Dharma · AI Companion

唯名

nāma-mātra

诸法由名言增上安立为有,非由自体自相成立。AI-generated

Type ViewDifficulty AdvancedTruth-level span III · nominal designationInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

一、這個概念在說什麼

Pick up anything near you right now — a mug, a phone, the light coming in from the window. Before your hand can hold it, before your eye can name it, a word has already arrived in your mind. *Mug. Phone. Light.* The thing and its name are so tightly braided together that we never notice the braid. We assume the name sits on top of a self-existing thing — that under the word "mug" there is a *mug-itself*, possessing a hard little essence called mug-ness, which the word merely labels.

The teaching called 唯名 (nāma-mātra, "mere name") from the 《辨了不了義善說藏論》 says: that assumption is the hidden move that needs to be undone. Its one-sentence claim is sharp: 諸法由名言增上安立為有,非由自體自相成立 — "All phenomena are established as existent through the force of naming, not by virtue of any own-being or own-characteristic of their own."

This is a thesis about how things are *put together*, not about whether things *are*. It is saying that if you try to peel off the word and find the wordless thing beneath it, you cannot; what you find is always another word, another designation, another convention. But it is emphatically not saying "nothing exists, only words." The treatise is explicit on this point, and we will come to it. First, let us slow down and hear the argument in its native form.

The Bottle, Walked Slowly

The treatise uses the everyday example of a 瓶 (bottle/pot). Stripped of the word, what is there? A belly-shape (大腹), some clay, a hollow. Without anyone having applied the term "bottle," would the thought *"this is a bottle"* naturally arise? No. The recognition "this is a bottle" requires the *conceptual designation* (施設) of "bottle." That dependence — the fact that the recognition only comes once the name has been put in place — is the argument: the bottle's being-a-bottle is *name-established* (名言增上安立), not *self-established* by its own belly-shape.

If, on the contrary, the bottle-ness were really just the belly-shape's own inner nature (自相), then the recognition "this is a bottle" should pop up on its own, the way the wetness of water pops up when water is touched. It does not. Therefore bottle-ness is not the belly-shape's self-being; it is what gets added when mind *applies the name*.

The Multi-Name / Same-Name Argument

The treatise then tightens the screw with two further examples. One thing can wear many names: a man can be called 百施 ("Hundred-Giver"), 因陀羅 ("Indra"), 壞聚落 ("Fortress-Breaker") — three names, three images, one man. If each name were dictated by the man's own self-being, then by having three names he would have to *be* three men — which is absurd. Conversely, two men can share one name: two husbands both called 近護 ("Close-Protector"). If name and referent were sealed together by self-being, the two men would collapse into one man — also absurd.

So the connection between name and thing is not a self-seal. It is a *convention*, a *designation*, an *overlay of mind* — without which the referent is not "found" but rather *made to function* as such. Once you see this, every object in the room is in the same boat as the bottle.

Eight Phrasings, One Point

The treatise does not let the teaching sit in a single phrase. It wears the same insight in eight interchangeable forms, and these should be preserved in the reader's mind as a single coherent vocabulary:

- 唯名 — mere name - 唯表 — mere expression / mere indicator - 唯言說 — mere verbal designation - 唯世俗名 — mere conventional name - 唯有表示 — mere having-an-indication - 唯是假立 — merely provisionally posited - 名言增上安立 — established through the *force* (增上) of name-and-speech - 假立客名 — provisionally posited, guest-name (here 客 is read as 假造, "provisionally fabricated," used to negate any assumed self-being)

These are not eight different doctrines. They are eight doors into the same room. The handrail through all of them is the word 施設 (prajñapti, "designation / conventional positing") and the word 增上 ("force, empowerment") — names don't float loose; they *enable* things to function in experience.

The Two Criteria — This Is What Saves the Teaching from Nihilism

This is the part the modern reader most often misses, and the treatise is precise about it. The teaching 唯名 comes with two criteria, not one. Grasping (執著) is defined in the text as: "taking inner and outer phenomena to exist *by self-being* rather than through designation." 唯名 negates *that*. But what does it affirm?

The text gives a double test:

1. Is it established through the force of designating mind? (是否由名言增上安立) — what gets put in place by conceptual designation can be granted conventional existence. 2. Is this establishment validated by valid cognition? (此安立是否為量所成立) — here 量 (pramāṇa) means *a valid means of knowledge*: perception, inference, reliable testimony.

So 唯名 does not say "anything you name, exists." If you name "the rabbit in my garage," the rabbit is *not* thereby established, because no perception, no inference, no testimony validates it. Conversely, the bottle in your hand *is* established, because you see it, can use it, others can see it too. The teaching never lets go of the second criterion. It is this second criterion — 量 — that prevents 唯名 from collapsing into either Western-style nominalism ("it's only a word") or postmodern constructivism ("reality is whatever we say it is"). Things function because they are designated, but only those designations backed by valid cognition actually carry.

The text is unusually insistent here: *"凡未由施設名言之心增上而立者,不許為名言有"* — "what is not established through the force of designating mind is not permitted to count as nominal existence." And just as firmly: *"由施設心所立之一切,亦不必然皆能成立為名言有,仍須區分量所成立者與不成立者"* — "but everything the designating mind posits is not necessarily established as nominal existence; one must still distinguish what is validated by cognition from what is not."

Range of Application: From Form (色) All the Way to Buddha (佛)

The treatise extends 唯名 across the entire range of what can be spoken about. *"從色乃至於佛之一切法皆說為唯假名"* — "from form (色) all the way to the Buddha, every phenomenon is taught as merely provisionally named." This includes "form," "feeling," "self," "world," and — crucially — "Buddha" itself. "Buddha" is a designation that functions, but no self-existent Buddha-essence sits underneath the word waiting to be discovered. This is one of the more startling moves of the teaching: it does not stop at the secular. The holiest name we have is also a *name* — and holy precisely because it works as a designation, not because a self-being Buddha sits behind the syllables.

Where This Sits in the Path of Liberation

A bird's-eye view is useful here. The whole Buddhist project of liberation is, in one reading, the undoing of a single hidden assumption: that things exist by self-being (svabhāva / 自性) — that there is, under or behind every experience, a hard, findable, independent core. When that assumption is undone without falling into "nothing exists," the mind relaxes and the cycle of grasping-driven suffering loosens. 唯名 is one of the cleanest analytical tools for that undoing. It does the work by exposing, with great precision, *how* designations hold things together — and thereby showing that the "self-being" we assume beneath them was never there.

It pairs naturally with the famous 《心經》 declaration 「照見五蘊皆空」 ("the five aggregates, seen through, are empty") — 唯名 is one specific way of *how* the five aggregates are empty: not absent, but name-established rather than self-established. It also rhymes with the Diamond Sutra's teaching about forms being insubstantial — though the precise language differs.

So the teaching is small enough to fit in a sentence and large enough to dismantle a metaphysics.


二、生活裡的走查

Let us walk through a single ordinary morning and notice where 唯名 is quietly operating — and where it gets *missed*. The point of the walk is not to philosophize but to feel the muscle.

6:42 a.m. — Waking Up and Naming the Day

You open your eyes. Before you have moved, a thought arrives: *Monday.* That single word organizes the entire next twelve hours. Monday means alarm-acceptable; Monday means back-to-work; Monday means a certain face. The day itself — the light, the ache in your shoulder, the bird outside — has no day-of-the-week built into it. Monday is a designation. It functions. It functions enormously. The 8:30 meeting will use the designation; payroll will use the designation. But the day has no inner Monday-nucleus.

The grasping move is to say, "Monday *is* depressing." Suddenly the designation has hardened into a thing. The teaching of 唯名 does not ask you to disbelieve in Monday — your meeting is real. It asks you to notice that the heaviness is not coming from a Monday-essence; it is coming from a *designation overlaid by mind and reinforced by a thousand Mondays before*. You can still go to the meeting. You are just no longer being pushed by a self-existing Monday.

6:55 a.m. — The Mug

You take a mug off the shelf. The thought "this is my mug" arrives pre-packaged. Now run the treatise's experiment: before the designation "mug" was applied, is there a mug-shaped self-being sitting in your hand? What you find is a shape, a weight, a warmth, a clay-body (大腹). The mug-ness — the *being-a-mug* — is supplied by designation. Without it, you would not be wrong to call it a paperweight or a small vase; the form would carry those uses too.

Notice: this does not make the mug unreal. The clay is there. The weight is there. The hot coffee will spill if you tilt it (the second criterion — 量, perception — is fully met). What is *not* there is a hidden mug-essence that the word "mug" merely points at. The mug is the way it functions; the mug is name-and-function together, all the way down.

The misstep most modern readers make here: "So it's just a label." No. The treatise is explicit. The mug-functions — holding, warming, comforting — are real and validated by perception. The teaching subtracts only the hidden essence, not the function.

7:30 a.m. — Scrolling

Now the most designation-saturated hour of contemporary life. Names and categories arrive faster than perception can verify them: *"friend," "mutual friend," "suggested for you," "trending," "based on your interests," "you may also like."* Each label functions. Some of them you accept, some you reject, but all of them are *designations overlaid on data*. Here is where the second criterion of 唯名 — 量 — does critical work.

The platform *names* you ("you are a 28-year-old urban professional interested in X"). Is this name validated by your own valid cognition? Often, no. You can see that the label is descriptive only in patches; it is name-overlay without perceptual grounding. The teaching of 唯名 does not say "the platform's label has no effect" — it does have effect, often large effect. It says the label is designation without adequate measurement; treat it accordingly, not as a self-disclosure of your being.

This is where the doctrine quietly cuts against a whole economy of identity. Most of what people are told they *are* — by feeds, by metrics, by HR departments, by their own past — is designation that has hardened into the feeling of self-being. 唯名 asks: is the designation still alive and accurate, or has it petrified?

9:15 a.m. — The Meeting, the Boss, the Title

You walk into a room. Someone is sitting at the head. The label "boss" arrives. The label "boss" causes a whole rearrangement of posture, tone, breath — and most of the day follows from that one designation.

Now apply the test. Is "boss" a hidden essence behind the person? No. The person has a body, a history, a temper, an agenda. The *being-a-boss* is relationally designated: by the org chart, by the meeting's agenda, by mutual consent. Change the org chart, change the meeting, change the contract, and that same person is no longer your boss. "Boss" is a designation; the human is not.

But — and this is the half the cynic always skips — the designation *functions*. The boss can sign your check; the boss can ask you to leave. The designation carries real effects. To say "it's just a label" in this context is to be practically naive. To say "the boss is a self-existing boss-being with a fixed inner authority" is to be metaphysically naive. 唯名 offers the third option: a functioning designation, used skillfully, not worshipped.

The same applies to "project," "deadline," "Q3 goals," "stakeholder," "investor." Each is a designation. Each works. None contains a self-being. When a deadline passes, you will feel the force of the designation; the question is whether you will feel it *as a real thing with real power* (the grasping mode) or *as a name-mediated pattern that you can renegotiate by changing the naming relationship* (the liberated mode).

1:30 p.m. — A Friend Asks About "Meaning"

At lunch, a friend asks you, "Do you ever wonder what your *life* is *about*?" The hidden move in that sentence is the assumption that there is, somewhere, an about-ness of your life — a hidden *purpose-essence* that the word "about" is reaching for. The teaching of 唯名 invites a closer look.

What you find when you search for "the about of my life" is a series of designations: roles, values, memories, hopes. Each functions. None is the essence. There is no self-existing "meaning-stuff" sitting beneath the question — but there *is* a living pattern of meaning-making that holds the day together. You don't need to find a hidden meaning; you need to see how meaning is being made by designation, moment by moment, and how each designation is valid only to the extent your own careful cognition backs it.

8:00 p.m. — Sitting with the Word "Buddha"

This is the move the treatise specifically makes. If you are a Buddhist practitioner, you might at some point in the evening sit, perhaps light a candle, perhaps say the name "Buddha." Run the experiment on that holiest of words. Is there a self-existing Buddha-essence that the syllables point at? The treatise says no. "Buddha" is a designation — for a particular human life, a particular set of qualities, a particular kind of freedom. The designation works. Images are made; minds are changed; centuries of practice have flowed from it. But the word is *not* pointing at a self-existent Buddha-substance behind the world-curtain.

For some practitioners this is devastating at first hearing. For others it is a relief: the Buddha is not a faraway metaphysical object; the Buddha is a functioning designation that lives in every act of attention. The teaching sharpens, rather than dulls, devotion.

The Most Common Mapping Mistake

In all six scenes above, the contemporary reader is most likely to misread the teaching in one specific way: collapsing it into either cynicism ("so nothing matters") or relativism ("so it's all just labels, do whatever"). Both miss the second criterion. The mug holds coffee. The meeting happens. The boss signs. The friend grieves. The candle burns. The word "Buddha" opens the heart. **None of this is cancelled by the analysis; all of it is unmasked as *functioning designation* rather than *self-existing entity*.** That is the precise middle path the treatise is drawing.


三、當代⼈為什麼需要它

Why does this two-millennia-old analysis feel almost surgically designed for the present?

1. We live inside an economy of names that have forgotten they are names.

Job titles ("creative director," "growth hacker"), identity tags on social media, lifestyle labels ("minimalist," "high-functioning anxious"), diagnostic labels from psychology, brand names, political team-names — every layer of contemporary life is designation-overlay. Because we have forgotten they are designations, we have started to *live as if* they are essences. People suffer not because they have titles, but because they have frozen their designations into self-beings — "I *am* a failure," "I *am* a success," "people like me *are* like this." The teaching of 唯名 does not ask you to drop the titles. It asks you to notice that you have been confusing a name with a soul.

2. The reflexive escape hatch is broken.

A century ago, the modernist could retreat to "the real thing" when language felt slippery — the rock, the body, the unmediated fact. That escape is now closed by both neuroscience and lived experience. The brain categorizes before it perceives; the eye edits before it sees; the algorithm names before it shows. We are no longer in a position to pretend we can step outside language to a wordless bedrock. The teaching of 唯名 is, in this sense, *post-foundationalist before the term existed*: it does not ask for a wordless rock; it asks you to see that *even the rock is a name-mediated pattern that has been validated by perception*. The teaching meets us where we already are.

(Note: this is *not* to say neuroscience has *proven* the Buddhist claim. The parallels are suggestive and practically useful; the metaphysical claim — that there is no self-being under the designations — is its own assertion, to be tested in practice, not in a scan.)

3. It offers a path between polarization and nihilism.

Public discourse has two cheap escape routes: "X is essentially Y" (essentialism — the grasping mode) and "X is just a social construct" (cynical constructivism). 唯名 refuses both. "X is designation, validated by perception, functioning here and now, without self-being" is the third option — and it is, I suspect, the only sustainable one. It allows commitment without idolatry. It allows critique without nihilism. It allows change without lying about what was.

4. It is a tool for skillful action under uncertainty.

When everything is designation, decision-making becomes interesting rather than paralyzed. You are no longer looking for the *true* answer hidden in the situation; you are looking for the *designation that, validated by your best perception and inference, will function well here*. This is closer to how good policy, good design, and good relationships actually work than the metaphysics of "essence" ever was. A practiced user of 唯名 is not paralyzed by relativity — they are unusually agile in choosing *which* designations to honor.

5. It scales down the ego without vaporizing the person.

Many contemporary mindfulness traditions swing between "you're not a self" (which can feel annihilating) and "trust your authentic self" (which re-installs an essence). 唯名 threads the needle: there is a person who functions, makes decisions, suffers, acts — but the person is not a *self-being* underneath the designations. You can lose a job-title and still be the functioning person; you can lose a relationship-status and still be the functioning person; you can lose a belief-system and still be the functioning person. The designations mattered; the designations are not the soul.


四、常見誤讀與澄清

Misreading 1 — "It's just a name, so nothing matters."

This is the most common error and the one the treatise guards against most carefully. To read 唯名 as nihilistic dismissal is to drop the 量 (valid cognition) criterion entirely. The text does not say "everything named is real"; it also does not say "nothing named is real." It says: *the designation must be backed by valid cognition to count as conventionally real*. The mug holds coffee. The sun rises. The body ages. The teaching is not a magic eraser.

Misreading 2 — "唯名 = 唯識 (consciousness-only)"

The vocabulary looks similar and the texts are in dialogue, but the doctrines are not the same. 唯識 (vijñapti-mātra), in its classical Yogācāra form, holds that the three natures are ultimately mind-only — that there is an *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness) as the substrate. 唯名 (nāma-mātra), as the treatise uses the term, does *not* posit a self-existing mind-substrate either; it goes one level further and says even the *mind* is a functioning designation, not a self-being. In fact, this very treatise is famous for reading 唯識 *as* 唯名 — that is, treating the Yogācāra teaching itself as a provisional name-designation rather than as an ultimate metaphysical thesis. So: 唯名 is more deflationary than 唯識, not a synonym for it.

Misreading 3 — "It's postmodern constructivism."

Postmodernism often says "reality is a social construction." 唯名 says something subtler: "reality is name-mediated, but name-mediation is *validated or not* by cognition that is not itself a name." This is the second-criterion safety net. There are real dragons (those supported by perception, inference, testimony) and unreal dragons (those posited only by mind). The teaching is therefore *not* the "anything goes" of radical constructivism; it is a careful conventional realism nested inside a subtler ultimate analysis.

Misreading 4 — "Words are lies."

No. Words are *functional*. Without words you cannot cross the street, eat a meal, learn a craft, find a friend, follow a teaching. Words are the ligaments of a functioning life. 唯名 is not against words; it is against words mistaken for essences. The error is not in using the word "mug"; the error is in believing the word "mug" *refers to a self-existing mug-substance*. Use all the words. Just don't confuse the use for the thing.

Misreading 5 — "Mere" is dismissive.

In English, "mere" sounds like a put-down — a *mere* name, a *mere* designation. The Sanskrit mātra and the Chinese are not dismissive; they are *analytical*. They mark off what something *is* and what it is *not*. The teaching is not saying "your life is just a name, sorry." It is saying "your life is name-and-function-without-essence, and that is interesting rather than pathetic." The tone is one of *precision*, not *reduction*.

Misreading 6 — "Once you see through names, you should stop using them."

Enlightened beings in the Buddhist tradition still use language — they teach, they name, they negotiate, they praise. The treatise itself is doing exactly this. The point is not to fall silent, but to use names without being *used* by them. This is sometimes called the "second naiveté" — a transparency through language rather than an escape from it.

Misreading 7 — "唯名 and 假名 are the same."

In some schools, 假名 (provisional name) is used to describe, for example, the three natures in Yogācāra, where 假名 is one of the natures (the *prajñapti-sat*, the dependent-nature-as-named). In other contexts, 假名 is used to mean "false name" (which the treatise would *not* endorse). 唯名 in the 《辨了不了義善說藏論》 is closer to the first sense — *functioning designation* — and explicitly *not* the second. The treatise's eight-form vocabulary (唯名, 唯表, 唯言說, 唯世俗名, 唯有表示, 唯是假立, 名言增上安立, 假立客名) is one *family* of terms, all meaning the same thing, all carefully calibrated against the misreadings.


Coda: The Quiet Practice

There is no special technique for 唯名. There is only the practice of noticing — at the cup, at the meeting, at the word "Buddha," at the name you call yourself — that what is in front of you is designation-in-action, validated by perception, hollow of self-being, fully functional. The teaching asks for *no less* than the work of a lifetime, and *no more* than a single honest look at the next thing you pick up.

*"凡有皆是唯名、唯表、唯言說。"* Everything that exists is *mere name*, *mere expression*, *mere verbal designation*.

*"色等於世間名言中可立為有,而非於勝義中由自體成立。"* Form, and all such things, can be established as existent in the world's name-and-speech; they are not established by self-being in the ultimate.

*"世間諸事皆不觀察立為有。"* Worldly things are all posited as existent *without* further analysis.

*"若瓶即是大腹本具的體性或自相,則在尚未施設『瓶』名以前,也應自然生起『彼是瓶』之覺。"* If the bottle *were* the belly-shape's own inner nature, then before the name "bottle" was applied, the thought "this is a bottle" should arise on its own.

These four lines, taken together, are the entire teaching. The rest is practice.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

定义与核心要义

唯名(nāma-mātra),谓一切法皆由名言增上安立为有,并非由事物之自体或自相方面成立。此说并非否定世俗名言中诸法之作用与建立,而是遮遣于名言施设之外另有一自性实有可得。

主要阐述

《辨了不了义善说藏论》以「瓶」之施设为喻:大腹本具之体性中,未施设「瓶」名之前,不应自然生起「彼是瓶」之觉;既须依名言方起此觉,便显示瓶之有非由其自体方面成立,而是名言所立者。

本论复以多名与同名之例显示自相成立之过失:同一事可有多名(如百施、因陀罗、坏聚落等),若名称皆由事体自身决定,便应由多名而成多体;反之,两位丈夫同名近护,若名及分别全由事体决定,两事又应成为一体。故名称与所指之间不能解作事物自性所成,而须理解为施设安立。

论中对唯名之作明确限定:「凡有皆是唯名、唯表、唯言说」。此说意谓:寻求名言所诠之义时,不能获得一个由自体方面成立的实义;但这并非说只有名称而全无所指,亦非说一切非名称之义悉皆不存在。凡未由施设名言之心增上而立者,不许为名言有;然而由施设心所立之一切,亦不必然皆能成立为名言有,仍须区分量所成立者与不成立者。

本论在应用上,从色乃至于佛之一切法皆说为唯假名。此说不等于全无名所依事,而是说没有一个不由名言增上安立、可作为名称所依的自性实有;因此「有彼事」与「唯由假名安立」并不相违。其正面结论是:色等于世间名言中可立为有,而非于胜义中由自体成立。

本论亦区分名言安立与寻求自性:世间诸事「皆不观察立为有」,若进一步寻求施设假名所依之独立异义,则不可得。例如罗睺与罗睺之头、埼钴与埼钴之身,经此寻求,并无离开相关名言关系而可得的另一实义;但世间日常仍可随顺言说而安立能别与所别。

不同部类与译本的表述差异

本论论述唯名时使用多种语形,可逐一列举如下:作「唯名」、作「唯表」、作「唯言说」、作「唯世俗名」、作「唯有表示」、作「唯是假立」、作「名言增上安立」、作「假立客名」。其中「客」字在本论中被解作「假造」,用以遮遣自性;「由假名安立诸法」即由名言增上安立为有,故是「假造性」。这些语形皆应于本论论述唯名时保留为原有用词。

另就所立之法的范围而言,本论以色乃至于佛之一切法为例,说「色」「佛」等名皆是于事假立客名。此处「假立客名」与「唯名」同义,互为异名同指,用以表诠由名言增上安立之一切法。

与相关概念的关系

唯名与执着之相对:本论将执着之相状说为:认为内外诸法并非由名言增上而立,而是「由自体有」。与此相反,唯名不是否定名言中诸法的作用与成立,而是否定在名言施设之外另有自体、自相可得。其判准落在两处:一为是否由名言增上安立,二为此安立是否为量所成立。

代表性原文引用

- 「凡有皆是唯名、唯表、唯言说。」 - 「由假名安立诸法。」「假造性。」 - 「色等于世间名言中可立为有,而非于胜义中由自体成立。」 - 「世间诸事皆不观察立为有。」 - 「若瓶即是大腹本具的体性或自相,则在尚未施设『瓶』名以前,也应自然生起『彼是瓶』之觉。」

By SutraAI-generated

辨了不了義善說藏論B0048 · 藏傳論典部

《辨了不了義善說藏論》論「唯名」,核心在說諸法之有,乃由名言增上安立,並非由事物自體或自相而有。論中以「大腹」被施設為「瓶」為例:若瓶即是大腹本具的體性或自相,則在尚未施設「瓶」名以前,也應自然生起「彼是瓶」之覺;既須依名言方起此覺,便顯示瓶不是由自身方面成立,而是名言所立。

本論又以多名與同名說明自相成立的過失。同一事物可有百施、因陀羅、壞聚落等多名,若名稱皆由事體自身決定,便應由多名而成多體;反之,兩位丈夫同名近護,若名及分別全由事體決定,兩事又應成為一體。故名稱與所指之間不能解作事物自性所成,而須理解為施設安立。

論中對「唯名」作了明確限定:「凡有皆是唯名、唯表、唯言說」,意謂尋求名言所詮之義時,不能獲得一個由自體方面成立的實義;但這並非說只有名稱而全無所指,也不是說一切非名稱之義悉皆不存在。凡未由施設名言之心增上而立者,論中不許為名言有;然而由施設心所立的一切,也不必然都能成立為名言有,仍須區分量所成立與不成立者。

本論特別使用「唯名」「唯表」「唯言說」「唯世俗名」「唯有表示」「唯是假立」「名言增上安立」「假立客名」等語形來表述此義。其中「客」被解作「假造」,用以遮遣自性;「由假名安立諸法」,即由名言增上安立為有,故是「假造性」。這些正是本論論述「唯名」時應保留的原有用詞。

論中並以從色乃至於佛的一切法說明「唯假名」:說「色」「佛」等名,皆是於事假立客名。此說不等於全無名所依事,而是說沒有一個不由名言增上安立、可作為名稱所依的自性實有;因此,「有彼事」與「唯由假名安立」並不相違。其正面結論是:色等於世間名言中可立為有,而非於勝義中由自體成立。

本論亦區分名言安立與尋求自性:世間諸事「皆不觀察立為有」,若進一步尋求施設假名所依的獨立異義,則不可得。例如羅睺與羅睺之頭、碕鈷與碕鈷之身,經此尋求,並無離開相關名言關係而可得的另一實義;但世間日常仍可隨順言說而安立能別與所別。

最後,論中把執著的相狀說成:認為內外諸法並非由名言增上而立,而是「由自體有」。與此相反,「唯名」不是否定名言中諸法的作用與成立,而是否定在名言施設之外另有自體、自相可得;其判準仍落在是否由名言增上安立,以及此安立是否為量所成。

Related