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grāha

对人法境相固着不舍。AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty IntroductoryTruth-level span outside the four-fold two-truths frameworkInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is About

"Grasping" (*執*, grāha) is not merely liking something, nor simply stubborn adherence to one's own view. According to the framework of the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* (*瑜伽師地論*), the key structure of grasping is this: the mind, relying on names, language, and appearing images (*nimitta*), conceptually discriminates (*parikalpayati*) the referent, and then affirms that it possesses a self-nature that can be independently determined and fixedly grasped.

In a single sentence: names are originally for the sake of recognition and communication, and phenomena do indeed appear in dependence on conditions; but grasping pushes "this is how it is called, this is how it appears" into "it is inherently thus, and certainly so."

For example, a colleague rejects your proposal in a meeting. At the factual level, one can say: "He just disagreed with this proposal." But the mind may quickly complete a chain of reification:

"He rejected my proposal" → "He looks down on me" → "He is an arrogant person" → "I am someone not respected in this team."

Here it is not merely that judgments occur; rather, names and impressions have been solidified into the "determinate self-nature" of persons and things. "An arrogant person" and "a me who is not respected" are no longer seen as provisional descriptions made in dependence on certain conditions, but rather as essences that are intrinsic to the object and eternally unchanging. This comes close to what the treatise calls grasping a referent "in accordance with the name, in accordance with the speech" (*如名、如言而執有所詮事*).

Therefore, the problem of grasping does not lie in the use of language. If we could not name at all, we could not even ask for directions, see a doctor, or study the Dharma. The problem lies in forgetting that names are designations (*prajñapti*), taking convenient markers of communication as the immovable substance of things. A map is not the land; but grasping takes the boundaries on the map as lines drawn by the earth itself.

The grasping discussed in the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* extends far beyond "grasping at a self" (*我執*) and "grasping at what belongs to a self" (*我所執*). Whenever the specific characteristics (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) of dharmas, their general characteristics (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), their categories, their names, or the realms attained through practice are taken as real determinate self-natures, that too may be grasping. Even if one does not verbally assert "there is an eternal self," one may still grasp "successful person," "failure," "introverted personality," "victim of one's family of origin," or "someone who practices well" as fixed entities.

The treatise divides the "grasping of the self-nature of the conceptually constructed" (*遍計所執自性執*) into two main types:

The first type is "grasping in the mode of preparatory effort" (*加行執*, *prayoga-grāha*). It observes grasping from the direction and exertion of the mind, and includes five kinds:

- Desire-attachment preparatory effort (*貪愛加行*): moving toward, pursuing, and managing the object due to craving.

- Aversion preparatory effort (*瞋恚加行*): exerting effort toward the object due to rejection and hostility.

- Union preparatory effort (*合會加行*): obstinately bringing about some aggregation, meeting, or union.

- Separation preparatory effort (*別離加行*): obstinately bringing about some separation, isolation, or dissociation.

- Equanimous-following preparatory effort (*捨隨與加行*): this is another form of preparatory effort listed in the treatise; it should be understood by preserving its original designation, and should not be casually compressed into a modern slogan. The five together indicate: grasping is not merely hidden in views; it also runs along the intentional arcs of desire, aversion, union, separation, and equanimous-following, becoming the way the mind actually activates and manages its objects.

The second type is "grasping in the mode of name-designation" (*名施設執*), further divided into two:

- Non-verbal fabrication (*非文字所作*): even before a clear judgment has been written down, the mind, in asking "what is this?" and "what, in the end, is this thing?" has already begun to seize a determinable referent.

- Verbal fabrication (*文字所作*): further, one explicitly determines it with words as form (*rūpa*), consciousness (*vijñāna*), conditioned (*saṃskṛta*), unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), permanent (*nitya*), impermanent (*anitya*), wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome (*akuśala*), or ethically neutral (*avyākṛta*).

This does not mean all classification is faulty. The Dharma itself uses these doctrinal terms for teaching. Distinguishing "wholesome and unwholesome" can help people avoid harm; the problem is mistaking classifications made in dependence on conditions and purposes as unchanging entities inside the object.

The treatise also lists five kinds of "subtle grasping" (*微細執著*):

1. Grasping the permanent in the impermanent (*於無常執常*): changing relationships, identities, and feelings are imagined as something that ought to remain long-lasting and unchanging.

2. Grasping pleasure in suffering (*於苦執樂*): experiences that cannot provide stable satisfaction are taken as happiness that can permanently settle one.

3. Grasping purity in the impure (*於不淨執淨*): projecting permanently possessable purity and perfection onto things that are composed of multiple conditions and subject to decay and change.

4. Grasping a self in the selfless (*於無我執我*): establishing, within the processes of body and mind, an independent, permanent, fully sovereign "I."

5. Arising of grasping of constructed self-nature with respect to all images (*於諸相中起遍計所執自性執*): even without directly speaking of "self," one still takes the marks of form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness (*色受想行識*, *rūpa-vedanā-saṃjñā-saṃskāra-vijñāna*) as possessing determinate self-nature.

The fifth is especially important. Grasping does not only occur in "this is my body"; it may also occur in "form is just a fixed entity." Here "form" cannot be narrowly reduced to the physical body; it should include the four great elements (*四大*, *mahābhūta*) and all form derived from them, encompassing both the body and external material objects. Feeling (*受*, *vedanā*) is the reception of suffering, pleasure, and neither-suffering-nor-pleasure; it is not a vague "emotion." Perception (*想*, *saṃjñā*) is the taking of marks, discrimination, and labeling; it is not what we ordinarily call "random thoughts." Volition (*行*, *saṃskāra*) is will and the forces of fabrication; it is not equivalent to external actions. Consciousness (*識*, *vijñāna*) is the activity of discernment; it is not an eternal observer hiding inside body and mind. If one grasps these analytical tools themselves as five independent, unchanging things, one has still not escaped grasping.

This is precisely the fine line between "words are useful" and "self-nature is real": one may speak conventionally of "there is form, there is feeling, there is a person in pain," without adding the further layer "it must be established by itself, and can only be so."

Viewed from the three self-natures (*三自性*, *trisvabhāva*), this boundary becomes clearer:

- The constructed self-nature (*遍計所執自性*, *parikalpita-svabhāva*) is the determinate self-nature superimposed by names and discrimination. The treatise requires that one correctly know it as "name only, construction only" (*唯有其名、唯遍計執*). This does not mean that even mistaken experience has not occurred; rather, the fixed self-nature superimposed by the mind has never actually been established.

- The other-dependent self-nature (*依他起自性*, *paratantra-svabhāva*) is the process in which phenomena arise from causes and conditions and appear in mutual dependence. If, upon these various appearances, one further places "an essence established by itself," this is what the treatise calls "initial grasping" (*初執*); if one only correctly knows that there are merely the various appearances manifesting in dependence on conditions, without further constructing a self-nature for them, this is called "non-grasping."

- If one goes deeper: when the "bondage of images" (*相縛*) has not yet been uprooted, and one still feels, in the face of appearances, that there is a real object for the mind to seize, possess, or attain, this is the "second grasping" (*第二執*). Only when the bondage of images is permanently uprooted, and one attains nothing in images, is this what is meant here by non-grasping. The so-called "attaining nothing" (*無所得*) is not the loss of discriminative ability; it is no longer taking, with a grasping mind, an object that is established by its own self-nature.

- The perfected self-nature (*圓成實自性*, *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*): the treatise says that "this has no grasping," because it is not an object on which grasping can rest. If one has not yet attained, not yet touched, not yet realized, and yet proclaims "I have already realized," then "the self that has realized" and "the realm possessed by me" remain an arrogance (*adhimāna*) built upon the constructed and other-dependent self-natures.

Therefore, non-grasping is not completed by a single sentence "I know everything is just names." The treatise distinguishes between presently active recognition and "dormant disposition grasping" (*隨眠執*, *anuśaya-grāha*): even though one's view knows "name only," habits may still lie latent. When criticized, the body tightens first and the mind defends; when the relationship wavers slightly, one immediately seizes "he doesn't love me anymore"; when a little stillness appears in practice, one immediately generates "I am already different from ordinary people." This shows that one has understood the doctrine intellectually, but the coarseness of habit has not yet been abandoned. Only when the relevant dormant dispositions and coarseness (*粗重*, *dauṣṭhulya*) are permanently cut off is there non-grasping in the thorough sense.

With respect to persons and self, the treatise further distinguishes two kinds of erroneous grasping: forming "this is my self, this is what belongs to my self" in accordance with the teachings of others is called "erroneous grasping from another's instruction" (*他教邪執*); giving rise to views of self and what belongs to self by oneself through internal incorrect discrimination is called "internal erroneous grasping" (*內邪執*), also known as "erroneous grasping not from another's instruction" (*非他教邪執*). One can learn from family, culture, religion, or consumer-society psychology "what counts as me"; or, without anyone explicitly saying so, one can continuously maintain a centered self. The sources differ; the structure of grasping is similar.

The widely known *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (*金剛般若波羅蜜經*) says:

凡所有相,皆是虛妄;若見諸相非相,則見如來。

*"All images whatsoever are illusory; if one sees that all images are non-images, then one sees the Tathāgata."* (The original text may be found in the [CBETA textual-critical records for the *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*](https://cbetaonline.dila.edu.tw/doc/zh/changelog/2018/2018Q1-punc.pdf).) This should not be crudely understood as "everything before one's eyes does not exist," nor can it be directly said that its terminological system is entirely identical to that of the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*. A more cautious harmonization is: images can appear and can be used in the conventional world; but if one grasps the appearing image as determinate self-nature, one is bound by images. "Seeing all images as non-images" is not closing one's eyes and not looking; it is no longer taking the mode of appearance as self-nature itself.

On the path of liberation, grasping occupies an extremely critical position: ignorance (*無明*, *avidyā*) does not always appear as abstruse philosophy; it often manifests as "of course I know things are just so." From this arise craving and clinging (*愛取*), giving rise to the impulses to protect, possess, reject, and become a certain kind of person, which in turn drive fabrication and suffering. *Śīla* (戒, discipline) helps us keep grasping from immediately becoming harm; *samādhi* (定, concentration) gives the mind the ability to see how grasping activates; *prajñā* (慧, wisdom) illuminates that name, image, and determinate self-nature are not the same thing. Non-grasping is not coldly withdrawing from life; it is letting compassion and action no longer be bound by a fixed self, fixed others, and fixed results.

A Walk-Through in Daily Life

Imagine a very ordinary evening: you come home from overtime work, and your partner only replies "mm," then continues scrolling on the phone. Let us walk through this following the sequence of "name—image—construction—preparatory effort—habit."

Step one: the images appear.

You see the other person with head lowered, you hear the brief response, and the body feels tired and tense. These are experiences that arise in dependence on conditions. At this point one cannot yet assert that the other person is cold: the lowered head could be fatigue, a work message, physical discomfort, or indeed dissatisfaction. The various images arising in dependence on other conditions have appeared, but they have not declared a single exclusive explanation by themselves.

Step two: taking the image and naming.

The perception aggregate (*想蘊*, *saṃjñā-skandha*) takes the image of the experience and discriminates: "the tone is cold," "not looking at me." Note that perception here is recognition and labeling, not the broad sense of "I had a thought." Naming itself has practical utility; without it, you could not even notice that there might be a problem in the relationship.

Step three: moving from the name to determinate self-nature.

The mind compresses "this response was cold" into "he is a cold person," and then solidifies "I did not get a response just now" into "I am someone not worth loving." "Cold" and "not worth loving" change from provisional explanations into the essences of both parties. This step is the core of grasping; it is not simply the appearance of discomfort.

Step four: feeling and grasping push each other forward.

The mind receives a suffering feeling. Feeling is the reception of suffering, pleasure, or neither; it is not equivalent to a whole story; "my chest feels uncomfortable" and "he deliberately hurt me" are not on the same level. The place where people most easily misproject is taking the suffering feeling itself as proof of fact: "I feel so bad, therefore my judgment must be true." In reality, the suffering feeling genuinely occurs; it does not follow that the interpretation built around it has determinate self-nature.

Step five: grasping in the mode of preparatory effort unfolds.

You may develop:

- Desire-attachment preparatory effort: urgently seeking comfort, confirmation, and attention, demanding that the other person immediately prove they love you.

- Aversion preparatory effort: being sarcastic, dredging up old grievances, wanting the other person to also feel bad.

- Union preparatory effort: forcing the other person to "talk it out" right away, to quickly restore intimacy.

- Separation preparatory effort: storming off in anger, blocking contact, or declaring inwardly "I will never get close to him again."

- Equanimous-following preparatory effort: it may also operate through this form of preparatory effort listed in the treatise; the key point remains observation—whether the mind is activating toward and away from an object that has been reified, rather than casually repurposing this term as "healthy letting go."

Wanting to communicate, or temporarily stepping away to calm down, does not automatically equal grasping. The same action may arise from wisdom or from fixation. The boundary lies in: do you affirm "he must be this kind of person" and "I must get this result, otherwise I am incomplete"?

Step six: subtle grasping enters the relationship.

You may grasp the permanent in the impermanent, thinking that an intimate relationship ought to maintain the same intensity forever; grasp pleasure in suffering, expecting another person to permanently fill one's own unease; grasp purity in the impure, fantasizing a complex, fatiguing, misunderstanding-prone ordinary relationship as a flawless refuge; grasp a self in the selfless, affirming that there is a "me" that must be continuously recognized and must never be damaged; and construct determinate self-nature with respect to all images, turning an expression, a sentence, a silence into the essence of the other person.

Step seven: there is a little right view, but dormant dispositions remain.

You may have already learned to remind yourself: "This is only my label; it is not necessarily a fact." But the hand still cannot help repeatedly checking the chat history, and the mind continues rehearsing the argument. At this point, there is no need for shame, nor should one declare "I am already free of grasping." Right view has begun to appear; dormant dispositions and coarseness are still present. Being able to honestly acknowledge this is itself closer to practice than playing the part of "someone who has already seen through it."

Step eight: practicing non-grasping without escaping.

You can first discern:

"There is a suffering feeling here; perception is taking the image of 'cold'; the volition aggregate is driving me to interrogate or flee; consciousness is discerning all of this. All of these are occurring, but none of them alone is sufficient to prove that 'he is essentially cold' or 'I am essentially unworthy of love.'"

Then you can ask the other person: "You seem very tired just now, and you didn't respond to me much. Did something happen? I'm also exhausted today, and I'd like to talk to you for a few minutes."

This is discrimination and action without determinate self-nature. Non-grasping does not make you lose your boundaries; if there is genuinely ongoing harm in the relationship, you can still seek help, set limits, or even leave. It is just that you do not need to first sentence the other person as an eternal villain, nor sentence yourself as an eternal victim, in order to be qualified to take protective action.

The same structure also appears when scrolling through your phone:

"This post has many likes" is an observable image; "so it must be correct" is treating popularity as the self-nature of truth; "the algorithm always pushes these to me, so people in the world are all like this" is taking a filtered appearance as the whole picture of the world; "I only like watching this, so this is the complete me" solidifies a preference into identity.

An algorithm can predict the next click based on past behavior, but it cannot thereby prove that there is a fixed, unchanging self. Conversely, the Buddhist analysis of grasping cannot be said to have already received proof from neuroscience or artificial intelligence. Scientific models study measurable behavior, neural activity, and predictive mechanisms; Buddhism is concerned with suffering, erroneous grasping, and its cessation. The two can illuminate each other, but their objects of study, methods, and boundaries of conclusions are not identical, and many questions of consciousness and self remain scientifically unresolved.

Why Contemporary People Need It

Contemporary life does not only offer us objects; it continuously offers names we can claim: "high-value person," "failure," "people-pleasing personality," "chill energy," "person with family-of-origin trauma," "elite," "socially anxious," "a person of this or that camp." These names can sometimes genuinely help us understand experience, find companions, and obtain treatment; the danger is that an explanatory tool quickly becomes a cage of identity.

A psychological label originally describes only a partial tendency, but grasping says: "I was born this way and can only be this way." A career setback is originally the result of multiple conditions, but grasping says: "I simply have no ability." A public issue originally has complex facts, but grasping divides people into fixed categories of good and evil. The more convenient the label, the more easily the mind forgets that it was designated for a purpose.

Understanding grasping brings at least four important freedoms.

First: release from "I must prove who I am."

Non-grasping is not the annihilation of personality; it is not treating personality as an entity that must be permanently defended. Being capable today does not require establishing "I can never fail"; being fragile today does not require establishing "I am destined to be weak." Identity can still bear responsibility, but it no longer needs to be a fortress requiring day-and-night guard.

Second: allowing relationships to once again have the possibility of change.

When we say "he is just selfish" or "the child simply lacks self-discipline," we have often solidified certain behaviors into determinate self-nature. In this way, even if the other person changes, we will only filter for evidence that supports the old label. Non-grasping is not indulgence; it is accurately distinguishing: "this behavior caused harm" from "this person's essence is harm." The former allows accountability and change; the latter easily locks both parties in place.

Third: avoiding making practice itself into a new possession.

Meditative experiences, clear feelings, and understanding of emptiness can all be grasped as "my attainment." The *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* is very sharp on this: not yet attained, not yet touched, not yet realized, yet believing one has already realized, is arrogance (*增上慢*), and is still grasping. Even if an experience genuinely occurs, as long as the mind is anxious to turn it into identity and possession, the image-bondage of "attainment" (*有所得*) remains.

Fourth: re-understanding liberation as not destroying the world.

If one understands emptiness and non-grasping as "nothing exists, nothing matters," one easily falls into nihilism. According to the three self-natures, what needs to be abandoned is the determinate self-nature superimposed by construction, not the functions and causality that arise in dependence on conditions. A knife has no fixed "good nature" or "evil nature," but using a knife to harm people still produces real consequences; an identity is not established by its own self-nature, yet discrimination—a social harm operating through conditions—must still be faced.

Non-grasping is therefore not a reduction of care, but a reduction of the possessiveness mixed into care. Grasping at a child "must become the person I envision" looks like love but in fact often turns the child into an extension of one's own plans; the love of non-grasping can better see the child's present conditions, abilities, and suffering, while still bearing the responsibility of raising them.

Practice is ultimately not about teaching the mind to say "everything is false," but training it to move within words without being deceived by words, to be among images without being bound by images, and to act without fabricating a self that must be completed by results. To be able to name while knowing the limits of names, to discriminate without reifying discrimination, to be invested without making possession the condition of investment—this is the maturity that gradually emerges as grasping loosens.

Common Misreadings and Clarifications

One: "Grasping is desire, so desire nothing."

This is inaccurate. Desiring may become the driving force of preparatory grasping, but the core of grasping is constructing determinate self-nature through names and images. Wanting to eat, seeking medical care, and protecting one's children are not necessarily grasping; taking "if I do not get this, I can never be secure" as a certain fact is what reveals fixation. Liberation is not the annihilation of all volition; it is allowing volition to no longer be governed by erroneous reification.

Two: "Persisting is grasping; going with the flow is the Dharma."

Sticking to principles, caring for the sick, and long-term practice may all require tremendous perseverance. Whether something is grasping cannot be judged by external action alone; one must see whether the mind seizes the object, the identity, and the result as determinate self-nature. Sometimes so-called "going with the flow" is just avoiding responsibility; sometimes resolute action comes precisely from clarity and compassion.

Three: "'Name only' means things are just words, and reality does not exist."

No. What the treatise refutes is the determinate self-nature superimposed by names, not the images, functions, and causality that arise in dependence on other conditions. The name "fire" is conventionally established, but putting your hand in fire still hurts; "violence" is a linguistic category, but the suffering caused by violence cannot be cancelled with "it's only a name."

Four: "Non-grasping means not judging, not classifying."

Not that either. Both daily life and Dharma study require discrimination: knowing medicine from poison, good conduct from harm, honesty from deception. Non-grasping is knowing, while discriminating, that classifications are established in dependence on conditions, standards, and purposes, and not absolutizing them. When Buddhism speaks of "wholesome" and "unwholesome," it is not thereby claiming that good and bad actions are no different at all; what it prevents is fabricating a self-nature entity on top of classification.

Five: "Non-self means negating my feelings."

Quite the opposite. Feelings must still be honestly observed; what non-self refutes is the establishment of an independent, permanent, fully sovereign self within the flow of body and mind. Pain is occurring, and "there is an essentially broken me" are two different things. The former requires care; the latter is a determinate verdict superimposed by the mind on top of pain.

Six: "Form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness are all constructed by grasping, so the five aggregates do not exist."

This formulation is too crude. The five aggregates are effective designations for analyzing experience: form includes the body and external objects as matter derived from the four great elements; feeling is reception; perception is the taking of marks and recognition; volition is will and the forces of fabrication; consciousness is discernment. Grasping lies in affirming each of them as an entity established by its own self-nature, or in seeking within them a permanent self; it does not lie in using the five-aggregate framework of analysis itself.

Seven: "Knowing that labels are unreliable, I am already free of grasping."

The treatise explicitly retains the layer of "dormant disposition grasping." Intellectual understanding and the permanent cutting off of habits are not the same thing. The real test often comes at the moment of stimulation: does the old label immediately take over perception? Must one obtain a certain result to feel at ease? Does the mind become displeased the moment it seeks a certain image and fails to find it? Seeing recurrence is not failure; it is finally seeing the depth that practice truly needs to address.

Eight: "Attaining nothing means having no learning outcomes, and no need to cultivate."

Attaining nothing does not oppose learning and cultivation; it means not turning attainments on the path into objects that can be possessed by an entity-like self. The discipline, concentration, and wisdom that should be cultivated must still be cultivated; the habits that should be cut off must still be cut off. If one uses "originally nothing attained" to cover up greed, hatred, and delusion that have not yet been transformed, that is precisely using emptiness to protect grasping.

Nine: "The perfected self-nature has no grasping, so one may grasp 'suchness' as the supreme entity."

This goes directly against the meaning of "this has no grasping." The perfected self-nature is not a final metaphysical object established for grasping. If the mind thinks "I have finally found an eternal ground," it has pulled the concept of the perfected back into names and construction. The true perfected self-nature is not a place where grasping can rest.

Ten: "'All images are illusory' means one should negate all phenomena."

The verse immediately continues with "if one sees all images as non-images." The point is not to close one's eyes and reject images, but to see images without taking them as self-nature. If one grasps at "images should not appear at all," one fabricates another object: "only what is imageless is real." Rejecting images can still be a reverse grasping at images.

In the final analysis, grasping is not holding something in your hand; it is the mind pressing flowing conditions into fixed essences. Non-grasping is not throwing everything away; it is finally knowing: names can be used but cannot be claimed as truth; images can be seen but cannot be taken as self-nature; responsibility can be borne without forging an eternal bearer; love can be deep without being proven by possession.

When this structure is gradually seen through, liberation is no longer an escape to somewhere outside experience; it is that at every naming, judging, loving, hating, and acting, one no longer adds to the world an extra cage of "it must be thus."

Canonical EntryAI-generated

1. 定义与核心要义

「执」(grāha)在《瑜伽师地论》中,主要指依名言、文字或所现诸相,遍计所诠事具有可以决定、固着的自性。凡夫不只为事物施设名称,而且「如名、如言」认定名称所指之事确有相应自体,例如认为某事决定具有色、受、想、行、识等自性,遂依其名言称为色乃至识。这种把假立之名及其所诠相认作决定自性的作用,称为「遍计所执自性执」。

因此,本论所说之执不限于执我、我所,也包括对诸法自相、共相、名称、类别与所得境界的固着。其核心在于:由名与相而起遍计,将本来唯是假立、唯是众相者认定为具有「决定自性」。

2. 主要阐述

《瑜伽师地论》将「遍计所执自性执」略分为「加行执」与「名施设执」。加行执有五种:贪爱加行、瞋恚加行、合会加行、别离加行、舍随与加行。名施设执则有「非文字所作」与「文字所作」二类:前者是在追问「此为何物」「此物是何」时执取其所指;后者则藉文字明定某物是色、识、有为、无为、常、无常、善、不善或无记等。此一分类着重说明执如何随意欲活动、名称施设及文字判定而生。

论中又说五种「微细执着」:于无常执常、于苦执乐、于不净执净、于无我执我,以及于诸相中起遍计所执自性执。后一种显示,即使不直接宣称有我,观察诸法自相、共相时,若认定某事实有色相或受、想、行、识相,仍属细密之执。寻思某相而求之不得,因而心生不乐,也表现出对相的固着。

就执与无执的界线而言,依言说假立名字之后,若又遍计诸法具有决定自性,名为「彼觉悟执」;若善知「唯有名」,不认为诸法具有决定性,则名「于彼无执」。然而,见解上虽已有此种了知,若执着的习气随眠尚未拔除、习气麁重尚未舍离,仍称「随眠执」;必须永断其随眠与麁重,方可说是无执。

依三自性分别时,对遍计所执自性的觉悟执,又遍计依他起的众相具有所成自性,称为「初执」;若只知唯有众相,不遍计其所成自性,则为无执。若「相缚」未拔,于诸相中仍有所所得,称为「第二执」;相缚永拔,在无相界中正了知而于相无得,或后时如其所有而有所得,则说无执。

至于圆成实自性,论称「此无有执」,因其界不是执着安足之处。但若实际尚未得、未触、未作证,却自谓已得、已触、已证,所生增上慢仍属建立在遍计所执自性及依他起自性上的执。

在人我方面,论另说两种「邪执」:因他人教导而起「此是我、此是我所」之见,名「他教邪执」;由内心不正分别而执我、我所,名「内邪执」,亦名「非他教邪执」。一切此类邪执永断,则称为「智果」。

3. 不同部类与译本的表述差异

本条所据材料仅出自瑜伽部《瑜伽师地论》(《瑜伽師地論》),未提供其他部类经论或同经异译,故不能据此列举跨部类、异译本之用词分歧。就本论内部而言,其表述随论述角度而异:从名言与自性说「遍计所执自性执」「名施设执」「决定自性」;从诸相及认识所得说「相缚」「初执」「第二执」「所得」;从未断的潜在状态说「随眠执」「习气随眠」「习气麁重」;从人我错见说「邪执」「他教邪执」「内邪执」或「非他教邪执」。这些是同一论中不同论域的用语,不能视作异译词汇。

4. 与相关概念的关系

执与「名施设」相连:问题不在假立名字本身,而在依名字遍计所诠事具有决定自性。执也与「相缚」及「所得」相连:于诸相中认为实有所取、所得,即表明相缚未拔。与「随眠」「麁重」相较,现行执是当下所起的认定,随眠执则表示即使已知唯名,相关习气仍未永断。

在三自性中,遍计所执自性应被正知为「唯有其名、唯遍计执」,并被说为无相、无性、无生、无灭、无染、无净、本来寂静、自性涅槃,如虚空遍一切处;依他起的众相若被遍计为具有所成自性,便成为初执所缘;圆成实自性则被明说为无执安足之处。

执我、我所属于「邪执」,而于无常执常、于苦执乐、于不净执净、于无我执我,则列于「微细执着」。两组分类各依不同论述脉络施设:前者分辨邪执由他教或内在不正分别而起,后者呈现对诸法性相的颠倒与固着。

5. 代表性原文引用

本论以「如名、如言」概括凡夫依名言于所诠事执有自性,并以「唯有名」指出不遍计决定自性的认识;说遍计所执自性时,则标举「唯有其名、唯遍计执」。

其对三自性的判别中明言圆成实自性「此无有执」;对人我邪执则以「此是我、此是我所」表示所执取的内容。这些语句分别显示本论从名言、自性与我所见等层面界定执着。

By SutraAI-generated

入中論善顯密意疏B0044 · 藏傳論典部

《入中論善顯密意疏》論「執」,核心在於對人、法及境相增益自性、諦實而固著不捨。其主要術語為「實執」,亦說「執人法實有」「增益人法為有自性」「增益諸法諦實自性」;所執並非僅是人法本身,而是被錯誤增益於人法之自性與實有。論中以破有自性之理破除人法有自性,由此成立此執乃迷亂於所著境之執著,並為通達真實義之明慧的違品,故可安立為染污無明。

在人我方面,本論使用「補特伽羅」「我執」「我所執」「薩迦耶見」等語。文中辨明,執補特伽羅有獨立實體,可安立為我執薩迦耶見;執我所有為該實體補特伽羅所自在,則安立為我所執薩迦耶見。又指出,執補特伽羅有獨立實體,未學邪宗者亦可能生起;但執補特伽羅異於諸蘊、別有餘相,未學邪宗者決定不會有。此處本論稱構成人身心者為「諸蘊」,而非「五陰」;稱有情之人為「補特伽羅」。

本論又將實執視為其餘煩惱生起所依的愚癡。癡因對通達真諦極為愚蒙,遂增益諸法具有諦實自性;貪等煩惱則在愚癡所遍計的諸法自性上,再增益可愛、不可愛等差別而轉。所謂貪等不異癡而轉,是說貪等須與癡相應方能生起,離癡則不轉。對境增益悅意、不悅意的差別,是引生貪瞋的「非理作意」,並非貪瞋本身的行相。

論中並細辨所緣:說「唯於癡所遍計」,意指貪瞋須依增益有自性之悅意、不悅意相而轉,並非說癡所遍計的實有是貪等唯一所緣。二種俱生我執所緣的是「有法」;貪等與癡相應時,二者同一所緣。這顯示本論談「執」時,兼顧所執自性、能執煩惱及其所緣關係。

就其後果而言,本論說若越出所說正理,便決定損壞世俗諦與勝義諦;在尚未捨盡該執以前,決定不能證得解脫,顯示捨執與不失壞二諦密切相連。又以「無色不應執有心,有心不應執無色」表明,不應在無色處執心為有,亦不應在有心處執色為無。此外,縱然不許某法為世間我執之所依,不了知者仍會生起我見,說明我見之起不全繫於明確認許某一理論所依。

本論亦從有事、無事兩邊描述執著的流轉結果:不智之人執有事或無事,因而承受生死中的愛別離、怨憎會等苦,並造罪而趣向惡趣,使世間成為大悲所緣的悲境。由此,大悲遮止佛心趣入寂滅,故佛不入涅槃。

瑜伽師地論T1579 · 瑜伽部

《瑜伽師地論》論「執」,以三自性為綱骨,將執之生起、分類、斷除置於遍計所執、依他起、圓成實三重架構中展開,術語精嚴,層次分明。

一、執之根本機制。論以頌言「執法自性故,執我性而轉;覺此故覺彼,由覺故還滅」,點出執的核心運作:先執諸法有決定自性,復於其上執我性而流轉;反之,覺了此執則還滅。此頌重出,可見論中以此為執論之總綱。

二、遍計所執自性執之分類。論於「依二遍計二自性」下,將遍計所執自性執略分為二種:「加行執」與「名施設執」。加行執復開五種:貪愛加行、瞋恚加行、合會加行、別離加行、捨隨與加行,是就情意造作上立執之差別。名施設執復分二:非文字所作——謂執此為何物、云何此物等四問;文字所作——謂執此為此物,或色乃至或識、或有為或無為、或常或無常、或善或不善或無記等,是就名言分別上立執。論又別出「微細執著」五種:於無常常執、於苦樂執、於不淨淨執、於無我我執、於諸相中遍計所執自性執。此五種即四倒加遍計所執,屬極難察覺之深層執取。此外,論以五因緣說明愚夫「如名、如言,於所詮事執有自性」,即把名言所指誤認為事物本身具有決定自性,此為執之認識論根源。

三、執與無執之判準——覺悟執與隨眠執。論立「彼覺悟執」:由言說假立名字,遍計諸法決定自性,即是覺悟執;善了知唯有名,則非彼諸法有決定性,名「於彼無執」。然若未拔習氣隨眠,雖無現行覺悟執,仍有「隨眠執」,乃至未捨習氣麁重;永斷已方名無執。此處論以「隨眠」稱潛伏之執習,以「麁重」稱其殘留勢用,用語有別於泛稱「煩惱」或「習氣」。

四、依他起自性上之執與無執。論分二層:初執——由遍計所執自性覺悟執故,復遍計彼所成自性;無執——善了知唯有眾相,不遍計彼所成自性。第二執——於「相縛」未永拔者,於諸相中有所得時即名執;無執——相縛已永拔,於無相界正了知,於相無得,或後時如其所有而有所得。「相縛」一詞為本論特色用語,指為相所縛縛而不得自在,較「執」更強調束縛義。

五、圓成實自性無執。論明言「此無有執,此界非執安足處故」,圓成實性本身不為執之所依。然若於此界未得、未觸、未作證中起得觸證之增上慢,則仍屬遍計所執及依他起上之執,是執之最後微細形態。

六、遍計所執自性之體相。論以「唯有其名、唯遍計執,無相、無性、無生、無滅、無染、無淨,本來寂靜、自性涅槃」等無量行相正了知之,「遍一切處皆如虛空」。此即執之所執境本無實體,執乃於無中計有。論又總舉綱目「如名等執性」,及「微細執著」、無體、生、執等分別,顯示全篇結構。

綜觀本論,「執」之術語體系以「遍計所執」為核心詞,輔以「加行執」「名施設執」「覺悟執」「隨眠執」「微細執著」「相縛」等差別名目,較他經單言「執著」「取著」遠為精密,且始終扣緊三自性架構而說,為其獨特論述面目。

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