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有覆無記

nivṛtāvyākṛta

能障圣道而非善恶的心法AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty IntermediateTruth-level span outside the four-fold two-truths frameworkInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is Saying

To understand 有覆無記, you need to first see the coordinate system it sits inside. The *Cheng Weishi Lun* (《成唯識論》, Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), the landmark Yogācāra text compiled from Ten Treatises by Xuanzang (7th century CE), sorts every *dharma* (phenomenon, event, factor of experience) into one of four natures — a system known as the 四性 (four natures, *catuḥ-svabhāva*):

1. (*kuśala*, wholesome/good) 2. 不善 (*akuśala*, unwholesome/bad) 3. 有覆無記 (covered-indeterminate) 4. 無覆無記 (uncovered-indeterminate)

The last two categories are where the real philosophical action happens, because they capture something that the everyday moral binary of "good vs. bad" simply cannot see.

The Two Words: 覆 and 記

(*nivṛta*) literally means "covered, concealed, veiled." In this technical sense it refers to the way a defiling factor obstructs the holy path (障道) and conceals one's own mind (隐蔽自心), making the heart impure. "Covered" is not about hiding from others — it is about hiding from *yourself*. Something is "covered" when it dims your capacity to see clearly what is happening in your own experience.

(*vyākṛta*) literally means "determined, recorded, marked out." A dharma can be "marked" or "recorded" as good or bad when, by virtue of its own nature and the fruits it ripens, it can be assigned a moral valence — pleasant results (可愛果) or unpleasant results (不可愛果). Something is *avyākṛta* (無記, "indeterminate") precisely when it cannot be so recorded: it is neither good nor bad, and it does not produce the kinds of karmic fruits that would sort it into either column.

Put the two together: 有覆無記 names something that is profoundly defiling and obscuring (覆) — yet, paradoxically, is not classifiable as good or bad (無記). It does not announce itself as sin. It does not show up on a moral scoreboard. Yet it corrodes from within.

Where the Concept Lives: The Seventh Consciousness

The *Cheng Weishi Lun* does not scatter this label across every kind of neutral event. It pins it down with surgical precision. The judgment in the text is sharp: "末那心所,有覆無記所攝,非餘" — "The mental factors associated with the *manas* belong *only* to the covered-indeterminate category, and to nothing else."

So what is *manas* (末那), the seventh consciousness? And why does it alone earn this strange designation?

*Manas* is the "self-mind" — the consciousness that perpetually turns toward its own basis, the eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, *ālayavijñāna*, storehouse-consciousness), and grasps it as "me". Its activity is described with extraordinary precision in the source:

- It 恒常緣取 (constantly, continuously takes as its object) the storehouse-consciousness. - It 執為內我 (clings to it as an inner self). - This activity runs 任運而轉 (spontaneously, without deliberate effort, by its own momentum) and is 相續 (unbroken, continuous).

In other words, *manas* is the background sense of "I" that is running in every moment you are alive — not the thought "I am thinking," not the narrative of your life story, but the much more primitive, automatic, wordless self-assertion that something here is *me* and the rest is *not-me*.

The reason this qualifies as 有覆 (covered, defiling) is that the *manas* in its untransformed state is conjoined with the four fundamental afflictions (四煩惱): 我見 (self-view), 我慢 (self-conceit), 我愛 (self-love), and 無明 (ignorance). These are the染法 (defiling factors) that obstruct the holy path and conceal the mind from itself.

The reason it qualifies as 無記 (indeterminate, neither good nor bad) is that this self-grasping, while deeply obscuring, does not operate like a lie, a theft, or a cruelty. It does not announce itself in the moral ledger. It does not produce the kind of karmic fruit that would mark it as "vice." It is, in a deep sense, *prior* to the moral categories of good and bad — not because it is innocent, but because the moral categories are too coarse to catch it.

The Critical Contrast: 第七 vs. 第八

The *Cheng Weishi Lun* draws a sharp contrast that makes the concept even sharper:

| | Eighth Consciousness (阿賴耶識) | Seventh Consciousness (末那, untransformed) | |---|---|---| | Nature | 無覆無記 (uncovered-indeterminate) | 有覆無記 (covered-indeterminate) | | Why "uncovered/covered" | It is not itself defiling; it is the basis (所依) on which defilements arise. Because it is "non-defiling," it is "uncovered." | It is conjoined with the four afflictions and does obstruct the path and conceal the mind. | | Why "indeterminate" | Not good, not bad. | Not good, not bad (yet defiling). | | Functional role | Holds seeds (持種), receives impressions (受熏), is the substrate of all experience. | Perpetually grasps the eighth as "me." |

This contrast is the spine of the doctrine. The storehouse-consciousness is *uncovered* because, although everything defiling happens *in relation to it*, nothing defiling is *it*. The self-mind, by contrast, is *covered* because its very mode of operation is defiling — it cannot be a neutral substrate; it is, in its untransformed state, always already grasping.

A subtler point worth holding onto: *manas* is also called 異熟生攝 (belonging to the category of *vipāka-ja*, "ripening-born"). This name does not mean *manas* is itself a ripening fruit. It means *manas* is *continuously born from* the ripening-consciousness (the eighth in its ripening aspect). The name marks its dependence, not its identity. It would be a mistake to confuse 異熟生 (ripening-born, a description of how *manas* arises) with 異熟 (ripening, the nature of the eighth). The same word in different grammatical roles names two very different things.

"Covered" Depends on What You're Trying to See

One of the most philosophically interesting moves in the source is that "covered" and "uncovered" are not fixed properties of a dharma in isolation — they depend on what the dharma obstructs.

The text distinguishes between two kinds of self-grasping active in the *manas*:

- 我執俱 (conjoined with self-grasping proper — the view of self) - 法執俱 (conjoined with dharma-grasping — the view that dharmas have inherent existence)

For 聲聞 (śrāvakas, "hearers" — those aimed at individual liberation) and 獨覺 (pratyekabuddhas, "solitary realizers"), the dharma-grasping in *manas* is said to be 不染 (non-defiling). It is called 無覆 (uncovered). Why? Because it does not obstruct *their* path to their *their* liberation. They are working to break the sense of self; the subtler dharma-grasping does not block that specific project.

For 菩薩 (bodhisattvas), however, the very same dharma-grasping is called (defiling) and 亦名有覆無記 (also named covered-indeterminate). Why? Because the bodhisattva's path requires the full realization of the threefold nature of dharmas (三性: 遍計所執, 依他起, 圓成實), and dharma-grasping obstructs that deeper seeing.

So the label 有覆 is not stamped on a substance; it is a relational judgment about what a particular factor obstructs for a particular practitioner on a particular path. The same mental event can be covered for one and uncovered for another.

When the Covered Mind Goes Quiet

Crucially, the defiled *manas* is not always running. The *Cheng Weishi Lun* lists three contexts where it does not arise:

- 阿羅漢 (the stage of the arahant — full liberation within the śrāvaka path). - 滅盡定 (*nirodha-samāpatti*, the attainment of cessation, where even subtle feeling and perception temporarily cease). - 出世道 (the moments when a supramundane path-consciousness is directly present).

These are the moments when, in the technical sense, the habitual self-grasping has been so fully interrupted that the *manas* does not function in its defiled mode.

And when the *manas* is fully 轉依 (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*, transformed in its basis), it is no longer 有覆無記 at all. The text is explicit: after transformation, the seventh consciousness is 唯是善性 (purely of good nature), and it is no longer tied to the three realms (不再繫屬三界諸地). This is the structural reason why 有覆無記 must not be treated as a permanent identity of the seventh consciousness — it is its character only in the untransformed position (未轉依位), conjoined with the four afflictions.


Walkthrough in Life

The hard part of this concept is that its referent is not an experience you can easily point to. It is the substrate-level assumption that someone is here. The walkthrough has to slow you down to that stratum.

1. The morning of an ordinary day.

You wake up. Before there is any thought — before you check your phone, before you remember your name, before you assess whether today will be good or bad — there is already a sense of "I am here." You did not decide it. You did not choose it. It is not good or bad. It is just the background fact of there being a *someone*. That someone is *manas*. This is the 任運而轉 (spontaneously self-turning) the text describes.

Most people, including most meditators, never notice this stratum because it is not dramatic. There is no lie, no cruelty, no obvious greed to flag. So the moral categories — good vs. bad — glide right past it. And yet this stratum is doing enormous work: it is what makes every subsequent experience feel like *my* experience, witnessed *by* me, happening *to* me. It is the root condition of the whole theater.

2. The commute that nobody did anything to you about.

You are on a train. Nothing has happened. You have not been insulted or praised. You are simply present. But there is a subtle, almost imperceptible *tension* — a low-grade alertness, a faint readiness to defend or assert. Nobody has threatened you. The self-mind is still at work, holding the position of "I" against a world it has already implicitly categorized as "not-me." That holding is not a moral failure. It is not a sin. It is 有覆無記 in motion: covered (because it dims your capacity to be fully present without a reference point) and indeterminate (because there is nothing to confess).

3. The meditation cushion, where the moral categories fail you.

You sit down to meditate with the sincere intention to "be good," "watch the breath," "let go." This is wholesome — 善. But very quickly you may notice a quiet, persistent commentator that narrates everything: *I am sitting well. I am not sitting well. I am getting calmer. Why am I not getting calmer.* That narrator is not a sin. It is not bad behavior. Yet it is the thing the meditation is meant to penetrate. This is precisely why the category of 有覆無記 exists: to name a phenomenon that lies *beneath* the wholesome/unwholesome binary, that does not respond to moral condemnation, and that is precisely what must be seen through.

4. A moment of small resentment you do not act on.

A colleague takes credit for something you did. You feel a sting. You do not lash out. You do not scheme. You simply carry the sting quietly, rehearse the scene, and file it. From a moral standpoint, you have done nothing wrong. From a Yogācāra standpoint, the *manas* has been running the entire time, broadcasting "this happened to *me*," and the sting is its handiwork. The 有覆 part is exactly here: something is happening that is real, it is not bad, and yet it is coloring and confining your experience from inside.

5. The place where modern frameworks get confused.

Here is the trap. Most contemporary readers, when they hear "covered-indeterminate" or "self-grasping," map it onto:

- Toxic ego / narcissism / low self-esteem. All three are psychological states with histories, causes, and treatments. They are *objectifiable* and *therapizable*. The *manas* is none of these. You cannot reparent it. You cannot medicate it. It is not an inflated or deflated self-image; it is the fact that there is any self-image at all. - Implicit bias / cognitive distortions. These are specific, identifiable mental habits that can be corrected with training. They are not continuous, spontaneous, and substrate-level the way the *manas* is described. - Subconscious drives. Freudian or depth-psychological categories approach something similar but still operate within the framework of a self that has hidden contents. The Buddhist analysis goes further: the *self that has the contents* is itself the problem.

A useful clarifying image: **the moral categories (善/不善) are like noticing whether someone is being polite or rude. The covered-indeterminate category is noticing that someone is *present at all* and treating their presence as primary.** The first you can correct with social feedback. The second you cannot correct socially, because the correction is itself another act of that same self-presence.


Why Contemporary People Need This

We live inside a culture that has, perhaps for the first time in history, made the *self* into both the central object of inquiry and the central object of devotion. Psychology, self-help, identity politics, productivity culture, the entire attention economy — all of these take the self as given and ask how to optimize, heal, express, or assert it. Almost no framework within this culture asks the prior question: is the self-as-such a coherent object, and what is its continuous activity costing us?

The Yogācāra diagnosis in 有覆無記 is, in this sense, almost anachronistically relevant. It names a phenomenon that contemporary frameworks systematically miss:

1. The phenomenon of continuous, low-grade self-occupation.

Modern attention research describes the constant inner narration ("baseline internal mentation," the default mode network, the never-resting inner voice). The *manas* is not identical to these — it is deeper, more continuous, and not reducible to cognitive narration. But the contemporary descriptions can serve as a useful approximation: there is a stratum of mind that is almost never silent, that constantly refers everything back to a "me," and that operates below the threshold of what we count as an *event*. The classical category of 有覆無記 gives this stratum a precise name and a precise valence: it is not bad (so don't moralize it), but it is defiling (so don't pretend it is innocent), and it is continuous (so don't imagine it can be fixed by a single insight or decision).

2. The phenomenon of moral exhaustion.

Contemporary moral discourse is exhausted. People are fluent in identifying harms, privileges, injustices, and biases — and this fluency has not produced the liberation it promised. The reason, the Yogācāra analysis suggests, is that moral fluency operates only on the 善/不善 (good/bad) level, while the deepest obstruction is at the 有覆無記 level — which is, by definition, invisible to moral analysis. You can become a flawless moral agent and still have the *manas* running underneath, organizing experience around "me." The traditional language for this is that you can be a morally good person and still not have begun the actual work of liberation.

3. The phenomenon of contemplative practice that does not penetrate.

Many contemporary meditators report reaching a plateau: their practice feels pleasant, they can manage their emotions, they have insight into patterns. And yet something is not moving. The concept of 有覆無記 gives a sharp diagnosis: the practitioner may have addressed every category except the substrate one. They have worked with thoughts (想蘊), feelings (受蘊), intentions (行蘊), and bodily experience (色蘊) — but they have not directly looked at the *fact of the one who is watching*. And that fact is precisely what 有覆無記 names: continuous, automatic, morally neutral on the surface, and yet constituting the deepest veiling of all.

4. The phenomenon of identity as a project.

Modern life increasingly invites — and sometimes requires — people to *construct* an identity: career identity, gender identity, cultural identity, brand identity. The concept of 有覆無記 is not a critique of any particular identity but a description of the mechanism by which any identity becomes a covering. The moment an identity is grasped as *mine*, the *manas* has begun its work. This is true whether the identity is carefully chosen or politically imposed, celebrated or resented. The category refuses the contemporary assumption that the path forward is through better identities; it points instead toward the dissolution of the identity-grasping function itself.


Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading 1: "有覆無記 means some thoughts are neutral, others are bad."

This flattens the concept into something close to common-sense psychology: some thoughts have moral weight, others don't. But the *Cheng Weishi Lun* is not making a claim about thoughts. It is making a claim about a specific stratum of consciousness — *manas*, the seventh — and its conjoined factors. The defiling covered-indeterminate activity is continuous, substrate-level, and prior to the formation of discrete thoughts. A neutral thought that arises from an ordinary mind-stream is not the same as the substrate-level self-grasping the concept names. Conflating the two turns a precise structural analysis into a vague idea about "some thoughts being neutral."

Misreading 2: "The seventh consciousness is permanently 有覆無記."

The text explicitly contradicts this. 有覆無記 is the nature of the *manas* only in the untransformed position (未轉依位) when conjoined with the four afflictions. In three contexts it does not arise (arahant stage, cessation attainment, supramundane path). And when fully transformed (轉依), the seventh consciousness becomes 唯是善性 — purely good. So the category is not an identity of *manas*; it is a description of a specific mode of its functioning. To treat it as a permanent identity is to mistake a conditional state for an essence, which is exactly the error the doctrine is trying to undo.

Misreading 3: "有覆 = evil; 無記 = neutral; so 有覆無記 = a kind of mild evil."

This is the most natural reading in English and it is precisely wrong. 有覆 is not a synonym for evil; it means defiling in the specific sense of veiling the mind and obstructing liberation, which is a different axis from the good/bad axis. A substance like alcohol, from a Buddhist ethical standpoint, would be classified in the bad column (不善) because of its karmic effects. The *manas*'s self-grasping, however, is not a substance, not an act, and not a moral choice; it is a structural feature of unenlightened experience. Putting "covered-indeterminate" on a moral spectrum is like putting "gravity" on a moral spectrum. Gravity is not good or bad; it is a condition; and yet if you do not see it, you fall.

Misreading 4: "有覆無記 can be overcome by becoming a better person."

This confuses the moral project with the liberation project. The *Cheng Weishi Lun* explicitly preserves the difference: you can be a morally good person (善) and still have a fully functioning 有覆無記 *manas*. The four afflictions that conjoin with *manas* — self-view, self-conceit, self-love, ignorance — are not addressed by ordinary moral improvement. They require the specific practice that transforms the seventh consciousness at its basis. As the text notes, even the arahant only resolves this issue with respect to *their* path; for the bodhisattva, further transformation is required. The whole architecture refuses to collapse the deeper work into the moral work.

Misreading 5: "If 末那 is 'the self,' then 有覆無記 just means 'the self is bad.'"

Two errors folded together. First, *manas* is not "the self" in the sense of a unified personal identity; it is a specific stream of consciousness with a specific function (perpetually grasping the eighth as self). Second, 有覆無記 is not a verdict on the self but a description of a mode of functioning that is conditional, transformable, and absent in certain attainments. Treating *manas* as the metaphysical self is precisely the move the *Cheng Weishi Lun* is trying to dismantle. The doctrine does not replace "the self is good" with "the self is bad"; it replaces "the self exists as a substance" with "there is a process of self-grasping that can be precisely described and ultimately resolved."

Misreading 6: "This is just Buddhist pessimism about human nature."

The very opposite. The doctrine exists because the defiled *manas* can be transformed. The text ends not in despair but in a precise specification of the conditions under which the transformation occurs. 有覆無記 is, in fact, the *most hopeful* of the four categories for a serious practitioner: it identifies the precise obstruction that must be addressed, in the precise location where it must be addressed, with the precise path that addresses it. To call the doctrine pessimistic is to confuse the diagnosis with the prognosis.


A final image. The moral categories (善/不善) are like the visible weather — sun and storms, things you can name and prepare for. The covered-indeterminate (*manas*) is like the ocean current beneath the weather. It is not visible on the surface. It is not good or bad. It does not announce itself. It is, however, what determines where everything on the surface eventually drifts. The *Cheng Weishi Lun*'s category of 有覆無記 is the most radical admission in Buddhist philosophy that there is a current beneath morality itself, and that liberation means seeing it — not as an enemy to defeat, but as a mode of functioning to understand, and ultimately, to outgrow.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

「有覆無記」(nivṛtāvyākṛta)是《成唯識論》四性分类之一。论中将诸法判为善、不善、有覆无记、无覆无记。「覆」指染法具有障碍圣道、隐蔽自心并令心不净的作用;「记」指善恶之法能够依其所感可爱、不可爱之果及其殊胜自体而被记别;「无记」则表示既非善,也非不善。因此,有覆无记虽具染污性和障道作用,却不归入善、不善二性。

这一性质在《成唯識論》中主要用来判定未转依位的第七识末那及其相应心所。它不是泛指一切无记法,也不是第七识在所有分位中恒常不变的性质,而是与染污末那任运、相续的我执活动相联系。

2. 主要阐述

《成唯識論》直接判定末那及其相应心所为「有覆无记所摄,非余」。与末那相应的四烦恼等属于染法,能够「障碍圣道,隐蔽自心」,故名「有覆」;但这些染法又「非善、不善」,故名「无记」。论中并举上二界烦恼等为例:这些烦恼受定力摄藏,因而属于无记;末那俱起的染法则因所依微细、任运而转,同样摄入无记性。

未转依时,末那恒常缘取其所依的藏识,执为内我。其有覆无记性由此落实于一种持续而任运的染污活动:它与我执及相应烦恼俱起,能障圣道、染污自心,却并非能够招感可爱或不可爱果而被判为善恶的法。论中因此以「染污意」或「染污末那」称述这一识;其中「意」是第七识的名称。

有覆与无覆的判定,还随其所障对象而有所分别。法执俱起的末那,对于二乘等可说「不染」,因为它不障其智,故称「无覆」;对于诸菩萨则仍称为「染」,因为它能障菩萨之智,所以「亦名有覆无记」。这显示「覆」并非仅指法体具有一般意义上的染污,还涉及它是否障碍相应修行者所应证得的智慧。

同一论段又把此末那称为「异熟生摄」。这一名称表示它恒常从异熟识生起,故名异熟生,并不表示末那自身就是异熟果。其性质仍是有覆无记,不应因「异熟生」之名而与第八识的异熟性混同。

就断除和转依而言,染污意并非在一切分位恒常现行。论中以「阿罗汉、灭定、出世道无有」概括其不起现行的情形,即在阿罗汉位、灭尽定位以及出世道现前时,染污末那不有。若第七识已经转依,则其性质发生改变,不再属于有覆无记,而是「唯是善性」,并且不再系属于三界诸地。因此,有覆无记的判定须限定于未转依位的染污末那及其相应心所,不能笼统地作为一切第七识的固定属性。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

现有材料仅涉及瑜伽部《成唯識論》(《成唯識論》),未提供其他部类经典或同经异译本,因而不能据此列举跨部类或异译之间的用词分歧。《成唯識論》内部所用的完整性类名称为「有覆无记」;说明其主要所依时,又用「末那」「意」「染污意」「染污末那」等称名。其中「末那」与「意」均指第七识,而加称「染污」则标明所论是未转依、与烦恼相应的分位。

与之相关的第八识则有「阿赖耶识」「异熟识」「藏识」等不同名称。这些名称在论中从不同关系称述同一识:末那缘取其所依的「藏识」而执为内我;第八识又因异熟及摄藏等义被称为「异熟识」「阿赖耶识」。然而这些名称差别并不改变本论对其性类的判定:阿赖耶识自身唯属无覆无记,染污末那才是有覆无记。

4. 与相关概念的关系

有覆无记首先与善、不善并列而有区别。善与不善可以依据所感之果及殊胜自体而受记别,有覆无记虽属染法,却既非善也非不善,故称无记。

它又与无覆无记形成直接对照。第八阿赖耶识是异熟性,也是善、染诸法的所依,并承担受熏、持种的作用,因而不能自身成为善法或染法;它因「非染」而称无覆,因非善非恶而称无记。第七染污末那则因与烦恼相应、能够障道和隐蔽自心而称有覆,同时仍因非善非不善而称无记。

有覆无记也与异熟生相关而不相等。末那被称为异熟生,是就其恒从异熟识生起而言;阿赖耶识被称为异熟识,则是就其自身的异熟性而言。前者可属有覆无记,后者则属无覆无记。

最后,有覆无记与转依后的善性相对。未转依的染污末那具有有覆无记性;转依之后,第七识「唯是善性」。因此,「末那」是识的名称,「有覆无记」是其特定分位中的性类判定,二者不能完全等同。

5. 代表性原文引用

《成唯識論》判定末那心所:「有覆无记所摄,非余。」其所以名为有覆,在于相应烦恼「障碍圣道,隐蔽自心」;所以名为无记,则因其「非善、不善」。

论述染污意不起现行的分位时,概括为:「阿罗汉、灭定、出世道无有。」

论及不同所障对象时说,法执俱意对于菩萨能障其智,故「亦名有覆无记」;论及转依后的第七识,则判为「唯是善性」。这些文句共同显示,有覆无记专就尚未转依而能障智的染污末那立名,并非第七识在一切分位中的恒定性质。

By SutraAI-generated

阿毘達磨俱舍論T1558 · 毘曇部

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》對「有覆無記」之論述,可從心法分類、表業特性、得之時分及術語形式等數端綜觀。

一、四心分類與十二心體系

論中明立欲界具四種心:善、不善、有覆無記、無覆無記;色、無色界各除不善,故各唯有善、有覆無記、無覆無記三心,合成十有漏心,會無漏學、無學二種,總成十二心。 此十二心於「無間生」之相互關係中,論逐一開列:欲界善心無間生九,色界善心無間生十一,無色界善心無間生九,欲界有覆無記心無間生九,色界有覆無記心從八無間而生,無色界有覆無記心無間生七心,異熟威儀心無間生七,通果心無間生二,乃至有學心、無學心之生起數量,皆有詳密之分判。

二、有覆無記之力勢與得之限制

論於釋「得」之時指出:有覆無記表色之得,唯有俱起,無前起、無後起;雖具上品,而不能發無表,故勢力微劣,「由此定無法前後得」。 又論有覆、無覆二種無記表,「定無有能成就過未,法力既劣得力亦微,是故無能逆追成者」,並以此表從劣心起,其力倍劣於能起之心,故表與心之成就力有別。

三、欲界無有覆無記表業之判定

毘婆沙師據佛經「若不樂散心則於四威儀能常在定」之文,論諸有表業成善等性,乃「如轉心」非「如隨轉」。欲界中,見所斷心雖能為轉,而修所斷轉心為間隔,故「於欲界定無有覆無記表業」。

四、術語形式

論中以「有覆無記」與「無覆無記」對舉,復以「染污」或簡稱「染」攝不善及有覆無記;於偈頌中以「有罪」「覆劣」形容有覆之相,云:「染有罪覆劣」。 又以「安不安非業,名善惡無記」之頌簡別善惡與無記之別。

如上所陳,《俱舍論》以有部毘曇之傳承,對有覆無記之分類、力勢、得之時分、表業之有無,皆有縝密之分判,且名相系統自成一家,與他經或論所用之「染心」「染污心」「有覆心」等異稱互通而不混淆。

成唯識論T1585 · 瑜伽部

《成唯識論》對「有覆無記」的論述,核心圍繞末那(染污意)而展開,並以阿賴耶識為無覆無記的對比案例。

一、法之四類與術語定義

論中先將一切法分為四種:善、不善、有覆無記、無覆無記。其中「覆」指染污法能「障聖道故,又能蔽心,令不淨故」;「記」指善、惡有「愛、非愛果,及殊勝自體可記別故」。阿賴耶識因是異熟性故,唯是無覆無記;論中以「異熟若是善、染污者,流轉還滅應不得成」、「如極香臭,應不受熏」等道理成立之。

二、末那為有覆無記之典型

論中明言末那心所「有覆無記所攝,非餘」,並以頌文「有覆無記攝,隨所生所繫,阿羅漢、滅定、出世道無有」標示其性質與繫屬。

三、稱「有覆」之由

末那名「有覆」,因其相應之四煩惱等是染法,能「障礙聖道,隱蔽自心」。此「障礙聖道」、「隱蔽自心」二義,與前文定義「覆」之「障聖道故」、「蔽心令不淨」相互呼應。

四、稱「無記」之由

末那名「無記」,因「非善、不善」,對應上文「記」之定義——唯善、惡方有可愛、非愛果及殊勝自體可記別。論中別說其歸入無記而非善染之理:上二界諸煩惱等由「定力攝藏」故是無記攝;末那相應染法則以「所依細故,任運轉故」,亦攝入無記。此顯示有覆無記之「覆」雖屬染污,然所依之心細、任運不自在,故不同於粗顯之善、不善。

五、與阿賴耶識之對照

同為心王,阿賴耶識因異熟性而是無覆無記,末那則因相應染法而成有覆無記。論中又及觸等五遍行心所如阿賴耶同屬無覆無記,以「諸相應法,必同性故」為理;此亦間接顯示末那之「有覆」乃由其特殊之染污相應所決定。

六、轉依後之變化

論中提及末那「若已轉依,唯是善性」,意謂有覆無記並非永恆不變之性,於轉依位可轉為純善。此顯示該論視有覆無記為染淨間之過渡性類別,須賴對治道力方得轉化。

術語方面,本論以「有覆無記」為主詞,並用「末那」或「染污意」指第七識,「藏識」或「阿賴耶識」指第八識;定義「覆」、「記」所用之關鍵語為「障聖道故」、「蔽心令不淨」、「可愛、非愛果」、「殊勝自體可記別」等。

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