Dharma · AI Companion

本位

行履中本然常住之位,不因偏正语默体用而移易的根本处所。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty AdvancedTruth-level span IV · beyond wordsInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

不因偏正语默体用而移易,即超对待之离言根本处

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

Běnwèi (本位, “the original position” or “fundamental place”) is Hongzhi Zhengjue’s name for the place one has never actually left, even while speaking or remaining silent, resting or responding, seeing clearly or becoming entangled. It is “original” not because it belongs to a remote beginning, but because it is not manufactured by practice. It is a “position” not because consciousness can locate and occupy it like a meditation seat, but because every movement of practice and realization already occurs without departing from it.

The central formulation in the *Extensive Record of Chan Master Hongzhi* (《宏智禪師廣錄》, T2001) is:

「偏正不曾離本位,無生那涉語因緣。」 “Neither the partial nor the proper has ever departed from the original position; how could the unborn be implicated in the conditions of language?”

This needs to be read in both directions.

First, piān and zhèng (偏正) are contrasting modes within Chan practice and expression. Depending on context, they can suggest the differentiated and the upright, the relative and the absolute, responsive engagement and undivided reality. No single English pair exhausts them. Hongzhi’s point is not that one side is the original position and the other is a deviation from it. Neither side ever leaves it. Differentiation does not damage it; stillness does not possess it.

Second, its nature is called wúshēng (無生, unborn or non-arising). This does not mean that nothing appears or that events never begin in ordinary causal terms. Sounds occur, emotions arise, decisions have consequences. “Unborn” points to the fact that the fundamental reality of these appearances cannot be established as an independently arising thing. Because běnwèi is not an object produced by causes, language cannot manufacture it, transmit it as information, or contain it in a definition. Thus Hongzhi says that true realization cannot be conveyed through words and subtle accord cannot be reached by conceptual calculation.

Yet this is not a dismissal of language. Silence does not reach it either. To think, “Words fail, therefore silence is the truth,” merely replaces attachment to speech with attachment to muteness. Speech and silence are both modes of functioning; neither is běnwèi, and neither occurs outside it.

This is why běnwèi cannot be reduced to a peaceful inner core. Hongzhi explains the relation of tǐ and yòng (體用, ground and functioning), together with gōng and wèi (功位, activity/attainment and position):

「借功明位,用在體處;借位明功,體在用處。」 “Borrow activity to illuminate the position: functioning is at the place of the ground. Borrow the position to illuminate activity: the ground is at the place of functioning.”

When activity reveals the position, functioning is not outside the ground. When the position reveals activity, the ground is not hidden behind functioning. Běnwèi is therefore neither the static ground alone nor outward functioning alone. It is not one member of the pair. It names that which is never abandoned as ground and functioning disclose one another.

A lamp offers a limited analogy. Illumination is not something separate from the lamp’s shining, yet the lamp is not identical to any particular object illuminated. The analogy soon breaks down: běnwèi is not an entity standing behind experience, and there is no independent observer shining a private light upon the world.

Hongzhi also describes the practice of returning to it. One must first “come completely to rest” (歇得盡) while remaining luminously undimmed. Then one must “step back and come to oneself” (退步就己). But even clear, solitary awareness can become a subtle achievement: “I am the one who abides in pure observation.” Hence the practitioner must not stop at “solitary illumination” (獨在之照) while retaining a trace of merit or attainment. One must “turn the head to glimpse the original position and attend to the position” (回頭窺本位顧位).

“Returning” is practice-language, not a claim that běnwèi was spatially lost. What is relinquished is appropriation: grasping experience as “my clarity,” “my realization,” or “my pure state.” Once this subtle ownership relaxes, one can move freely through seeing, hearing, sound, form, ground, and functioning.

This places běnwèi at a precise point on the path of liberation. It is not merely an initial reassurance that everyone already possesses awakening. Nor is it simply a final metaphysical proposition. It concerns the transition from cessation of compulsive grasping, through direct nonconceptual accord, into unobstructed responsiveness. One settles, turns back, sees through the one who claims to have settled, and then re-enters conditions without being carried away by them.

Hongzhi calls this the place where the “person of the original character” (本色人) naturally dwells. Buddhas appearing cannot enhance it; demons arising cannot invade it. The image of “a patch of ground the size of a sitting mat before dust-kalpas” (塵劫以前的一坐具地) expresses intimacy, sufficiency, and primordial non-acquisition. It does not describe an ancient location or an eternal substance. “Before” here loosens dependence on constructed time; “a sitting-mat’s ground” makes the teaching immediate enough to sit upon.

Its stability is consequently not rigidity. Hongzhi’s practitioner can “release the body” into responsive activity and, in a turn of the eyes, return without residue: 「轉盻解歸來,蕭然還就位」. Going out into circumstances is not exile from the original position; returning leaves no triumphant practitioner polishing a spiritual medal.

Life in review

Imagine an ordinary evening. You are commuting home after overtime. A message from your partner appears: “You said you would be back early.” At almost the same moment, your manager sends another request. The train is crowded, your body is tired, and your hand has already opened social media before you notice doing it.

Begin with what is actually happening. There is bodily fatigue, visual form on the screen, the sound of the train, irritation, defensive thoughts, an impulse to reply, and the learned reflex of scrolling. Běnwèi is not one special item hidden beneath these events. In particular, it is not the bodily feeling of calm you hope to recover.

The differentiated details—partner, manager, phone, fatigue, resentment, responsibility—belong to the side of distinction and responsive functioning. They should not be erased as “mere illusion.” A missed promise still affects another person. Workplace pressure may be unjust. Exhaustion may require sleep and changed boundaries. Recognizing the original position does not cancel conventional causality or ethical responsibility.

Now suppose you pause before replying. “Coming completely to rest” does not require suppressing irritation. It means ceasing, even briefly, to feed the machinery that turns irritation into accusation, self-justification, or compulsive distraction. The train still moves; the feeling may remain. Rest is the ending of added grasping, not the freezing of experience.

“Luminously undimmed” means that the pause is awake. You know the tight jaw as tightness, the message as words, the defensive rehearsal as a defensive rehearsal. A blank trance, dissociation, or emotional shutdown would not fulfil this description merely because it is quiet.

Then comes “stepping back and coming to oneself.” Instead of immediately standing inside the story—“I am being attacked; nobody understands what I carry”—you turn toward the activity by which an “I under attack” is being assembled. This is not psychological self-analysis alone. The question is more intimate: before defending a position, what is this very field in which message, fatigue, hurt, and defence appear?

A common mapping error happens here. People often identify the detached watcher with běnwèi: “I am pure awareness observing my anger.” Hongzhi explicitly warns against stopping in a solitary illumination that still carries accomplishment. If there is a subtle observer congratulating itself for being unreactive, subject and object have simply been refined, not released.

To “look back toward the original position” is to see that neither the angry participant nor the calm observer owns the scene. Speech has not left běnwèi; silence has not entered it. Irritation does not expel you; mindfulness does not admit you. This is the force of “the partial and the proper have never departed from the original position.”

Now functioning becomes possible. You may write: “I’m sorry. I misjudged the work and should have told you earlier. I’m on the train now; can we talk when I arrive?” You may tell the manager that the new task must wait until morning. Or you may discover that your first interpretation of the message was wrong. No particular sentence is guaranteed to be enlightened. The relevant point is that response emerges without needing to defend a solid self or preserve a pure meditative state.

Here ground is seen in functioning, and functioning occurs at the place of ground. Apologizing is not a fall from emptiness into the messy relative world. Setting a boundary is not necessarily ego. Remaining silent is not necessarily wisdom. Speaking is not necessarily attachment. The ethical quality of the response depends on whether greed, aversion, confusion, and self-protection are being enacted—or clearly seen and relinquished.

Then the hand opens social media again. This does not prove that the original position has been lost. But “never leaving” must not be turned into permission for unconsciousness. The practical question is whether scrolling is freely used as a function or whether craving is carrying the person while declaring itself free. One returns, notices, and responds again. “Returning to position” is not retreating from the train, the relationship, or the algorithmic environment. It is leaving no fixed self lodged in either distraction or purity.

The same walk-through applies in parenting. A child’s screaming does not obstruct běnwèi, and a parent’s calm tone does not possess it. One first stops feeding reactive momentum, remains vividly aware, relinquishes the identity “I am the competent parent who must control this,” and then acts—comforting, restraining danger, setting a limit, or admitting exhaustion. Ground and function meet precisely in the concrete response.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary life trains us to live from acquired positions. We become a job title, a political stance, a personal brand, a diagnosis, a parenting philosophy, a productivity system, or the profile inferred by an algorithm. These positions are not necessarily false; many are useful. The bondage begins when a functional description becomes the place from which existence must continually be defended.

Běnwèi does not offer a better identity. It interrupts the demand to secure identity through every encounter.

That matters because people commonly alternate between two exhausting strategies. One is ceaseless performance: respond, optimize, explain, prove, accumulate. The other is fantasies of withdrawal: turn off the phone, stop thinking, become untouchable, preserve inner peace. Hongzhi’s teaching refuses both captivity to functioning and attachment to stillness. The original position is not improved by successful performance and not protected by retreat.

This has ethical force. If my deepest ground depends on being right, criticism becomes an existential threat. If it cannot be invaded by praise or blame, I can listen without collapsing and apologize without annihilation. “Cannot be invaded” should not mean becoming insensitive to harm. It means harm need not harden into a permanent owner of harm, nor pain into a licence to injure others.

The teaching also corrects a common spiritual split: meditation over here, ordinary life over there. Hongzhi’s imagery allows stillness—“the Milky Way clear, without waves; at midnight the moon spans autumn”—but does not make stillness the whole path. The practitioner must be able to release into activity and return without residue. Liberation is tested not only by what happens on the cushion but by whether seeing, hearing, speaking, working, caring, and conflict remain unobstructed by appropriation.

One might compare this with contemporary discussions of constructed self-models, attention, or automated prediction. Such comparisons can help us notice how quickly experience is organized around a supposed central owner. They do not prove Hongzhi’s teaching. Neuroscience has no settled instrument for identifying “the unborn,” and a model of brain processing is not equivalent to Chan realization. Běnwèi concerns the relinquishment of grasping in lived practice, not merely a theory that the self is constructed.

Likewise, an AI system can produce language about silence and nonduality without realizing anything. Fluency illustrates Hongzhi’s warning: correct discourse is not direct accord. But human silence is not automatically realization either. The issue is not whether words appear; it is whether speaker, speech, and meaning are being grasped as self-established positions.

In the wider path of liberation, běnwèi therefore guards two thresholds. Before realization, it prevents practice from becoming the manufacture of a sacred self. After an opening, it prevents realization from congealing into possession. And in compassionate activity, it prevents engagement from being imagined as a departure from truth. One practises diligently, yet nothing fundamental is manufactured; one responds fully, yet no fixed responder needs to remain.

Common misreadings and clarifications

1. “Běnwèi is my true, eternal self.” Hongzhi’s language of one’s “own dwelling place” is intimate, but it should not be converted into an indestructible personal substance. A hidden metaphysical owner would recreate precisely the appropriation that “stepping back” and “attending to the position” undo. “One’s own” indicates unsurpassable immediacy, not private ownership.

2. “It is a calm state underneath emotions.” Calm arises and passes. Běnwèi is not one conditioned experience among others. If irritation could remove it and tranquillity restore it, the statement that partial and proper never leave it would be false. Calm may support investigation, but it is not the original position.

3. “Since we never leave it, practice is unnecessary.” Never leaving does not mean realizing. A person dreaming in bed has not left the bed, yet may run in terror all night. The analogy is imperfect, but the distinction matters: original non-separation does not abolish delusion, karmic habit, ethical cultivation, or the need to see directly. Hongzhi gives a demanding sequence—rest completely, remain undimmed, step back, relinquish solitary attainment, attend to the position, and function freely.

4. “Returning means withdrawing from the world.” Hongzhi’s “return” is paired with responsive manifestation. One returns from fixation, not necessarily from activity. Caring for a child, negotiating a conflict, or answering a difficult question may be the very place of return.

5. “Speech is conventional; silence is ultimate.” The record says that true realization is beyond verbal transmission and conceptual reach, but it also says that neither speech nor silence reaches it. Silence can be fear, resentment, confusion, or display. Speech can be compassionate functioning. Neither has privileged ownership of běnwèi.

6. “The proper is pure, while the partial is fallen.” This moralizes a relational Chan vocabulary. Partial and proper illuminate one another and neither departs from the original position. Their distinction remains useful, but běnwèi is not simply the “proper” side renamed.

7. “Ground is real; functioning is secondary appearance.” Hongzhi’s paired formulations block this hierarchy. Functioning is at the place of ground; ground is at the place of functioning. Treating the ground as a concealed substance behind appearances turns living realization into metaphysics.

8. “Nothing can invade it, so suffering does not matter.” Inviolability is not immunity of the body, psyche, or community. People can be wounded, traumatized, exploited, and killed. Causes and consequences remain. The claim concerns the non-acquired fundamental place, not the denial of conventional suffering. Genuine freedom should make suffering more honestly approachable, not easier to dismiss.

9. “‘Originally nothing’ is simply another definition of běnwèi.” The related phrase 「本來無物,當處出生」—“originally no thing; arising right at this place”—illuminates non-production and immediacy. But the passage does not itself use the term běnwèi. It is best treated as a neighboring expression, not silently substituted as an exact synonym.

10. “Běnwèi is a doctrine to believe.” The term functions as guidance for practice: stop, remain lucid, step back, inspect the claimant of lucidity, and respond without residue. As soon as “the original position” becomes something the mind possesses, defends, or displays, another provisional position has been built on top of it.

The heart of the teaching is therefore neither “do nothing” nor “become something transcendent.” It is more exacting and more liberating: nothing you encounter has carried you outside the fundamental place, yet every trace of grasping still deserves to be seen through. When that is clear, stillness need not fear activity, activity need not abandon stillness, and one can meet the world without constructing a second world called awakening.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「本位」于《宏智禅师广录》中,指行履中本然常住、不随偏正语默与体用关系而移易的根本处所。本经反复收束其旨于一语:「偏正不曾离本位,无生那涉语因缘」——不论偏行正行,皆未尝离却本来所住之位;而其体性无生,不落语言因缘,非言宣可到,亦非意度能及。

二、主要阐述

(一) 本位的不移性

本经以「偏正不曾离本位,无生那涉语因缘」为收束之定式,指出不论偏与正的行履如何转变,始终不离本位。真证不可言传、妙契不可意到,乃至语默皆不到之际,皆以此句为归宿。本位并非寂守一端,亦不等同于某一偏、正、体或用,而是在体中得用、用中得体之时皆未曾离却的根本位次。即便「总不借」体用位次之分而立论,仍须以「偏正不曾离本位」作答。

(二) 回头窥本位、顾位的参究

本经以「回头窥本位顾位」说明参究中的返照工夫。行者的进程是:先须「歇得尽」,至于灵然不昧;再「退步就己」,不可停在「独在之照」而仍带功勋;其后还须回头窥本位、顾位,方能阔步过今时,于见闻声色及体用之间不受拘碍。此处所用语以「本位」「顾位」「就己」连说,突出返归自身、妙尽冥符而又能垂应的行履,而非另立抽象名目。

(三) 本色人自住本位的原具性质

本经又将本位表述为本色人自住之处。本色人自住本位,诸佛出世、众魔出兴皆不能侵犯;尘劫以前的一坐具地,便是人人自己所住之处。于此境地,彼不侵犯我、我不侵犯彼,法界洞然,无丝毫隔越。经文不从造作所得界定本位,而以「自住」「自所住处」显示其原具、稳密、平淡的性质;若能识破,则不触一切,在闹浩浩处亦不被混杂。

(四) 进退应用中的归位

本经从进退与应用侧写本位。问未进步时安身立命之处,答以「银河净无浪,半夜月横秋」;问神通游戏者如何放身,则说「转盻解归来,萧然还就位」。可见放身应现并非离位外驰,而是于运用中仍能归来就位,一切处应现而丝发不留痕。

(五) 体用互见中的本位

本经以「借功明位,用在体处;借位明功,体在用处」说明位、功、体、用互见之关系。即使「总不借」体用位次之分而立论,仍以「偏正不曾离本位」作答。本位不只是寂守一端,也不等同某一偏、正、体或用,而是体用互见之时皆未尝离却的根本位次。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

本部类现存材料仅见于《宏智禅师广录》(诸宗部·《宏智禪師廣錄》),无其他经论或异译本可资对照。于本经之内,「本位」一词为核心用语,并配合以下语汇共同呈现其义:

- 「顾位」「就位」「就己」:偏就参究返照之工夫层而立名,与「本位」连说。 - 「自住本位」「自所住处」:就本具不假造作的性质而立名。 - 「一坐具地」:以空间意象(尘劫以前的一坐具地)喻显本位之原住不动。 - 「就位」:就放身应现而能归来之侧面而立名。

另有一段作「本来无物,当处出生」,系由「本来」与「当处」补写其不待造作而现前之侧面,但该段未直接出现「本位」一词,宜视为相关语境,不与「本位」一词强行等同。

四、与相关概念的关系

- 与「顾位」「就位」之关系:「顾位」「就位」皆围绕「本位」而立,系就参究工夫中返照、安住之侧面立名,三者连说始能尽其旨趣。 - 与「体用」「功位」之关系:本经明言「借功明位,用在体处;借位明功,体在用处」,体、用、功、位互见,本位不离其中亦不滞于其中。 - 与「一坐具地」「自所住处」之关系:二者为本位在空间与性质上之譬喻与描写,与「本位」同指而异名,皆出于本经同一段表述。 - 与「本来无物,当处出生」之关系:此句以「本来」「当处」补写本位不待造作而现前之相,义趣相近但未直接出现「本位」一词,故不视为同义替换。 - 与「偏正」「语默」之关系:「偏正」「语默」是行履中对立而立之相,本位则为此等诸相所不离之根本处所,二者不立于同一层次。

五、代表性原文引用

- 「偏正不曾离本位,无生那涉语因缘。」 - 「回头窥本位顾位……歇得尽……退步就己。」 - 「本色人自住本位……诸佛出世、众魔出兴,不能侵犯……尘劫以前的一坐具地,便是人人自己所住之处。」 - 「银河净无浪,半夜月横秋……转盻解归来,萧然还就位。」 - 「借功明位,用在体处;借位明功,体在用处……总不借——偏正不曾离本位。」 - 「真证不可言传,妙契不可意到,语默皆不到之际。」

By SutraAI-generated

宏智禪師廣錄T2001 · 諸宗部

《宏智禪師廣錄》論「本位」,核心在於本然所住之處不因偏正、語默、體用及應緣而移易。其反覆使用的定式是:「偏正不曾離本位,無生那涉語因緣。」此語一方面指出偏與正的行履始終未離本位,另一方面以「無生」表明此處不落言語因緣;無論真證不可言傳、妙契不可意到,或語默皆不到之際,皆以此句收束其旨。

本經又以「回頭窺本位顧位」說明參究中的返照。行者須先「歇得盡」,至於靈然不昧,再「退步就己」,不可停在「獨在之照」而仍帶功勳;其後還須回頭窺本位、顧位,方能闊步過今時,於見聞聲色及體用之間不受拘礙。此處所用的術語形式不是另立抽象名目,而是以「本位」「顧位」「就己」連說,突出返歸自身、妙盡冥符而又能垂應的行履。

「本位」亦被表述為本色人自住之處。《宏智禪師廣錄》說「本色人自住本位」,乃至諸佛出世、眾魔出興,皆不能侵犯;又說塵劫以前的一坐具地,便是人人自己所住之處。於此境地,彼不侵犯我、我不侵犯彼,法界洞然,無絲毫隔越。經文並非以造作所得來界定本位,而以「自住」「自所住處」顯示其原具、穩密、平淡的性質;若能識破,則不觸一切,在鬧浩浩處亦不被混雜。

本經還從進退與應用側寫本位。問未進步時安身立命之處,答以「銀河淨無浪,半夜月橫秋」;問神通游戲者如何放身,則說「轉盻解歸來,蕭然還就位」。可見放身應現並非離位外馳,而是於運用中仍能歸來就位,且一切處應現而絲髮不留痕。

在體用關係上,本經以「借功明位,用在體處;借位明功,體在用處」說明位、功、體、用互見;即使「總不借」,仍以「偏正不曾離本位」作答。因此,本位不只是寂守一端,也不等同某一偏、正、體或用,而是在體中得用、用中得體之時皆未曾離卻的根本位次。

就用詞而言,本經直接使用「本位」,並配合「顧位」「就位」「自住本位」「自所住處」「一坐具地」等語加以呈現;原文未另以其他譯名替代此概念。「本來無物,當處出生」則從「本來」與「當處」補寫其不待造作而現前的側面,但該段未直接出現「本位」一詞,宜視為相關語境,不與本位一詞強行等同。

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