Dharma · AI Companion

外法

bāhyadharma

与内在身心相对的外在诸法,涵盖四大及声色等色法。AI-generated

Type PhenomenaDifficulty IntroductoryTruth-level span outside the four-fold two-truths frameworkInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What This Concept Is Actually Saying

"External dharmas" sounds almost too simple — like everything that isn't you. But the Yogācāra treatise *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra* (大乘莊嚴經論, T1604) uses this term with surgical precision, and the precision matters because what it points to is something most of us never question.

The opening verse sets the frame:

佛說所緣法,應知內外俱,得二無二義,二亦不可得。 *"The dharmas that are objects of awareness, taught by the Buddha, should be understood as both internal and external; though spoken as two, they yield a non-dual meaning, and even these two are ultimately unattainable."*

So 外法 (bāhyadharma) and 內法 (ādhyātmika-dharma) are not metaphysical opposites. They are two coordinated terms for describing what shows up in experience. 內法 is the inner pole — your body-mind, your feelings, your cognition, your volitions. 外法 is the outer pole — water, wind, earth, fire, sound, visible form, smell, taste, touch, and a special category called 法入色 (dharmāyatana as form — more on this in a moment).

The verse ends with a punchline that is easy to skip past: *二亦不可得* — "even these two [inner and outer] are unattainable in the end." That's the Mahāyāna twist. The whole point of distinguishing inner from outer is to use that distinction skillfully; but in ultimate reality (勝義), neither pole has independent, graspable existence. We'll come back to this, because it's where the concept lands in the larger path of liberation.

The Core Proposition: Everything Outside You Is Momentary

The treatise's central thesis is stated bluntly:

一切諸外法,無非剎那體。 *"All external dharmas without exception have the nature of a single moment [kshaṇa]."*

Then it proves this not from scripture but from observable phenomena, using fourteen specific reasons grouped by category. These reasons are important because they are the actual content of what "momentary" means — not a philosophical slogan, but a description of behavior you can watch for yourself.

Water (2 reasons — growth 滋 and drying 涸): Water somewhere is either swelling or receding. If water had no moment-to-moment nature, you couldn't explain why a pond today is full and the same pond next month has shrunk to mud. Growth and drying only make sense if water is constantly renewing itself in each instant.

Wind (3 reasons — movement 性動, intensification 增盛, subsiding 減息): Wind is, by definition, something in motion. But even more: it speeds up (a gust), it dies down (a breeze dropping to stillness). These three qualities — essential motion, intensification, and subsiding — can only happen if wind is moment-to-moment. A permanent wind couldn't speed up or quiet down; it would just *be*.

Earth (6 reasons — two origins 二起 and four transformations 四變): Earth's momentary nature is argued two ways: - *Two origins*: During the formation of a world-cycle, earth arises as the result of water and wind. Origin itself implies moment-to-moment arising. - *Four transformations*: Earth changes because of (a) karmic action (業力所作) — different beings' karma shapes their environments differently; (b) human action (人功所作) — we dig, build, till; (c) the other great elements (諸大所作) — fire melts earth, water erodes it, wind grinds it; (d) the seasons (時節所作) — earth shifts with time.

Crucially, these six reasons also apply to visible form (色), smell (香), taste (味), and touch (觸) — meaning earth gets the longest proof because all four of its material derivatives share the same structure.

Fire (1 reason — fuel-power 薪力): Fire appears because of fuel. When the fuel is gone, the fire is no longer there. Fire is obviously dependent and obviously impermanent — the proof is almost embarrassing in its obviousness once stated.

Sound (1 reason — gradual fading 漸微): Strike a bell, and the sound fades. If the ringing sound had no moment-to-moment nature, the later, quieter moments of that sound couldn't exist as the same sound becoming small. The very fact that "the bell was rung a moment ago" and "now the sound is fading" shows that the sound was being continuously re-arising moment by moment, each one smaller than the last.

Dharmāyatana-as-form (1 reason — arising according to mind 隨心起): This is the most philosophically interesting. *法入色* is "form that arises from dharmic [mental] causes." The clearest example the text gives is the precept-body (戒體) — the subtle form-material that arises in you when you take a vow or receive a precept. The strength of that precept-body depends on the strength of your mind at the moment of receiving: low-grade mind produces a low-grade precept-body, middle produces middle, lofty produces lofty. Since mind itself is momentary, its resultant material imprint must also be momentary. This shows that 外法 isn't just "rocks and rivers" — it includes subtle form-arising connected to mind.

The Closing Argument: The Lamp Flame That Looks Still

The treatise wraps up with a question-and-answer that anticipates the modern reader's objection beautifully. Someone might say: "But we don't perceive things as flickering moment by moment. A table looks continuous. Doesn't that contradict the thesis?"

The text replies: if impermanence (諸行無常) is a valid teaching, then conditioned phenomena *must* be momentary in their nature. If you object that momentary change is too subtle to perceive, the response is: look at a lamp flame in still air. Even when it's not flickering visibly, you can't actually catch it "being there" at any one frozen moment — your eye cannot track a single instant of its identity. Yet the flame is still momentary in its nature. Apparent continuity doesn't refute momentariness; it simply means the moments are very tightly linked.

This argument is structurally similar to one you might hear from physics about frames of film or refresh rates — but I want to flag carefully: the analogy illuminates, it doesn't prove. Buddhist philosophers were not making a quantitative claim about time intervals; they were making an ontological claim about how things exist.

Where This Sits in the Path of Liberation

外法 is a piece in a larger map. Here's how it fits:

1. Within the āyatana system (十二入 / twelve sense bases): The six "external" sense bases — visible form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and mental objects — are exactly what 外法 covers, plus the inner six (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind). The treatise's distinction corresponds to this classic Abhidharma schema.

2. Within the skandha system (五蕴 / five aggregates): 外法 falls under the *form aggregate* (色蕴, rūpa-skandha). The four great elements and their derivatives ARE the form aggregate's outer face. So 外法 is essentially the "objective pole" of form.

3. Within the Mahāyāna teaching of emptiness (空性): This is where the verse's final line matters. Once you've established that all external dharmas are momentary, you naturally ask: *what is it that lasts? what is it that has independent existence?* The Mahāyāna answer is: nothing. Not even the "external" itself is a self-standing thing. The 内/外 distinction is a skillful teaching tool; it's not the final word on what's real.

4. Within the Yogācāra "consciousness-only" (唯識) framework: For this treatise's broader tradition, both inner and outer are projections of consciousness (vijñāna). External dharmas don't exist "out there" as independently graspable objects — they appear as objects because of the unfolding of consciousness. But this is a deep rabbit hole the 外法 concept alone doesn't force you down. It just points: if external dharmas are all momentary, then where exactly is the "external" standing?

The liberation function of contemplating 外法 is to dismantle the tacit assumption that the world outside you is solid, continuous, and reliably graspable. Once that assumption is loosened, the way you relate to everything from weather to relationships to your own possessions can begin to shift.


Walking Through This in Daily Life

Let's take the fourteen reasons and let them speak in scenes you'll recognize.

Scene 1: The morning coffee, or the puddle that disappears

You wake up. Outside your window, the air is damp. By afternoon, the air is dry. You might not think anything of it — but the water-argument is happening right there. Humidity is a verb, not a noun. The moisture in the air is constantly being born and constantly passing. If it weren't, "drying out" wouldn't be something you could describe.

Or the puddle in the parking lot that was there when you arrived at work and is gone by lunch. That puddle's "existence" was a continuous stream of water-arising moments, each one a little less than the last. By the end, the puddle wasn't the same water it started as — it was a different, smaller moment of the same puddle-name.

Common misread here: Don't map this as "the puddle is an illusion." The puddle is real. What's being pointed at is that *puddle-ness* isn't a permanent thing held by some permanent essence called Puddle. It's a process wearing the name.

Scene 2: The traffic, the wind, the sigh that quiets

You're stuck in traffic, windows down. A gust hits the car — then dies. A moment later, another gust, weaker. The wind-argument is doing its thing. The air around you isn't "wind" all the time; it becomes wind and unbecomes wind, moment to moment. When the breeze picks up (增盛), it's because the moments are more vigorous; when it dies (減息), the moments are gentler.

Your own breath is wind too — same category. The breath you're taking right now is not the breath you'll take in three seconds. They might look like one continuous breath, but breath is always arriving and always leaving.

Common misread here: Don't think "momentary = very fast." The text isn't claiming a duration. It's claiming a structure of existence — always arising, always ceasing. Even the slowest process you can imagine (a glacier moving a millimeter a year) is still doing this.

Scene 3: The pothole that wasn't there yesterday

Drive the same route daily. One morning a pothole has appeared. By next week it's been patched; a month later, the patch has cracked; six months later there's a different pothole, slightly to the left.

The earth-argument explains this without effort. Earth changed because of: - Karmic action (業力所作) — translated loosely: the conditions of how this stretch of road came to be, what loads it bears, what the surrounding geology is. - Human action (人功所作) — the patch, the truck that drove over it, the water main that burst under it. - Other elements (諸大所作) — winter freeze-thaw widened the crack; rain softened the substrate. - Seasonal action (時節所作) — summer heat expanded the asphalt, winter cold contracted it.

None of these changes could happen if the road were a permanent, unchanging thing. The road is constantly being re-arising in each moment as the road-shape, even though the road-shape is recognizable.

Common misread here: "So nothing lasts." No — patterns persist. The road is still recognizable as the road. What's not lasting is the *substance* assumed to be carrying the road-ness. The map (the recognizable pattern) and the territory (the impermanent stuff) are not the same.

Scene 4: The candle on the dinner table

You're having dinner, conversation, candles lit. Look at the flame when no one is paying attention. It looks still. But it isn't. It can't be caught in any single instant. The wax is vaporizing, the vapor is combusting, the combustion is rising, new wax is drawing up. The flame-argument says: even apparent stillness is composed of tightly linked moments. You don't perceive each one because they're too tightly stacked, but each one is born and passes.

This is also the fire-argument (薪力) at the same time. The flame exists because of fuel. The moment the wick and the wax are exhausted, no more flame. The flame was never "a thing" sitting there; it was always a continuous process.

Common misread here: Don't say "so the candle doesn't exist." The candle exists as a process. What's being refused is the assumption that beneath the process there is some further thing — a "candle-essence" — that holds it all together. There isn't. There's only the process.

Scene 5: The ringtone that fades

Your phone rings. You let it ring out. The sound gets quieter toward the end of each ring. Then it stops. A moment later, a notification chime — louder, sharper. Then silence, then nothing.

The sound-argument is exactly this. The later quieter parts of the ring aren't the same ring-tone getting quieter; they're new moments of ring-tone that are quieter. Without moment-to-moment arising, the fading couldn't happen — there would just be one fixed-volume ring.

Same with the chime after: a different sound with a different shape, arising, fading.

Common misread here: Don't conclude that you therefore didn't really hear anything. You heard it. The hearing is also a stream of momentary events (in your ear, in your auditory nerve, in your mind), and so is the ringing. Two moment-streams meeting.

Scene 6: The promise you made and then broke

This is the 法入色 / precept-body scene. Maybe you took a vow — to a partner, to a practice, to yourself, to quit something or start something. There was a moment when the vow was taken. In that moment, a subtle "form" was produced in you: the *felt sense* of having committed, the imprint that shows up as resolve.

Months later, you broke the vow. Where did it go? It was never a permanent thing — it was a *form arising from mind*, and the mind that produced it was itself momentary. So the vow's strength, its clarity, its grip on you: all of this was always being renewed. When the renewal stopped (because attention moved, because conditions changed, because the underlying mind-state shifted), the vow-shape faded.

This is not a counsel of despair. It's the opposite. Because the vow is not a permanent thing, you can take it again. Every moment is a new moment to recommit. The structure is renewing, so renewal is always available.

Common misread here: Don't map 法入色 as "spirit" or "non-physical energy." In Abhidharma, 法入色 is classified as *form* (rūpa), not as mind. It has a material aspect — it's the subtle imprint produced. The point is that even things produced by mind are still in the form-category and still subject to momentariness.

Scene 7: The screen you're reading this on

The pixels on your screen refresh dozens of times per second. The "image" of the text you're reading is not a stable painting sitting on the glass. It's a flicker held together so tightly that your eye integrates it into continuity.

This is structurally identical to the lamp-flame argument in the treatise. Apparent continuity does not refute momentariness; it just means the moments are very tightly stacked.

I want to be careful here. I'm not saying "science has proven Buddhist momentariness." The two are operating at different levels. But the structural similarity is striking and worth noticing: both Buddhism and certain physics traditions have good reasons to question naïve continuity. The analogy is illuminating; the metaphysics are not identical.


Why Contemporary People Need This Concept

We live in a civilization that has built an entire emotional and economic structure on the assumption that external things are solid, permanent, and reliably graspable. Real estate assumes land persists. Pensions assume institutions persist. Photographs assume moments persist. Brand identity assumes reputation persists. The whole of late-capitalist life is a sophisticated set of techniques for pretending that the outer world is more stable than it is.

This isn't a moral failing — it's a workable fiction. Most of the time, the fiction holds. Tables hold. Mountains hold. People mostly hold (until they don't).

The problem is that the fiction also runs the *inner* world. When we lose a job, a relationship, a home, a version of ourselves — we suffer not just the loss but the shock of discovering the fiction was a fiction. The grief contains a secondary grief: *I thought this was solid, and it wasn't.*

Contemplating 外法 in the way this treatise invites is not a project of depressing yourself with impermanence. It's a project of *getting the metaphysics right before the loss hits*. So that when the loss comes, there is less secondary grief. The loss is the loss. The shock of "how could this not be permanent?" doesn't need to compound it.

Three specific uses:

1. Saner grief. When someone you love dies, the moment-by-moment nature of their body doesn't make the loss smaller — but it can dissolve the surprise that the body failed. The body was always a moment-stream. Death is one transition within that stream, not an interruption of a permanent thing.

2. Less clinging in relationships. A relationship isn't a permanent object you "have." It's a moment-by-moment process of two people re-arising together, moment by moment, choosing to recognize each other. This is not a lessening of love — it's actually closer to what love actually is. Love isn't a permanent possession; it's a continuous recognizing. When you see this, you hold it more carefully, and you stop taking the moment-by-moment recognizing for granted.

3. Less panic about the world changing. Climate, politics, technology, culture — all of these are external dharmas in the precise sense the text means. They are moment-by-moment, multi-causal, constantly transforming. The panic comes from imagining these should be stable, and being shocked when they shift. The contemplation gives you a different relationship with change: not optimism, not pessimism, but a steady seeing of what's actually happening.

There's a fourth use that matters more than the practical ones. The verse's last line — *二亦不可得* — opens something important. If external dharmas are momentary and your inner dharmas are also momentary, then the *boundary* between you and the world is also impermanent and conventional. You are not a fixed self standing over against a fixed world. You are a process recognizing itself within other processes. This recognition, properly cultivated, loosens the grip of self-clinging — which is, in this tradition, the deepest source of suffering.


Common Misreadings and Clarifications

Misreading 1: "外法 means the physical world, so it doesn't include anything mental"

Wrong. 法入色 (dharmāyatana-as-form) is explicitly included. This category covers subtle material phenomena that arise from mental causes — the precept-body is the text's example, but the category is broader. Anything with a form-aspect that's produced by mind (and therefore material enough to register as an "object" rather than a purely internal mental event) sits here. So 外法 is not "non-mental" — it's "appearing as the outer pole of experience," regardless of what produced it.

Misreading 2: "Momentary means lasting only an instant of clock time"

The treatise's argument is about *nature* (體性), not *duration* (時分). The point isn't that everything lasts exactly 1/100th of a second or whatever. The point is that every external dharma, by its nature, is something that arises and ceases — it has no fixed, independent, lasting essence. A mountain and a lightning bolt both fit this. They're not the same in scale, but they're the same in nature. The lamp-flame analogy is helpful here: even a "slow" process like a glacier is doing moment-to-moment in its own pace.

Misreading 3: "So nothing really exists externally"

This is a misreading the Mahāyāna traditions explicitly warn against. The verse *二亦不可得* doesn't mean "the external world is fake." It means *the inner/outer distinction itself* is not ultimately graspable — both poles are conventional designations, not ultimate realities. The world appears. You appear. The distinction between "inside" and "outside" appears. All of this appears. What's being refused is the idea that any of these appearances have *svabhāva* — an own-being, a self-nature, a fixed essence underneath the appearance.

Misreading 4: "Momentariness is depressing, so this teaching is nihilistic"

The Buddhist traditions that contemplate momentariness are not nihilist. The point of seeing things as momentary is precisely so that you stop clinging to them as if they were permanent. Once you stop clinging, you can *engage* with them more honestly, more carefully, more kindly. A doctor who knows bodies are impermanent isn't more pessimistic — they're more attentive. A lover who knows love is impermanent isn't less loving — they're more present.

Misreading 5: "The fourteen reasons prove things are momentary empirically, so this is a scientific claim"

Careful. The fourteen reasons are *philosophical arguments based on observable phenomena*, not empirical science in the modern sense. They're meant to be persuasive through reflection, not measurement. They show that momentariness is the most coherent way to make sense of the changes we observe. This is close to what some process philosophies and certain physics intuitions point toward — but the framing is Buddhist, not scientific. If you find the arguments convincing, fine. But the tradition isn't claiming empirical proof; it's claiming *philosophical coherence*. Conflating the two is a category error.

Misreading 6: "Inner dharmas and outer dharmas are really two separate things"

The verse says this from the start: 內外俱, "both inner and outer." And then 二亦不可得, "even these two are unattainable." The pair is a *teaching device*, not a final ontology. The Mahāyāna move is: use the inner/outer distinction to dismantle your naïve assumption that there's a solid self over against a solid world — and then, once the assumption is dismantled, recognize that the *distinction* itself was a tool, not a description of ultimate reality. The tool is precious for the dismantling; it isn't the dismantled state.

Misreading 7: "This is just about objects; it has nothing to do with ethics or practice"

The opposite. The whole point of seeing external dharmas as momentary is to weaken greed, hatred, and delusion — all of which depend on the assumption that things are solid, permanent, and reliably mine. If you deeply see momentariness — not just as an idea but as a stable contemplative insight — then greed (which needs objects to grab) is undermined, hatred (which needs enemies to endure) is undermined, and delusion (which needs a fixed self-and-world) is undermined. The conceptual analysis serves the practice; the practice deepens the analysis. This is the path of liberation the momentariness of 外法 is part of.


A Final Orientation

If you take only one thing away from this, let it be the verse: *一切諸外法,無非剎那體* — all external dharmas, without exception, have the nature of a single moment.

This doesn't mean the table is going to vanish when you blink. It means the *table-ness* is being held moment by moment, by a confluence of conditions, and so are you, and so is your seeing of the table. When the confluence changes, the table changes. When the confluence ceases, the table ceases.

Seen clearly, this is not sad. It's a precise description of what is always already true. And the seeing itself — the moment you're noticing the puddle drying, the wind dying, the bell fading — that noticing is also momentary, also arising, also ceasing. Which is also fine. Because the next moment's noticing will arise too, with new content, fresh eyes.

The practice, if there is one, isn't to *believe* in momentariness. It's to keep *looking* at how things actually behave — at the water, at the wind, at the sound, at the breath — until the seeing settles into something the tradition calls *yathābhūta-jñāna-darśana* (如實知見): seeing things as they actually are. That's a long project. But you can start now. The next breath is already a moment. Watch it arrive. Watch it leave. Watch the next one.

That's what the treatise is pointing at.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「外法」(bāhyadharma)一词,在《瑜伽部》典籍中与「内法」对举,指相对于内在身心的外在诸法。内法指众生内在的身心诸法,外法则指外在的物质现象,包括水、风、地、火、声、色、香、味、触以及法入色等,涵盖四大种及其所造色。外法与内法同为佛陀所说所缘法的范畴,二者并立而不离,然在胜义上内外二法俱不可得。

二、主要阐述

《瑜伽部·大乘庄严经论》对外法的核心论述,集中于论证「一切诸外法,无非刹那体」这一命题。论以偈颂总标佛所说所缘法的结构为「内外俱显,得二无二义,二亦不可得」,指出外法与内法同时具足为所缘境界,虽可说内外二法,却又能得「无二」之义,而此二法本身亦不可得。

论中以十四因分别成立水、风、地、火、声等外法的刹那体性:

(一)水二因——滋、涸:水若无刹那,则无法解释其或时滋长、或时干涸的现象。

(二)风三因——性动、增盛、减息:风若常住无刹那,则其运动、增盛、减息皆不可成立。

(三)地六因——二起、四变:「二起」指地由水、由风而起(劫生时地为水风之果);「四变」指业力所作(众生业力差别)、人功所作(掘凿等)、诸大所作(火水风)、时节所作(时改转异相)。若地无刹那,四变不可得。此六因同样适用于色、香、味、触。

(四)火一因——薪力:火由薪力而起,薪尽火亦不住,故火为刹那。

(五)声一因——渐微:如钟声后时渐微,若无刹那则后时小声不可得。

(六)法入色一因——随心起:如受戒时随心下中上品而起,心因刹那故,其果法入色亦为刹那。

论最后以问答方式总结,以难问成就外法刹那之义:若说诸行无常,则诸行亦应为刹那灭;若以刹那细故不可觉为难,则如灯焰于不动位亦不可知,然其体仍是刹那;以「灯焰与诸行不相似」为难亦不成立,因不相似仅有自性与时分二种,而二者皆可类比。

论中使用「业力所作」「人功所作」「诸大所作」「时节所作」等分类术语,分析外法变异之因;以「灯焰」「钟声」作为刹那之譬喻;又以「诸行」一词涵摄有为法之无常义。所论对象包括水、风、地、火、声、色、香、味、触、法入色,涵盖四大与法入色(色法之一)。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

现存材料仅涉及《瑜伽部·大乘庄严经论》(《大乘莊嚴經論》)。本论使用「外法」一词指称外在诸法,与「内法」对举;论中以「刹那」而非其他词描述外法的体性。就本论本身的论述脉络而言,「外法」与「内法」构成一对相对概念,二者同被列为佛所说所缘法的范畴。

四、与相关概念的关系

(一)与内法的关系:外法与内法相对而立,内法指内在身心,外法指外在物质现象;二者同为所缘法,虽可施设内外二分,而胜义中俱不可得。

(二)与刹那的关系:外法被论定为「刹那体」,即一切外法皆为刹那灭,此为有为法无常的具体表现。论中以「诸行」一词涵摄有为法之无常义,外法之刹那体性即诸行无常之具体落实。

(三)与四大的关系:外法所涵盖的对象包括水、风、地、火四大及声、色、香、味、触等色法,其中色、香、味、触被视为与地同理同样具有六因之刹那体性。

(四)与法入色的关系:法入色为外法之一,其刹那体性由「随心起」之因成立,因心为刹那,故其果法入色亦为刹那。此显示外法中除物质性的四大及所造色外,还包含与心相关的色法(如戒体等)。

五、代表性原文引用

《瑜伽部·大乘庄严经论》颂曰:「佛说所缘法,应知内外俱,得二无二义,二亦不可得。」此颂总标佛所说所缘法之结构,以「内外俱」之语标明外法与内法同为所缘法的范畴,二者并立而不离。

又颂曰:「一切诸外法,无非刹那体。」此为本论对外法体性之核心命题,以下以十四因分别成立水、风、地、火、声、法入色之刹那体性。

释文以难问总结:「若说诸行无常,则诸行亦应为刹那灭;若以刹那细故不可觉为难,则如灯焰于不动位亦不可知,然其体仍是刹那。」以难问成就外法刹那之义。

By SutraAI-generated

大乘莊嚴經論T1604 · 瑜伽部

本論以「外法」一詞指稱相對於內在身心的外在諸法,並從多個側面論證其體性。

一、總標:內外俱顯、二無二義

論中首先以一頌總標佛所說所緣法的結構:「佛說所緣法,應知內外俱,得二無二義,二亦不可得。」此頌指出:佛陀所宣說的所緣境界,應當了知其內法與外法同時具足;雖可說內外二法,卻又能得「無二」之義,而此二法本身亦不可得。此即以「內外俱」之語,標明外法與內法同為所緣法的範疇,二者並立而不離。

二、別明:以外法為剎那體

本論對外法的核心論述,集中於論證「一切諸外法,無非剎那體」這一命題。偈頌以十四因分別成立水、風、地、火、聲等外法的剎那體性,最後更以「難問成」作為總結。

釋文逐一解說此十四因: (1)水二因——滋、涸:水若無剎那,則無法解釋其或時滋長、或時乾涸的現象。 (2)風三因——性動、增盛、減息:風若常住無剎那,則其運動、增盛、減息皆不可成立。 (3)地六因——二起、四變:「二起」指地由水、由風而起(劫生時地為水風之果);「四變」指業力所作(眾生業力差別)、人功所作(掘鑿等)、諸大所作(火水風)、時節所作(時改轉異相)。若地無剎那,四變不可得。此六因同樣適用於色、香、味、觸。 (4)火一因——薪力:火由薪力而起,薪盡火亦不住,故火為剎那。 (5)聲一因——漸微:如鍾聲後時漸微,若無剎那則後時小聲不可得。 (6)法入色一因——隨心起:如受戒時隨心下中上品而起,心因剎那故,其果法入色亦為剎那。

三、以難問為總成

釋文最後以問答方式總結:若說諸行無常,則諸行亦應為剎那滅;若以剎那細故不可覺為難,則如燈焰於不動位亦不可知,然其體仍是剎那;以「燈焰與諸行不相似」為難亦不成立,因不相似僅有自性與時分二種,而二者皆可類比。由此總以難問成立外法剎那。

四、術語特點

本論使用「外法」一詞指稱外在諸法,與「內法」(內在身心)對舉。論中以「剎那」而非其他詞描述外法的體性,並以「諸行」一詞涵攝有為法之無常義。又使用「業力所作」「人功所作」「諸大所作」「時節所作」等分類術語,分析外法變異之因,並以「燈焰」「鍾聲」作為剎那之譬喻。所論對象包括水、風、地、火、聲、色、香、味、觸、法入色,涵蓋四大與法入色(色法之一)。

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