Dharma · AI Companion

相待假

由相互对待而成立的假有。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty AdvancedTruth-level span III · nominal designationInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

一、这个概念在说什么

In the Tiantai 天台 tradition's principal meditation manual, *Mohe Zhiguan* 摩訶止觀 (T1911, "The Great Calming and Contemplation"), composed by Zhiyi 智顗 in the early Sui dynasty, the analysis of how human beings conceptually construct "reality" is given in three layers. They are called the Three Fabrications (三假):

- 因成假 (Yīnchéng jiǎ) — fabrication through *conditions coming together*. A thing is posited as a thing because its constituent causes and conditions have assembled. Without the conditions, the thing would not be. - 相续假 (Xiāngxù jiǎ) — fabrication through *continuity across time*. A thing is posited as a thing because its prior and subsequent moments link into what we take to be a stable, persisting entity. - 相待假 (Xiāngdài jiǎ) — fabrication through *mutual relation*. A thing is posited as a thing — and more precisely, *gets its name* — only by being distinguished from, set against, or oriented toward something else.

Of these three, the third is the most subtle and, for contemporary life, perhaps the most important. Almost every ordinary experience of "this" and "that" — of self and other, of success and failure, of enough and not-enough — is already operating inside 相待假 before we have any chance to notice.

The core formula is delivered in one short sentence across the text: 「待余无心,知有此心,即相待假」— "By depending on a 'no-mind' other than this one, we know that there is 'this mind'; this is 相待假." The structure is constant. An X is recognized, named, and felt as X only because a not-X is standing beside it. Remove the not-X and X loses its handle.

Zhiyi does not leave this as a single abstract principle. He walks it through four domains, and the walk-through itself is part of the definition. If we collapse the four into one, we lose the concept.

1. On the mind (心法)

You know "this mind" by referring to a "not-this-mind." Zhiyi deepens this by giving the reference two directions:

- Vertical (竖待): above the present moment of mind is the moment of its eventual cessation — the "no" of extinction. Part of why the present mind registers as a present mind is that we can imagine it fading. The sense of "having a thought" already contains a tacit reference to no-longer-having-it. - Horizontal (横待): beside this mind are the three "non-conditions" (三无为) — the doctrinal "no-minds" of unarisen, unstopping, unconditioned. The very sense of *this* arising is juxtaposed against a horizon of *non-arising*.

So even before we name any thought, the act of recognizing it as "this thought" is already a relational operation. We do not first have a thought and then compare it to a no-thought; we have the thought *as* thought only because the no-thought is implicit in the framing.

2. On the body (正报色身)

「以身待不身」— we know "body" by referring to "non-body." The boundary of the skin is not given in the skin's own substance; it is given by what is excluded from it. When you say "my hand," you are implicitly subtracting "not-hand" — the air, the table, the rest of the room. The recognition of "body" as a unified, bounded thing is, on this analysis, a relational operation. We never experience the body as such except against the field of not-body around it.

3. On the environment and its objects (依报) — for instance, a pillar

「此柱待不柱,长短大小等」— a pillar is a pillar partly because it is not the wall, the floor, or the empty space around it. And it is a *long* pillar, a *big* pillar, only because there are short pillars and small things. Length, size, even the spatial position of the pillar are all relational terms; they would not exist in a world of one undifferentiated object.

4. On desire-mind (欲心)

「以有欲心相,异无欲心」— desire feels like desire, and registers as desire, precisely because there is a "no-desire" state to be differentiated from. The very *shape* of craving has within it the silhouette of not-craving. To feel pulled toward something is already to feel the absence of rest.

The directional image: one thing, two names

Beyond the four domains, Zhiyi gives what may be the cleanest illustration of all: 「一物未异,而有东西之别,有名无实,是为相待有」— "One thing is unchanged, yet there is an east-and-west distinction; there is the name but no substance; this is mutual-relation existence." The same physical object, depending on where you stand or which way you look, is "east" or "west." The thing has not changed; the name has arisen purely from relational position.

This is the most striking image in the whole teaching, because it isolates the operation completely. *Nothing* in the object has shifted. Only the position of the observer has. And yet a name — with all the weight that names carry — has been produced. 相待假, in its purest form, is the production of names by nothing more than relational perception.

Why 相待假 corresponds to 名假施設

Zhiyi maps the three fabrications onto three kinds of designation in the *Śāstra* (释论) he cites:

- 法假施設 (fǎ jiǎ shīshè, "dharma-fabrication designation") ↔ 因成假 - 受假施設 (shòu jiǎ shīshè, "reception-fabrication designation") ↔ 相续假 - 名假施設 (míng jiǎ shīshè, "name-fabrication designation") ↔ 相待假

This correspondence is not incidental. The other two fabrications involve real changes in how things come to be (conditions) and continue (continuity). 相待假 is the one most tightly bound to the *act of naming itself*. It is the layer where the world becomes, in a precise sense, words — names laid on the world on the basis of relations, not substances.

This is also why the famous formulas of the *Prajñāpāramitā* tradition land with extra force once you have seen 相待假. The *Heart Sūtra*'s 「照见五蕴皆空」("illuminate the five aggregates as empty") and the *Diamond Sūtra*'s 「凡所有相,皆是虚妄」(in the Vajracchedikā: "all conditioned marks are illusory") are not the *Mohe Zhiguan*'s own words, but the same logic is what they are pointing at: the marks that appear "real" are marks that are, structurally, mutual-relation fabrications. The *Mohe Zhiguan* names the manufacturing process; the *Heart Sūtra* and *Diamond Sūtra* point to the emptiness of what is produced.

The meditation dimension: 相待惑起

The teaching does not stop at analysis. In the section on entering emptiness (入空观), Zhiyi notes that when a practitioner tries to let go of conceptual fabrication, the mind often responds by *still* holding that "heart-mind depends on a no-mind." This residual sticking is called 相待惑起 (xiāngdài huò qǐ, "the delusion of mutual-relation arising"). It is a subtler trap than the previous two. 因成假 and 相续假 depend on a *particular extinction* (别灭) — something specifically going out of being. 相待假 depends on a *general extinction* (通灭), which can include the broad doctrinal category of "non-arising" (无生) as a whole. The text gives the example: 「待虚空无生而说心生,即是相待假」— "depending on the empty-space's non-arising to say that mind arises, this is 相待假." The very spiritual move of "I am letting go of arising into non-arising" can still be caught inside 相待假.

To break this layer, Zhiyi applies four-cornered reasoning (四句推检): is the no-mind there? Is it not there? Does mind depend on arising? On non-arising? Each answer falls into two errors. The point is not to solve the riddle but to dissolve the assumption that the contrast itself is a solid thing.

The place of 相待假 in the broader teaching

It is worth saying what the concept is *not* doing. It is not denying that conventional distinctions function. It is not asking you to abandon the language of "long" and "short," "self" and "other," "wanted" and "unwanted." It is asking you to notice that the distinctions themselves are not the world — they are names laid on the world based on relations. The "substance" we instinctively feel behind the names is precisely what Zhiyi describes as *有名无实* — having the name without the substance.


二、生活里的走查

Let us take a single contemporary day and walk it through the four-domain structure, exactly as Zhiyi walks it through the four domains. The point is not to label ordinary experience as "mere fabrication" and feel superior to it. The point is to *see* how constantly the conceptual machinery of mutual-relation is already running, so that we can use it without being used by it.

6:50 a.m. — "Rested" against "tired"

You wake up. Within seconds, before any analysis, a vague sense rises: "I am rested today." This is the mind example (心法). For "rested" to register, you are implicitly referring to "not-rested" — the state of dragging yourself through the morning. You may not have a clear mental image of the tired version, but the rested feeling is *shaped* by the absent tired. Vertical reference: the dusk of yesterday's exhaustion. Horizontal reference: the broader category of "people who haven't slept enough."

A few minutes later, you step on the scale and feel either satisfied or unsettled. "Satisfied" is a 相待假 construct. The number is a number. The *feeling* is built by reference to numbers you have decided are not-yours. The relational substructure is invisible, but it is doing the whole job.

The common mapping error here: people often say "this is just 因成假" because the rested feeling is *caused* by sleep. It is not. 因成假 answers *why* the feeling exists; 相待假 answers *how* the feeling gets its name. Sleep is the cause; the satisfied/tired polarity is the naming.

7:30 a.m. — The same road, two names

You walk to the subway. The same stretch of pavement, taken yesterday evening, was "going home." Taken this morning, it is "going to work." The pavement has not changed. The sky has barely changed. Yet the entire felt quality of the walk has changed, because the name has changed. This is the directional example (东西之别) in its pure form. 相待假 is what produces the morning commute's "easterliness" and the evening commute's "westerliness" — not the road, but the relational position of the walker.

Notice: the *feeling* of dread or uplift is generated by the relational naming, not by the pavement. Knowing this does not make the pavement beautiful. It does, however, loosen the grip of the dread.

9:00 a.m. — 项目经理, 业绩, 同行

You arrive at work. You are introduced as a 项目经理. The name confers a certain status. It is only intelligible because there are non-项目经理 around you — interns, peers, those above. The pillar example (柱待不柱) is operating here at full scale. The "long" pillar of your title is only long because there are short pillars beside it.

Your quarterly KPI lives in the same space. "Hit 110%" is bright; "hit 90%" is dim. The differential is constructed by long/short (the numerical scale), by pillar/not-pillar (your role versus others'), and by the body example (this body's capacities against all the bodies it could have had). The apparent substance of "achievement" is held up by an entire relational infrastructure.

The mapping error that almost everyone makes: we treat the relational structure as if it were 因成假 (a real change in our substance) or 相续假 (a long-earned continuity of effort). Sometimes it is. But more often, it is purely 名假施設 — the name has shifted, and the feeling has shifted, and the world has not shifted, and we have not shifted.

12:30 p.m. — "Healthy" against "unhealthy"

Lunch. You stare at a menu. "Healthy" and "unhealthy" are not properties of the food; they are relations the food has to alternatives. The kale salad is "healthy" because the cheeseburger is on the same page. The cheeseburger is "tempting" because the kale salad is. The desire-mind example (欲心) is doing much of the work: 「以有欲心相,异无欲心」— you feel the pull of the burger because you can feel the silhouette of not-desiring it.

This is the most uncomfortable of the four to see clearly, because the desire often *feels* like a fact about the world ("I really want the burger") rather than a fact about the contrast ("I want the burger *because* there is a not-burger option"). Zhiyi's analysis suggests that as long as the not-burger is implicit in the framing, the burger will continue to pull. The remedy is not to deny the pull but to see the relational scaffolding that holds it.

3:00 p.m. — Scrolling, "wasted time" against "work"

The afternoon is hard. You pick up your phone. Within ten minutes, you have been shown a piece of content that, viewed at noon, would have been "useful." Viewed at 3 p.m., on company time, it is "wasted time." The content has not changed. The relational position has. This is the pillar example again: the same pillar, the long side and the short side, depending on where the light falls.

The contemporary mistake is to accept the new name ("wasted time") and feel guilty. The more accurate seeing is that the name arose purely from relational position. The content remains; the *moral valence* is the moving part.

7:30 p.m. — "I" against "you"

You meet a friend. The conversation is warm. Later, walking home, you replay the conversation. The "I" who is replaying it is only coherent as "I" because there was a "you" being addressed. The body example (身待不身) is in operation. The relational boundary of "me" was, throughout the conversation, drawn against "you." Without the not-me beside it, the me would not have the shape it has.

Most modern self-concepts are soaked in 相待假. "I am an introvert" requires "extrovert." "I am a progressive" requires "conservative." "I am successful" requires "unsuccessful." The identities that feel most substantive are often the most saturated with relational substructure.

11:00 p.m. — "I should sleep" against "I should be awake"

You are in bed. The thought "I should sleep" arises. It is recognizable as a thought only against the "I should be awake" of the day just past. Vertical reference (the day, now finished) and horizontal reference (the nights of other people, who are clearly sleeping) are both in play. The thought is, on the analysis, a 相待假 object — known in its shape by depending on a not-this-thought.

The five minutes between "I should sleep" and actually sleeping are often the most 相待假-saturated of the day. The mind is still running the comparisons of the day; the names are still being laid; the relatum is still shifting.


三、当代人为什么需要它

The contemporary self lives in a thicket of comparisons. Salary against colleagues. Body against idealized bodies. Lifestyle against the curated lives of strangers. Vacation against other people's vacations. Each of these is a 相待假 operation. The thicket is not new — it has always been there — but its density and velocity have changed. The feed does not pause; the comparison pipeline is always running. The result is an almost continuous sense of relative position, and a corrosively low sense of being okay as one simply is.

Three things make 相待假 directly useful for contemporary life.

1. It lets you keep the comparisons without being colonized by them. The teaching does not say "stop comparing." It says: notice that the comparison is a relational naming, that the name is not the substance, and that the substance itself is not changed by the name. You can still see the relative height of pillars. You can still keep score on KPIs. You can still notice whether you are rested or tired. The teaching simply makes it possible to do all this without the comparison secretly running your inner life.

2. It exposes the algorithm's natural habitat. Recommendation systems, social ranking, status signals — these are all, in their formal structure, machines for producing 相待假. They present the same content under different relational labels (trending / not trending, in-network / out-of-network, popular / niche) and they profit from the resulting shifts in feeling. Knowing this is not the same as escaping it, but it is the first step toward not being moved invisibly by the labeling. (We should be honest about the limits of the analogy: neuroscience and computer science do not yet have a unified account of how relational naming works in the brain. The suggestive parallel with neural contrast-enhancement — retinal lateral inhibition, opponent-process coding, category-boundary effects in perception — is genuinely suggestive, but the doctrinal analysis is doing its own work on its own terms.)

3. It addresses the specific modern illness of "I am only as good as my current contrast." The rolling identity panics, the search-engine optimization of the self, the brittle sense of self-worth that swings with each new comparison — all of these are faces of one underlying structure: *I am the relational label I carry right now*. 相待假 analysis says: the label is the label, the substance is the substance, and the two are not the same. Your worth is not the height of the pillar; the pillar's height is the height of the pillar measured against other pillars. The pillar itself is just a pillar.

This is also why the tradition places 相待假 in a *three-fabrication* framework rather than presenting it alone. 因成假 gives the answer to *why* this happened; 相续假 gives the answer to *how long* it has been going on; 相待假 gives the answer to *what name we have laid on it*. Without the first two, the third floats abstractly. Without the third, the first two feel more solid than they are. The three together describe the conceptual edifice you inhabit; the practice of seeing through them is the dismantling of that edifice.


四、常见误读与澄清

1. "It is just semantics." This is the most common dismissal. It treats 相待假 as a matter of word choice, which is precisely the opposite of what the concept is saying. The stakes are not about labels; the stakes are about *how labels generate the feeling of substance*. The east/west example is decisive: nothing in the object has changed, and yet a name has produced a different felt reality. That is not semantics; that is the operational power of relational naming.

2. "It is just relativism." Taken as a worldview, relational thinking becomes a flat claim that "everything is relative." The Buddhist teaching is not making that claim. It is making a precise structural claim: *the function of naming is relational*. That is a claim about the machinery of conceptualization, not a claim about the nature of reality. Zhiyi's later teaching of the *Threefold Truth* (三谛 — 空, 假, 中) places 相待假 within a structure that includes the ultimate non-arising of all three fabrications. They are not being affirmed as reality; they are being seen through.

3. "It is the same as 因成假 or 相续假." It is close enough to confuse at first read, but the three are doing different work. 因成假 explains *why a thing came to be* (conditions assembled). 相续假 explains *how a thing persists over time* (continuity). 相待假 explains *how a thing gets its name and identity* (relation). A person's body is 因成假 (parents, conditions), 相续假 (a continuous life from birth to death), and 相待假 (a body defined against not-body, an identity defined against not-identity). The three are layered; the analysis is incomplete if any layer is missed.

4. "It is purely a meditation concept with no daily use." The contrary is true. The whole reason Zhiyi applied the analysis to ordinary mind, body, environment, and desire was to bring it into the everyday. The walk-through above is an attempt to translate that explicit intention into contemporary terms. The meditator's four-cornered reasoning (四句推检) is the formal intensification of something that is already available as reflection in any moment of the day.

5. "Neuroscience has shown reality is constructed by the brain, so this is redundant." Neuroscience has indeed shown that perception is constructed, that category boundaries affect neural response, that contrast shapes what we see. This is a suggestive convergence. But it is not the same as the doctrinal claim. Neuroscience describes the *mechanism*; the doctrinal analysis describes the *function of naming* within conceptual experience, and proposes a practice for dissolving the felt solidity of the names. The two can be complementary; they are not interchangeable. (We should not overstate the convergence. The hard problem of how subjective naming arises from neural activity is unresolved; the bridge between mechanism and meaning is open.)

6. "It denies ordinary distinctions." This is the worry of a careful reader, and it is the one the *Mohe Zhiguan* itself addresses. The text does not say distinctions are false. It says they are conventional, relational, and empty of independent substance. The pillar is still a pillar; the long is still long relative to the short. What is dissolved is the *additional* belief that the relational name captures a substantive reality. The two-step teaching is: see the distinction; see that the distinction is a name; do not collapse the second seeing into a denial of the first.

7. "It is pessimistic about the world." Opposite. The whole point of dissolving the substance-feeling behind relational names is to release the comparisons that are most painful. The teaching is not "nothing exists"; it is "what you thought existed as a solid thing is actually a name, and that is more interesting than the false solidity, and far less crushing." The east is not diminished by being seen as east; the pillar is not diminished by being seen as one pillar among many. The *agonizing* of having to be the tallest pillar — that is what is released.


结语

Zhiyi's *Mohe Zhiguan* is a meditation manual, and the place of 相待假 within it is practical. It is offered so that the practitioner, when they notice the felt solidity of any relational name — "I am this," "this is mine," "I am not that," "that is not me" — can hold it lightly. The name continues to function; the substance-feeling behind it can be recognized as relational, and therefore not load-bearing. The east-pillar saw nothing change in itself as it became west. The practitioner can, with the same recognition, walk through a day in which the names shift constantly, and not be repeatedly knocked over by them.

That is the teaching of 相待假: the world is full of names, the names are useful, and the names are not all that there is.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

相待假是《摩訶止觀》所说三假之一,指一法依待与它法的差别、对立或方位关系而得成立;离开所待,其名义便无从安立。其典型结构是以「此」待「彼」、以「有」待「无」,如心待无心、身待不身、柱待不柱,以及长待短、短待长。相待假所说明的不是诸法具有独立不变的实体,而是某些分别与名称须依相互关系才能设施。《摩訶止觀》又以「一物未异,而有东西之别,有名无实」概括其义:同一物并未因此成为两个实体,却可随相待方位而有东、西等不同名称。

2. 主要阐述

心法上的相待

《摩訶止觀》先以一念心说明三假:法尘对意根而生一念心,是因成假;前念、后念次第不断,是相续假;「待余无心,知有此心」,则是相待假。此处所待之「无心」兼具纵、横二义:纵向是「竖待灭无之无」,即相对于心念灭后的无;横向是「横待三无为之无心」,即相对于三无为所表示的无生、无心而说有心。

该论述并引开善之说,以「因兼二假」或「过之」说明三假相涉:相待假至第三重方起,其成立以前二假为因,故称「因兼」;前一重假尚未除遣,后一重假又复生起,故称「过之」。这显示三假虽可分别说明,却可在同一心念的分析中层层开展。

色身与依报上的相待

色法亦具三假。就正报色身而言,先世行业托生父母,是因成假;从受胎以后相续成长,直至老年皓首,是相续假;「以身待不身」,由身与非身的分别而立身名,是相待假。就依报之柱而言,四微和合成柱,是因成假;柱随时节迁变而相续不断,是相续假;「此柱待不柱,长短大小等」,由柱与非柱以及长短、大小等相对分别而立名,是相待假。

相待有与三假设施

《摩訶止觀》引《释论》「三种有」中的「相待有」解释相待假:长因短而有,短亦因长而有;此与彼等关系亦复如此。又如同一物因观察位置不同而有东、西之别,物体本身未必发生异变,而相待之名已经成立,故说「有名无实,是为相待有」。

该论又将自身所说三假与《释论》的三种设施相配:法假设施如因成假,受假设施如相续假,名假设施如相待假。这里相待假特别显出「名」依关系而立的性质。《摩訶止觀》同时举《璎珞经》《大品》《大经》佐证三假之义,但本段材料所呈现的具体对应,仍以《摩訶止觀》引述《释论》者最为明确。

观心推检中的相待惑

在入空观的论述中,若行者仍计有心依待无心而成立,便是「相待惑起」。因成假、相续假所待的灭偏于「别灭」,相待假则「待于通灭」,可通待三无为等无生之义;例如「待虚空无生而说心生」,即被判为相待假。

《摩訶止觀》继而依四句推检此心:若说心待无生而生,须追问究竟有此无生,还是无此无生;若说心待生而生,则如长应当待长,不能显出相待;若说待生与无生而有心生,如待长、短而得长名,又落入两种过失。其目的在破除对能待、所待及由此建立之心的执取,使相待假不得被计为实有。

欲心上的相待

欲心亦依三假分析:尘境触动意根而起欲心,是因成假;欲念相续不断,乃至导致行事,是相续假;「以有欲心相,异无欲心」,由有欲与无欲之异而建立欲心之相,是相待假。此三者皆被说为虚妄不实,并以四句推破而入空,不能据之执为真实道理。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

现有材料的直接文本仅为诸宗部《摩訶止觀》(《摩訶止觀》),未提供同经异译本,因而无「五阴/五蕴」一类异译词形可列。其内部用语则有数种对应层次:一称「相待假」,与「因成假、相续假」并列;二引《释论》称「相待有」;三以三假设施相配时,称其相当于「名假设施」。这些名称出现在《摩訶止觀》的会通叙述中,不宜视为同一经的异译。

具体例语随对象而异:心法作「待余无心」;正报色身作「以身待不身」;依报柱体作「此柱待不柱,长短大小等」;欲心作「以有欲心相,异无欲心」。入空观中又作「待于通灭」及「待虚空无生而说心生」。这些差别反映论述对象与推检层次不同,并非术语义项彼此冲突。

4. 与相关概念的关系

相待假与因成假、相续假共同构成三假。因成假着重众缘或组成条件使一法成立,如法尘对意根、行业托生父母、四微成柱;相续假着重前后相承所显现的持续,如念念不断、由胎至老、柱随时迁变;相待假则着重依他项的差别和对立而立名。三者分别显示条件和合、时间延续与关系命名三个角度。

相待假与「相待有」的关系,在于二者皆以长短、此彼、东西等相依关系说明名义成立;与「名假设施」的关系,则在于相待所得主要表现为名称与分别的设施。至于「相待惑」,是把这种相待而立的心或法计为实有时所生的执著;观心推检即针对这种计著加以破遣。

5. 代表性原文引用

- 「待余无心,知有此心,即相待假。」 - 「以身待不身。」 - 「此柱待不柱,长短大小等。」 - 「一物未异,而有东西之别,有名无实,是为相待有。」 - 「待虚空无生而说心生,即是相待假。」 - 「以有欲心相,异无欲心,即相待假。」

By SutraAI-generated

摩訶止觀T1911 · 諸宗部

《摩訶止觀》以「三假」——因成假、相續假、相待假——為一組核心分析框架,相待假居其三。本經對相待假的正面定義為:「待餘無心,知有此心,即相待假」,即此心之成立,須待其餘無心方顯,由相對待而假立。本經復就色法與依報舉例:「以身待不身,即相待假」;「此柱待不柱,長、短、大、小等也」,凡由對立面而得安立者,皆屬相待假。本經又特別標出相待假所待之對象有寬狹之別:「相待竪待滅無之無,又橫待三無為之無心也」,即相待假不僅待有無之對,亦待虛空、無生等通滅之法。

本經判三假有「隨事」與「隨理」兩層:三藏經中所說為「隨事三假」,大乘則為「隨理三假」,謂三假「附無明起,如幻如化,但有名字,實不可得」;就相待假而言,「以幻化長短相待,寧復可得」,即相待本身亦了不可得。本經又引《釋論》三種有——相待有、假名有、法有——以會通三假,其中「相待有」之定義為:「長因短有,短亦因長;此、彼亦爾。物東則以此為西,在西則東;一物未異,而有東西之別。有名無實,是為相待有」。本經明確將《釋論》三假施設與己之三假對應:「法假施設,如因成;受假施設,如相續;名假施設,如相待」,並斷言「三假義同」。

在觀行實踐上,本經以相待假為破惑之關鍵一環。若行者於從假入空觀中不得入,「猶計有心待於無心,相待惑起」,此惑較因成、相續二假更為深細,因「因成取根塵兩法和合」,「相續竪取意根前後」,皆屬「別滅」而狹;相待假則「待於通滅,此義則寬」,通滅者即三無為雖不併是滅而得是無生。本經引開善「因兼二假,或亦過之」之語,釋相待假起時兼帶前二假,且所待更寬,故言「過之」。本經復以四句推檢破相待假:「為待無生心生?為待有生心生?為待亦生亦無生而心生?為待非生非不生而心生?」逐句推破,令相待無所立。

在破貪欲之具體觀法中,本經舉例:「以有欲心相,異無欲心,即相待假」,即以有欲心與無欲心之對待而假立。利根者以四句推欲,「欲無來處,亦無去處,畢竟空寂」;鈍根者則依次於因成、相續、相待三假中層層作觀,「更於相待中作觀,例前可解」。

術語方面,本經始終以「相待假」為正名,又用「相待有」引《釋論》之文,以「名假施設」為《釋論》三假施設中對應相待假之名目;本經稱小乘三假為「隨事三假」,大乘三假為「隨理三假」,此二名目為本經特有之判分用語。

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