Dharma · AI Companion

決定相

niścaya-lakṣaṇa

决定相:究竟简择诸谛后不由加行而任运生起之现观智相,《显扬》立十种决定。不含中观所破之诸法固定自相(另见决定自相条)。AI-generated

Type AttainmentDifficulty AdvancedTruth-level span I · dependent arisingInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

同名异指:此取瑜伽行/阿毗达磨『究竟简择诸谛后不由加行而起之现观智相』义;中观所破之诸法固定自相为另一义,依细则不并入同一跨度

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is About

The term "decisive mark" (決定相, niścaya-lakṣaṇa) points in precisely opposite directions in the two great divisions of Buddhism. To understand it, one must first be positioned correctly.

On the Yogācāra side, the *Xianyang shengjiao lun* (*Compendium of the Teaching*, *Śrāvakabhūmi*–related exegesis, T1602) treats "decisive mark" as a positive description of the cognition of direct realization (現觀, abhisamaya). What is direct realization? Simply put, it is that instant of personally witnessing truth. Most of our Buddhist study is "knowledge born of hearing" (聞所生智) — what we have heard, read, and inferred through reasoning. Beginning with hearing, passing through proper mental engagement and knowledge born of cultivation, up to the knowledge of the supreme worldly dharma, all of these are "preparatory practices" (加行, prayoga) — exertion, fabrication, striving to approach. The "decisive mark" speaks to this: when, on the preparatory stage, you have already thoroughly discriminated the Four Noble Truths to the end, a turning point follows — after that critical threshold, awareness of the truth-object no longer requires effort. It decides itself; it arises by itself. It is like water boiling at one hundred degrees: the boiling is not the result of adding another stick of firewood, but something that naturally occurs once the temperature is reached.

The *Xianyang* uses two formulations to characterize it: first, "the mark of arising as decided without reliance on preparatory exertion" (不由加行功用決定生起相) — not relying on effort, it presents itself with certainty; second, "the mark of the decisive cognition fused with its object" (決定智与境和合相) — this cognition has ultimately arrived at the knowable, and apart from the object presently witnessed, there is no other realm worth pursuing. These two layers together constitute the complete "decisive mark": it neither requires effort nor has anywhere further to go. Precisely for this reason it is called "direct realization" (現觀, abhisamaya), not "inferential observation" (比觀, anumāna) — it is not reasoned out; it is directly seen.

The *Xianyang* further states that this decisive mark has ten kinds, summarized in a verse: "Self-nature, no three realms; non-extinction, no duality; no discrimination, no fear; self-severing — therein is decision." The text lists only the verse summary without explaining each item. Each of the ten lines of the verse corresponds to one kind of decision — the decision regarding "self," the decision regarding the "three realms" (三有, traidhātuka), the decision regarding "non-extinction," the decision regarding "non-duality," the decision regarding "non-discrimination," the decision regarding "no fear," the decision regarding "self-severing." Although we lack more detailed commentary, one can sense: these ten decisions cover the practitioner's confirmation of a series of fundamental questions upon personally witnessing truth — selflessness, impermanence, non-discrimination, fearlessness, severance… These are not mere words; they are confirmed once and for all, decisively, in direct realization.

On the Mādhyamika side, the "decisive mark" used in the *Middle Treatise* (《中論》, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, T1564) is an entirely different battlefield. What Nāgārjuna refutes as "decisive mark" refers to: the view that each dharma possesses its own fixed, unchanging, determinable intrinsic characteristic and intrinsic nature. For example, someone maintains that "the six kinds each have their own fixed marks; because there are fixed marks, therefore there are six kinds" — the sentient beings of the six destinies each have their own fixed marks, and because there are fixed marks, the distinctions among the six destinies can be established. Nāgārjuna's method of response is to ask in return: if dharmas truly had an immovable, fixed mark, they should not change according to causes and conditions; yet we clearly see all dharmas in the midst of transformation. Flowers bloom and then wither; people gather and then part; thoughts arise and then cease — if there were truly "fixed existence-nature," then it would "never change or transform"; if there were truly a "decisive mark," then the various marks of the world should be "unarisen and unceasing, permanent and indestructible." But that is not how things actually are. Therefore the conclusion is: there is no such fixed, unchanging intrinsic characteristic.

Note: what the *Middle Treatise* refutes as "decision" is the cognitive error of "judging that which is changing to be fixed." It does not deny that there is such a thing as "certain cognition" — Nāgārjuna of course knows that "certainty" exists; what he denies is the clinging that judges dharma-nature to be fixed, self-subsistent, and unchanging. Especially on the question of birth, aging, and death, the *Middle Treatise* says: reflecting on birth, aging, and death all entails fault; they are originally resolved into non-arising and ultimate emptiness. Why then still cling to conceptual proliferation (戲論, prapañca), holding that birth, aging, and death possess a "decisive mark"? Here "decisive mark" is connected with clinging and conceptual proliferation — taking what is originally dependently originated and devoid of self-nature, and affirming that it has an immutably certain nature: this is conceptual proliferation.

Thus, the same term is, in the *Xianyang*, a positive mark of accomplishment in practice, and in the *Middle Treatise*, a cognitive error to be refuted. This is not contradictory — because the two divisions are not concerned with the same thing at all. The *Xianyang* is concerned with the form of *cognition*: when wisdom matures to a certain degree, it manifests as effortlessness certainty. The *Middle Treatise* is concerned with the nature of the *object*: do all dharmas have a fixed, unchanging self-nature? The answer is no.

Placed within the larger coordinate system of the path to liberation, the two matters are actually two sides of one process: precisely because dharmas lack fixed intrinsic characteristics (the Mādhyamika refutation), the practitioner can, after the maturity of preparatory practice, confirm this without effort (the Yogācāra establishment). What is refuted is clinging to objects as real; what is established is wisdom arising as decision. Refuting delusion is for the sake of revealing truth.

A Walk-Through in Everyday Life

Let us bring "decisive mark" into contemporary life, beginning with the Yogācāra side.

You are learning to drive. At the beginning, every step is preparatory practice: checking the rearview mirror, signaling, braking, reading the road, judging distance… every action requires deliberate effort, the mind running at high speed, palms sweating. At this point you have no "decisive mark" whatsoever regarding "driving" — you are still discriminating, still in preparatory practice. But after a few years, one day you drive home from the office, passing through twenty intersections, and you cannot remember at all whether the light at any given intersection was red or green — yet you arrived home safely. Steering wheel, accelerator, brake — all cooperate "without preparatory exertion." Judging distance, timing the brake, the moment to change lanes — all completed in an instant, without needing to deliberate each one. This is a rough analogy for a kind of "decisive mark."

But here there is a crucial difference, and it is where most people mis-map the analogy: driving skill is not the "decisive mark" of the *Xianyang*. Why? Because driving skill is the automation of a worldly skill, and its object is road conditions — a realm that is constantly changing and can never be "ultimate." The "decisive mark" of the *Xianyang* has a precondition: "having ultimately discriminated the truths" — you have thoroughly thought through the principle of the Four Noble Truths, and what you decide is the truth itself — suffering, origin, cessation, path — an "ultimate" object. Cognition and object "fuse" to the ultimate, with no remaining object to seek. The automation of driving is far from this: no matter how skilled you are at driving, you do not feel that "apart from driving, there is no other skill worth learning." But when the decisive mark of direct realization arises, the sage's experience is: this is it; there is nothing else.

Now let us walk through the *Middle Treatise* side.

You open your phone and scroll to a post saying that people of a certain personality type are just so-and-so. You look at it: "Yes, that's exactly what I'm like." This "I am" — note, hidden here is a "decisive mark." It judges the dependently originated, flowing process of "self" to be a fixed, unchanging thing: I am an introverted person, I am an anxious person, I am someone bad at math. These judgments appear to be "knowing oneself," but in fact they freeze a constantly changing process into static labels. Nāgārjuna would ask: if "I" truly had a decisive mark, then it should not change. But clearly last year you felt very extroverted; how is it that this year you are introverted? If there were truly fixed self-nature, divergent marks should not appear. Divergent marks have appeared — this shows there is no fixed mark.

There is also the question of "fixed action" (決定業). In discussing the relationship between agent and action, the *Middle Treatise* says that if one pre-fixes the agent as "existing" or "non-existing," the corresponding relationship of action cannot be established. How should contemporary people understand this? For example, you decide that "I am just a procrastinator" — this is a "fixed agent": fixing "me" as a procrastinator. Once this fixed judgment is in place, the behavior of "procrastinating" is locked onto you; it becomes "your" attribute rather than a "dependently originated" process. So the more you identify yourself as a procrastinator, the more you procrastinate. This "decisive mark" becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. What the *Middle Treatise* means is: the agent (you) and the action (procrastinating behavior) are both dependently originated; there is no fixed, unchanging "procrastinator" who procrastinates — there is only, when causes and conditions converge, the arising of the behavior of procrastination. Seeing this clearly, the behavior becomes capable of loosening.

Consider intimate relationships. Much of the pain in relationships stems from erecting a "decisive mark" for one's partner: "He is just this kind of person" — and then any behavior of the other that does not conform to this judgment makes you confused and angry. But if you accept "no fixed mark": people are flowing; today they are like this, tomorrow they may be like that; this moment like this, the next moment possibly different — it is not that you do not understand him, but that he has no fixed, unchanging essence that you could ever fully grasp. This is unsettling, but it is also liberating: no fixed mark means change is possible, means the deadlock in a relationship is not the final word.

Why Contemporary People Need It

What characterizes contemporary life? Information overload, an explosion of choices, a thinning of meaning. We make countless judgments every day: Is this piece of information credible? Is this person trustworthy? Is this choice correct? Faced with so much uncertainty, people naturally want "decision" — they want a certain answer, an unchanging anchor. So we manufacture a great many "decisive marks": astrology, personality tests, MBTI, label-based socializing — compressing complex human beings into a few letters, fixing the flowing self into a report. These tools themselves are not wrong; what is wrong is grasping them as "fixed marks": "I am an INFJ, so I am just so."

The *Middle Treatise*'s "no fixed mark" is a sobering reminder for contemporary people: the labels you stick on yourself and others are not the discovery of a pre-existing essence but the manufacture of a cognitive prison. You judge yourself as "socially anxious," and you genuinely become increasingly afraid to speak; you judge your partner as "incapable of romance," and you increasingly fail to see the things they do for you. Fixed judgments block the possibility of change.

The *Xianyang*'s "decisive mark," by contrast, points to another kind of "certainty" — not freezing the flowing into the fixed, but gathering the scattered into clarity. What contemporary people lack is not certainty but the *capacity* for decision — not the certainty told to you by others, but the settled confidence of personal verification. We are fed a "false sense of decision" by algorithms: whatever the short-video feed pushes at you, you become "certain" you like it; whatever the trending topics tell you is important, you become "certain" it deserves attention. But none of these decisions are yours — they are preferences that have been shaped in you, not wisdom that you have discriminated.

The true "decisive mark" requires a precondition: you must first "ultimately discriminate." This means you must actually spend time thinking, observing, verifying — thinking through what "suffering" really is, how "origin" operates, whether "cessation" is possible, how the "path" should be walked. This process of discrimination has no shortcuts; it requires the complete training of hearing, reflection, and cultivation. But once discrimination is ultimate, that decision is not imposed by others, nor is it self-suggested — it arises by itself, without preparatory exertion. This kind of decision is what contemporary people truly lack: not the certainty that is pushed at you, but the settled confidence of having walked all the way to the end yourself.

There is a nearby experience to reference: you once agonized over whether to leave a relationship that was draining you. You thought for months, analyzed every angle, hesitated. One morning you woke up and suddenly knew the answer — not because you had thought of some new reason, but because all reasons had already been considered, and at some instant, the decision settled by itself. That "settling" was not emotional impulse but the natural result of matured discrimination. This is structurally similar to the "decisive mark": without waiting for effort, naturally decided. Of course, this is a worldly matter; the *Xianyang* speaks of direct realization of truth, but in psychological mechanism, that sense of certainty of "having thought it through and no longer needing to think" can let you vaguely touch what "without preparatory exertion" means.

As for that layer of "decisive cognition fused with its object" — "apart from the object presently witnessed, there is no other realm to seek" — for contemporary people this is almost a foreign experience. We are perpetually in the anxiety of "there is still something better": beyond this job there is a better job, beyond this relationship a better relationship, beyond this answer a better answer. The fusion of cognition and object says: when you reach that point, you stop searching. Not because there is nothing better, but because you already know — the thought of "better" itself is a product of the preparatory stage; and the cognition of direct realization has arrived at the ultimate of "nothing else to seek." Contemporary people may occasionally taste a hint of this experience in moments of deep absorption: doing one thing with total concentration, reaching the point of forgetting both self and object, and in that moment there is no thought of "should I be doing something else instead." But that is only the taste of concentration (定, samādhi), not yet the "decision" of wisdom (慧, prajñā) — the decision of wisdom is the confirmation of truth, deeper than mere focus.

Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading One: "A decisive mark means a fixed characteristic, so Buddhism acknowledges that there are fixed, unchanging things."

This conflates the usages of the *Xianyang* and the *Middle Treatise*. The *Xianyang*'s "decisive mark" speaks of the form of cognition — not relying on preparatory exertion, naturally decided; the *Middle Treatise* refutes the fixity of objects — dharmas have no unchanging intrinsic characteristics. The two are not speaking of the same thing. No school of Buddhism has ever maintained that "dharmas possess fixed, unchanging intrinsic characteristics." When the Yogācāra school says "decision," it speaks of the certainty of wisdom, not the fixity of objects. This distinction must be kept clear.

Misreading Two: "The decisive mark is the meditative mark, the light-vision, and so forth, seen while sitting in meditation."

The *Xianyang* clearly distinguishes: in its questions and answers on samādhi, the "meditative mark," "object mark," "light mark," "purity mark," and so forth are signs within meditative concentration or prerequisites for entering absorption — they are not the same as the "mark of decisive arising" in the direct realization of the truths. Seeing light or visions in meditation is an experience of concentration; the "decisive mark" is an attainment of wisdom. Taking meditative experiences as the decision of direct realization is a common fork in the road in practice — concentration can give rise to wisdom, but concentration is not wisdom. The classics distinguish this finely, and we should not conflate them either.

Misreading Three: "'Without preparatory exertion' means no need to practice — just lie down and wait for enlightenment."

Quite the opposite. "Without preparatory exertion" is the natural result *after* preparatory practice is completed; it does not cancel preparatory practice. Once water has boiled, no more heat is needed, but before the water reaches one hundred degrees, the fire cannot be stopped. The *Xianyang*'s formulation is explicit: first, "relying on worldly wisdom, ultimately discriminate the truths" — the word "ultimately" is the precondition. Knowledge born of hearing, knowledge born of reflection, knowledge born of cultivation — step by step to completion, and only then comes the subsequent "without preparatory exertion." To speak of the "decisive mark" while skipping preparatory practice is like waiting for water to boil without heating it. Contemporary people easily fall into this misunderstanding because we are always looking for shortcuts — but this path has no shortcuts; there is only the "no longer needing to walk" that comes after having walked it all.

**Misreading Four: "The *Middle Treatise* says there is no fixed mark, so everything is chaotic and without regularity."**

Refuting the "decisive mark" is not refuting the law of cause and effect. What the *Middle Treatise* refutes is "fixed self-nature," not "the principle of dependent origination." Precisely because dharmas lack fixed self-nature, they can arise, cease, and transform according to causes and conditions — precisely because there is transformation, cause and effect can operate. If there were truly fixed marks, then things would be "unarisen and unceasing, permanent and indestructible," and there would be no cause and effect at all. Thus "no fixed mark" is not nihilism but the necessary conclusion of dependent origination: because there is no fixed, unchanging essence, everything flows within cause and effect. This flow is not chaos but precise dependent origination.

Misreading Five: "The decisive mark is some kind of mystical experience of spiritual attainment that ordinary people cannot access."

As the cognitive mark of direct realization, the "decisive mark" is indeed not part of ordinary people's daily experience. But the direction it points toward — effortlessness certainty, the settled confidence of discrimination carried to the end — has its shadow in ordinary experience. The key is not to mystify the concept but to understand its place within the path to liberation: it is the turning point from the preparatory stage to the path of seeing, the natural flowering of matured wisdom. What ordinary people can do is: honestly walk the path of preparatory practice — much hearing, much reflection, much cultivation — and then one day, discover that some things have settled by themselves. When that day comes, you will recognize it: it is not something you forced yourself to think through; it came through on its own.

Finally, back to that verse of the ten decisions: "Self-nature, no three realms; non-extinction, no duality; no discrimination, no fear; self-severing — therein is decision." Of the ten decisions, not one describes a "thing" — they all describe the confirmation of wisdom: confirming selflessness, confirming departure from the three realms, confirming non-extinction, confirming non-duality, confirming non-discrimination, confirming fearlessness, confirming self-severing. None of these confirmations can be grasped by label, definition, or fixed mark. They are not "knowledge about something" but "clarity that has penetrated through all things."

This, perhaps, is the deepest meaning of the "decisive mark": when wisdom reaches the ultimate, it no longer needs a "mark" to establish itself — it is itself the decision.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「决定相」(niścaya-lakṣaṇa)一词,在佛教不同部类的经论中具有截然不同的指向:于瑜伽行派为正面描述现观之智相,于中观部则为破斥之对象。《显扬圣教论》将此相置于谛现观的脉络中,谓行者依世间智究竟简择诸谛之后,于所观谛境不由加行功用而自然、确定地生起,此即现观之相状。《中论》则以此词指诸法被执为具有固定不变之自相、自性之见,为龙树所破斥的对象。

二、主要阐述

《显扬圣教论》(瑜伽部·《顯揚聖教論》)

本论以「决定生起相」与「决定相」论述此义,并置于「谛现观」之中。行者先依世间智,从闻所生智逐步至世间第一法智,对诸谛已作究竟简择;此后于谛不再需要加行,在所观察的诸谛境中,不由加行功用而决定生起,此即「现观相」。

本论又从智与境的关系显示决定相的另一侧面,称为「决定智与境和合相」。此智已究竟到达所知,除当前所证之境以外,更无其他境界需要寻求;正因智与所观谛境如此和合而至究竟,此观才名为「现观」。

在术语形式上,本论正文主要使用「决定生起相」「决定相」「决定智与境和合相」及「现观相」,并明示「当知此决定相复有十种」。十种决定以颂文总摄为:「我性无三有,不灭无有二,无分别无怖,自断中决定。」然原文只列颂目,未逐项解释各类内涵。

此外,本论在三摩地问答中亦广泛使用「相」字,如「定相」「境相」「因相」「乱不乱相」「无分别影像作意相」「清净相」「光明相」等,属于禅定征相或入定资粮之说明,并未称为「决定相」,不应与谛现观中的「决定生起相」混同。

《中论》(中观部·《中論》)

《中论》对「决定相」的论述,主要不是建立一种可执取的确定相状,而是借由反诘与推论,破除诸法各有固定自相、自性之见。核心论证为:若诸法真有明确判定而不动摇的相状,便不应随因缘呈现变异;然而现见诸法具有异相,所以应知并无不可改易的「定相」。

本经先举有人主张「六种各有定相,有定相故则有六种」,以「定相」表示各类法具有各自确定、可据以成立差别的相状。此处保留的是问者的立场,随后全论所示的方向则在检验并否定这种固定化的成立方式。

在生、老、死的讨论中,本经说,思惟三者皆有过失,则归于无生、毕竟空,并反问何以仍贪着戏论,认为生老死「有决定相」。此处「决定相」与对生老死的执取、戏论相连;经文所否定的,是把生老死判作具有确然不动之相。

本经又从变异反证无定相:若诸法「决定有性」,便终不应变异;若「定有自性」,也不应出现异相。偈颂进一步指出,若世间种种相真有「决定性」,其结果便是「不生不灭,常住而不坏」,此说揭明决定性一旦成立即排除生灭与败坏。

在作者与业的论述中,本经另用「决定有作者」「决定无作者」及「决定业」「无定业」等语,指出若预先固定判定作者为有或无,相应的作业关系亦不能成立。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

瑜伽部与中观部对「决定相」的立场截然相反,术语形式亦各异:

- 瑜伽部(《显扬圣教论》):正面建立,术语为「决定生起相」「决定相」「决定智与境和合相」「现观相」「不由加行功用决定生起相」。 - 中观部(《中论》):破斥对象,术语为「定相」「决定相」「决定性」「定有自性」「决定有性」「决定有作者」「决定无作者」「决定业」「无定业」。

《中论》并用多个译名,「定相」与「决定相」指向固定不变的相状,「决定性」「定有自性」则从性、自性的层面表述同一固定化问题。整理时宜完整保留本经这组实际用词。

四、与相关概念的关系

- 与现观的关系:在《显扬圣教论》中,决定相即现观相,是现观之智相的具体描述。 - 与自性、有性的关系:在《中论》中,决定相与「决定有性」「定有自性」相互连结,所破的「决定」正是将法性判作固定、自立而不变。 - 与十种决定的关系:《显扬圣教论》说决定相有十种,以颂文总摄,但未逐项解释。 - 与禅定诸相的关系:《显扬圣教论》中另有「定相」「境相」「清净相」「光明相」等,属禅定征相,与现观中的决定相不应混同。

五、代表性原文引用

1. 《显扬圣教论》:「不由加行功用决定生起相」() 2. 《显扬圣教论》:「当知此决定相复有十种」() 3. 《显扬圣教论》:「我性无三有,不灭无有二,无分别无怖,自断中决定」() 4. 《中论》:「六种各有定相,有定相故则有六种」() 5. 《中论》:「若决定有性,则终不变异」() 6. 《中论》偈颂:若世间种种相有决定性,则「不生不灭,常住而不坏」() 7. 《中论》:「决定有作者,决定无作者」()

By SutraAI-generated

中論T1564 · 中觀部

《中論》對「決定相」的論述,主要不是建立一種可執取的確定相狀,而是藉由反詰與推論,破除諸法各有固定自相、自性之見。其核心是:若諸法真有明確判定而不動搖的相狀,便不應隨因緣呈現變異;然而現見諸法具有異相,所以應知並無不可改易的「定相」。文中又將「決定有性」「定有自性」與「定相」相互連結,顯示所破的「決定」,正是將法性判作固定、自立而不變。

本經先舉有人主張「六種各有定相,有定相故則有六種」,以「定相」表示各類法具有各自確定、可據以成立差別的相狀。此處保留的是問者的立場,隨後全論所示的方向則在檢驗並否定這種固定化的成立方式。

在生、老、死的討論中,本經說,思惟三者皆有過失,則歸於無生、畢竟空,並反問何以仍貪著戲論,認為生老死「有決定相」。此處「決定相」與對生老死的執取、戲論相連;經文所否定的,是把生老死判作具有確然不動之相,而非另立一個決定相作為真實法。

本經又從變異反證無定相:若諸法「決定有性」,便終不應變異;若「定有自性」,也不應出現異相。既然現前可見諸法有異相,即應知「無有定相」。因此,是否容許變異,是本經檢驗決定相的重要側面;固定自性與實際異相不能同時成立。

偈頌進一步指出,若世間種種相真有「決定性」,其結果便是「不生不滅,常住而不壞」。此說揭明決定性的含義及其後果:一旦性相被判定為固定,就排除了生滅與敗壞;而經文正以世間諸相不能如此成立,顯示不可執有決定性。

在作者與業的論述中,本經另用「決定有作者」「決定無作者」及「決定業」「無定業」等語,指出若預先固定判定作者為有或無,相應的作業關係亦不能成立。這是「決定」一詞在關係論證中的用法,著重固定判定所造成的矛盾。

就術語記錄而言,《中論》並用「定相」「決定相」「決定性」「定有自性」「決定有性」等形式,而非始終只用單一名稱。其中「定相」與「決定相」指向固定不變的相狀,「決定性」及「定有自性」則從性、自性的層面表述同一固定化問題;整理多種譯名時,宜完整保留本經這組實際用詞。

顯揚聖教論T1602 · 瑜伽部

《顯揚聖教論》以「決定生起相」與「決定相」論述此義,並將它置於「諦現觀」的說明之中。其核心表述是:行者先依世間智,從聞所生智逐步至世間第一法智,對諸諦已作究竟簡擇;此後於諦不再需要加行,在所觀察的諸諦境中,不由加行功用而決定生起,這種相狀即是「現觀相」。所以,本論所說的「決定」,不只是一般意義上的明確認定,而特指究竟簡擇諸諦之後,對諦境自然、確定地生起之智相。

本論又從智與境的關係顯示決定相的另一側面,稱為「決定智與境和合相」。此智已究竟到達所知,除當前所證之境以外,更無其他境界需要尋求;正因智與所觀諦境如此和合而至究竟,此觀才名為「現觀」。由此可見,決定相兼具兩層意義:一是生起時不待功用,二是於所知已臻究竟,不再另求餘境。

在術語形式上,《顯揚聖教論》正文主要使用「決定生起相」「決定相」「決定智與境和合相」及「現觀相」,並說「當知此決定相復有十種」。因此,歸一記錄時宜以「決定相」為概念名稱,同時保存其在本論語境中的完整表達「不由加行功用決定生起相」;這是原文明示的用詞,不宜改寫成其他近似名目。

十種決定以頌文總攝為:「我性無三有,不滅無有二,無分別無怖,自斷中決定。」此處顯示決定相並非僅有單一面向,而被進一步分成十種;然而所給原文只列頌目,未逐項解釋各類內涵,故只能如實記錄其十種之說,不宜據此自行展開。

此外,本論在三摩地問答中也廣泛使用「相」字,如將入定時生起、能令行者或教授師預知將入或已入某定的「定相」,以及「境相」「因相」「亂不亂相」「無分別影像作意相」「清淨相」「光明相」等。這些屬於禪定徵相、所緣或入定資糧的說明,並未稱為「決定相」,不應與諦現觀中的「決定生起相」混同;其作用在於顯示本論對「相」字另有多種具體用法。

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