Dharma · AI Companion

退屈

līnatā

退屈,指修行者内心怯弱,自认不能证得无上正等菩提之念。AI-generated

Type Mental factorDifficulty IntroductoryTruth-level span outside the four-fold two-truths frameworkInitial AI estimate · evolves with use

A Contemporary ReadingAI-generated

What this concept is saying

Tuìqū (退屈, “discouraged shrinking back”; Sanskrit *līnatā*) is not ordinary tiredness, a temporary loss of enthusiasm, or the sensible decision to abandon an unsuitable method. Asaṅga’s *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, as explained in Asaṅga’s commentator Asvabhāva’s *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya*—the Chinese *She Dasheng Lun Shi*, Wuxing’s commentary (《攝大乘論釋·無性釋》, T1598)—defines it with unusual precision:

「其心怯弱名為退屈。謂我不能證覺無上正等菩提。」 “When the mind becomes timid and weak, that is called retreating in discouragement—namely, thinking: ‘I cannot realize unsurpassed complete awakening.’”

The decisive point is the sentence “I cannot.” Tuìqū is a judgment about one’s ultimate spiritual capacity. Difficulty is present, but difficulty alone is not yet tuìqū. It becomes tuìqū when the mind turns present difficulty into a verdict on what awakening is possible for this person: “Others may be able to follow the bodhisattva path, but not someone like me.”

This locates the term quite specifically within the path. In T1598 it appears while explaining how a bodhisattva enters the reality to be known. Even someone sustained by wholesome roots may lose heart; therefore the treatise first prescribes three forms of liànmó xīn (練磨心, “tempering” or “strengthening the mind”). These are not three claims that enlightenment is effortless. They are three ways of making the mind sufficiently strong to undertake the long work of hearing, reflection, cultivation, calm, insight, and the removal of obstacles. The commentary says that to temper the mind is to “raise it up and make it keen” so as to counteract tuìqū. In other words, encouragement is preparatory to insight: a mind convinced that realization is impossible will not patiently cultivate the causes of realization. [T1598, fascicle 6](https://deerpark.app/cbeta/T1598/6)

The text develops this encouragement in three formal stages, followed by a verse reinforcing the first through the equality of capacity.

First, it widens the field of vision:

「無量諸世界無量人有情,剎那剎那證覺無上正等菩提,是為第一練磨其心。」

Across immeasurable worlds there are immeasurable human beings, and beings attain unsurpassed complete awakening. The accompanying verse concludes, 「故不應退屈」—“therefore one should not shrink back.” This is not the claim that every person in every world becomes a Buddha in each literal instant. The scale is cosmic: among boundlessly many worlds and beings, awakening is continually realized. The practitioner is asked to stop treating Buddhahood as an event belonging to a different species of being. Buddhas do not begin as beings metaphysically unrelated to us.

Second, the text turns from precedent to a cause already present in the practitioner:

「由此意樂能行施等波羅蜜多,我已獲得如是意樂……」

Yìlè (意樂, a settled aspiration or deep motivational orientation) enables the cultivation of generosity and the other pāramitās. Here “generosity and so forth” means the six pāramitās: generosity, ethical discipline, patient endurance, energetic perseverance, meditative stability, and wisdom. It does not mean that a passing wish is already their perfection. The commentary explains the relevant aspiration as free from miserliness, sensual seeking, hostility, laziness, torpor, sleepiness, and ignorance. Once such an orientation has genuinely been established, practice increasingly becomes congruent with what the person most deeply wants; it need not forever be dragged forward by brute force.

The reasoning is subtle: “I cannot yet perform the pāramitās perfectly” does not entail “I lack the capacity for them.” If bodhicitta and wholesome aspiration are already moving one toward giving, restraint, patience, diligence, meditation, and wisdom, then the causal direction is present. What remains is cultivation and purification.

Third, the text reasons from the efficacy of causes:

「若有成就諸有障善,於命終時即便可愛一切自體圓滿而生。我有妙善無障礙善,云何爾時不當獲得一切圓滿?」

Even yǒuzhàng shàn (有障善, wholesome karma still accompanied by obstacles) can produce a desirable conditioned rebirth. How, then, could the superior good that removes its opposing obstacles be incapable of yielding the complete fruit of Buddhahood? The verse contrasts the limited fruition of worldly goodness at death with the unsurpassed fruition made possible through the permanent abandonment of obstacles.

This is not simply, “Good people get everything they want when they die.” Nor is death itself the remedy for discouragement. It is an argument about causal efficacy within the treatise’s karmic framework: if limited wholesome causes can bear limited fruits, unobstructed causes directed toward awakening are not inherently fruitless. One should therefore examine and strengthen the causes instead of declaring the fruit impossible.

A further verse brings the first encouragement inward:

「無量十方諸有情,念念已證善逝果,彼既丈夫我亦爾,不應自輕而退屈。」 “Immeasurable beings throughout the ten directions have continually realized the fruit of the Well-Gone Ones. They possess the capacity for this, and so do I; I should not belittle myself and shrink back.”

The classical word zhàngfū (丈夫, literally “man” or “heroic person”) should not be used to make Buddhahood a male privilege. Its function here is to affirm courage and equal spiritual capacity: those who awakened were beings capable of undertaking the path; I too belong to the order of beings who can undertake it. The verse joins zìqīng (自輕, self-belittlement) directly to tuìqū. The obstacle is not honest humility but a distorted inferiority: treating one’s present defilements as proof of an unchangeable essence.

The four lines of encouragement can therefore be remembered without flattening them into one vague message:

1. Awakening has been realized by beings across immeasurable worlds; it is not alien to the condition of a sentient being. 2. The wholesome aspiration that enables the pāramitās can already be cultivated here; an existing cause can be strengthened. 3. If obstructed worldly goodness bears fruit, unobstructed goodness directed toward liberation is not causally sterile. 4. Other awakened beings and oneself are not divided into two fixed spiritual species; self-belittlement is therefore unwarranted.

This is where tuìqū stands in the path of liberation. Suffering and defilement must be recognized truthfully; bodhicitta must orient practice toward awakening for all beings; the pāramitās must embody that orientation; calm and insight must transform understanding; and the obscurations must actually be relinquished. Tuìqū tries to terminate this sequence at its entrance by saying that the destination is impossible “for me.” Tempering the mind does not replace the path. It keeps the path open long enough to be walked.

A walkthrough in everyday life

Imagine someone riding home after an exhausting day. They open their phone and see a respected practitioner describing years of disciplined meditation, generosity, and service. Admiration quickly turns into comparison:

“I cannot sit for twenty minutes without checking my phone. I lose patience with my child. I still want praise for every good thing I do. The bodhisattva path is for exceptional people. I will never awaken.”

Let us walk through this carefully.

The fatigue on the train is not tuìqū. The difficulty concentrating is not tuìqū. Nor is the accurate recognition “My attention is presently unstable.” These are conditions to understand and work with. Tuìqū enters when the mind converts them into “Therefore I am incapable of unsurpassed complete awakening.” A report about today has become a metaphysical sentence about the entire path.

Self-belittlement then supplies supporting evidence. The mind remembers every impatient remark but discounts every occasion on which patience was possible. It compares another person’s visible maturity with its own private confusion. An algorithmic feed can intensify this distortion by repeatedly displaying dramatic outcomes while hiding years of ordinary cultivation. That is a useful modern comparison, not a claim that algorithms cause all spiritual discouragement or that cognitive science proves the Buddhist analysis.

The first tempering now changes the comparison. Instead of using accomplished practitioners as evidence against oneself—“They can, therefore I cannot”—one uses precedent as the treatise intends: “Awakening has been realized by beings who also had to cultivate causes. Its realization shows that defilement is not an eternal identity.” This does not prove that one is already close to Buddhahood. It removes the false inference that another’s attainment establishes one’s impossibility.

The second tempering examines aspiration in action. On the same evening, the person wants to listen fully when their partner speaks, chooses not to retaliate during an argument, and puts the phone aside to attend to a distressed child. Strictly mapped to the text, these are not automatically perfected pāramitās. Putting down the phone is not by itself “meditation,” and giving a child attention is not automatically transcendent generosity. But the wish to relinquish self-centred grasping, refrain from harm, endure discomfort, remain steadily present, and understand clearly may express the causal orientation from which generosity, discipline, patience, effort, concentration, and wisdom are cultivated.

The correct conclusion is modest but powerful: “The pāramitās are not complete in me, yet their causes are not wholly absent.” One then makes the cause concrete—perhaps one act of giving without display, one repaired breach of trust, ten minutes of undistracted practice, or one honest investigation of the anger beneath an argument.

The third tempering looks at causality. A month of consistent sleep, restrained phone use, and daily meditation may already make reactive speech somewhat less frequent. These are conditioned and incomplete goods, but they show that repeated causes alter the field of experience. The classical argument extends much further, through karma, death, rebirth, the removal of obstacles, and the fruit of Buddhahood. A modern habit example does not prove that entire doctrinal framework; it merely helps us see the form of the reasoning. If limited causes have limited effects, it is irrational to demand the final fruit before agreeing to cultivate its causes.

The fourth encouragement corrects the hidden identity claim. “I am uniquely disqualified” sounds humble, but it quietly gives the present self an exceptional permanence. Other beings may transform, the thought says, but “my” greed, anger, and confusion reveal what I essentially am. The verse reverses this self-exemption: those who awakened were not made from a separate spiritual substance. I too can undertake causes, abandon obstacles, and be transformed. This is equality of capacity, not equality of present attainment.

The person arrives home still tired. No mystical certainty has appeared. But the mind has moved through a crucial sequence:

“My practice is presently weak” becomes “weakness is a condition, not a final identity.” “Others are far ahead” becomes “their attainment shows that causes can mature.” “My pāramitās are incomplete” becomes “their motivating causes can be cultivated now.” “I cannot awaken” becomes “I do not yet know the limits of what sustained cultivation and relinquishment can make possible.”

That last statement is not inflated confidence. It is the suspension of an unsupported sentence of impossibility.

Why contemporary people need it

Contemporary culture oscillates between two harsh messages: “You can achieve anything if you want it enough,” and “Your traits, history, productivity metrics, and psychological profile define what you are.” Buddhist encouragement agrees with neither.

It does not promise that desire alone creates results. The path requires causes: ethical transformation, accumulated merit and wisdom, sustained attention, right view, compassionate intention, and the abandonment of obscurations. Yet it also refuses to turn conditioned patterns into an immutable self. “I repeatedly become angry” is important knowledge. “Therefore anger is my permanent nature” adds something that experience has not established.

This distinction matters wherever people are measured. Workplaces convert performance into identity; social media converts attention into a ranking; self-tracking converts fluctuating states into a portrait of “the kind of person I am.” AI systems may infer probable future behaviour from past patterns, but statistical prediction is not knowledge of a person’s ultimate spiritual capacity. Algorithms can model regularities in recorded data; they cannot settle the Buddhist question of whether ignorance and attachment can be uprooted. Conversely, Buddhist teaching should not be presented as a neuroscientific finding. The scope, methods, and unresolved questions of these fields are different.

Tuìqū is also important because a vast aspiration naturally exposes the distance between intention and conduct. If one merely wants a calmer week, small improvement may feel reassuring. If one vows to awaken for the benefit of all beings, one’s impatience, vanity, and inconsistency can look crushingly disproportionate. The text does not solve this by reducing the aspiration. It trains the mind to bear the scale of it.

The antidote is therefore neither self-esteem in the ordinary sense nor constant emotional inspiration. One may feel discouraged and still refuse the conclusion of incapacity. Courage on the bodhisattva path is the willingness to cultivate causes without possessing advance proof of personal greatness.

There is wisdom in this restraint. “I will certainly become a Buddha because I am special” strengthens conceit. “I can never awaken because I am especially defective” strengthens an inverted conceit. Both make a solid identity out of “me.” The treatise’s encouragement is quieter: awakening occurs; its causes can be cultivated; causes can bear fruit; I am not uniquely excluded. Now practise.

Common misunderstandings and clarifications

“Tuìqū means any wish to stop.” Not necessarily. Leaving an abusive teacher, changing an unsuitable technique, resting when ill, or acknowledging that one lacks the present preparation for an advanced practice may be wise discernment. Tuìqū is specifically the timid conviction that one cannot realize unsurpassed complete awakening. One may change methods without abandoning awakening; one may also continue performing religious routines while inwardly having surrendered the possibility of transformation.

“It is simply low self-esteem.” The concepts can overlap, especially through zìqīng, self-belittlement, but their ranges differ. Ordinary low self-esteem may concern appearance, competence, lovability, or social worth. Tuìqū concerns capacity on the path to bodhi. Psychological care may be necessary and beneficial, but the term should not be reduced to a modern diagnosis.

“The antidote is to repeat, ‘I am already a Buddha.’” That is not the argument given here. T1598 speaks of strengthening aspiration, cultivating the pāramitās, permanently removing obstacles, and attaining the fruit. Equal capacity does not erase the distinction between the path not yet completed and awakening realized.

“If I believe strongly enough, enlightenment is guaranteed without effort.” The second encouragement says the opposite. Aspiration matters because it enables generosity and the other pāramitās; it must become cultivation. The text later speaks of continuous, earnest practice of calm and insight and of eliminating obstacles. Encouragement without causes becomes fantasy.

“‘Others attained, so I can attain’ is a proof that every individual will certainly awaken on a chosen timetable.” The verse establishes that awakening is not alien to beings like oneself and attacks self-exclusion. It does not provide a personal schedule, promise identical conditions, or deny the enormity of the path.

“The third encouragement says virtuous people receive whatever they desire at death.” Its scope is karmic fruition: obstructed worldly good can yield desirable conditioned results, while unobstructed good that removes what opposes awakening is directed toward the complete Buddha-fruit. It is not a promise that every preference will be fulfilled, and “self-fulfilment” here should not be confused with contemporary lifestyle fulfilment.

“‘Great man’ means only men possess this capacity.” In the verse, 丈夫 expresses courageous spiritual capability. Making biological sex the point would undermine the verse’s actual work, which is to reject a fixed class of beings uniquely incapable of awakening.

“Not shrinking back means never feeling fear or exhaustion.” Feelings arise through conditions. The practice is not to punish oneself for them, but to notice the inference added afterward. “I am exhausted” may call for rest. “I am afraid” may call for support and careful preparation. “Therefore awakening is impossible for me” is the specific knot to untie.

Finally, tuìqū should not be confused with humility. Humility says, “My defilements are deep, my understanding is partial, and I need instruction and long practice.” Tuìqū says, “Because my defilements are deep and my understanding partial, liberation is not possible for me.” The first sees conditions accurately and begins cultivating them. The second turns conditions into destiny.

The teaching’s deepest kindness lies here: it does not ask us to pretend that the road is short. It asks us not to confuse a long road with a closed one.

Canonical EntryAI-generated

一、定义与核心要义

「退屈」(梵语 līnatā),在《摄大乘论释(无性释)》中有明确界定。无性菩萨于释文中曰:「其心怯弱名为退屈」,指出退屈即修行者内心萌生怯懦退缩之念。具体而言,退屈的内涵即修行者自起一念:「谓我不能证觉无上正等菩提」——自认无力证得无上正等菩提。此一定义将退屈之本质归结为内心的怯弱状态,是修行者在追求无上菩提之道上的自我设限与放弃之念。对治退屈之关键,在于从内心加以劝勉,令修行者破除怯弱、自设之障碍。

该释在用语上,以「退屈」一词贯穿始终,以「心怯弱」作为其直接同义表述,同时又以「自轻」与退屈并提,二者紧密关联,皆指向修行者对自身成佛能力之低估。

二、主要阐述

依《摄大乘论释(无性释)》之论述,对治退屈之道乃纯从正面劝勉入手,层层设譬,从以下四个面向论证一切修行者皆具成佛之能,故不应萌生退屈之心。

(一)以人趣有情劝勉。偈颂云:「人趣诸有情,处数皆无量,念念证等觉,故不应退屈」。此颂之论证逻辑为:人趣之中处处皆有有情,数量无量无边;既然此等有情皆能于念念之间证得无上正等菩提,则推己及人,修行者亦不应自生退屈之心。此处以「人趣」作为观察范围,强调凡夫成佛之普遍性,借人趣有情数量之无量与成佛之事例,破除修行者关于自身无能之疑虑。

(二)以修习施等之能劝勉。偈颂续云:「诸净心意乐,能修行施等,此胜者已得,故能修施等」。意谓已得清净意乐之胜者,其心清净,能修习布施等波罗蜜多善行而有所成就;既已得清净意乐之胜者既能修行施等,则后学亦应自许能修。此以胜者之先例为据,劝勉修行者应于善行起自许能修之心。

(三)以善者命终圆满劝勉。偈颂又云:「善者于死时,得随乐自满,胜善由永断,圆满云何无!」 此颂指出,修善者于命终之时,得随其意乐而自满——究竟圆满之果并非不可得,故不应退屈。此以临终果报之圆满为劝,强调胜善永断生死之后,圆满果报自然现前。

(四)以十方大丈夫平等之理劝勉。另引一颂云:「无量十方诸有情,念念已证善逝果,彼既丈夫我亦尔,不应自轻而退屈」。此颂之核心论点在于:十方无量有情皆已于念念之间证得善逝之果(佛果);既然彼等为大丈夫,而我亦为大丈夫,丈夫之性平等无别,故不应自轻而退屈。此处以「丈夫」之平等性为论据,破除自轻自贱之心,并以「自轻」与「退屈」并举,明示二者内在意义之相通——退屈之心实源于自轻之念。

综合而言,此释论述「退屈」之特色在于:将其界定为「心怯弱」之内心状态,专指自认不能证得无上菩提之念;其对治之道纯从正面劝勉入手,分别从人趣处处成佛、胜者能修施等、善者临终圆满、十方丈夫平等四个面向,论证一切大丈夫皆具成佛之能,故不应自轻而退屈。

三、不同部类与译本的表述差异

本次小结所依据之原始材料仅涉及《摄大乘论释(无性释)》(瑜伽部,《攝大乘論釋(無性釋)》)一部,未见其他部类经论及同经异译本对「退屈」一词之不同译法或表述差异。该释所用之核心术语有以下特征:以「退屈」一词贯穿始终,并以「心怯弱」作为其同义表述,另用「自轻」一词与退屈并举,强调退屈之心实源于自轻之念。

四、与相关概念的关系

退屈作为修行之障碍,主要与「自轻」、「怯弱」等概念关系密切。在《摄大乘论释(无性释)》中,自轻与退屈并提,二者皆指向修行者对自身成佛能力之低估。退屈本质上即「心怯弱」之状态,表现为自认无力证得无上菩提。其对治之道则与「劝勉」、「意乐」等概念相应——通过正面鼓励,令修行者发起胜解、增进勇心。此外,「退屈」与「无上正等菩提」之追求直接对立,是修行路上应破除之心病。

五、代表性原文引用

1. 《摄大乘论释(无性释)》:「其心怯弱名为退屈。谓我不能证觉无上正等菩提。」——(明退屈之定义与具体表现)

2. 《摄大乘论释(无性释)》偈颂:「人趣诸有情,处数皆无量,念念证等觉,故不应退屈。诸净心意乐,能修行施等,此胜者已得,故能修施等。善者于死时,得随乐自满,胜善由永断,圆满云何无!」——(以人趣无量、胜者能修施等、善者命终圆满三方面劝勉)

3. 《摄大乘论释(无性释)》偈颂:「无量十方诸有情,念念已证善逝果,彼既丈夫我亦尔,不应自轻而退屈。」——(以十方大丈夫平等之理破除自轻退屈)

By SutraAI-generated

攝大乘論釋(無性釋)T1598 · 瑜伽部

《攝大乘論釋(無性釋)》對「退屈」的論述,見於勸勉修行者不應心生怯弱、勿自輕而放棄無上菩提之求的部分。

一、釋義界定:無性菩薩於釋文中明確定義「退屈」之內涵,釋曰:「其心怯弱名為退屈」,指出退屈即修行者內心萌生怯懦退縮之念。其具體表現則為「謂我不能證覺無上正等菩提」——自認無力證得無上正等菩提。此一定義強調退屈本質上是內心的怯弱,故須由內心勸勉加以對治。

二、以人趣有情勸勉:偈頌云:「人趣諸有情,處數皆無量,念念證等覺,故不應退屈」。其論證邏輯為:人趣中處處皆有有情,數量無量,且此等有情皆能於念念之間證得無上正等菩提,因此修行者不應生退屈之心。此處以「人趣」為觀察範圍,凸顯凡夫成佛之普遍性。

三、以修習施等之能勸勉:偈頌續云:「諸淨心意樂,能修行施等,此勝者已得,故能修施等」。意謂已得清淨意樂之勝者既能修行布施等善行而有所成就,亦能繼續修習,由勝者已得之例證,勸勉行者應自許能修。

四、以善者命終圓滿勸勉:偈頌又云:「善者於死時,得隨樂自滿,勝善由永斷,圓滿云何無!」指出修善者於命終時得隨其意樂而自滿,究竟圓滿之果並非不可得,故不應退屈。此以臨終果報之圓滿為勸,強調勝善永斷後圓滿自得。

五、以十方大丈夫平等之理勸勉:另引一頌云:「無量十方諸有情,念念已證善逝果,彼既丈夫我亦爾,不應自輕而退屈」。此頌之核心論點在於:十方無量有情皆已於念念間證得善逝之果(佛果),既然彼等為大丈夫,而我亦為大丈夫,故不應自輕而退屈。此處以「丈夫」之平等性為論據,破除自輕自賤之心,並以「自輕」與「退屈」並舉,明示二者內在意義之相通。

綜合而言,此釋論述「退屈」之特色在於:將其界定為「心怯弱」之內心狀態,專指自認不能證得無上菩提之念;其對治之道純從正面勸勉入手,分別從人趣處處成佛、十方念念證果、勝者能修施等、善者臨終圓滿四個面向,論證一切大丈夫皆具成佛之能,故不應自輕而退屈。所用術語方面,該釋以「退屈」一詞貫穿始終,並以「心怯弱」作為其同義表述,另用「自輕」一詞與退屈並舉,強調退屈之心實源於自輕之念。

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