不於實有起損減執,不增不減、不取不捨,如實了知如實真如離言自性」。此處「實有唯事」與「假說所表」之對舉,為本論獨特之用語:以「唯事」指稱離言之實有基礎,以「假說性法」指稱名言所詮之無體法,增益執即執後者為有,損減執即撥前者為無。

在觀行層面,本論以「四種尋思、四種如實智」說明增益執之生起機制:「若於一切色等想事不假建立色等名者,無有能於色等想事起色等想;若無有想,則無有能起增益執;若無有執,則無言說」。增益執依名→想→執→言說之次第而起,斷之亦須於「名尋思」處如實了知名唯是假立。

本論另立「八種差別增益」與「自性增益」之分類:差別增益由後後展轉八相構成,自「執常增益」「執無常增益」依次展開至「執我」「執無我」「執真實心」「執不真實心」「執善等乃至清淨增益」「執不善等乃至雜染增益」;自性增益則「差別增益為所依止,由諸愚夫遍計所執所有言說自性增益,即於彼事增益為有」。此處以「遍計所執」釋增益執之體性,與本論三自性說相貫。貫穿損減則「由一相,損減實事所顯」,即「於彼邪法無我性起於勝解,執著一切種、一切法相都無所有」。

綜上,本論術語形式有可注意者:一、以「實無事/實有事」對舉標定增益與損減之對象;二、以「唯事」稱離言之實有基礎,他經少見此用法;三、以「假說自性自相」稱所增益之內容;四、以「遍計所執所有言說自性」為自性增益之體;五、以「惡取空者/善取空者」對舉收攝損減與中道之判準。

顯揚聖教論T1602 · 瑜伽部

《顯揚聖教論》對「增益執」之論述,散見於有關蘊善巧、我之思惟等段落,其義與「於本無之法妄執為有」之概念定義相契合。

一、蘊善巧所對治之染污。在論述「云何蘊善巧」之段落中,此論明言:「了知色等相差別故,及能遠離彼所對治增益執故,於諸蘊中自相共相皆得善巧。」 此處將「增益執」明列為蘊善巧所對治之障染,並與「於諸蘊中捨一合想」「於諸蘊中補特伽羅性不可得」之正觀相對而言。論中引薄伽梵之教,示如來不於色乃至識蘊中可見,西你迦答以「不也」,以顯於蘊之總別中補特伽羅皆不可得;意謂若於五蘊中計執一常住之我、有情、命者,即是增益執之相。

二、「增益」即顛倒之邪執。一頌中此論云:「取已立名故,餘即不能取,如眾生邪執,增益為顛倒。」 頌意謂:一旦依名言施設而立名,則名所不及之實體即不可得;眾生以邪執於本無之法增益為有,其體性即是顛倒見。此頌直接以「增益」等同於「顛倒」,顯示增益執即顛倒執之異名。

三、思惟我時之二邊過失。在論我不應思惟有無之段落,此論以最為明確定義之語句說:「不應思我若有若無。何以故?成二過失故。若思為有,即於非實有義起增益執過;若思為無,即於假有義起損減執過。」 此處將「增益執」與「損減執」對舉:執我為有,則於本無實我之義橫計為有,名增益執;執我為無,則於假施設之我起斷滅見,名損減執。二者皆為思惟我時所應遠離之兩端過失。論中復由「若執為一,有情多過;若執為異,非六處過」,顯「一異」之執亦同墮此二過。

術語方面,此論用「增益執」一詞,未見其他異譯;其反面稱「損減執」。相關術語如「蘊」(非五陰)、「補特伽羅」、「一合想」、「顛倒」、「非實有義」、「假有義」等,皆為瑜伽行派之常語。對自我之施設,論中用「假有」一語,顯示此論承認世俗層面所施設之我為假有,而不可執為實有,從而嚴別增益與損減二邊。

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