Dharma · AI Companion

pramāṇa

判定认识真伪的准则或有效知识。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span I · dependent arising ⇢ III · nominal designationInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

现、比二量之量准义在因明基础层即可完整教授(初立第一重);陈那量论依唯识自证深化其安立(2),瑜伽现量指向无分别智之安立为正面重读(究竟第三重);月称遮破自续之量属PP3不升。

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is Saying

The Chinese word *liang* (量, “valid measure,” “standard,” “quantity,” or “magnitude”) carries two distinct meanings in the materials before us. They are related by the broad idea of “that by which something is determined,” but they must not be collapsed into one doctrine.

In the *Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* (《瑜伽师地论》), 量 concerns the grounds on which a thesis can rightly be established. Here it is close to “valid cognition,” “warrant,” or “authoritative means of knowing.” In the cited passages of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (《阿毘达磨俱舍论》), however, 量 chiefly means quantity, extent, proportion, or measurement. The latter passages do not present a theory of perception, inference, and authoritative teaching; those categories must not be imported into them merely because the same Chinese character appears in both works.

This distinction matters beyond philology. The first meaning asks, “What warrants this judgment?” The second asks, “How much, how large, how long, or in what proportion?” One tests cognition; the other specifies magnitude.

In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, 量 belongs to the structure of reasoned discussion, together with the thesis (*zong*, 宗), reason (*yin*, 因), example (*yu*, 喻), similar cases, and dissimilar cases. A purported ground is not automatically valid just because it sounds persuasive or comes with supporting language. If it conflicts with what is to be established, fails to determine the matter, or merely repeats the conclusion in another form, it cannot establish the thesis and is “not a measure” (*bu ming liang*, 不名量). A ground counts as a “correct measure” (*zhengliang*, 正量) when it does not conflict with the thesis, is determinate, differs from the proposition it supports, and can genuinely establish that proposition.

That last condition is easily overlooked. “This teaching is true because it is a true teaching” adds no independent support. “I am right because I feel certain” confuses psychological force with cognitive warrant. Certainty may accompany knowledge, prejudice, fear, or intoxication; it is not by itself a measure of truth.

The *Yogācārabhūmi* discusses three principal kinds of warrant.

1. *Xianliang* (现量, direct or present cognition)

This is cognition of what is presently known rather than a conclusion reached by discursive comparison. The treatise uses several related expressions: “worldly direct cognition” (世间现量), “purified direct cognition” (清净现量), and “purified direct cognition not shared with the world” (不共世间清净现量).

The last expression points to supramundane wisdom that knows its field as it is: the conditioned as conditioned, the unconditioned as unconditioned, the surpassable as surpassable, and the unsurpassable as unsurpassable. It therefore should not be reduced to ordinary eyesight or to the slogan “seeing is believing.” The category reaches from worldly immediacy to a mode of knowing transformed by the path.

Nor does direct cognition mean that every interpretation arising during a sensory event is infallible. “I hear a raised voice” and “she raised her voice because she despises me” do not have the same status. The first is closer to what is presently given; the second already incorporates memory, expectation, attribution, and inference. Much unnecessary suffering begins when these layers are fused.

2. *Biliang* (比量, inferential cognition)

Inference is accompanied by reflective discrimination and considers what has been or ought to be examined. The treatise gives five forms, each of which must retain its own structure.

- *Xiang biliang* (相比量, inference from a sign or characteristic) knows something through a sign and its relation to what is signified: seeing a banner and knowing that a carriage is present, or seeing smoke and inferring fire. The same pattern may infer qualities such as faith, dispassion, the conduct of a bodhisattva, or the qualities associated with a tathāgata from relevant manifestations. This does not mean that appearances never deceive; it means that an inference depends on a defensible relation between sign and signified.

- *Ti biliang* (体比量, inference from an observed entity or part) proceeds from a presently seen body, instance, or portion to an unseen entity or its remaining portion. It may also reason from the present to the past or future, and from something near to something distant. Seeing one exposed section of a structure and inferring its continuation is a simple contemporary example, though the strength of the conclusion depends on how reliably the observed part represents the whole.

- *Ye biliang* (业比量, inference from activity or function) infers the bearer or basis of an activity from what it does. Movement at a distance may distinguish a person from a tree stump; tracks, manner of movement, or sounds may indicate an elephant, snake, horse, or lion. The treatise also gives a more technical pattern: from seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and cognizing, one infers respectively the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind as their bases.

- *Fa biliang* (法比量, inference through connected dharmas) moves from one associated or contiguous principle to another: from impermanence to suffering, from suffering to emptiness and non-self; from the conditioned to arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation; and from the unconditioned to the absence of those conditioned phases. This is not merely an association of words. Each transition expresses a contemplated relation that must be understood and verified within the relevant doctrinal framework.

- *Yinguo biliang* (因果比量, causal inference) reasons between cause and effect in either direction. One may infer a likely result from its causes, or infer antecedent causes from an observed result. The cited summary gives the example of inferring attainment of a śramaṇa’s fruit from cultivation of the path, or inferring prior cultivation from the fact that such a fruit has been attained.

These five forms show that Buddhist inference is not one vague act called “thinking.” A sign, a part, a function, a doctrinal relation, and a causal relation do different work. Confusing them produces bad arguments: a mere resemblance is treated as a cause, a visible fragment is mistaken for the whole, or correlation is promoted into necessity.

3. *Zhengjiao liang* (正教量, the warrant of authentic teaching), also called *zhengjiao* (正教, authentic teaching)

This refers to teaching spoken by an omniscient one, or heard from that source and transmitted in accordance with the Dharma. Yet “a text says so” is not the complete criterion. The *Yogācārabhūmi* gives three tests:

- *Bu wei shengyan* (不违圣言): it does not contradict the sacred teaching. It is spoken by the Buddha or noble disciples, transmitted through the tradition, and does not violate right Dharma and right meaning.

- *Neng zhi zaran* (能治杂染): it can counteract defilement. Practised according to the teaching, it is capable of taming greed, hatred, delusion, and their associated afflictions. This is a practical and soteriological test. A doctrine that merely supplies spiritual ammunition for vanity and hostility has not thereby demonstrated its curative power.

- *Bu wei faxiang* (不违法相): it does not violate the characteristics of phenomena. It neither adds existence where the relevant characteristic is absent nor denies what is present; it does not confuse what is determinate with what is indeterminate, difference with non-difference, cause with effect, or literal actuality with provisional designation.

These criteria hold textual fidelity, transformative efficacy, and accuracy about phenomena together. None should be isolated. Fidelity without understanding becomes dogmatism. Claimed spiritual benefit without accuracy can become wishful thinking. Analytical precision without the treatment of greed, hatred, and delusion can become an elegant instrument of self-importance.

The second meaning of 量 is more straightforward but philosophically revealing. In the cited *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* passages, it denotes amount, dimension, proportion, or a measurable relation. The text speaks of the quantity or extent of Dharma aggregates, of the nose and two other faculties taking an “equal-sized object” (*dengliang jing*, 等量境), and of measurements of the container-world, bodily magnitude (*shenliang*, 身量), and lifespan (*shouliang*, 寿量). Measurement and number sometimes occur side by side.

The treatise also preserves a named hierarchy of units. In its fine-length sequence, each successive unit is seven times the preceding one: seven *jiwei* (极微) make one *wei* (微); the progression then continues through gold-dust, water-dust, rabbit-hair dust, sheep-hair dust, ox-hair dust, dust visible in a sunbeam, nit, louse, barley grain, and finally finger-joint. Above that level, three finger-joints make one finger; twenty-four fingers laid crosswise make one cubit; four cubits make one bow-length, also called a fathom; five hundred bow-lengths make one *julushe* (俱卢舍); and eight *julushe* make one *youshanna* (踰缮那). The road between a village and an *āraṇya*, a secluded wilderness dwelling, is used to indicate approximately the road-distance of one *julushe*.

These old units should not be treated as modern laboratory constants. The text itself emphasizes systems established through names. Measurement makes comparison possible by selecting a unit, naming it, and applying a rule of accumulation. It is useful precisely because it stabilizes a relation; it is not an independently existing essence hidden inside things.

Placed in the path of liberation, the two meanings converge without becoming identical. We require sound warrants because ignorance mis-knows experience; we require awareness of measurement because the mind continually measures “more,” “less,” “enough,” “too late,” “not successful enough,” and “not loved enough.” Valid cognition helps distinguish what is known from what is projected. Reflection on conventional measures shows how much of the world we inhabit is organized through useful designations. Neither exercise is liberation by itself, but both can weaken confusion and prepare the mind for seeing phenomena without distortion or appropriation.

A Walk-Through in Everyday Life

Imagine receiving a short message from your partner during an exhausting commute: “Fine. Do whatever you want.” You immediately think, “They are furious, the relationship is deteriorating, and tonight will be a disaster.” At the same time, your phone reports that you have spent six hours online this week, while an app tells you that your relationship “compatibility score” has declined.

Walk through this slowly.

First, identify what is directly present. There are visible marks on a screen, recognized as words. There may be bodily tension, heat in the face, and a tightening in the abdomen. These are candidates for the layer of present cognition. “My partner is furious,” however, is not simply visible in the pixels. It is already an inference.

This is where people most often map the categories incorrectly: they call the entire first interpretation “direct perception” because it arrived instantly. Speed does not turn inference into direct cognition. An interpretation can be learned so deeply that it appears before deliberate thought, yet it still goes beyond what was immediately given.

Next, examine the inference by its actual kind.

As an inference from a sign, the clipped wording may signify irritation—but only if that wording is reliably connected with irritation in this person and context. The same sign could arise from fatigue, hurry, distraction, pain, or an awkward attempt to avoid conflict. A sign licenses investigation; it does not automatically license certainty.

As inference from a part, one message is a fragment of a longer interaction. You may reasonably use a part to consider the whole, but a fragment is not the whole relationship. Algorithms routinely exploit this mistake: one click is treated as your identity, one pause as your preference, one week as your enduring character. Sometimes such predictions are useful; sometimes the sample is unrepresentative.

As inference from activity or function, you might consider observable patterns: replies have become unusually delayed, plans are repeatedly cancelled, or attempts at conversation are avoided. These activities may indicate an underlying difficulty. But they still do not reveal its nature without further evidence. Behaviour can disclose that something is happening without telling you exactly what it means.

As inference through connected principles, you can notice that this emotional event is conditioned and changing. What changes cannot provide permanent security merely by being grasped. The unease produced by demanding permanence from changing conditions opens contemplation of suffering, emptiness, and non-self. This does not mean, “The relationship is unreal, so I need not care.” It means that neither the message, the fear, nor the threatened self possesses the fixed, independent nature that panic assigns to it.

As causal inference, you may reason prospectively: if you answer with accusation, defensiveness will probably intensify; if you pause, regulate your agitation, and ask what is happening, a more truthful conversation becomes possible. Looking backward, you may infer that sleep loss, unresolved resentment, workplace pressure, or your own earlier words contributed to the present tension. Causal inference should widen responsibility, not manufacture a single villain.

Now apply the three tests of authentic teaching. Does the advice you are about to follow accord with the Dharma rather than merely borrow Buddhist vocabulary? If practised, does it actually reduce greed, hatred, and delusion, or does it make resentment feel holy? Does it respect the characteristics of the situation, neither adding a betrayal that has not been established nor denying pain that is plainly present? Does it distinguish a provisional label—“toxic,” “avoidant,” “bad partner”—from the full reality of a changing person and relationship?

Finally, notice the other meaning of 量. “They took three hours to reply.” “I initiate conversation 70 percent of the time.” “We spend only one evening together each week.” These may be accurate measurements. They can reveal a pattern that vague impressions conceal. But numbers answer questions of amount, not automatically questions of meaning. Three hours can signify indifference, a medical emergency, concentrated work, or nothing of consequence. A compatibility score is a quantity generated by a model; it is not direct access to the moral or emotional truth of a relationship.

The same applies at work. Hours logged, tickets closed, citations received, followers gained, calories counted, and a child’s examination scores are forms of measurement. They can support wise decisions. They become oppressive when a conventional unit is mistaken for a complete measure of a person.

Brain science and machine learning offer helpful comparisons here. Both distinguish raw inputs, learned feature extraction, probabilistic inference, and output decisions. This can remind us that an apparently immediate judgment may contain many hidden stages. But the analogy has limits: scientific models remain contested and incomplete, artificial systems do not thereby possess supramundane wisdom, and correlations in neural or computational processes do not prove Buddhist claims about liberation. The comparison can sharpen a question; it cannot substitute for contemplative realization.

Why Contemporary People Need It

Contemporary life produces a peculiar combination: an excess of information and a shortage of trustworthy orientation. We see images instantly, receive conclusions before context, and inherit measurements chosen by institutions whose purposes may not be ours. 量 offers two disciplines suited to this condition.

The first is epistemic humility with teeth. It does not merely say, “Everything is subjective.” It asks what kind of warrant a claim has. Was it directly known? Inferred from a sign? Generalized from a part? Inferred from an effect? Received from an authority? Does the alleged evidence determine the conclusion, or merely repeat it? This makes humility precise rather than evasive.

The second is freedom from metric enchantment. Measures are indispensable: medicine needs dosage, buildings need dimensions, schedules need duration, and communities need ways to distribute resources. But contemporary systems often convert a useful measure into a goal and then the goal into an identity. Attention becomes screen time, friendship becomes engagement, competence becomes productivity, health becomes a dashboard, and worth becomes rank.

The Buddhist response is not to abandon numbers. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* itself carefully records scalable units. The point is to know measurement as measurement: a named, relational system that serves particular purposes. What can be counted is real enough to function conventionally, but the count does not exhaust what the thing is.

This has a direct place on the path. Ignorance does not only consist in lacking information. It includes superimposing what is not there, subtracting what is there, confusing the certain and uncertain, mistaking a designation for an essence, and reversing cause and effect. Those are precisely the kinds of distortion guarded against by valid measure and authentic teaching.

Practice therefore begins before dramatic mystical experience. It begins when one says:

“I directly know this much.”

“I infer this, and here is the relation on which the inference depends.”

“I received this teaching, and I will examine whether it accords with Dharma, treats defilement, and respects the characteristics of phenomena.”

“This number is useful for this purpose, but it is not the whole truth of a life.”

Such discipline restrains impulsive appropriation. It creates room between contact and story, evidence and certainty, description and selfhood. In that room, craving and aversion are less able to pose as knowledge.

Yet 量 is not the final aim. A perfectly argued map is not arrival. Correct inference about impermanence can guide practice, but liberation requires that impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self cease to be merely conclusions one can defend. The distinctive “purified direct cognition not shared with the world” marks this horizon: the path moves from hearing, through disciplined reflection, toward direct, transformative knowing.

Thus reason and teaching are not enemies of realization. They protect the journey from fantasy and point beyond themselves. Their success is not measured by how many arguments one wins, but by whether misapprehension and defilement are actually relinquished.

Common Misreadings and Clarifications

“量 always means *pramāṇa* or valid cognition.”

No. In the cited *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* passages it means quantity, magnitude, extent, or measurement. Even the *Yogācārabhūmi* uses 量 in ordinary expressions concerning high or broad dimensions, low or narrow dimensions, and the measure of worldly speech. Context determines the sense.

“Because the *Yogācārabhūmi* teaches direct cognition, inference, and authentic teaching, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* passages must teach the same three.”

That is precisely the kind of unwarranted addition the category warns against. The supplied *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* passages do not establish that classification. A doctrine found in one treatise cannot be inserted into another passage without textual evidence.

“Direct cognition means whatever feels immediate and obvious.”

No. A thought can arise immediately while containing interpretation, memory, and inference. “There is a message on the screen” and “the sender no longer loves me” are not the same cognitive act. Nor should ordinary present cognition be equated with the supramundane, purified cognition described by the treatise.

“Inference is just guessing.”

No. Guessing lacks an adequately established relation. Inference proceeds through a sign, a known part, an activity, an associated principle, or a causal relation. It can be strong or weak depending on whether that relation is reliable and whether alternatives have been considered.

“All five inferences are basically the smoke-and-fire example.”

No. Smoke and fire exemplify inference from a sign. Inferring a whole from a seen part, a bearer from its activity, non-self through a doctrinal relation, and a cause from its effect have distinct structures. Flattening them hides the very discipline the classification supplies.

“Authentic teaching means blind obedience to scripture or teachers.”

No. The *Yogācārabhūmi* gives a threefold criterion: non-contradiction with sacred teaching, efficacy in treating defilements, and non-violation of the characteristics of phenomena. Lineage or quotation alone does not erase the need for right meaning, practice, and accurate discernment.

“If a teaching makes me feel calmer, it must be authentic.”

Not necessarily. Temporary comfort may coexist with denial, attachment, or distorted causality. “Treating defilement” means the actual taming of greed, hatred, delusion, and associated afflictions, together with fidelity to Dharma and phenomena—not simply producing a preferred mood.

“If something is conventionally measured, Buddhism says it is unreal.”

No. Measurements function. Dosages, distances, durations, and proportions have consequences. The point is that units are established through names and relations; they should not be mistaken for self-existing essences or for exhaustive descriptions of what they measure.

“Numbers are objective, so they interpret themselves.”

Numbers can be accurate while the conclusion drawn from them is false. A duration does not reveal a motive; a score does not define a person; a correlation does not by itself establish a cause. Measurement supplies magnitude. Interpretation still requires an appropriate warrant.

“Valid cognition is chiefly a weapon for defeating other people’s views.”

Within debate, 量 does help establish or reject a thesis. Within the path, however, its deeper target is our own ignorance. The crucial false thesis is often the one silently asserted by craving: “This changing thing must secure me,” “this feeling proves my story,” or “this label is the person.”

The wisdom of 量 is therefore double. Learn to ask what truly establishes a claim, and learn to see the limits of every scale by which the world is counted. The first protects the mind from falsehood; the second protects it from mistaking a useful convention for ultimate reality. Together they train a person not merely to possess more information, but to know with greater honesty—and eventually to release the grasping that turns knowledge, authority, and measurement into new forms of bondage.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

「量」在所列论典中有两类不可混同的用法。《瑜伽师地论》主要以量为成立所立宗义所依凭的正确认知或根据,列举现量、比量、正教量,并以能否决定、有效地成就宗义判定其是否为量;《阿毘達磨俱舍論》所引诸段则以量表示数量、尺度、分量及度量关系,未直接建立现量、比量等认识方式的分类。 因而,整理「量」时须分别保存论议中的认识根据义与一般的量度义,不可因梵语概念相同,便将一部论中未见的术语补入另一部论。

2. 主要阐述

《瑜伽师地论》把量置于宗、因、喻以及同类、异类等论议结构中,总摄为「论所依」。若所据与所立相违,或因不决定、或因与所成相同,便不能成就宗义,故「不名量」;若其与所立不相违,具有决定性,并且异于所成而能成立所立宗义,则名「正量」。

现量方面,本论特别提出「清净现量」。一切世间现量也可称清净现量;此外尚有出世智于所行境如实了知有为、无为、有上、无上者,称为「不共世间清净现量」。本论由此并用「现量」「世间现量」「清净现量」和「不共世间清净现量」诸名。

比量指与思择俱,对已思或应思之境加以推度,共分五种。相比量依相状及相属关系推知境界,如见幢知车、见烟知火,亦可由行相推知正信、离欲、菩萨或如来。体比量由已现见的自体或一分,比知未现见之体或其余部分,并可由现在比过去、未来,由近事比远事。 业比量由作用推知其所依,如由动摇与否辨知远处为人或木杌,由足迹、行迹、声音推知象、蛇、马、师子等;又由见、闻、嗅、尝、触、识,分别推知眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意。法比量依相邻、相属之法推知另一法,如由无常推苦,由苦推空、无我,由有为推生住异灭,由无为推无生住异灭。因果比量则在因果之间展转相比,既可见因推果,也可见果推因。

正教量又称「正教」,指一切智所说言教,或从彼听闻而随顺其法,具有「不违圣言、能治杂染、不违法相」三项。不违圣言,是佛或圣弟子所说、展转流布而不违正法正义;能治杂染,是依法修习能够调伏贪、瞋、痴及随烦恼;不违法相,是不对有无之相作增益或减损,不颠倒决定与不定、差别与无差别,也不误立因果、真实与假说之相。

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》则从具体计量关系显示量度义。论法蕴时说「诸法蕴,量如彼论说」,其量关涉法蕴的数量或分量,但引文仅作指示,未列具体数目。 论鼻等三根取境时说「唯取等量境」,以「等量」限定所取境的尺度关系。 器世间计量又以「去下量」与「去上数」相对,并说二者「亦然」,显示距离尺度与数目计算并举。

本论还说先前依踰缮那等辨器世间及身量差别,依年等辨寿量差别,二量皆依名称建立,继而提出「三极少量」。 其中长度序列以极微为初、指节为后,后后皆增七倍:七极微为一微,继为金尘、水尘、兔毛尘、羊毛尘、牛毛尘、隙游尘、虮、虱、穬麦,直到指节。 指节以上,则三指节为一指,二十四指横布为一肘,四肘为一弓,五百弓为一俱卢舍,八俱卢舍为一踰缮那;又以村至阿练若之间的道路说明一俱卢舍的大致道量。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

毘昙部《阿毘達磨俱舍論》所见复合词为「等量」「身量」「寿量」「二量」「极少量」「道量」,并以「量」与「数」交替描述尺度和数目;其单位名称包括「极微」「指节」「弓谓寻」「俱卢舍」「踰缮那」。这些段落没有出现现量、比量、正教量的分类。

瑜伽部《瑜伽师地论》在论议语境中则作「现量」「世间现量」「清净现量」「不共世间清净现量」「比量」「正教量」「正量」,并将比量分作「相比量、体比量、业比量、法比量、因果比量」;正教量亦可简称「正教」。 但同论另有「高广量不相应」「卑狭量相应」「世间言说量」等一般形量、尺度或言说分量用法,不宜一概解释为认识根据。 所给材料未列同一论典的异译本,故无可据原文记录的同经异译词形。

4. 与相关概念的关系

在《瑜伽师地论》中,量与「所立宗义」直接相关,并同宗、因、喻、同类、异类共同构成论议所依;「正量」与「不名量」的区别,取决于所据是否决定、是否异于所成及能否成就宗义。 现量关联现前如实知境,比量关联思择、推度及相属、作用、法与因果关系,正教量关联圣言、杂染对治与法相;三者从不同方面成为论议依据。 在《俱舍论》中,量则与数、名称、身量、寿量及器世间的长度单位相连,表现为可命名、可累积、可换算的度量次第。

5. 代表性原文引用

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》:「诸法蕴,量如彼论说。」 又说鼻等三根「唯取等量境」。 长度换算中有「弓谓寻」,并以俱卢舍、踰缮那及「道量」说明较大的尺度。

《瑜伽师地论》以能成就所立宗义者称「正量」,相违而不能成立者则「不名量」。 其现量中特称「不共世间清净现量」,比量列「相比量、体比量、业比量、法比量、因果比量」,正教量则以「不违圣言、能治杂染、不违法相」为三项准则。

By SutraAI-generated

正理滴論(譯自西藏文本)B0042 · 藏傳論典部

《正理滴論》以「量」為全書核心概念,其論述涵義可歸納為三個層面。一、量之名義:依該經譯序所述,「量」有三方面含義:一者,因明論式稱為「量」,成立論式稱為「立量」;二者,量是有關知識性質的概念,故《因明論》又名《量論》,帶有認識論意味;三者,量的作用與結果在於對事物得到正確的認識,如同以尺量布,量布的動作是作用,所知之長度是結果。

二、量之體系:該經遵從陳那《集量論》之說,否定聲教量(聲量),僅立現量與比量二種。陳那分析「所量」不出自相、共相二大類:自相為事物自具之特性,由現量了知;共相為事物間之共性,由比量了知。法稱承襲此說,以現量與比量(再分自利比量、利他比量兩部分)概括因明全部內容。

三、量之分類與內容:經文正文開篇即言「士夫成辦諸事,正智必須先行」,正智分為現量與比量二種。現量定義為「離分別、不錯亂」之智,分為四種——五根現量、意現量、自證現量、瑜伽現量;其所緣境為自相。比量分自利比量與利他比量:自利比量由具三相之因所生,三相即「於所推論比度之事上必須具備、於同品上定有、於異品上遍無」;三相所在之因有三種——未緣到因、自性因、果因,又概括為立物因與否定因二種。利他比量則以語言建立論式,自立立他於三相之具足上並無差別。該經並強調「現量之智,即為量之結果」,以了境為其自性。

四、術語特色:此經以「量」總攝現量、比量之認識手段,以「正智」指正確之認識,以「所量」指認識對象,以「自相」「共相」區分所量之兩大類別,並以「三相」標誌因之成立條件。經題中「滴論」二字暗示其為法稱因明體系之精要概括。

入中論善顯密意疏B0044 · 藏傳論典部

《入中論善顯密意疏》以「量」及「正量」論判定認識真偽與成立所知之準則,並在世間見、真實觀察及不同有情之認識等脈絡中辨明其效力與界限。其一,論中先舉「世住自見許為量」之說:若僅以世間共同見聞為量,便可聲稱世人皆知「他從他生」,無須另說成立他生的道理。此處所呈現的問題,是把世間自見直接當作足以成立所主張之義的準則。

其二,論中明確反駁「世間是正量」:若世間所見即可衡定真實,則聖者及所修聖道皆成無用,且將導致以愚人為量的不合理結果。因此,原文說「世間一切非正量」,並指出在觀察真實之時,不受世間見所提出的詰難。這裡使用的術語是「正量」,且把世間通常之見與真實時能否作為判準清楚區分。

其三,論中又使用「名言量」一詞,討論餓鬼、傍生、人、天於同一河事各見膿血、宅舍道路、清水或虛空的情形。由於所見彼此相違,遂生疑問:若各種所見皆由名言量成立,是否意味相違之事不再相違,乃至量所成立者亦不可信?論中不接受由此推成「量不可憑信」,認為這等於毀謗一切正量;故「名言量」並非任意認識皆可成立一切相違境相之說。

其四,論中以持咒者與無咒力者觸熾燃鐵丸為喻:二者身識皆緣同一鐵觸,前者因咒水之緣不生極燒熱相之識,後者則生此識。原文稱二者為「二身識量」,並說燒觸與不燒觸依各自之量而成立;某一量所成立者,未必由另一量成立,甚至可為另一量所破。由此可見,本論論量時特別注意認識所依條件、能量之識及其各自成立範圍,不因不同量所得境相有別,便否定一切正量的可信性。

就多譯名歸一而言,本論於相關段落實際使用「量」「正量」「名言量」「身識量」等語;其中「世間是正量」「世間一切非正量」及「二身識量」尤能顯示其具體措辭。原文並未另以其他名稱替代「量」,故記錄此概念時宜保留上述術語層次,而不將它們混作單一、毫無條件限制的稱謂。

菩提道次第廣論B0067 · 藏傳論典部

《菩提道次第廣論》論「量」,首重分辨其所成立之境與適用層次,不可籠統斷言諸識皆非量。論中引「眼耳鼻非量」及「世間皆非量」,隨即說明此等語句是破世間眼等識於「真實」或「勝真實境」為量,並非否定其於色、聲等名言境具有判定作用。若將觀察實性的正理移用來破壞一切世俗法,即是不善安立二諦;色等名言法仍須許為「量成」,不能因勝義觀察中不成立,便說世俗亦全無所成。

本論記錄「量」的核心相狀為「不欺誑」。論述《四百論釋》所破根識為量時,特別辨明所破並非根識在一切意義上皆非量,而是破其對五境「自相」為正量。色、聲等實無自相,根識卻現為有自相,故就此所現境而言屬欺誑;由「欺誑」破「不欺誑」,即是破量。這一辨析顯示,本論常用的術語形式包括「量」「正量」「定量」「現量」「比量」「所量」,並以「不欺誑是量相」明示其判準。

然而,破根識於自相為量,不等於全盤取消名言量。本論明說,安立實境之量雖須於自相為量,安立虛妄名言境之量則不須如此;並引「四量」——現、比、教、喻——說明世間仍由此通達諸義。名言識又依有無內外錯亂因緣分為倒與無倒:翳膜、黃眼、藥物、油水鏡像、谷響、陽燄、咒藥、邪宗及似比量等,皆可形成損害;相對而言,未受此等因緣損害的根識,可就世間共同承認之境成立無倒名言。唯由無明而現自性,並不足以破壞其名言上的有效性。

本論又以「能量、所量」成對表述認識與所知的關係:二者皆是觀待假立,有能量乃有所量,有所量乃有能量,並無自性。故其立場既破有自性的能量與所量,也保留緣起、觀待而立的能量與所量;「量」是否有效,須依所對境界、所受損害及所作觀察而判定。

在論理運用中,本論亦反覆討論「量成」「俱成」及立、敵雙方所許。它記述一說以立敵所許為據,認為未必有雙方量成之因,應成論式可依對方所許顯示其過;但隨後指出,僅憑對方承許而其義全無量成,並不足以破他,否則因與所立無別。相違亦不能只由他許任意建立,而須由量成立;只是某些相違之量,必須待對方已許自性等前提,方能對其成立。由此可見,本論所說「量」不僅指識對境的有效認知,也指論證中成立因、遍及相違關係的判定根據。

就多譯名歸一而言,本論在此主要使用單字「量」,並依語境加稱「正量」「定量」「現量」「比量」,以及「能量」「所量」「量成」;其關鍵界說語為「不欺誑是量相」。原文未另以其他專名取代「量」,而是藉上述複合詞精細區分其境、功能與成立方式。

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